Order:
Disambiguations
Luis Rosa [13]Luis Munaretti Rosa [1]
See also
Luis Rosa
University of Cologne
  1.  62
    Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise-beliefs to conclusion-beliefs, but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  49
    Logical Principles of Agnosticism.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Logic arguably plays a role in the normativity of reasoning. In particular, there are plausible norms of belief/disbelief whose antecedents are constituted by claims about what follows from what. But is logic also relevant to the normativity of agnostic attitudes? The question here is whether logical entailment also puts constraints on what kinds of things one can suspend judgment about. In this paper I address that question and I give a positive answer to it. In particular, I advance two logical (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis.Luis Rosa - 2012 - Logos and Episteme (4):571-577.
    In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called ‘Uniqueness Thesis.’ As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  4.  4
    Uniqueness and Permissiveness in Epistemology.Luis Rosa - 2018 - Oxford Bibliographies — Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  33
    Reasoning Without Regress.Luis Rosa - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    In this paper I explore alternative ways of addressing the infinite regress problem of inference, as it was depicted in Lewis Carroll’s ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’. Roughly put, the problem is that if a claim to the effect that one’s premises give support to one’s conclusion must itself be part of one’s premises, then an infinite regress of reasons ensues. I discuss some recent attempts to solve that problem, but I find all of them to be wanting. Those (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  51
    Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis Again - A Reply to Anantharaman.Luis Rosa - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):95-100.
    I reinforce my defense of permissivism about the rationality of doxastic attitudes in the face of a certain body of evidence against criticism published in this journal by Anantharaman. After making some conceptual clarifications, I manage to show that at least one of my original arguments pro-permissivism is left unscathed by Anantharaman's points.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  11
    Reliable Deduction.Luis Rosa - 2017 - Veritas 62 (3):725.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  57
    Introduction to Special Volume.Luis Rosa - 2013 - Intuitio 6 (2):189-199.
  9.  30
    In Order to Be Rational You Need to Know How to Reason.Luis Rosa - 2016 - Philosophical Inquiries 4 (1):25-39.
    In Section 1, we make some preliminary remarks about the concept of epis‐ temic entitlement, understood in terms of ex ante rationality. In Section 2, we argue that a certain epistemological view – one according to which ex ante rationality is solely a func- tion of available reasons – is inadequate. In Sections 3-4 we will esh out an alternative view about ex ante rationality, one according to which forming a certain belief is rational for a subject S only when (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  21
    Inferential Basing and Mental Models.Luis Rosa - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):102-118.
    In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  36
    Justification and Cognitive Algorithms.Luis Rosa - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):503-515.
    In this paper, we offer an alternative interpretation for the claim that ‘S is justified in believing that φ’. First, we present what seems to be a common way of interpreting this claim: as an attribution of propositional justification. According to this interpretation, being justified is just a matter of having confirming evidence. We present a type of case that does not fit well with the standard concept, where considerations about cognition are made relevant. The concept of cognitive algorithm is (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  11
    Rational Doxastic Dispositions and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Luis Rosa - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):589-607.
    In this paper, I deal with a version of the epistemic regress problem. After rejecting foundationalism as a solution to it, I consider two versions of infinitism. The first one is found to be unacceptable, for it fails both to cohere with certain attributions of justification and also to maintain its internal coherence. The second one avoids both problems, and it is found to be the best way of addressing the epistemic regress problem. As the successful version of infinitism makes (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  8
    Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis Again.Luis Rosa - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):95-100.
    I reinforce my defense of permissivism about the rationality of doxastic attitudes on the face of a certain body of evidence against criticism published in this journal by Anantharaman. After making some conceptual clarifications, I manage to show that at least one of my original arguments pro-permissivism is left unscathed by Anantharaman's points.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography