How does one scientifically verify a psychometric instrument designed to assess the mental competence of medical patients who are asked to consent to medical treatment? Aside from satisfying technical requirements like statistical reliability, results yielded by such a test must conform to at least some accepted pretheoretical desiderata; for example, determinations of competence, as measured by the test, must capture a minimal core of accepted basic intuitions about what competence means and what a theory of competence is supposed to do. (...) The concepts of “face validity” and “content validity” are both important here. Face validity “indicates that an instrument appears to test what it is supposed to and that it is a plausible method for doing so” (Portney and Watkins 2000, 82). Content validity “means that the test contains all the elements that reflect the variable being studied” (Portney and.. (shrink)

Compassion is mentioned in the Principles of the American Medical Association but not in the Code of Ethics of the Canadian Medical Association. In this article, we assess the case for including compassion in a code of ethics for physicians. We argue that, properly understood, there is a strong case for including compassion in codes of ethics for physicians on the basis that it is both clinically and ethically central to the practice of medicine.

A formal sequent system dealing with Menelaus' configurations is introduced in this paper. The axiomatic sequents of the system stem from 2-cycles of Δ-complexes. The Euclidean and projective interpretations of the sequents are defined and a soundness result is proved. This system is decidable and its provable sequents deliver incidence results. A cyclic operad structure tied to this system is presented by generators and relations.

This is the first English translation of Pierre Bayle's political pamphlet, Ce que c'est que la France toute catholique of 1686. Now that Bayle has received renewed attention from scholars such as Jonathan Israel and Gianluca Mori, it is time to introduce his political ideas to English-speaking readers who cannot read the original. And although a selection of the political writings from the Historical and Critical Dictionary has been published, much of Bayle's political thought has not been translated. This (...) translation complements recent editions of Bayle's Thoughts on the Comet and Philosophical Commentary, along with a forthcoming translation of his Conversations Between Maxime and Thémiste. A substantial introduction explores the context and reviews scholarly interpretations, and notes to the text explain references. (shrink)

La critique du dualisme cartésien, c’est-à-dire du mythe de l’intériorité, a été menée à partir de deux positions philosophiques. La première cherche à réduire l’état mental à l’état neuronal défini par ses propriétés neurologiques et l’autre, celle de Wittgenstein, tente de faire disparaître le mystère des relations entre la pensée et le cerveau par une critique grammaticale du langage. La notion de survol absolu, notion centrale de la philosophie de Ruyer, permet de développer une conception non matérialiste de l’identité entre (...) état cérébral et état mental. De plus, cette conception montre que l’intériorité de l’état mental ne saurait être réduite à une erreur de catégorie. Mais cette thèse de l’identité de la conscience et du corps nécessite de développer une perspective radicalement nouvelle permettant de concevoir une conscience « étendue ». (shrink)

Sir—In their editorial, Hall, Carter & Morley [1] present an incorrect interpretation of my central argument. The point of my paper [2] is that there are solid reasons to suspect that the capacity of heroin addicts to consent to heroin therapy is compromised because of their addiction. As one medical commentator on my paper states, if active heroin addicts can give voluntary and competent consent to heroin therapy without any problems, then we need a new conceptualization of addiction: they are (...) not addicted, almost by definition [3]. Yet obviously there are problems and grey zones. The solution is to investigate the issue empirically in order to determine the extent of the problem. (As we have done for consent to research on depression and other mental illnesses.) Ultimately, the question can only be solved on a case by case basis, using standardized assessment tools adapted for this purpose. The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool (MaCAT‐T) is the particular assessment tool I chose to discuss. [4] It is the most promising candidate available, and it has proved its merits in the areas of depression and schizophrenia. -/- At no point do I condemn heroin therapy and endorse an abstinence model of treatment, as the authors state. On the contrary, I note the success of heroin therapy and make suggestions about how to facilitate the consent process. Ironically, it may be Hall et al . who have oversimplified the issues. What we need here are empirical studies on the decisional capacity of heroin addicts to consent to heroin therapy. Only then will we be able to refute the naive view they have no ‘free will’, or say how much they have; but really my paper is not about ‘free will’ at all. This is a philosophical concept. The topic I chose to discuss is ‘decisional capacity’, also called ‘mental competence’. This is a clinical concept with complex legal and ethical associations that often vary across jurisdictions. My point was that although the Swiss Heroin Trials were approved in Europe, they probably would not be approved in Canada or the United States under existing regulations. Interested readers might want to consider the wide variety of reactions to my paper, published in the same issue [5]. Unfortunately, the editorial by Hall et al . does little to advance this debate. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the Canadian Alliance for Healthy Hearts and Minds cohort, participants underwent magnetic resonance imaging of the brain, heart, and abdomen, that generated incidental findings. The approach to managing these unexpected results remain a complex issue. Our objectives were to describe the CAHHM policy for the management of IFs, to understand the impact of disclosing IFs to healthy research participants, and to reflect on the ethical obligations of researchers in future MRI studies.MethodsBetween 2013 and 2019, 8252 participants were recruited with (...) a follow-up questionnaire administered to 909 participants at 1-year. The CAHHM policy followed a restricted approach, whereby routine feedback on IFs was not provided. Only IFs of severe structural abnormalities were reported.ResultsSevere structural abnormalities occurred in 8.3% of participants, with the highest proportions found in the brain and abdomen. The majority of participants informed of an IF reported no change in quality of life, with 3% of participants reporting that the knowledge of an IF negatively impacted their quality of life. Furthermore, 50% reported increased stress in learning about an IF, and in 95%, the discovery of an IF did not adversely impact his/her life insurance policy. Most participants would enrol in the study again and perceived the MRI scan to be beneficial, regardless of whether they were informed of IFs. While the implications of a restricted approach to IF management was perceived to be mostly positive, a degree of diagnostic misconception was present amongst participants, indicating the importance of a more thorough consent process to support participant autonomy.ConclusionThe management of IFs from research MRI scans remain a challenging issue, as participants may experience stress and a reduced quality of life when IFs are disclosed. The restricted approach to IF management in CAHHM demonstrated a fair fulfillment of the overarching ethical principles of respect for autonomy, concern for wellbeing, and justice. The approach outlined in the CAHHM policy may serve as a framework for future research studies.Clinical trial registrationhttps://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/nct02220582. (shrink)

Continuateur d’Eusèbe de Césarée (265-339), Socrate de Constantinople (380-440), un des plus grands historiens de l’Antiquité chrétienne de langue grecque, est l’auteur d’une précieuse Histoire (publiée probablement vers 439/440) dont l’intérêt réside, non seulement dans le fait qu’elle prolonge de plus d’un siècle l’Histoire ecclésiastique d’Eusèbe, mais aussi parce qu’elle nous a conservé des documents historiques de la plus haute importance, souvent cités in extenso, et dont certains sont ..

À travers une suite d’œuvres qui cherchaient toujours un autre but, Lévi-Strauss dessine tout de même les contours d’une éthique qui prend acte d’un certain nihilisme - la vie humaine n’a pas un sens qu’elle pourrait « découvrir » et elle ne saurait non plus donner son sens au monde -. Il détermine, en particulier, quelques caractéristiques d’une éthique qui veille à la protection de toutes les cultures et à la préservation de la terre qui abrite tous les vivants et (...) qui verra la fin de l’homme comme elle a connu la fin de tant d’espèces. Le lecteur de Lévi-Strauss s’étonne de constater que le structuralisme que l’auteur met en œuvre par méthode dans son travail anthropologique s’associe à un usage de fictions quand il s’agit de tracer une éthique. Notre enquête consiste à examiner cette association un peu étrange qui fait ressortir que, sans adhérer à l’utilitarisme, qui use d’une théorie des fictions, l’auteur se sert de cette dernière sur des points stratégiques pour éviter les dialectiques de style kantien et hégélien, c’est-à-dire pour que les oppositions se fassent contrepoids entre elles et pour que les contradictions puissent se résoudre en plis plutôt que se déchirer entre elles. (shrink)

The current debate over systematicity concerns the formal conditions a scheme of mental representation must satisfy in order to explain the systematicity of thought.1 The systematicity of thought is assumed to be a pervasive property of minds, and can be characterized (roughly) as follows: anyone who can think T can think systematic variants of T, where the systematic variants of T are found by permuting T’s constituents. So, for example, it is an alleged fact that anyone who can think the (...) thought that John loves Mary can think the thought that Mary loves John, where the latter thought is a systematic variant of the former. (shrink)

What has been called the new mechanistic philosophy conceives of mechanisms as the main providers of biological explanation. We draw on the characterization of the p53 gene in molecular oncology, to show that explaining a biological phenomenon implies instead a dynamic interaction between the mechanistic level—rendered at the appropriate degree of ontological resolution—and far more general explanatory tools that perform a fundamental epistemic role in the provision of biological explanations. We call such tools “explanatory frameworks”. They are called frameworks to (...) stress their higher level of generality with respect to bare mechanisms; on the other hand, they are called explanatory because, as we show in this paper, their importance in explaining biological phenomena is not secondary with respect to mechanisms. We illustrate how explanatory frameworks establish selective and local criteria of causal relevance that drive the search for, characterisation and usage of biological mechanisms. Furthermore, we show that explanatory frameworks allow for changes of scientific perspective on the causal relevance of mechanisms going beyond the account provided by the new mechanistic philosophy. (shrink)

La vie et l'oeuvre de Louis Bouyer se placent tout entières sous le signe de l'oecuménisme. Protestant par sa naissance et son éducation, entré en contact de l'orthodoxie au cours de ses années universitaires, Bouyer demande à être reçu dans l'Église catholique à l'âge de 26 ans. Les pierres d'attente de sa longue formation humaine et spirituelle auprès des réformés et des orthodoxes trouvent, au sein de cette Église, le terrain propice à l'érection d'un édifice intellectuel et littéraire auquel (...) il consacrera toutes ses forces. Sa théologie sera marquée par le souci constant de reconduire au vrai bercail catholique ce que les spiritualités chrétiennes et les pensées authentiquement humaines ont de meilleur. La conviction de l'auteur est en effet que c'est à l'intérieur de l'Église catholique romaine, héritée du Christ et des Apôtres, qu'elles reçoivent leur pleine fécondité. (shrink)

This article examines the responses of Parisian noble women to campaigns for women's rights in France of the early Third Republic. The methodology of the article is based on the works of Pierre Bourdieu. His concept of the habitus is used to analyse the effects of class and gender in noble women's attitudes to French feminisms before the First World War. The conditioning of Parisian noble women explains their resistance, indeed often outspoken opposition, to feminists' demands. These female aristocrats (...) supported their own oppression within a social order governed by the state, the scientific and medical establishments, the expectations of family, and the Catholic Church of the time. (shrink)

Part I: WHAT IS ETHICS? Plato: Socratic Morality: Crito. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part II: ETHICAL RELATIVISM VERSUS ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM. Herodotus: Custom is King. Thomas Aquinas: Objectivism: Natural Law. Ruth Benedict: A Defense of Ethical Relativism. Louis Pojman: A Critique of Ethical Relativism. Gilbert Harman: Moral Relativism Defended. Alan Gewirth: The Objective Status of Human Rights. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part III: MORALITY, SELF-INTEREST AND FUTURE SELVES. Plato: Why Be Moral? Richard Taylor: On the Socratic Dilemma. David Gauthier: Morality (...) and Advantage. Gregory Kavka: A Reconciliation Project. Derek Parfit: Later Selves and Moral Principles. Bernard Williams: Persons, Character, and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IV: VALUE. Jeremy Bentham: Classical Hedonism. Robert Nozick: The Experience Machine. Richard Taylor: Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong. Friedrich Nietzsche: The Transvaluation of Values. Derek Parfit: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best? Thomas Nagel: Value: The View from Nowhere. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part V: UTILITARIANISM AND CONSEQUENTIALISM. John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism. J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism. Kai Nielsen: Against Moral Conservatism. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism. John Hospers: Rule-Utilitarianism. Robert Nozick: Side Constraints. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VI: KANTIAN AND DEONTOLOGICAL SYSTEMS. Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals. W. D. Ross: What Makes Right Acts Right? Onora O’Neill: Kantian Formula of the End in Itself and World Hunger. Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck. Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Judith Jarvis Thomson: Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VII: CONTRACTARIAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Thomas Hobbes: The Leviathan. David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism? John Rawls: Contractualism: Justice as Fairness. T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism and Utilitarianism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VIII: VIRTUE-BASED ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Aristotle: The Ethics of Virtue. Bernard Mayo: Virtue and the Moral Life. William Frankena: A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics. Walter Schaller: Are Virtues No More than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules? Alasdair MacIntyre: The Nature of the Virtues. Susan Wolf: Moral Saints. Louis P. Pojman: In Defense of Moral Saints. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IX: THE FACT/VALUE PROBLEM: METAETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. David Hume: On Reason and the Emotions: The Fact/Value Distinction. G. E. Moore: Non-Naturalism. A. J. Ayer: Emotivism. R. M. Hare: Prescriptivism: The Structure of Ethics and Morals. Geoffrey Warnock: The Object of Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part X: MORAL REALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM. J.L. Mackie: The Subjectivity of Values. Jonathan Harrison: A Critique of Mackie’s Error Theory. Gilbert Harman: Moral Nihilism. Nicholas Sturgeon: Moral Explanations. Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Bruce Russell: Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism. Michael Smith: A Defense of Moral Realism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XI: RELIGION AND ETHICS. Plato: Morality and Religion. Immanuel Kant: God and Immortality as Necessary Postulates of Morality. George Mavrodes: Religious and the Queerness of Morality. Kai Nielson: Ethics Without God. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XII: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO CLASSICAL ETHICAL THEORY. Part A. Sociobiology and the Question of Moral Responsibility. Charles Darwin: Ethics and the Descent of Man. E.O.Wilson: Sociobiology and Ethics. Michael Ruse: Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach. Elliot Sober: Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics. J.L. Mackie: The Law of the Jungle, Evolution and Morality. Suggestions for Further Readingon Sociobiology. Part B. The Challenge of Determinism to Moral Responsibility and Desert. Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Louis Pojman: Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility:A Response to Galen Strawson. Richard Taylor: A Libertarian Defense of Free Will and Responsibility. Suggestions for Further Reading on Moral Responsibility. Glossary of Ethical Terms. (shrink)

Physicien théoricien, philosophe de la physique et historien des théo­ries physiques, le savant catholique français Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) a profondément marqué la pensée du vingtième siècle. Chacun connaît le Système du monde, dont les dix volu­mes ont contribué à la redécouverte de la science médiévale, et La théorie physique, qui a notamment donné lieu à la célèbre «thèse Duhem-Quine». Si Clio a donc gardé de Duhem le sou­venir d’un grand historien des sciences et d’un philosophe perspicace de la physique, (...) lui-même cependant n’aspirait qu’à être reconnu comme physicien. Son œuvre est en effet traver­sée par un projet scientifique qui consiste à ordonner et à réunir les diverses branches de la physique sous l’égide de la thermo­dynamique dans le cadre d’une théorie représentative et non explicative du réel. C’est ce projet que Duhem a voulu réaliser dans ses publications scientifiques, exposer dans ses écrits philoso­phiques, et finalement cautionner par ses recherches historiques. Cependant l’investissement toujours plus important de Duhem en histoire des sciences et la présence dans son œuvre de con­sidéra­tions apologétiques et d’écrits patriotiques peuvent don­ner à penser qu’il s’est progressivement détourné de ce projet primordial au profit d’autres préoccupations. De même, les tensions qui, à l’inté­rieur de ce projet scientifique, subsistent entre sa volonté unificatrice et sa revendication phénoménaliste peuvent conduire à une relativi­sation de cette dernière, conçue comme une demande contextuelle, passa­gère et finalement peu significative. Sans ignorer ces préoccu­pations historiques, religieuses ou patriotiques, sans négliger ce con­flit d’intérêt entre les deux parties constitutives du projet duhémien, cette étude entend tout d’abord réaffirmer que ce projet scientifique ne sera jamais ni abandonné, ni amputé. Toutefois, dès lors que sont maintenues la permanence, la prio­rité et l’intégralité de ce projet, trois paradoxes surgissent im­médiatement. Si Duhem se voulait avant tout physicien et souhaitait être reconnu comme tel, par quelle extravagance de l’histoire est-il finalement connu pour ses recherches histori­ques et ses travaux philosophiques et non pour ce qui lui tenait le plus à cœur? S’il ne voulait être qu’un illustre physicien, pourquoi s’est-il acharné, au retour du laboratoire, à exhumer de l’oubli les manuscrits et les théories scientifiques des au­teurs médiévaux? Enfin, s’il voulait vraiment établir une physi­que qui soit unifiée, cohérente et parfaite, pourquoi se prive-t-il du réa­lisme et s’embarrasse-t-il du phénoménalisme? Basée sur la corres­pondance inédite de Duhem, cette étude, centrée plus particu­liè­rement sur ce troisième paradoxe, contribue fina­lement à élucider chacun d’eux. (shrink)

The notion of “intentionality” is much invoked in various foundational theories of meaning, being very often equated with “meaning”, “content” and “reference”. In this paper, I propose and develop a basic distinction between two concepts and, more fundamentally, properties of intentionality: intentionality-T and intentionality-C. Representationalism is then defined as the position according to which intentionality-T can be reduced to intentionality-C, in the form of representational states. Nonrepresentationalism is rejecting this reduction, and argues that intentionality-T is more fundamental than intentionality-C. Non-representationalism (...) allows for a new layered view of the relations between cognitive intentionality and linguistic intentionality; this view is presented at the end of the paper. (shrink)

La philosophie est comme un casse-noix : certaines personnes ne réussissent qu'à se pincer les doigts avec, les professionnels le retournent dans tous les sens, et puis - quand même - il se trouve des gens qui s'en servent pour ouvrir ces merveilleuses noix qu'on appelle les pensées. Philosopher, c'est bien ; philosopher soi-même, c'est mieux. Philosopher soi-même chaque jour sur le quotidien, sur du banal, c'est le mieux, quand on ne compte plus sur la religion ou l'idéologie politique. Le (...) maître à penser, c'est toi. A quoi ressemble un petit-déjeuner? As-tu assez de courage pour te reconnaître dans le miroir et te reconnaître sur le " trône "? Que se passe-t-il quand tu es tenté au bureau? Une fois réveillé, vas-tu interpréter et utiliser tes rêves? Finalement, rien de tel qu'un simplissime " Où, quand, comment, pourquoi? " devant un gros problème. Chaque jour est un beau jour pour philosopher... (shrink)

Bultmann a-t-il été en partie victime d’une certaine « logique du protestantisme » ? R. Marlé a posé la question. Un théologien protestant peut être d’accord pour le fond avec la critique catholique, mais en la reprenant dans un esprit différent qui fera valoir la particula veri propre à Bultmann. On passera en revue à cet effet les quatre principaux griefs qui lui sont adressés.a) Réduction, au profit de la foi, de l’objectivité de l’historique et de celle du monde. — (...) L’objectivité à revendiquer est celle des données de la croyance, qui sont incarnées, et celle du monde comme lieu de salut. b) Survalorisation de la subjectivité de l’acte de foi au détriment de son contenu. — La particularité de l’engagement de foi dans le présent doit être maintenue, intégrée à une mémoire et à un corps de symbolismes et de références. c) Rejet de la révélation de Dieu à l’extérieur de la raison et de l’expérience historique. — Contre un refus radical à l’excès des médiations de la croyance, on maintiendra que Dieu est « pensable », sans que cela revienne à le « comprendre ». d) Insuffisance de la conception de la théologie comme simple intellectus fidei. — L’exercice théologique doit se déployer sous un horizon universel, mais aussi à un niveau socio-culturel attentif à toutes les inscriptions du religieux dans l’histoire et les mentalités.En définitive, on peut tenir le « fidéisme » du Bultmann pour l’illustration d’un « destin protestant », sans qu’il ait renié pour autant la théologie dialectique, mais pas davantage la théologie libérale, en tant que la première est une riposte articulée à la modernité et non un retour en arrière.Was Bultmann, to some extent, a victim of a certain “Protestant logic”? R. Marlé asked that question. A Protestant theologian can fundamentally agree with the Catholic position but take it in a different spirit, which would highlight the particula veri proper to Bultmann. The four principal complaints addressed to Bultmann in this matter will be reviewed.a) Reduction, in favor of the faith, of the objectivity of the historical and that of the world. — The objectivity demanded is for the tenets of belief, which are incarnate, and for a world as the place of salvation. b) Overvaluing of the subjectivity of the act of faith to the detriment of its content. — The particularity of the engagement of faith in the present must be upheld, integrated into a memory and a body of symbolisms and references. c) Rejection of the revelation of God outside reason and historical experience. — Against a radical refusal of the excess of mediations of belief, one can hold that God is “thinkable”, without being “understood”. d) Lack of the conception of theology as simple intellectus fidei. —The theological task should spread itself under a universal horizon, but also to a socio-cultural level that is attentive to all the inscriptions of the religious in history and mentalities.Finally, one can hold the “fideism” of Bultmann as an illustration of a “Protestant destiny”, without necessarily denying dialectical theology. Nor, indeed, liberal theology, in so far as the former is an articulated reply to modernity and not a return to the past. (shrink)

" Pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose et non pas plutôt rien? " Telle est sans doute la question la plus célèbre à laquelle l'ontologie, qui se veut précisément la science de l'être en tant qu'être, est censée répondre. Néanmoins cette question est-elle légitime? Nous faisons tous une expérience de l'être, à la fois externe et interne, sous la forme du monde et sous la forme du sujet. En lieu et place du rien nous trouvons toujours quelque chose. Aussi Lavelle, après (...) Bergson, conteste-t-il la présence contradictoire du néant au sein de l'être : ce dernier est partout présent, et c'est pourquoi l'ontologie lavellienne est résolument optimiste. Dans cet exposé dense et clair, le philosophe dessine le cercle qui lie d'une manière indestructible le renouvellement et la manifestation de chaque chose au moyen de trois concepts : l'être, l'existence et la réalité. Bien qu'univoque, l'être se décline en effet selon un mouvement de donation qui a pour fil conducteur la catégorie charnière de l'existence. Mais la démarche de Lavelle ne s'arrête pas là, elle tend à nous montrer que l'articulation des trois notions précédentes doit être elle-même comprise en relation avec les catégories axiologiques que sont le bien, la valeur et l'idéal. L'être est pour Lavelle la source de toute positivité, et c'est pourquoi son ontologie, qui comble en même temps notre intellect et notre volonté, renoue par-delà le christianisme avec la grande tradition grecque, en nous proposant les principes d'une sagesse possible ici et maintenant. (shrink)

I will not dwell overlong on the “meaning” of this story. But let me make two essential points. Plato tells us this story as though it were true: it is “a tale which, though passing strange, is yet wholly true.” Those words were to be translated into every language in the world and used to justify the most realistic fantasies. That is quite understandable, for Plato’s story started something new. With a perversity that was to ensure him great success, Plato (...) had laid the foundations for the historical novel, that is to say, the novel set in a particular place and a particular time. We are now quite accustomed to historical novels, and we also know that in every detective story there comes a moment when the detective declares that real life is not much like what happens in detective stories; it is far more complicated. But that was not the case in the fourth century B.C. Plat’s words were taken seriously, not by everyone, but by many, down through the centuries. And it is not too hard to see that some people continue to take them seriously today.As for the “meaning,” following others and together with others, I have tried elsewhere to show that essentially it is quite clear: the Athens and Atlantis of ancient lore represent the two faces of Plato’s own Athens. The former, the old primordial Athens, is what Plato would have liked the city of which he was a citizen to be; the latter is what Athens was in the age of Pericles and Cleon, an imperialistic power whose very existence constituted a threat to other Greek cities. Pierre Vidal-Naquet is director of the Centre Louis Gernet de Recherches Comparées sure les Sociétés Anciennes at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. His most recent publications are the second volume of Les Juifs, la mémoire et le present , La Grèce ancienne 1: Du mythe à la raison, with Jean-Pierre Vernant , and La Démocratie grecque vue d’ailleurs . Among his works to have appeared in English are Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece, with Jean-Pierre Vernant , and The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World . Janet Lloyd is a supervisor for a number of colleges in Cambridge University, where she gives classes in French language and literature. Among her more recent translations are Yves Mény’s Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy, West Germany and Marie-Claire Bergère’s Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937 . In progress are translations of works on Shakespeare, Pericles’ Athens, and a historical geography of France. (shrink)

"J'aime ce livre" serait une proposition insignifiante. L'artiste: un prétexte. On en parle, certes, mais dans une perspective de déconstruction. L'art, donc, plutôt comme expression de la vie. Et la vie comme art de la fuite révolutionnaire. Certains auteurs sont cités à satiété, certains passages sont repris textuellement, répétion aussi des mêmes thèmes, des mêmes expressions. Et une impasse fondamentale. "J'aime ce livre est en effet une proposition insignifiante.Tout propos portant sur le passé, dire "je t'aime", c'est dire qu'en ce (...) moment je ne t'aime pas. Mais si aimer, écrire et vivre constituent "un même combat", et si dire l'amour n'est pas aimer, comment écrire la vie serait-il vivre? Et que pourrait bien signifier la proposition "Je n'aime pas ce livre"? (shrink)

La logique narrative de la Bible est-elle uniquement liée aux épisodes, ou s’observe-t-elle également dans la séquence de ces épisodes? Il y a bel et bien, manifestent ces pages, un «drame au long cours» dans le corpus biblique. Après une présentation de la culture du récit qui habite les Écritures , l’enquête manifeste les voies et moyens de la macro-narrativité biblique. S’avancer dans le récit de la Bible, d’épisode en épisode, c’est progresser dans une séquence temporelle sous-tendue par une causalité (...) irréductible à celle des hommes, mais en constante interaction avec celle-ci. (shrink)

La notion de « commerce d’amour-propre » telle qu’elle a été élaborée par Pierre Nicole constitue-t-elle une sorte de préfiguration de l’utilitarisme moderne ? Il est commun de le penser. Mais c’est peut-être là faire trop peu de cas du soubassement théologique augustinien de la doctrine de Nicole. Pour analyser le problème, il convient de confronter la pensée de Nicole à celles de Pascal, de Hobbes et de saint Augustin lui-même.

The movement and its members.--H. C. Brokmeyer.--W. T. Harris.--Denton J. Snider.--Bibliography.

At the very beginning of L’Homme-Machine, La Mettrie claims that Leibnizians with their monads have “rather spiritualized matter than materialized the soul”; a few years later Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and natural philosopher with a strong interest in the modes of transmission of ‘genetic’ information, conceived of living minima which he termed molecules, “endowed with desire, memory and intelligence,” in his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés. This (...) text first appeared in Latin in 1751 under the title Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali naturae systemate, with the pseudonym Dr Baumann; it was translated by Maupertuis in 1754 as Essai sur la formation des corps organisés and was later included in his 1756 Œuvres under the title Système de la nature. Now, it is clear that Maupertuis was a kind of Leibnizian; and that his molecule possessed higher-level, ‘mental’ properties. In that sense he falls under the first category described by La Mettrie. But he was also involved in a debate on this issue with Diderot, who put forth a sustained critique of Maupertuis’ theory of the molecule in the additions to his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature. Where Maupertuis attributes higher-level properties to his living minima, Diderot argues that these properties are ‘organizational’, i.e., they can only be properties of the whole. At issue here is the degree of commitment to a form of materialism. (shrink)

Can the Âtman in its infinity and transcendence be made the basis for civil rights? Can we deduce the idea of civil rights and their number from the conception of the Âtman? Can historicity be preserved in the bosom of the Âtman? It has been said that only ideas like that of the dictatorship are possible on the basis of the Âtman as conceived by Indian thinkers. Individual freedom and initiative necessary for new scientific discoveries and inventions are taught by (...) Christ and other Israel-born religions, and the discovery of the atom bomb is due to such ideas. Long ago the late Prof. C.A. Moore of Hawaii urged me several times to handle such criticisms of Indian philosophy and religion. I tried to answer them in some early papers. The most important considerations are: As Kant said, from the highest metaphysical reality it is not logically possible to deduce anything particular or even lower; for instance, we cannot even deduce from “All men are mortal” whether Socrates is or is not mortal, unless we add “Socrates is a man,” which is an empirical statement. And If the Âtman is one and all-comprehensive, no democracy is said to be possible because individual men cannot be real then; but it is overlooked that then nothing is possible, not even trees and stones. Again, if there is only one personal God and if his will is supreme, will he not be a tyrant or a Louis XIV of the heavens, thundering his unquestionable commands? Where do democracy and freedom of the individual go then? On the other hand, if every one is the Supreme Âtman in essence, then everyone is free with all the initiative one can have by birth. Civil rights will then have a metaphysical foundation because every finite individual is inherently one with the Supreme Person and has the same rights and freedom as any king or emperor. But these arguments and counter-arguments cannot impress every one because to deduce anything from the highest Being leads only to antinomies and will be counter-productive in our search for truth. In metaphysics or ontology we can go only from the lower to the higher in logic or discursive thinking, but not vice versa. (shrink)

In his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and a natural philosopher with a strong interest in the modes of transmission of 'genetic' information, described living minima which he termed molecules, “endowed with desire, memory and intelligence.” Now, Maupertuis was a Leibnizian of sorts; his molecules possessed higher-level, 'mental' properties, recalling La Mettrie's statement in L'Homme-Machine, that Leibnizians have “rather spiritualized matter than materialized (...) the soul.” But Maupertuis also debated this issue with Diderot, who critiqued this theory in the additions to his 1753 Pensées sur l'interprétation de la nature. Where Maupertuis attributes higher-level properties to his living minima, Diderot argues that these can only be 'organizational', i.e., properties of the whole. At issue here is the degree of commitment to a form of materialism. (shrink)

Le nihilisme a creusé le vide qui est en nous car l'homme est un être risqué et toujours projeté en avant de lui-même. Nous avons laissé le nihilisme s'emparer de ce vide et l'habiter. Nous avons laissé grandir la force mauvaise du nihilisme. Car le nihilisme est une force. Mais c'est une force qui ronge l'homme et détruit le désir du bien et de la vie. Le nihilisme est une force qui nous met en état d'apesanteur et d'oubli de soi. (...) Le nihilisme nous met hors sol par haine de la terre. Il nous met aussi hors de la durée par haine de l'histoire, et des permanences, et des fidélités. Achever le nihilisme, c'est en pousser la logique jusqu'à ce qu'il se détruise lui-même plutôt qu'il ne nous détruise."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This book, in language accessible to the general reader, investigates twelve of the most notorious, most interesting, and most instructive episodes involving the interaction between science and Christianity, aiming to tell each story in its historical specificity and local particularity. Among the events treated in When Science and Christianity Meet are the Galileo affair, the seventeenth-century clockwork universe, Noah's ark and flood in the development of natural history, struggles over Darwinian evolution, debates about the origin of the human species, and (...) the Scopes trial. Readers will be introduced to St. Augustine, Roger Bacon, Pope Urban VIII, Isaac Newton, Pierre-Simon de Laplace, Carl Linnaeus, Charles Darwin, T. H. Huxley, Sigmund Freud, and many other participants in the historical drama of science and Christianity. (shrink)

V.1. livres I-IV V.2. livres V-VII. V.3 livres VIII-X.