This book provides a look at philosophical practice from the viewpoint of the practitioner or prospective practitioner. It answers the questions: What is philosophical practice? What are its aims and methods? How does philosophical counseling differ from psychological counseling and other forms of psychotherapy. How are philosophical practitioners educated and trained? How do philosophical practitioners relate to other professions? What are the politics of philosophical practice? How does one become a practitioner? What is APPA Certification? What are the prospects for (...) philosophical practice in the USA and elsewhere? Handbook of Philosophical Practice provides an account of philosophy's current renaissance as a discipline of applied practice while critiquing the historical, social, and cultural forces which have contributed to its earlier descent into obscurity. (shrink)

Bertrand's random-chord paradox purports to illustrate the inconsistency of the principle of indifference when applied to problems in which the number of possible cases is infinite. This paper shows that Bertrand's original problem is vaguely posed, but demonstrates that clearly stated variations lead to different, but theoretically and empirically self-consistent solutions. The resolution of the paradox lies in appreciating how different geometric entities, represented by uniformly distributed random variables, give rise to respectively different nonuniform distributions of random chords, and hence (...) to different probabilities. The principle of indifference appears consistently applicable to infinite sets provided that problems can be formulated unambiguously. (shrink)

Notwithstanding recent successes of philosophical counseling, which appear to be leading to its legitimization as a professional practice in America and abroad, many forces concen to condition its emergent structure and function. This paper briefly elucidates some of the influences to which philosophical counseling is subject, that lie beyond its unilateral control. These include its portayal by the media to the public, its scope of practice, its relations with psychology and psychiatry, its foreseeable effects in particular cases, and its perception (...) by (and of) analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Hamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Philosophical counseling is an educational activity in which philosophers engage in dialogue with clients who wish to address questions or manage problems that arise during the course of everyday life. This chapter offers three contrasting perspectives on the question of what philosophical counselors do: first, an institutional scope of practice for philosophical counseling; second, an anecdotal list of common issues for which clients seek philosophical counseling; and third, a heterogeneous set of views by several pioneers of philosophical counseling. From what (...) we have seen thus far, it may already be clear that there exist both parallels and anti‐parallels between philosophical counseling and psychotherapy. First and foremost, anyone who wants to become a philosophical counselor should earn an accredited graduate degree in philosophy in whichever area of specialization captures their interest. (shrink)

On Human Conflict excavates the philosophical foundations of war and peace in order to determine whether wars can ever be ended. It ranges over relevant mathematical models, Hobbes’s natural philosophy, theories of causality, biological and cultural evolution, general systems theory, Buddhism, globalization, and futurology.

Synchronicity IIn the summer of 2006, I read several books by well-known existential psychiatrist and insightful novelist Irvin Yalom.2 They were all thought-provoking and mightily entertaining. Dr. Yalom sustains lively interests in philosophical aspects of psychiatry, as well as in psychiatric aspects of philosophy. Among other works, he has written two profoundly philosophical novels, namely The SchopenhauerCure and When Nietzsche Wept, in which he has delved deeply and creatively into the psyches of these two outstanding thinkers via the refracting media (...) of literary and historical fiction, and through lenses of eclectic existential psychiatry.Yalom’s fictive excursions are not confined to philosophical realms—far from it. In a delightfully ironic novel entitled Lying on the Couch Yalom takes to task some perennially unfinished business of psychoanalysis, namely analysts’ perpetual struggles with counter-transference issues. Even the most seasoned psychoanalysts, so Yalomartfully reveals, have not yet had their own egos sufficiently shrunk. In consequence, they are apt to experience all kinds of problems with patients, and not always of the patients’ making. To be sure, patients are wont to deceive their analysts at times, whether subconsciously, diffidently, or maliciously. And analysts themselves are prone to all the vanities catalogued by Ecclesiastes in antiquity,3 egoisms and egotisms alike that appear innately rooted in the human psyche, and which inevitably contribute to self-deception. If an analyst’s vanities, self-deceptions, and unresolved counter-transferences were skillfully exploited by a professional con-artist posing as a patient, personal and professional mayhemwould result. This is one of the conspicuous threads in the rich tapestry of untruths, vanities and self deceptions that Yalom weaves in Lying on The Couch.One particular episode in Yalom’s novel rather jarred me when I encountered it in August 2006, because it coincided with an uncannily similar episode that was unfolding in my own life at precisely the same time. (shrink)

From the author of the international bestseller Plato Not Prozac!, a vital guide to the art of living. Professor Lou Marinoff's first book drew on the wisdom of the great philosophers to solve our everyday problems, launching a movement that restored philosophy to what it once was: useful in all walks of life. Now, in The Big Questions, he takes the concept to the next level, applying centuries of philosophy and great literature to answer central questions of modern existence. Urging (...) us not to accept victimhood as the by-product of modern life, Professor Marinoff uses specific case studies from his counseling practice to show how wisdom from the great thinkers can help us define our own philosophy, and thereby reclaim our sense of well-being. He asks and answers questions that go to the heart of the human condition: How do we know what is right? How can we cope with change? Why can't we all get along? And, most centrally, how can we use the centuries of wisdom that have come before us to help us answer these questions and feel at ease in the world? Accessible, entertaining, and profoundly useful, The Big Questions mixes wisdom from the great thinkers with specific case studies to illuminate how a shift in perspective can truly be life changing. (shrink)

Conversation 1: waking up to our inner strength -- Conversation 2: family education and parental recollections -- Conversation 3: philosophy and the will to encourage -- Conversation 4: a life of robust optimism -- Conversation 5: start from our shared humanity -- Conversation 6: like the light of the sun -- Conversation 7: healing as the restoration of wholeness -- Conversation 8: healing individual and social wounds -- Conversation 9: the healing power of dialogue -- Conversation 10: dialogue of peace (...) and humanism -- Conversation 11: philosophic wisdom; humanity's great treasure -- Conversation 12: epoch-creating philosophy -- Conversation 13: the quest of art and the mentor-disciple bond -- Conversation 14: views of life and death -- Conversation 15: women, builders of the peace culture -- Conversation 16: the human revolution: the philosophy of global citizenry. (shrink)

Abstract In an engaging and ingenious paper, Irvine (1993) purports to show how the resolution of Braess? paradox can be applied to Newcomb's problem. To accomplish this end, Irvine forges three links. First, he couples Braess? paradox to the Cohen?Kelly queuing paradox. Second, he couples the Cohen?Kelly queuing paradox to the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). Third, in accord with received literature, he couples the PD to Newcomb's problem itself. Claiming that the linked models are ?structurally identical?, he argues that Braess solves (...) Newcomb's problem. This paper shows that Irvine's linkage depends on structural similarities?rather than identities?between and among the models. The elucidation of functional disanalogies illuminates structural dissimilarities which sever that linkage. I claim that the Cohen?Kelly queuing paradox cloaks a fine structure that decouples it from both Braess? paradox and the PD (Marinoff, 1996a). I further assert that the putative reduction of the PD to a Newcomb problem (e.g. Brams, 1975; Lewis, 1979) is seriously flawed. It follows that Braess? paradox does not solve Newcomb's problem via the foregoing and herein sundered chain. I conclude by substantiating a stronger claim, namely that Braess'paradox cannot solve Newcomb's problem at all. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders a well-known Diophantine problem-“the coconut puzzle”-with two philosophically humorous motives. The first motive is methodological; the second, ontological. First, different methodological approaches to solving this problem, namely those of the stereotypical engineer, physicist, and mathematician, are informed by different conceptualizations of the mathematical puzzle itself. This is illustrated by comparing stereotypical solutions by an engineer, a physicist, and a mathematician. Second, ontological implications of Dirac’s unorthodox solution precipitate heuristic questions concerning correspondence between mathematically admissible answers and physically (...) possible states. An anecdotal history of this problem is also cited, in order to prepare the ground for a concluding satirical solution by an erstwhile Carlylean economist. (shrink)

This paper examines a social contractarian model in which an actor cooperates by mimicry; that is, cooperates just in case there is majority cooperation in his orher vicinity. A computer simulation is developed to study the relation between initial and final proportions of such cooperators, as wel l as to chart the population dynamics themselves. The model turns out to be non-linear; item bodies a quintessentially chaotic threshold. The simulation also yields other unforeseen results, revealing a "geometry of delection" that (...) unites delecting cells into robust molecular formations which persist with in overall cooperative domains, or which under certain conditions undermine cooperativeness entirely. The model thus sheds so me light on the structura l dimension of mimicry that underlies social communication, conflict and its resolution. (shrink)

The article’s purpose is to illustrate ways in which renowned philosophers, statesmen, and poets—as well as family members and friends of this author—utilized humor to express fearlessness of or contempt for death, or indeed to mock others’ fears of dying or tendencies to treat death too seriously. If Sigmund Freud was correct in hypothesizing that humor is the ego’s defense against life’s affronts, and if death poses the greatest possible affront to life, then jokes about death are the strongest protests (...) we can lodge against our own mortality. (shrink)

This paper examines a social contractarian model in which an actor cooperates by mimicry; that is, cooperates just in case there is majority cooperation in his orher vicinity. A computer simulation is developed to study the relation between initial and final proportions of such cooperators, as wel l as to chart the population dynamics themselves. The model turns out to be non-linear; item bodies a quintessentially chaotic threshold. The simulation also yields other unforeseen results, revealing a "geometry of delection" that (...) unites delecting cells into robust molecular formations which persist with in overall cooperative domains, or which under certain conditions undermine cooperativeness entirely. The model thus sheds so me light on the structura l dimension of mimicry that underlies social communication, conflict and its resolution. (shrink)

This paper claims that the edifice of philosophical practice bears prima facie resemblance to other counseling-dispensing professions—e.g. medicine, law, psychology, accountancy. It defends virtues of professionalism in philosophical practice against accusations of sophism, and also rejects social constructivism as a politically extreme form of sophistry. It concludes that, notwithstanding prima facie resemblance to other counseling professions, philosophical practice is foundationally distinct from them. When elaborated, this distinction complicates the notion of inculcating virtue in philosophical practice.