Susan Haack has recently attempted to discredit religion by showing that science is an extended and enhanced version of common sense while religion is not. I argue that Haack’s account is misguided not because science is not an extended version of common sense, as she says. It is misguided because she assumes a very restricted, and thus inadequate, account of common sense. After reviewing several more realistic models of common sense, I conclude that common sense is rich enough to allow (...) various kinds of extensions. Just as science can be correctly seen as an enhanced version of common sense, so also religion. (shrink)

I examine three major antireligious arguments that are often proposed in various forms by cognitive and evolutionary scientists, and indicate possible responses to them. A fundamental problem with the entire debate arises because the term "religion" is too vague. So I reformulate the debate in terms of a less vague central concept: faith. Referring mainly to Aquinas on faith, I proceed by evaluating how the previously mentioned cognitive and evolutionary arguments fare when dealing with faith. The results show that some (...) aspects of the concept of faith are in principle beyond the range of evolutionary explanation and some other aspects are not. Nevertheless, an evolutionary account merges smoothly with faith’s theological dimensions. (shrink)

The role of empirical evidence in scientific and in religious discourse has been revisited in a recent paper by John Worrall, who argues for the overlap between these two types of discourse and for the superiority of the former. His main thesis is that the epistemic attitude of natural science is superior because it is essentially related to evidence and falsifiability, whereby the search for counter-evidence is taken as the primary driving force for research. The epistemic attitude of religion, on (...) the contrary, is essentially related to faith, whereby the effects of counter-evidence are always minimized or neutralized. In this paper, I question Worrall’s analysis of the role of evidence in the two kinds of discourse. I argue that the debate has systematically neglected the question of holism of meaning. When such holism is taken into consideration, the very idea of a purely given experience becomes questionable. I argue that this neglected area is as pivotal in our understanding of religious discourse as it has been acknowledged to be in philosophy of science. I then propose a refined account of religious language, illustrating thereby that between the role of evidence in science and its roles in religion there is a lot in common. (shrink)

Science has uncovered many mistakes that had been hidden for centuries among implicit everyday assumptions. When we make explicit what lies implicit within language, there is no guarantee that we will arrive at truth about the world. Many therefore assume that only science delivers truth. Recent debates on this issue often refer to Wilfred Sellars’s arguments against the pre-conceptual given but conclude that his additional insistence on the exclusivity of the scientific image of the world is unfounded. In this paper (...) I resort to Robert Brandom’s development of these arguments to show that saying a word, understanding a concept and engaging in some practices go together. Both laws of nature and social norms regulate these practices and determine the identity conditions of objects. I argue therefore that the conceptual scheme indeed reflects the nature of things because it results from our successful engagement with the world during the long sweep of evolutionary time. (shrink)

Max Jammer has recently proposed a model of God's eternity based on the special theory of relativity, offering it as an example of how theologians should take into account what physicists say about the world. I start evaluating this proposal by a quick look at the classic Boethius-Aquinas model of divine eternity. The major objection I advance against Jammer refers to Einstein's subtle kind of realism. I offer various reasons to show that Einstein's realism was minimal. Moreover, even this minimal (...) realism has been undermined by recent experimental work. If Jammer is suggesting that theologians should take Einstein's physics seriously because it describes the world, his argument is unconvincing because it doesn't address the crucial question of Einstein's realism, which makes all the difference. /// O artigo toma em consideração o modelo acerca da eternidade de Deus baseado na teoria especial da relatividade de Einstein recentemente proposto por Max Jammer, autor que considera ser este um exemplo de como os teólogos deveriam tomar em consideração aquilo que os físicos dizem acerca do mundo. O autor do artigo começa por fazer uma avaliação desta proposta mediante uma breve referência ao modelo clássico de Boécio e S. Tomás acerca da eternidade divina. A principal objecção levantada pelo artigo contra Jammer tem a ver com a forma subtil de realismo de Einstein. Segundo o autor do artigo, o realismo de Einstein era mínimo. Mais ainda, mesmo este realismo mínimo foi minado por trabalhos experimentais mais recentes. Com efeito, se Jammer sugere que os teólogos devem tomar a sério a física de Einstein baseados na presunção de que esta descreve o mundo, então o seu argumento, diz o autor do artigo, não convence na medida em que não trata da questão crucial acerca do realismo de Einstein, questão esta que sem dúvida faz toda a diferença. (shrink)

In its first section, dedicated to the topic science and relativism, the article argues against those who hold that science is absolutist while ethics is relativist. The point made is that the two disciplines are not all that different. There is an element of objectivity and an element of relativity in both. The article insists that there are two plausible ways in which these elements may be appreciated in both disciplines. The first way involves an analysis of precedents; the second (...) way an analysis of secondaryprecepts. Then, in its second section, dedicated to science and utilitarianism, the article focuses on the problem of abstraction. The author argues that the crucial issue is the way both scientists and utilitarian philosophers choose the relevant parameters for their theorising. When the choice of parameters is not correct, deformation results. Like economics, utilitarianism tends to present itself as an exact science that guarantees a complete explanation. However, the article shows how and why this attitude can be deeply problematic. /// Na sua primeira secção, dedicada ao tema da relaçãdo entre ciência e relativismo, o artigo argumenta essencialmente contra aqueles que defendem que a ciência é absolutista enquanto que a ética seria relativista. O ponto é que as duas disciplinas não são assim tão diferentes. Existe um elemento de objectividade e um elemento de relatividade em ambas. Sugere-se, assim, a existência de dois modos plausíveis em que estes elementos podem ser apreciados em ambas as disciplinas. O primeiro modo involve uma análise de precedentes; o segundo uma análise de preceitos secundários. Depois, na segunda secção do artigo, dedicada à relação entre ciência e utilitarismo, o artigo concentra-se na questão da abstracção. O autor defende que a questão crucial é o modo em que tanto os cientistas como os filósofos utilitaristas escolhem os parâmetros relevantes para a sua teorização. Constata-se que sempre que a escolha dos parâmetros não é a correcta se dá uma deformação dos resultados. Tal como a economia, o utilitarismo tende a apresentar-se como sendo uma ciência exacta que garante uma completa explicação. O artigo, porém, mostra de que modo essa atitude pode set profundamente problemática. (shrink)

Claims are universal when they are not dependent on when and where they are made. Mathematics and the natural sciences are the typical disciplines that allow such claims to be made. Is the striving for universal claims in other disciplines justifi ed? Those who attempt to answer this question in the affi rmative often argue that it is justifi ed when mathematics and the natural sciences are taken as the model for other disciplines. In this paper I challenge this position (...) and analyze the issue by looking at it from a new angle, a perspective that involves two key concepts: violence and loyalty. The result of this analysis throws light on the broader question concerning what the search for truth might mean in a pluralistic world. (shrink)

This Sacred Earth: Religion, Nature, Environment Edited by Roger S. Gottlieb Routledge, 1996. Pp. 673. ISBN 0-415-91233-4. 45.00 (hbk) 16.99 (pbk) Moderate Realism and its Logic By D.W. Mertz Yale University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi + 310. ISBN 0-300-06561-2. 27.50 (hbk) William James Remembered Edited by Linda Simon University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Pp. 275. ISBN 0-8032-4248-4. 28.50 (hbk). Cybermonde: La politique du pire. Entretien avec Philippe Petit. By Paul Virilio Les ditions Textuel, 1996.pp. 110. ISBN 2-909317-21-8. FF 79 (pbk).

La réflexion philosophique sur l'idée de progrès est en train de subir une reprise, surtout à cause de l'intérêt renouvelé pour les implications larges de la théorie de l'évolution biologique et dans l'applicabilité de cette théorie à l'épistémologie. Dans cet article, l'intérêt principal se situe autour de deux questions: Quel type de concept est en jeu quand on emploie le mot «progrès»? Le mot refère-t-il à un processus qui pourrait être découvert empiriquement? Dans la première section, plusieurs manières de comprendre (...) le progrès biologique sont évaluées. Une manière est d'employer l'idée de quantité d'information génétique appartenant à l'organisme, présupposant qu'une plus grande quantité d'information signifie un état meilleur. Une autre manière est de faire allusion à l'augmentation de la variété d'espèces biologiques. Encore une autre manière est de considérer la capacité des organismes d'acquérir et d'élaborer l'information sur leur environnement. La question du progrès, pourtant, reste ambiguë à cause de l'élément arbitraire du choix du critère évaluatif impliqué dans chaque perspective. La seconde section de l'article s'occupe du progrès cognitif. Selon l'épistémologie évolutive, l'image que nous avons du monde à un moment particulier est toujours moins approximative que nos images précédentes. Nous sommes en train de converger sur la description correcte. Des problèmes se manifestent ici parce qu'on do. (shrink)

L'interaction entre la science et la théologie est souvent considérée comme une interaction concernant leurs affirmations. Cet article examine comment cette interaction peut concerner leurs questions. Les questions concernant l'environnement seront le point focal parce que nous vivons dans un temps où la pertinence de ces questions augmente, et cette augmentation continuera probablement jusqu'à ce qu'elles soient prises au sérieux comme il le faut. La première étape de la discussion est une application d'un aspect de la philosophie de la science (...) afin que l'on puisse décider si la problématique de l'environnement est une question réelle pour les scientifiques ou une question irréelle. Au lieu de discuter la réalité des entités, des philosophes de la science ont récemment commencé à discuter la réalité des questions pour la communauté scientifique. Des questions sont réelles pour une communauté particulière à un moment donné quand elles sont des questions à la résolution desquelles les membres de cette communauté pourront voir comment s'efforcer. Pendant ces dernières décennies, notre prise de conscience de la problématique de l'environnement pourrait être comprise en ces termes. Une nouvelle question est en train de s'imposer à l'humanité. Une nouvelle question devient réelle. La seconde étape explore comment des questions deviennent réelles. Le scénario mondial le plus sombre est celui dans lequel la communauté des scientifiques, et d'autres communautés, fonctionnent seulement selon des principes d'égoïsme. Ici, les questions réelles pour la communauté scientifique sont celles qui produisent des avantages tangibles pour cette communauté. Des nouvelles questions deviennent réelles pour une communauté seulement quand cette communauté est contrainte d'accepter la pertinence de ces questions pour sa propre survie. Or la communauté scientifique, étant riche, est dans la meilleure position pour se sauveguarder des effets. (shrink)

Tanto la ciencia como la teología implican filosofía. Ambas implican argumento razonado, la evaluación de las posibles explicaciones, la aclaración de conceptos, formas de interpretar la experiencia, la comprensión del significado actual de lo que ha ido antes que nosotros, y otras tareas tales eminentemente filosóficas. Ambos implican la filosofía, especialmente cuando entran en diálogo con los demás. De hecho, implican el pensamiento filosófico, aun cuando no sean conscientes de ello. En este artículo voy a explorar un área específica de (...) la filosofía que es particularmente importante como un puente entre la teología y la ciencia. Me refiero a la zona del significado. Las preguntas relacionadas con significado son fundamentales porque todo lo que se dice acerca de la naturaleza de la vida, por los científicos, por los teólogos, o por cualquier otra persona, deben ser expresadas en palabras con sentido. El sentido es como el suelo que pisamos. Constituye lo que necesitamos para proceder con nuestra actividad. Sin tierra firme bajo nuestros pies, no podemos ir a ninguna parte. (shrink)