This article is a first attempt to line out the conditions under which executives might have a real self-interest in pursuing a broad stakeholder management (SM) orientation to enlarge their power. We suggest that managers have wider latitude of action under an SM approach, even when this is instrumental to financial performance. The causally ambiguity of the performance effects of idiosyncratic relationships with stakeholders not only makes SM strategy difficult for competitors to imitate but also increases managerial discretion. When managers (...) use this situation for their own benefit, they can undermine the purported goals of the SM approach. By analyzing some of the factors that might lead to such disfunctionalities, this article advances a theory of the potential dark side of SM. (shrink)
We draw on the behavioral agency model to explore the ethical consequences of CEO equity incentives. We argue that CEOs are more concerned with funding pension plans when they have more to gain from their stock options yet will increasingly underfund employee pension funds as their current option wealth increases. Our findings reveal that both effects hold when the CEO has greater power over firm decision making. Our study suggests that there is an ethical dimension to equity incentives, given they (...) are intended to align CEO interests with shareholders, yet potentially incentivize CEO behaviors with adverse consequences for employees. Insights from our findings provide boards and regulators with behavioral levers to protect employee well-being in the context of pension funding. (shrink)
We examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family. To do so, we draw upon literature demonstrating that family owners are loss averse with respect to the family’s socioemotional wealth, or the affective endowment derived from firm ownership and control. Our theory and findings suggest that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to (...) non-family firms, and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management. Moreover, the family-firm effect varies with the firm size, the degree of CEO entrenchment, and the firm’s stock structure. We provide important insights regarding differences between family and non-family principals in the use of unethical accounting practices, thereby extending agency theory and advancing an underdeveloped research area. (shrink)
Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.
W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.
Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)
El propósito general de este trabajo investigativo ha sido realizar un estudio sistemático en torno al sentido del dolor en perspectiva interdisciplinaria, con el fin de hacer aproximaciones a una nueva visión que favorezca el significado del dolor. Se presenta la validez y la vigencia de la mirada evangélica del dolor en Francisco de Asís a través de un estudio hermenéutico y de análisis documental. Discusión: el dolor nos hace tomar conciencia de nuestro existir en el mundo, de la individualidad, (...) de los límites y de la corporeidad. Todo ser humano ha experimentado alguna vez el dolor, por ello se afirma que es algo inherente e intrínseco a la condición humana, aunque no se apetezca, no se busque, se le quiera huir o evadir, a pesar de ser, en algunos casos, algo inevitable. El método a seguir es el documental, guiado por la hermenéutica, con el fin de congregar las diversas verdades construidas desde las diferentes disciplinas que acuden al estudio de este tópico. Conclusión: el dolor no se puede reducir a un hecho neurológico ni orgánico exclusivamente. El dolor humano requiere de un tratamiento interdisciplinar si lo que se busca es aportar un valor antropológico en favor de una mirada integral con la que se reconozca el aporte de múltiples intencionalidades epistemológicas y de las ciencias humanas que acuden al estudio del dolor. (shrink)
Ever since John Locke, philosophers have discussed the possibility of a normative epistemology: are there epistemic obligations binding the cognitive economy of belief and disbelief? Locke's influential answer was evidentialist: we have an epistemic obligation to believe in accordance with our evidence. In this dissertation, I place the contemporary literature on agency and reasons at the service of some such normative epistemology. I discuss the semantics of obligations, the connection between obligations and reasons to believe, the implausibility of Lockean evidentialism, (...) and some of the alleged connections between agency and justification. (shrink)
Hermeneutical injustices, according to Miranda Fricker, are injustices that occur “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (Fricker 2007, 1). For Fricker, the relevant injustice in these cases is the very lack of knowledge and understanding experienced by the subject. In this way, hermeneutical injustices are instances of epistemic injustices, the kind of injustice that “wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge” (...) (Fricker 2007, 5). In this paper, however, I identify different means by which our hermeneutic activities lead to social injustices, of both a practical and epistemic kind, and I identify different ways in which those injustices manifest themselves. Since Fricker’s use of the notion of “hermeneutical injustices” to denote a well-defined kind of injustice is rightfully well-established, I here refer to the more general kinds of injustices I have in mind as “hermeneutic injustices” instead. (shrink)
Um alinhamento responsável à alguma versão do naturalismo filosófico requer a articulação explicita e cuidadosa de um argumento em sua defesa. Em quatro passos, o texto que segue abaixo expande e examina a validade de um argumento que é frequentemente rascunhado em favor do naturalismo. Como veremos, contudo, a versão do naturalismo que esse argumento nos permite é um pouco diferente dos naturalismos filosóficos mais populares.
What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)
The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)
O ceticismo é por vezes descartado como uma doutrina absurda e merecedora do seu lugar distante na antiguidade. Nada poderia ser menos correto. O ceticismo continua extremamente relevante para o pensamento filosófico e científico de hoje, servindo como um lembrete de que a sabedoria não é barata nem segura. Nesse texto, o meu objetivo principal é reproduzir o raciocínio das discussões clássicas sobre o ceticismo, mas de uma maneira coloquial e contemporânea. Após seguir as linhas de pensamento de Sexto Empírico, (...) René Descartes, e David Hume, eu vou extrair e identificar claramente as teses centrais que marcam as suas ideias. A minha intenção, porém, não é a de sugerir que as suas teses são auto-evidentes, ou incontestáveis, ou até hoje ainda incontestadas. Muito pelo contrário. A minha intenção é produzir um aperitivo ao debate e um convite a discussão. (shrink)
En el artículo se describe el tránsito filosófico-existencial de Tula, protagonista de la novela La tía Tula de Miguel de Unamuno, por los tres estadios vitales del filósofo danés Søren Kierkegaard. A lo largo del texto, se muestra que las dudas existenciales que se plantea la protagonista son extensivas para todo el género humano. Además, el texto busca mostrar cómo la narrativa del pensador español está plagada de reflexiones filosóficas y está fuertemente influida por el existencialismo cristiano de Kierkegaard. Debatiéndose (...) entre la fe y la razón, Tula transita por los estadios tomando decisiones que entrañan sufrimiento. En esta novela, se plasman los afanes del ser humano por la perpetuación, inmortalidad y salvación frente al rostro descarnado de la nada. (shrink)
A new evolutionary concept is presented, based on the principle of biological diversity by organismal adaptation, more specifically the origin of the first variations and the process leading to speciation. The article suggests the mechanism of stimulation as the major promoter of genetic variation, making an overall assessment and accurate to the natural phenomenon responsible for this evolutionary step. Constantly, environmental forces interact with the organism, favoring changes to the organs toward adaptation. Stimulation focuses on this action?reaction between organism and (...) environment, trying to decipher the causes/consequences resulting. The article also addresses possible relationships and constraints with neo-Darwinism. (shrink)
Lynne Baker was a trenchant critic of reductionist and physicalist conceptions of the universe, as well as the foremost defender of the constitution view of human persons. Baker was a staunch defender of a kind of practical realism, or what she sometimes called a metaphysics of everyday life. And it was this general “common sense” philosophical outlook that underwrote her non-reductionist, constitution view of reality. Whereas most of her contemporaries were given to metaphysical reductionism and eliminativism, born of a penchant (...) for so-called Quinean desert landscapes, Baker was unapologetic and philosophically deft in her defense of ontological pluralism. This volume honors Baker’s work by bringing together 16 critical essays by some of her students, colleagues, interlocutors, and friends. The essays fall into four areas, each an area to which Baker made unique and influential contributions: Practical Realism about the Mind, The Constitution View of Human Persons, The First Person Perspective, and God, Christianity and Naturalism. (shrink)
Externalism about knowledge is thriving in contemporary epistemology. Yet there is no collection devoted exclusively to it. Consequently, externalism about knowledge is too often caricatured as merely reliabilism, too often confused with externalism about justification, and hardly ever considered as a distinct family of related but importantly different views. This collection addresses all of these issues by bringing new essays from leading externalist epistemologists working on seven different branches of this tradition: Traditional Reliabilism, Sensitivity Views, Safety Views, Virtue Epistemology, Proper (...) Functionalism, Naturalized Epistemology, and Knowledge-First Epistemology. This collection highlights their unity, their differences, their interconnections, and their most recent challenges, developments, and extensions. (shrink)
The ability of the medical profession to sustain life, or more appropriately, to prolong dying, in patients with terminal illness, creates a most complex and controversial situation for all involved: the patient, if mentally alert; the patient's family; and the medical care team including physicians, nurses and attendants. This situation is especially complex in large acute care hospitals where medical and nursing students, residents and house officers receive advanced medical training. A major problem, prolonging the dying of the terminally ill, (...) with its medical, legal, ethical and economic complexities now confronts American society. The problem is particularly acute in teaching hospitals, in which one finds a disproportionate number of terminally ill patients. The ability to work at these questions as a community rather than as adversaries will determine much about the ability of the health care system to respect the dignity and autonomy of those who seek aid and comfort when faced with serious illness and impending death. Better communication between the physicians, health care providers, the lawyers and ethicists must be developed in order to solve these problems. Over the next ten years society and our elected representatives will be making very demanding decisions about the use of the health dollar. One possible way to prevent increasing costs is to reach significant agreement on the proper care of the dying. Proper care for the dying is being considered, discussed, and evaluated by very thoughtful people. It is not governments which should decide who is to live or who is to die. There is the serious problem of the 'slippery slope' to euthanasia by omission if cost containment becomes the major force in formulating policy on the proper care of the dying. (shrink)
El artículo comienza con una consideración general en torno a la traducción inspirada en las reflexiones de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Se enfatiza el hecho de que la traducción no es simplemente un reflejo especular del texto original sino una sobreiluminación que oscila entre la participación en la cosa que se discute y la traición al sentido traducido. Una segunda sección está dedicada a la obra de Julia Iribarne como traductora de artículos y libros filosóficos. Se subrayan tanto su carácter de experta (...) en lenguas y cuestiones filosóficas como su condición de pensadora original preocupada por los mismos temas que traduce. Por último, se listan brevemente sus traducciones y se ofrece un comentario más detallado de su última gran realización, la traducción de la Crisis de Edmund Husserl, completada en el añoThe paper begins with a general consideration on translation inspired by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s reflections. The fact is stressed that no translation is simply a mirroring of the original text, but rather a highlighting that fluctuates between participation in the subject under discussion and betrayal of the translated sense. A second section is devoted to Julia Iribarne’s work as translator of philosophical papers and books. Her expertise in languages and philosophical issues, as well as her status as an original thinker engaged in the very topics she translates, are underlined. Finally, her translations are briefly listed, and a rather detailed commentary on her last major achievement, the translation of Edmund Husserl’s Crisis completed in 2008, is provided. (shrink)
The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification has been of undisputed theoretical importance in a wide range of contemporary epistemological debates. Yet there are a host of intimately related issues that have rarely been discussed in connection with this distinction. For instance, the distinction not only applies to an individual’s beliefs, but also to group beliefs and to various other attitudes that both groups and individuals can take: credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. Moreover, discussions of propositional and doxastic justification (...) have rarely focused on broader meta-epistemological issues, and yet meta-epistemological positions can have important implications for first-order views about this distinction. This volume addresses these and other issues by bringing together 16 essays that advance the state-of-the-art thinking on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes and is shaped by a range of issues previously neglected in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)
RESUMEN Partiendo de la discusión del concepto de carne, en este trabajo analizo la común estructura ontológica/biopolítica que comparten los animales humanos y no humanos. Para ello me sirvo de los feminismos materiales y utilizo los hallazgos teóricos del feminismo animalista. También examino la noción de "encierro" en tanto concepto biopolítico que produce un nuevo tipo de ser vivo. Todo ello para, en último lugar, articular un sentido positivo del concepto de encarnación que permita construir comunidad animal. ABSTRACT In this (...) article, I analyze the common ontological/biopolitical structure shared by human and non-human animals, starting out from the discussion of the concept of flesh. To that effect, I resort to material feminisms and to the theoretical findings of animal rights feminism. I also examine the notion of "enclosure" as a biopolitical concept that produces a new kind of living being. All of this serves to formulate a positive sense of the concept of incarnation that allows for the construction of a animal community. (shrink)