Aristotle's explanation of what is said ‘of every’ and ‘of none’ has been interpreted either as involving individuals, or as regarding exclusively universal terms. I claim that Alexander of Aphrodisias endorsed this latter interpretation of the dictum de omni et de nullo. This interpretation affects our understanding of Alexander's syllogistic: as a matter of fact, Alexander maintained that the dictum de omni et de nullo is one of the core principles of syllogistic.
Thomas Aquinas maintained that God foreknows future contingent events and that his foreknowledge does not entail that they are necessarily the case. More specifically, he stated that if God knows a future contingent event, this future contingent event will be necessarily the case de sensu composito, but not de sensu diviso. After emphasizing the unified nature of Aquinas’ notion of necessity, we propose an interpretation of his theses by restating them within the framework of non-normal modal logics. In this framework, (...) the K-axiom does not hold, i.e. the necessity operator does not distribute over the material implication. Moreover, assuming that Aquinas rejected the K-axiom is not only consistent, but also leads to a logical framework that allows us to understand other theses maintained by the Doctor Angelicus. In particular, we argue that Aquinas’ remarks on the principle of non-contradiction rest on an impossible worlds semantics for non-normal modal logics. (shrink)
In this paper I examine Aquinas’s commentary on a text of Aristotle in which the type of order between substance and accidents is discussed. I claim that Aquinas maintains that there cannot be any reference to sensibility, despite any prima facie interpretation of Aristotle’s texts, according to which it could be thought that substance is temporally prior to accidents and, hence, that we must presuppose a perceivable change in the world on the basis of which it is possible to consider (...) something temporally prior to something else. This interpretation – which is possible on the basis of Aristotle’s texts – would be a misinterpretation, according to Aquinas. Aquinas’s assumption is philosophically worthwhile because it confi rms that every metaphysical proposition must abstract from sensibility. (shrink)
Aristotelian philosophers have been always puzzled by the ambiguous status of essences: it is not clear whether an Aristotelian should admit that an essence, taken in itself, is real, even though essences do not exist over and above particular things, as Platonists posit; furthermore, it is not clear whether an Aristotelian should endorse the view that essences have a certain unity, even if they are taken in themselves, namely, by abstracting from the individuals of which they are essences. I tackle (...) Thomas Cajetan’s analysis of this problem: this analysis is more sophisticated than that developed by Aquinas—whose texts had been commented upon by Cajetan. Cajetan distinguishes two senses of “real” and of “unity,” in order to speak of the reality and of the unity of essences, taken in themselves, though not endorsing a Platonist’s ontology. I suggest that his solution is appealing for the contemporary debate about this problem. (shrink)
In his paper “Aquinas, Geach, and Existence”, D. Costa maintains that Aquinas’ solution to the puzzle of future contingent events entails that future contingent entities already exist. This is tantamount to state that Aquinas endorsed a form of eternalism, since he maintained that past, present and future timelessly exist in God’s sight. I object that Aquinas’ texts are also compatible with another reading. In any statement of the form “S will be P”, the verb “will be” simply states the truth (...) of the predicative link between S and P, not the existence of either S or P. In other words, I take the verb “to be” occurring in sentences describing future events as having the meaning of the “esse ut verum”. (shrink)
RÉSUMÉEn Physique VIII, 5, 256b8-13, Aristote soutient qu'il est impossible qu'il n'y ait pas de mouvement, parce qu'il a démontré auparavant qu'il est nécessaire qu'il y ait toujours du mouvement. En effet, en Physique VIII, 1, 251b23-28, Aristote avait dit qu'il est nécessaire que si le temps est éternel, le mouvement le soit aussi. En Physique VIII, 5, 256b8-13, Aristote introduit en revanche la nécessité du mouvement éternel de sensu diviso. Dans cette note, nous montrons que l'argument de Physique VIII, (...) 1, 251b23-28 implique aussi la nécessité du mouvement éternel de sensu diviso.ABSTRACTIn Physics VIII, 5, 256b8-13, Aristotle maintains that it is impossible that there is no motion, because he proved earlier on that it is necessary that there is always motion. In Physics VIII, 1, 251b23-28, Aristotle said that it is necessary that if time is eternal, then motion is also eternal. In Physics VIII, 5, 256b8-13, Aristotle speaks on the contrary about the necessity of eternal motion. In this paper, we show that the argument expounded in Physics VIII, 1, 251b23-28 entails that eternal motion is also necessary de sensu diviso. (shrink)
According to Philoponus, the activity of drawing syllogisms is a dynamic operation. Following the classical idea that actions are specified by their objects and habitual powers by their actions, Philoponus concludes that only a dynamic power can elicit the act of syllogizing. This power is identified with discursive reasoning. Imagination, on the contrary, is a static power, that cannot elicit that particular motion of drawing a syllogistic inference. The issue, however, is not entirely uncontroversial, because Ammonius maintains that sophistical syllogisms (...) can only be formed by imagination, since they involve “empty concepts” as terms and only imagination can form such concepts. In this paper I will reconstruct Philoponus’ and Ammonius’ theories about the “activity” of syllogizing, and I shall explain how Philoponus can deal with sophistical syllogisms in a consistent way. (shrink)
In today’s academia, scholars are compelled to be productive. The result is an overabundance of publications that often are formulaic follow-ups to the debates du jour. The essays included in this collection are a fortunate exception to this rule—they are original and make refreshingly bold claims. The articles are devoted to the reception of Aristotle’s logic and metaphysics in the Middle Ages and show the vitality of the cluster of scholars known as the “Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy.” Even though (...) the school does not identify as “neo-scholastic”, many of its members accept the idea that scholastic interpretations are relevant to our understanding of Aristotle’s thought. Undoubtedly, this is a... (shrink)
This dissertation includes an introduction, five main chapters, and a conclusion. In the chapter “The Definition of Change”, I expound Aquinas’ account of change. I maintain that Aquinas’ account is meant to describe both spiritual and material changes. Hence, the hylomorphic account of change as the passage from form-less matter to enformed matter is unable to describe all changes. Contrary to Brower, I suggest that Aquinas’ favorite model involves a passage from potentiality to actuality. In addition, I state that ‘change’ (...) is identical to the second potentiality/first actuality of a process that includes three steps, a first potentiality, a second potentiality, and a second actuality. In the chapter on “Aquinas, Presentism, and Adverbialism”, I analyze the semantics of propositions that describe changing processes. I maintain that Aquinas subscribed to the view that past and future tense statements can have a truth-value. Chapter 4 is devoted to the so-called principle of plenitude, i.e. the thesis that all possibilities are realized at some point in the future. Aquinas is believed to have subscribed to the principle, whereas Aristotle’s texts are much more disputed. In this chapter, I offer a new interpretation, according to which Aristotle accepted a restricted version of the principle of plenitude, but Aquinas rejected the principle in all its formulations. In chapter 5 “Aquinas on Future Contingents”, I expound Aquinas’ theory of future contingents events. In this chapter, I make two claims. I state that Aquinas’ theory entails that future events do not exist, according to the ‘actual’ sense of existence. My second claim is about the logic of future contingents. I claim that Aquinas’ argument is logically sound, but presupposes that the so-called K-formula is not a tautology of Aquinas’ modal system. In chapter 6 I expound Aquinas’ definition of time. I maintain that Aquinas’ definition is not circular and time is distinct in both definition and in essendo from change. I conclude by stating that time has extra-mental existence. (shrink)
In this paper I examine Aquinas’s commentary on a text of Aristotle in which the type of order between substance and accidents is discussed. I claim that Aquinas maintains that there cannot be any reference to sensibility, despite any prima facie interpretation of Aristotle’s texts, according to which it could be thought that substance is temporally prior to accidents and, hence, that we must presuppose a perceivable change in the world on the basis of which it is possible to consider (...) something temporally prior to something else. This interpretation – which is possible on the basis of Aristotle’s texts – would be a misinterpretation, according to Aquinas. Aquinas’s assumption is philosophically worthwhile because it confi rms that every metaphysical proposition must abstract from sensibility. (shrink)
In this paper I compare Philoponus’s account of the laws of conversion for categorical and modal propositions with Alexander’s exposition of the same topic. I argue that Philoponus’s main source was Alexander’s commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics and that Philoponus had no access to independent sources to reconstruct Theophrastus’s proof for the conversion of universal negative propositions. I suggest that the different solutions that Alexander and Philoponus offer to the puzzles of the doctrine of the laws of conversion depend on (...) the two commentators’ different exegetical strategies. Alexander tries to solve the puzzles by means of doctrines, which Aristotle expounded elsewhere. Philoponus instead interprets Aristotle’s passage as implying a hierarchy among propositions - a doctrine which is not explicitly present in Aristotle’s text. (shrink)
