Conflicts between labor unions and nongovernmental organizations often impede private labor regulatory attempts to protect worker rights at supplier factories. Based on a study of a failed private regulatory attempt for Swedish garment retailers, we contribute to existing research into union–NGO relations by demonstrating how conflict arises because unions and NGOs act upon different institutional logics. We also contribute to the institutional logics perspective by challenging the current emphasis on either coexistence or conflict among multiple logics, and showing the heterogeneity (...) in how multiple logics manifest on a local level, how this could shift over time, and suggesting an empirically derived typology of manifestations of multiple logics. (shrink)
This book, in language accessible to the general reader, investigates twelve of the most notorious, most interesting, and most instructive episodes involving the interaction between science and Christianity, aiming to tell each story in its historical specificity and local particularity. Among the events treated in When Science and Christianity Meet are the Galileo affair, the seventeenth-century clockwork universe, Noah's ark and flood in the development of natural history, struggles over Darwinian evolution, debates about the origin of the human species, and (...) the Scopes trial. Readers will be introduced to St. Augustine, Roger Bacon, Pope Urban VIII, Isaac Newton, Pierre-Simon de Laplace, Carl Linnaeus, Charles Darwin, T. H. Huxley, Sigmund Freud, and many other participants in the historical drama of science and Christianity. (shrink)
L’article examine la question philosophique de la fin du monde en comparant son traitement par Jacques Derrida et par Martin Heidegger. Nous résumons d’abord le concept heideggérien du monde. Après cela, nous présentons la pensée derridienne de la fin du monde comme sa déconstruction. Derrida oppose notamment à Heidegger l’idée de la mort de l’autre comme «fin du monde chaque fois unique». Dans «No apocalypse, not now», il examine également l’idée de la destruction sans reste du monde et de l’humanité, (...) qui ouvre la dimension de l’avenir autrement que chez Heidegger. Dans la dernière partie, en partant des termes Entweltlichung et Unwelt, nous présentons la pensée heideggérienne de la fin du monde: celle-ci n’est pas une figure de l’avenir mais une herméneutique de la désintégration du monde actuel. Pour finir, nous ouvrons la question de l’expression adéquate de la fin du monde. (shrink)
Omnipresent in popular culture, especially in film and literature, the theme of the 'end of the world' is often rejected from contemporary philosophy as hysterical apocalyptism. This volume attempts to show that it is vital that we address the motif of the 'end' in contemporary world – but that this cannot be done without thinking it anew.
Gene editing techniques, such as CRISPR, are being heralded as powerful new tools for delivering agricultural products and foods with a variety of beneficial traits quickly, easily, and cheaply. Proponents are concerned, however, about whether the public will accept the new technology and that excessive regulatory oversight could limit the technology’s potential. In this paper, we draw on the sociotechnical imaginaries literature to examine how proponents are imagining the potential benefits and risks of gene editing technologies within agriculture. We derive (...) our data from a content analysis of public comments submitted to the Food and Drug Administration’s 2017 docket titled “Genome Editing in New Plant Varieties Used for Food.” Our sample frame consists of 26 comments representing 30 agriculture and biotech companies, organizations, and trade associations. Our findings reveal three key sociotechnical imaginaries, including that gene editing technologies in agriculture: are not GMO but instead equivalent to traditional plant breeding; have the potential to usher in a new Green Revolution; and could facilitate the democratization of agricultural biotechnologies. We argue that forming and projecting these collective interpretations of the potential of gene editing technologies for crops and foods plays an important role in efforts by proponents to influence regulatory oversight, modes of governance, and build public acceptance. This research contributes to calls by science and technology studies scholars to investigate emergent concerns and imaginaries for novel technoscientific advances to help inform upstream models of public engagement and governance decisions. (shrink)
I present Gilbert Simondon’s thinking of technics, that I take to be so compelling today because it articulates technological reality in ecological terms as a technogeography and life as being-with-the-machines. I will flesh out Simondon’s program for a being-with-the-machines, show how it corresponds to the essence of the technical objects described in terms of milieu and relation indicate how this is based on Simondon’s ontology of individuation suggest a criticism of Simondon, insofar as he would underestimate the technicality of the (...) human being him/herself and of his/her world. (shrink)
The principle of self-determination plays a crucial role in contemporary clinical ethics. Somewhat simplified, it states that it is ultimately the patient who should decide whether or not to accept suggested treatment or care. Although the principle is much discussed in the academic literature, one important aspect has been neglected, namely the fact that real-world decision making is temporally extended, in the sense that it generally takes some time from the point at which the physician determines that there is a (...) decision to be made and that the patient is capable of making it, to the point at which the patient is actually asked for his or her view. This article asks under what circumstances, if any, temporising—waiting to pose a certain treatment question to a patient judged to have decision-making capacity—is compatible with the principle of self-determination. (shrink)
Ce texte a déjà paru dans la Revue philosophique de Louvain, 108, 2010, p. 527-548. Mon sujet sera le motif du « rythme » d'après des textes de Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. Bien sûr, j'aurais aimé parler du rythme de Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, du dictamen de sa phrase. Rythme admirable, oui, mais sujet pour moi intraitable dans le cadre d'un essai philosophique. Le rythme de la phrase de Lacoue-Labarthe se fait au creux d'autres rythmes et s'amplifie en chambre d'échos des voix qu'il met (...) en scène, - Philosophie – Nouvel article. (shrink)
This essay is a comparison between Schelling's and Blanchot's conceptions of the night of the imaginary. Schelling is the most romantic of the German idealist philosophers and Blanchot the most extreme of the French “deconstructionists.“ Their historical link is actually indirect, but they offer two complementary views on the “same“ impersonal nocturnal experience of the imaginary, the approach of which requires a certain self-overcoming of philosophy towards literature.
A critical edition and facing-page translation, accompanied by substantial analytical introduction and notes, of Perspectiva by Roger Bacon, a foundational text of modern optics written in about 1260, which defined the subject for the next 350 years.
What exactly is the unconscious? Although this question has not been sufficiently addressed, the notion of the unconscious is often used in philosophy, literary and cultural theory, and of course psychology, as if it provided a relatively solid foundation or basis for the stories we tell about our culture and ourselves. This article is part of a larger project in which I argue that ‘the unconscious’ is not a basis for our narratives of self and culture, but is, itself, a (...) narrative development - a way of organizing, and thus creating, knowledge. In my discussion, here, of HegeI and Nietzsche, I concur with the supposition that something like the unconscious appeared in Nietzsche’s work (while being absent from Hegel’s); but instead of maintaining that Nietzsche discovered this principle, I suggest that he invented it. More specifically, Nietzsche needed a narrative principle that would help free cultural values that he thought important from their ‘entrapment’ in the Hegelian dialectic.Qu’est au juste I’inconscient? Malgré son indéterminité, la notion d’inconscient est souvent utilisée en philosophie, dans la théorie culturelle et littéraire, et évidemment en psychologie, comme si elle pouvait servir de fondement è la narration culturelle et personnelle. Cet article s’insère dans un projet plus large qui cherche à montrer que “I’inconscient” ne peux servir de fondement aux narrations de soi et de la culture, mais qu’il représente lui-même un développement narratif - une fatçon d’organiser et, de ce fait, de créer la connaissance. Dans la présente discussion sur Hegel et Nietzsche, je concède que I’inconscient est apparu dans l’oeuvre de Nietzsche (alors qu’elle est absente de l’oeuvre de Hegel); mais loin de I’avoir découvert, je prétend que Nietzsche I’a inventé. En effet, ce dernier devait recourir à un principe narratif qui libérerait les valeurs culturelles qu’il croyait importantes de leur emprisonnement dans la dialectique hégélienne. (shrink)
This article addresses resilience in relation to climate change. Currently, our communities are not resilient to climate changes due to a strikingly limited political and scientific framing of climate change as solely a problem of emissions and individual behaviour. Owing to vulgarized interpretations of individual incentives for climate action, contextual barriers to action and the efficiency of individual climate action, this causes an action deficit on both collective and individual levels. We argue that a paradigm shift is needed in order (...) to engage with more adequate academic analysis and efficient policies. This new paradigm should focus on the capacities of societal institutions, which reflect precisely the level of climate resilience in a society. Resilience is not about societal and political immovability when faced with crisis of the dimensions of the climate crisis. It is about changing our society and politics and building institutions that enable us to properly respond to crisis. (shrink)
This paper is motivated by Heidegger’s invitation to think the essence of technics through a dialogue between technics and art. This dialogue is approached with the help of several artworks belonging to what can be called the “technological turn” in art. First, I draw a schematic picture of notions of instrumentality, rationality, totality, and teleology inherited from classical philosophy of art and technology and challenged by contemporary art. I underline the Romantic claim that art overcomes these features thanks to its (...) freedom and ask, referring to the work of Gilbert Simondon, whether technology could also be liberated from its subordination to utilitarian ends. Second, I look at how certain contemporary works of art attempt to solve some of these problems. Artists who seize technical objects generally seek to make their functioning visible and problematic by distorting, interrupting, or otherwise modifying the technical dispositif—this is when a machine becomes a work of art. I show how this happens in certain works of Rebecca Horn, Jean Tinguely, Anaïs Tondeur, Eduardo Kac, and Tomas Saraceno. In conclusion, I show how art can liberate technology by liberating it from utility and instrumentality and by exposing it as such in its functioning. On the other hand, I argue that technology can liberate art, both through artistic techniques and nonartistic technological processes. (shrink)
Historians of mediaeval optics have devoted a large measure of their effort to the work of three men who wrote on optics in the second half of the thirteenth century — Roger Bacon, Witelo, and John Pecham. Such an emphasis is not without justification: not only were they the ones who, under the influence of Alhazen's Perspectiva, produced the great thirteenth-century synthesis of optical knowledge, but it was chiefly through the dissemination of their works in manuscripts and printed editions that (...) this optical knowledge was transmitted to subsequent generations. (shrink)
Is Heidegger’s theory of the era of technology a sufficent hermeneutics of contemporary globalization? It remains invaluable because it understands technology in terms of transcendence, and transcencence in terms of being-in-the-world. But should it nevertheless be revised in the context of contemporary social and technological environment? This article shows firstly how Heidegger’s general idea of being-in-the-world is specified in his theory of technology, and how technology reduces man and nature into “natural resources” and being into elemental techno-nature. Secondly, the article (...) presents two types of critique to Heidegger’s idea: on the one hand, Ihde, Latour and Stiegler question Heidegger’s understanding of technology as a total system; on the other hand, Foucault and Eldred question Heidegger’s understanding of technology independently of social and economical structures. The article suggests that re-interpreted through these critiques, the theory of technology gives a good basis for an ontology of contemporary “uprooted” existence. (shrink)
In the concluding section of the Minos (318c ff), Socrates praises the oldest law, that given to Crete by Minos, who in Socrates's characterization obtained this law as a result of his status as confidant of Zeus, Minos's father (319d-e). The law that is unchanging, permanent, is therefore the best law, and arguably the only law that truly reflects the “lawness” of law, other possible senses of law being incomplete, as the dialogue shows. There is, moreover, something divine about the (...) character of the best law—though this divinity would seem to have little to do with its tenuous relationship to…. (shrink)
This essay is a broad overview of philosophy’s capacity of facing the historicity of nature. It shows why classical philosophy of history, especially Hegel, left nature outside of history, and also in what sense this kind of philosophy is outdated. Then it shows how natural sciences discovered historical phenomena since the invention of biology at the very end of the eighteenth century and especially since Darwinism, although these did not examine the philosophical presuppositions of their theories. Assuming that the challenge (...) of contemporary philosophy of history is to learn to include nature in history, the essay finally examines climatic change as a test case that allows us to see the problematics of nature’s historicity today. Climatic change cannot be explained if one holds onto the classical division into natural sciences and humanities, and this is because it is neither a natural nor a cultural phenomenon but manifests reality as a techno-nature, that has a singular, non-teleological and eventful historicity, the understanding of which is crucial today. (shrink)
_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 3, pp 369 - 389 The article’s aim is to measure the potential of Derrida’s work for a philosophy of technique. It shows why Derrida does not present a positive philosophy of technology but rather describes technique as a _quasi_-technique, _as if_ a technique. The article inquires into the potential of such a quasi-technique for a contemporary philosophy of technology: it is suggested that it can function as a salutary “deconstruction” of mainstream philosophy of technology (...) because it shows how to think technique _in_ the absence of essence and _as_ the absence of essence.The article begins with a survey of the machines that figure in Derrida’s texts. It then examines three propositions concerning technology in Derrida’s work:Derrida thinks technology as a metaphor of _writing_ and not the other way round.Derrida thinks technique as _prosthesis_, firstly of memory, then more generally of life.Derrida’s quasi-technique relies on his peculiar conception of the incorporal _materiality_ of technique. (shrink)
Cet article présente la conception hégélienne de la vie naturelle comme limite : la nature est la limite de l’esprit, et le vivant est une limite en soi. Examiné surtout dans l’animal, « vivre » équivaut à tracer les limites du vivant, dont on voit ainsi la plasticité fondamentale. La finitude du vivant se traduit en une imagination purement sensible, qui se réalise dans la création d’un espace-temps singulier ; le sens qui dirige cette activité vise à reproduire une existence, (...) non une forme, ce qui en fait plus un terme qu’un but de la téléologie animale. Or, si la nature vivante est la limite de l’esprit, peut-elle « surprendre » celui-ci ? Si la « surprise » dit l’apparition de l’inouï depuis la création libre, elle ne le peut pas, car la plasticité naturelle ne produit que la contingence de l’existence et de l’entendement. Mais la contingence ne soumet pas pour autant la nature intégralement à l’idée : en ce sens, la nature reste pour Hegel l’ « énigme » qui tient l’esprit en éveil.The article presents Hegel’s conception of natural life as a limit : nature is the limit of spirit, and the living being is a limit as such. Examined above all in the animal, life is the tracing of the limits of the living being, whose fundamental plasticity becomes manifest. The living being’s finitude is conveyed in its purely sensible imagination, which realises itself in the creation of a singular space-time ; the sense directing this activity aims at reproducing an existence, not a form, and such a sense is rather the end than the aim of animal teleology. Now, if living nature is spirit’s limit, can it « surprise » the latter ? It cannot, if « surprise » means the apparition of an unprecedented possibility of a free creation, for natural plasticity can only produce the contingencies of existence and understanding. But neither does the contingency of nature subjugate it integrally to idea : in this sense, nature remains for Hegel the « enigma » that keeps spirit awake. (shrink)