15 found
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  1. Public Health Ethics and Liberalism.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2009 - Public Health Ethics 2 (2):135-145.
    This paper defends a distinctly liberal approach to public health ethics and replies to possible objections. In particular, I look at a set of recent proposals aiming to revise and expand liberalism in light of public health's rationale and epidemiological findings. I argue that they fail to provide a sociologically informed version of liberalism. Instead, they rest on an implicit normative premise about the value of health, which I show to be invalid. I then make explicit the unobvious, republican background (...)
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  2. Autonomy and Ulysses Arrangements.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 252-280.
    In this chapter, I articulate the structure of a general concept of autonomy and then reply to possible objections with reference to Ulysses arrangements in psychiatry. The line of argument is as follows. Firstly, I examine three alternative conceptions of autonomy: value-neutral, value-laden, and relational. Secondly, I identify two paradigm cases of autonomy and offer a sketch of its concept as opposed to the closely related freedom of action and intentional agency. Finally, I explain away the autonomy paradox, to which (...)
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  3. An Aristotelian Approach to Cognitive Enhancement.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):365–375.
    In this paper, I argue that cognitive enhancement cannot be epistemically beneficial since getting things right in particular and epistemic agency in general both presuppose a kind of achievement. Drawing on Aristotle’s ethics, I distinguish four categories of actions: caused, attributable, responsible, and creditable. I conclude that to the extent that cognitive enhancement is incompatible with the latter category it undermines rather than strengthens autonomous agency in the realm of cognition.
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  4. Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
    In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in the context of decisional (...)
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  5.  39
    Depression, Decisional Capacity, and Personal Autonomy.Lubomira V. Radoilska - unknown
    This chapter aims to address two related challenges the phenomenon of depression raises for theories which present autonomy as an agency concept and an independent source of justification. The first challenge is directed at an intuitive conception of intentional agency as implying a robust though not always direct link between evaluation and motivation, for in depression what appears to be choice-worthy does not get chosen. The second challenge targets the feasibility of a reliable distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous choices, for (...)
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  6.  14
    Autonomy in Psychiatric Ethics.Lubomira V. Radoilska - unknown
    This chapter explores four kinds of skepticism about autonomy in general and its applicability to psychiatric ethics in particular. It is argued that although there are valuable lessons to be learnt from each of these skeptical challenges, their overall contribution is best understood in terms of friendly correctives to an autonomy-centered normative and conceptual framework instead of viable alternatives to it. The first four sections each provide a logical reconstruction of a distinct skeptical line of reasoning about autonomy and expand (...)
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  7.  68
    Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 43:25-50.
    This article offers an account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a recent account of weakness of will, developed by Richard Holton, that also points to a kind of failure of intentional agency but presents this as both separate from akrasia and more fundamental than it. Drawing on Aristotle’s work, it is argued that the failure of intentional agency articulated by the concept of akrasia is the central case, whereas the phenomenon Holton’s account is (...)
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  8. Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - Tópicos 43:25-50.
    In this article, I develop an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a phenomenon I refer to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’: I argue that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as a secondary failure of intentional agency, that to tackle akrasia.
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  9.  72
    Circumstance, Answerability, and Luck.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):155-167.
    This paper identifies a distinctive kind of moral luck, deep circumstantial luck and then explores its effects on moral responsibility. A key feature of the phenomenon is that it is recurrent rather than one-off. It also affects agents across a wide range of situations making it difficult to detect. Deeply unlucky agents are subject to unfavourable moral assessments through no fault of their own both in specific cases and when they try to respond to such initial assessments. In this respect, (...)
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  10.  31
    Distinguishing Value-Neutrality From Value-Independence: Toward a New Disentangling Strategy for Moral Epistemology.Lubomira V. Radoilska - forthcoming - In Mark McBride & Visa A. J. Kurki (eds.), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer.
    This chapter outlines a new disentangling strategy for moral epistemology. It builds on the fundamental distinction between value-neutrality and value-independence as two separate aspects of methodological austerity introduced by Matthew Kramer. This type of conceptual analysis is then applied to two major challenges in moral epistemology: globalised scepticism and debate fragmentation. Both challenges arise from collapsing the fact/value dichotomy. They can be addressed by comprehensive disentangling that runs along both dimensions – value neutrality vs. value non-neutrality and value independence vs. (...)
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  11.  34
    Pathologies of Agency.Lubomira V. Radoilska - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Agency.
    This chapter aims to distinguish between pathologies of agency in the strict sense and mere sources of impediments or distortion. Expanding on a recent notion of necessarily less-than-successful agency, it complements a mainstream approach to mental disorders and anomalous psychological conditions in the philosophy of mind and action. According this approach, the interest of such clinical case studies is heuristic, to differentiate between facets of agency that are functionally and conceptually separate even though they typically come together. Yet, in the (...)
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  12.  13
    Revisiting Epistemic Injustice in the Context of Agency.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):703-706.
    What makes an injustice epistemic rather than ethical or political? How does the former, more recent category relate to the latter, better-known forms of injustice? To address these questions, the papers of this Special Issue investigate epistemic injustice in close connection to different conceptions of agency, both epistemic and practical.
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  13.  22
    Review of David Hunter, 'Belief and Agency'. [REVIEW]Lubomira V. Radoilska - unknown
  14.  12
    Review of Bernard Williams, 'Truth and Truthfulness'. [REVIEW]Lubomira V. Radoilska - unknown
  15.  60
    Weakness of Will.Lubomira V. Radoilska - unknown
    Weakness of will, or akrasia, is an exciting issue at the heart of moral psychology and the philosophy of mind and action. This articleoffers a problem-centered guide to the relevant literature in contemporary analytic philosophy with reference to the main classical texts. The topics covered include: contemporary versus classical conceptions of akrasia, the possibility of weakness of will and its significance within instrumental and substantive theories of practical rationality, the nature of akratic actions and akratic attitudes, and the plausibility of (...)
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