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William G. Lycan [214]William Lycan [16]W. G. Lycan [11]Wg Lycan [2]
W. Gregory Lycan [2]W. Lycan [2]W. . . Gregory Lycan [1]
  1.  55
    Judgement and Justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    Toward theory a homuncular of believing For years and years, philosophers took thoughts and beliefs to be modifications of incorporeal Cartesian egos. ...
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  2. Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  3. Mind and Cognition: A Reader.William G. Lycan (ed.) - 1990 - Blackwell.
  4. Form, Function and Feel.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (January):24-50.
  5.  20
    Real Conditionals.G. Lycan William - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the syntax of conditionals, as investigated by linguists.
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  6. On the Gettier Problem Problem.William G. Lycan - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 148--168.
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  7. Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ..
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  8.  80
    Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP.W. Sauret & W. G. Lycan - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):363-370.
    Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories in the philosophy of mind are offered as explanations of what it is that makes a mental state a conscious state. According to HOP, a mental state is conscious just in case it is itself represented in a quasi-perceptual way by an internal monitor or scanning device. We start with one of the more popular objections to HOP and a seemingly innocuous concession to it: identifying the internal monitor with the faculty of attention. We conclude by (...)
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  9. Giving Dualism its Due.William Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
    Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind?body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered.
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  10.  12
    Modality and Meaning.William Lycan - 1994 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    MEANING POSTULATES REINSTATED If I am right in agreeing with Cresswell that the "logicarrlexicaT distinction is one of degree rather than one of kind, that in turn impugns the distinction between the official truth-rules that define logical ...
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  11. The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  12. A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Analysis 61 (269):3-4.
  13. Enactive Intentionality.William G. Lycan - 2006 - Psyche 12 (3).
    Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities.
     
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  14.  30
    Knowing Who.Steven Boër & William Lycan - 1986 - MIT Press.
  15. Moore Against the New Skeptics.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (1):35 - 53.
  16. What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental?William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (2):229-238.
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  17. Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
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  18.  22
    On the Plurality of Worlds by David Lewis. [REVIEW]William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
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  19.  87
    Have We Neglected Phenomenal Consciousness?William G. Lycan - 2001 - Psyche 7 (3).
    Charles Siewert's _The Significance of Consciousness_ contends that most philosophers and psychologists who have written about "consciousness" have neglected a crucial type or aspect that Siewert calls "phenomenal consciousness" and tries carefully to define. The present article argues that some philosophers, at least, have not neglected phenomenal consciousness and have offered tenable theories of it.
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  20. The Slighting of Smell.William Lycan - 2000 - In Nalini Bhushan & Stuart Rosenfeld (eds.), Of Minds and Molecules: New Philosophical Perspectives on Chemistry. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 273--289.
     
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  21. Externalism, Naturalism, Nominalism, and Mathematics.William G. Lycan, Penelope Maddy, Gideon Rosen & Nathan Salmon - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-117.
     
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  22.  63
    Two Concepts of Reduction: Modal Realism at Risk.William G. Lycan - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (11):693-694.
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  23. Ideas of Representation.William G. Lycan - 1989 - In David Weissbord (ed.), Mind, Value and Culture: Essays in Honor of E. M. Adams. Ridgeview.
  24.  62
    Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again).William G. Lycan - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.
    An explanatory coherence theory of justification is sketched and then defended against a number of recent objections: conservatism and relativism; wild and crazy beliefs; reliability; warranted necessary falsehoods; basing; distant, unknown coherences; Sosa's “self- and present-abstracts”; and Bayesian impossibility results.
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  25.  4
    Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan & Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
  26. The Trouble with Possible Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1979 - In Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual. Cornell University Press.
     
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  27.  86
    Knowing Who.Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (5):299 - 344.
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  28.  41
    On Two Main Themes in Gutting's What Philosophers Know.William G. Lycan - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):112-120.
    This paper addresses each of two of Gutting's three main contentions: that like anyone else, philosophers are entitled to begin with what they find obvious and that philosophy has produced a distinctive body of knowledge. I emphatically agree with the first contention and expand on it, defending a stronger claim. The second contention I dispute, in spirit if not in letter, on each of several grounds.
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  29.  11
    Logical Form in Natural Language.S. D. Guttenplan & W. G. Lycan - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):538.
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  30. Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
  31.  95
    Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude.William G. Lycan - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):201-215.
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  32. Consciousness as Internal Monitoring.William G. Lycan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.
    Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses.
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  33. Representational Theories of Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness. Indeed, there are now multiple representational theories of consciousness, corresponding to different uses of the term "conscious," each attempting to explain the corresponding phenomenon in terms of representation. More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of _intentionality_, and assumes that intentionality (...)
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  34. A Particularly Compelling Refutation of Eliminative Materialism.William G. Lycan - 2005 - In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.
    The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations.
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  35. The Superiority of Hop to HOT.William G. Lycan - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. pp. 93–114.
  36. Tacit Belief.William G. Lycan - 1986 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.
     
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  37.  58
    Epistemic Value.William G. Lycan - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):137 - 164.
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  38. Sellars' "Grain" Argument.William G. Lycan - 1987 - In W.G. Lycan (ed.), Consciousness. MIT Press.
  39.  83
    Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity.William G. Lycan - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press. pp. 293-305.
    Lycan (1985, 1988) defended a “Principle of Credulity”: “Accept at the outset each of those things that seem to be true” (1988, p. 165). Though that takes the form of a rule rather than a thesis, it does not seem very different from Huemer’s (2001, 2006, 2007) doctrine of phenomenal conservatism (PC): “If it seems to S that p , then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p ” (2007, (...)
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  40. Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning.William G. Lycan - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
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  41.  21
    What Does Taste Represent?William G. Lycan - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-10.
    What does vision represent? What does hearing represent? Smell? Touch? Competing answers to each of these questions have been defended. The present paper argues that the issue of what taste represents is categorically more complicated. In particular, it raises two very difficult dilemmas.
    No categories
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  42. Phenomenal Intentionalities.William Lycan - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):233 - 252.
    There is now a considerable literature that goes under the heading of “phenomenal intentionality.” But it features a number of distinct issues. What they have in common is the claim that intentionality bears a closer relation to phenomenology than had previously been recognized. There is a basic thesis, which is controversial, and there are further arguments attempting to draw more exciting morals from the basic thesis. My purpose in this paper is to survey these issues, see what may be at (...)
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  43.  30
    The Nature of Consciousness. [REVIEW]William G. Lycan - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):745-748.
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  44. What, Exactly, is a Paradox?W. G. Lycan - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):615-622.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  45. Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson's Defense of Conceptual Analysis.William G. Lycan - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
  46. Block and the Representation Theory of Sensory Qualities.William G. Lycan - unknown
    In the nearly half a century since its modern inception (Anscombe (1965), Hintikka (1969)), the Representation theory has faced no more implacable enemy than Ned Block. He has offered objection after objection, usually in the form of apparent counterexamples, and as I write this he shows no sign of flagging.
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  47. Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge.Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Laurence Bonjour, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, Peter Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Keith Lehrer, William Lycan, Peter Markie, George Pappas, Alvin Plantinga, Ernest Sosa, Marshall Swain & Bas van Fraassen - 1996 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    In his widely influential two-volume work, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga argued that warrant is that which explains the difference between knowledge and true belief. Plantinga not only developed his own account of warrant but also mapped the terrain of epistemology. Motivated by Plantinga's work, fourteen prominent philosophers have written new essays investigating Plantingian warrant and its contribution to contemporary epistemology. The resulting collection, representing a broad array of views, not only gives readers a (...)
     
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  48.  6
    “Is” and “Ought” in Cognitive Science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344.
  49. Chomsky on the Mind - Body Problem.William G. Lycan - 2003 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell. pp. 11--28.
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  50. Evidence One Does Not Possess.William G. Lycan - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):114 – 126.
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