9 found
Order:
  1. How the growth of science ends theory change.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):139-155.
    This paper outlines a defense of scientific realism against the pessimistic meta- induction which appeals to the phenomenon of the exponential growth of science. Here, scientific realism is defined as the view that our current successful scientific theories are mostly approximately true, and pessimistic meta- induction is the argument that projects the occurrence of past refutations of successful theories to the present concluding that many or most current successful scientific theories are false. The defense starts with the observation that at (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  2. Theory Change and Degrees of Success.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1283-1292.
    Scientific realism is the position that success of a scientific theory licenses an inference to its approximate truth. The argument from pessimistic meta-induction maintains that this inference is undermined due to the existence of theories from the history of science that were successful, but false. I aim to counter pessimistic meta-induction and defend scientific realism. To do this, I adopt a notion of success that admits of degrees, and show that our current best theories enjoy far higher degrees of success (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  3. Scientific Revolutions and the Explosion of Scientific Evidence.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):5039-5072.
    Scientific realism, the position that successful theories are likely to be approximately true, is threatened by the pessimistic induction according to which the history of science is full of suc- cessful, but false theories. I aim to defend scientific realism against the pessimistic induction. My main thesis is that our current best theories each enjoy a very high degree of predictive success, far higher than was enjoyed by any of the refuted theories. I support this thesis by showing that both (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  4. Understanding Brute Facts.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2005 - Synthese 145 (3):449-466.
    Brute facts are facts that have no explanation. If we come to know that a fact is brute, we obviously don’t get an explanation of that fact. Nevertheless, we do make some sort of epistemic gain. In this essay, I give an account of that epistemic gain, and suggest that the idea of brute facts allows us to distinguish between the notion of explanation and the notion of understanding. I also discuss Eric Barnes’ (1994) attack on Friedman’s (1974) version of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  5. (1 other version)Pessimistic meta-induction and the exponential growth of science1.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2009 - In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis. Frankfurt: Ontos. pp. 11--95.
  6. Normativität und Bayesianismus.Stephan Hartmann & Ludwig Fahrbach - 2004 - In Bernward Gesang (ed.), Deskriptive oder normative Wissenschaftstheorie. ontos-Verlag. pp. 177-204.
    Das Thema dieses Bandes ist die Frage, ob die Wissenschaftstheorie eine normative Disziplin ist. Zunächst überrascht die Frage, denn für viele Wissenschaftstheoretiker ist die Antwort ein klares „Ja“; sie halten es für einen Allgemeinplatz, dass die Wissenschaftstheorie ein normatives Unternehmen ist. Bei genauerem Hinsehen stellt sich jedoch heraus, dass die Frage unterschiedliche Interpretationen zulässt, die einzeln diskutiert werden müssen. Dies geschieht im ersten Abschnitt. Im zweiten Abschnitt suchen wir nach möglichen Erklärungen dafür, warum die Wissenschaftstheorie bisher bei dem Projekt, eine (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. (1 other version)Die Elimination des Wissensbegriffs1.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2004 - Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 6:45-56.
  8. We think, they thought : a critique of the pessimistic meta-meta induction.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2021 - In Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge From the History of Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Scientific realism, the view that our current successful theories are probably approximately true, is challenged by the pessimistic meta-induction, PMI, according to which many successful theories in the past of science were refuted later on. Realists often respond to the PMI by pointing out that sci-ence has improved a lot since the times of the past refuted theories, and these improvements block the PMI and save realism. Antirealists reply that past realists could have said the same thing, namely that science (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  43
    Introduction: Novel Predictions.Ioannis Votsis, Ludwig Fahrbach & Gerhard Schurz - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45:43-45.