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Luis Rosa [27]Luis Munaretti Rosa [1]Luis Carlos Dalla Rosa [1]
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Luis Rosa
University of Cologne
  1. Suspending judgment the correct way.Luis Rosa - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):2001-2023.
    In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to (...)
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  2. Logical Principles of Agnosticism.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1263-1283.
    Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer to it. In particular, I advance two logical (...)
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  3. Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.
    How does rationality bind the agnostic, that is, the one who suspends judgment about whether a given proposition is true? In this paper I explore two alternative ways of establishing what the rational requirements of agnosticism are: the Lockean–Bayesian framework and the doxastic logic framework. Each of these proposals faces strong objections. Fortunately, however, there is a rich kernel of requirements of agnosticism that are vindicated by both of them. One can then endorse the requirements that belong to that kernel (...)
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  4. Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):960-978.
    Why should we avoid incoherence? An influential view tells us that incoherent combinations of attitudes are such that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously vindicated by the evidence. But it is not clear whether this view successfully explains what is wrong with certain akratic doxastic states. In this paper I flesh out an alternative response to that question, one according to which the problem with incoherent combinations of attitudes is that it is impossible for all (...)
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  5. Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis.Luis Rosa - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (4):571-577.
    In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.
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  6. Reasoning without regress.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2263-2278.
    In this paper I explore alternative ways of addressing the infinite regress problem of inference, as it was depicted in Lewis Carroll’s ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. Roughly put, the problem is that if a claim to the effect that one’s premises give support to one’s conclusion must itself be part of one’s premises, then an infinite regress of reasons ensues. I discuss some recent attempts to solve that problem, but I find all of them to be wanting. Those (...)
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  7. Suspension, entailment, and presupposition.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    The paper is concerned with the rational requirements for suspended judgment, or what suspending judgment about a question rationally commits one to. It shows that two purported rational requirements for suspended judgment cannot both be true at the same time, at least when the entailment relation between questions is understood a certain way. The first one says that one is rationally required to suspend judgment about those questions that are entailed by the questions that one already suspends judgment about. The (...)
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  8. How should we ascribe the third stance?Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Alexandra Zinke & Verena Wagner (eds.), Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond. Routledge.
    Epistemologists often describe subjects as being capable of adopting a third kind of categorical doxastic stance regarding whether something is the case, besides belief and disbelief. They deploy a variety of idioms in order to ascribe that stance. In this paper, I flesh out the properties that the third kind of categorical stance is supposed to have and start searching for the best ways to ascribe it. The idioms ‘suspends judgment about whether’ and ‘is agnostic about whether’, among others, are (...)
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  9. Twisted ways to speak our minds, or ways to speak our twisted minds?Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Waldomiro Silva Filho (ed.), Epistemology of Conversation. Springer.
    There are many ways in which a speaker can confuse their audience. In this paper, I will focus on one such way, namely, a way of talking that seems to manifest a cross-level kind of cognitive dissonance on the part of the speaker. The goal of the paper is to explain why such ways of talking sound so twisted. The explanation is two-pronged, since their twisted nature may come either from the very mental states that the speaker thereby makes manifest, (...)
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  10. Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis Again.Luis Rosa - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):95-100.
    I reinforce my defense of permissivism about the rationality of doxastic attitudes on the face of a certain body of evidence against criticism published in this journal by Anantharaman. After making some conceptual clarifications, I manage to show that at least one of my original arguments pro-permissivism is left unscathed by Anantharaman's points.
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  11. Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):156-173.
    In this paper I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise-beliefs to conclusion-beliefs, but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples of (...)
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  12. Evidential support and its presuppositions.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Hinge Epistemology and Religious Belief.
  13.  70
    Uniqueness and Permissiveness in Epistemology.Luis Rosa - 2018 - Oxford Bibliographies — Philosophy.
  14. Doubt.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
  15. Introduction and overview : two entitlement projects.Peter J. Graham, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, Zachary Bachman & Luis Rosa - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.
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  16. Ambiguous Statements about Akrasia.Luis Rosa - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):581-601.
    Epistemologists take themselves to disagree about whether there are situations where it is rational for one to believe that p and rational for one to believe that one’s evidence does not support p (rational akrasia). The embedded sentence ‘one’s evidence does not support p’ can be interpreted in two ways, however, depending on what the semantic contribution of ‘one’s evidence’ is taken to be. ‘One’s evidence’ might be seen as a sheer indexical or as a descriptive singular term. The first (...)
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  17.  47
    Inferential basing and mental models.Luis Rosa - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):102-118.
    In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less (...)
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  18.  54
    Anti-Anti-Reductionist Considerations about the Justification of Testimonial Beliefs.Andre Neiva & Luis Rosa - 2016 - Proceedings of the Brazilian Research Group on Epistemology 2:161-170.
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  19.  46
    Rational Doxastic Dispositions and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Luis Rosa - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):589-607.
    In this paper, I deal with a version of the epistemic regress problem. After rejecting foundationalism as a solution to it, I consider two versions of infinitism. The first one is found to be unacceptable, for it fails both to cohere with certain attributions of justification and also to maintain its internal coherence. The second one avoids both problems, and it is found to be the best way of addressing the epistemic regress problem. As the successful version of infinitism makes (...)
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  20. Introduction to special volume.Luis Rosa - 2013 - Intuitio 6 (2):189-199.
  21.  5
    Correction to: Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):300-300.
    This is a correction to: Luis Rosa, Coherence and Knowability, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2022, pqab076, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqab076.
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  22.  9
    Explicando a racionalidade com atribuições de conhecimento-como.Luis Rosa - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):500-526.
    Na primeira parte deste estudo, defendemos que a afirmação de que um sujeito S crê que ϕ com base em boas razões não pode ser o único tipo de explicação para o fato de que S racionalmente crê que ϕ. Explicar atribuições de racionalidade somente por meio da noção de uma crença baseada em boas razões gera uma versão do problema do regresso das razões. Na segunda parte, apresentamos uma hipótese de acordo com a qual algumas crenças são racionalmente mantidas (...)
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  23.  3
    Explaining Rationality with Attributions of Knowledge-How.Luis Rosa - 2015 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 60 (3):500-526.
    In the first part of this paper, we argue that the claim that a subject S believes that ϕ on the basis of good reasons cannot be the only type of explanation why S rationally believes that ϕ. Explaining attributions of rationality only by means of the notion of a belief being based on good reasons generates one version of the problem of regress of reasons. In the second part we flesh out a hypothesis according to which some beliefs are (...)
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  24.  10
    On the probability of theism.Luis Rosa - 2015 - Dissertatio 41 (S2):215-228.
    A proposição expressa por “Deus existe”, se é verdadeira ou falsa, ela é ou necessariamente verdadeira/falsa ou não necessariamente verdadeira/falsa. Em outras palavras, se G é capaz de ter um valor de verdade v, então ela é ou necessariamente v ou contingentemente v. por “Deus” eu quero significar um ser sobrenatural, com uma mente poderosa e imaterial que supostamente criou o universo. Certamente existem outros significados que estão vinculados a esse termo em certos contextos, mas os argumentos que eu irei (...)
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  25.  23
    Passos levinasianos rumo à evasão da teologia ocidental.Luis Carlos Dalla Rosa - 2019 - Horizonte 16 (51):1218.
    Este artigo abre espaço para discutir a relação entre teologia e ontologia, a partir da ética da alteridade de Emmanuel Lévinas. Trata-se de analisar e compreender o movimento de êxodo ou de evasão ética em relação à força ontológica, ao peso do ser, que impacta também à teologia. O sujeito, exposto à aventura do ser, é alguém cativo de si mesmo. Por outro lado, cabe refletir sobre algumas possíveis repercussões teológicas que emergem da epifania do rosto do/a Outro/a. Pois, embora (...)
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  26.  45
    Reliable deduction.Luis Rosa - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):725.
    Neste artigo trato da questão sobre o que torna uma dedução confiável. Uma resposta satisfatória a tal questão nos ajudaria a entender como dedução pode expandir ou gerar conhecimento. Eu exploro duas respostas a tal questão. A primeira faz uso da noção de acarretamento lógico-formal, enquanto que a segunda faz uso da noção de acarretamento metafísico. A última é superior à primeira, pois nos permite explicar a confiabilidade de uma classe mais ampla de deduções.
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  27.  8
    Reliable deduction.Luis Rosa - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):725-747.
    Neste artigo trato da questão sobre o que torna uma dedução confiável. Uma resposta satisfatória a tal questão nos ajudaria a entender como dedução pode expandir ou gerar conhecimento. Eu exploro duas respostas a tal questão. A primeira faz uso da noção de acarretamento lógico-formal, enquanto que a segunda faz uso da noção de acarretamento metafísico. A última é superior à primeira, pois nos permite explicar a confiabilidade de uma classe mais ampla de deduções.
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  28.  63
    Justification and Cognitive Algorithms.Luis Rosa - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):503-515.
    In this paper, we offer an alternative interpretation for the claim that ‘S is justified in believing that φ’. First, we present what seems to be a common way of interpreting this claim: as an attribution of propositional justification. According to this interpretation, being justified is just a matter of having confirming evidence. We present a type of case that does not fit well with the standard concept, where considerations about cognition are made relevant. The concept of cognitive algorithm is (...)
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