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Lydia McGrew [31]Lydia M. McGrew [1]
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  1. Probabilities and the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Sceptical View.Timothy McGrew, Lydia McGrew & and Eric Vestrup - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1027-1038.
    Proponents of the Fine-Tuning Argument frequently assume that the narrowness of the life-friendly range of fundamental physical constants implies a low probability for the origin of the universe ‘by chance’. We cast this argument in a more rigorous form than is customary and conclude that the narrow intervals do not yield a probability at all because the resulting measure function is non-normalizable. We then consider various attempts to circumvent this problem and argue that they fail.
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  2. The Argument From Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2009 - In William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Blackwell. pp. 593--662.
  3.  34
    Internalism and Epistemology : The Architecture of Reason.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2007 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. Routledge.
    Internalism and Epistemology is a powerful articulation and defense of a classical answer to an enduring question: What is the nature of rational belief? In opposition to prevailing philosophical fashion, the book argues that epistemic externalism leads, not just to skepticism, but to epistemic nihilism - the denial of the very possibility of justification. And it defends a subtle and sophisticated internalism against criticisms that have widely but mistakenly been thought to be decisive. Beginning with an internalist response to the (...)
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  4.  20
    Accounting for Dependence: Relative Consilience as a Correction Factor in Cumulative Case Arguments.Lydia McGrew - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):560-572.
    I propose a measure of dependence that relates a set of items of evidence to an hypothesis H and to H's negation. I dub this measure relative consilience and propose a method for using it as a correction factor for dependence among items of evidence. Using RC, I examine collusion and testimonial independence, the value of diverse evidence, and the strengthening of otherwise weak or non-existent cases. RC provides a valuable tool for formal epistemologists interested in analyzing cumulative case arguments.
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  5.  25
    Bayes Factors All the Way: Toward a New View of Coherence and Truth.Lydia McGrew - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):329-350.
    A focus on the conjunction of the contents of witness reports and on the coherence of their contents has had negative effects on the epistemic clarity of the Bayesian coherence literature. Whether or not increased coherence of witness reports is correlated with higher confirmation for some H depends upon the hypothesis in question and upon factors concerning the confirmation and independence of the reports, not directly on the positive relevance of the contents to each other. I suggest that Bayesians should (...)
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  6.  7
    Undesigned Coincidences and Coherence for an Hypothesis.Lydia McGrew - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-28.
    Testimonial evidence that is particularly helpful to confirmation combines agreement on some content with variation of detail. I examine the phenomenon of “undesigned coincidences” from a probabilistic point of view to explain how varied reports, including those that dovetail in detail, assist confirmation of an hypothesis. The formal analysis uses recent work in probability theory surrounding the concepts of dependence, independence, and varied evidence. I also discuss the connection between these types of report connections and an hypothesis about the reliability (...)
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  7.  75
    Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual Support.Lydia McGrew & Timothy McGrew - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):55-77.
    The phenomenon of mutual support presents a specific challenge to the foundationalist epistemologist: Is it possible to model mutual support accurately without using circles of evidential support? We argue that the appearance of loops of support arises from a failure to distinguish different synchronic lines of evidential force. The ban on loops should be clarified to exclude loops within any such line, and basing should be understood as taking place within lines of evidence. Uncertain propositions involved in mutual support relations (...)
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  8. Likelihoods, Multiple Universes, and Epistemic Context.Lydia McGrew - 2005 - Philosophia Christi 7 (2):475 - 481.
    Both advocates and opponents of the fine-tuning argument treat multiple universes with a selection effect as a legitimate hypothesis to explain the life-permitting values of the constants in our universe. I argue that, except where there is specific relevant prior information, the occurrence of multiple instances of a low-likelihood causal process should not be treated as an alternative hypothesis to a higher-likelihood causal process. Since an ’ad hoc’ hypothesis can be invented to give high likelihood to any evidence, we must (...)
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  9.  5
    Of Generic Gods and Generic Men: The Limits of Armchair Philosophy of Religion.Lydia McGrew - 2018 - Journal of Analytic Theology 6 (1):183-203.
    Thomas Crisp has attempted to revive something akin to Alvin Plantinga’s Principle of Dwindling Probabilities to argue that the historical case for the resurrection of Jesus does not make the posterior probability of the resurrection very high. I argue that Crisp’s argument fails because he is attempting to evaluate a concrete argument in an a priori manner. I show that the same moves he uses would be absurd in other contexts, as applied both to our acquaintance with human beings and (...)
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  10.  3
    The World, the Deceiver, and The Face in the Frost.Lydia McGrew - 2018 - Quaestiones Disputatae 8 (2):112-146.
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  11.  16
    Probability Kinematics and Probability Dynamics.Lydia McGrew - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:89-105.
    Richard Jeffrey developed the formula for probability kinematics with the intent that it would show that strong foundations are epistemologically unnecessary. But the reasons that support strong foundationalism are considerations of dynamics rather than kinematics. The strong foundationalist is concerned with the origin of epistemic force; showing how epistemic force is propagated therefore cannot undermine his position. The weakness of personalism is evident in the difficulty the personalist has in giving a principled answer to the question of when the conditions (...)
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  12.  98
    Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23:239-256.
    On the “Russellian” solution to the Gettier problem, every Gettier case involves the implicit or explicit use of a false premise on the part of the subject. We distinguish between two senses of “justification” ---“legitimation” and “justification proper.” The former does not require true premises, but the latter does. We then argue that in Gettier cases the subject possesses “legitimation” but not “justification proper,” and we respond to many attempted counterexamples, including several variants of the Nogot scenario, a case involving (...)
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  13.  98
    On Not Counting the Cost: Ad Hocness and Disconfirmation.Lydia McGrew - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):491-505.
    I offer an account of ad hocness that explains why the adoption of an ad hoc auxiliary is accompanied by the disconfirmation of a hypothesis H. H must be conjoined with an auxiliary a′, which is improbable antecedently given H, while ~H does not have this disability. This account renders it unnecessary to require, for identifying ad hocness, that either a′ or H have a posterior probability less than or equal to 0.5; there are also other reasons for abandoning that (...)
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  14.  33
    Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:47-66.
    John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that “justifies” is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general transitive. They respond to attempted counterexamples to transitivity brought by Watkins and (...)
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  15. A Response to Robin Collins and Alexander R. Pruss.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2005 - Philosophia Christi 7 (2005).
     
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  16. The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the Miraculous.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2012 - In Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representing numerous epistemically relevant details in the unique situation in which (...)
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  17.  47
    Psychology for Armchair Philosophers.Lydia McGrew - 1998 - Idealistic Studies 28 (3):145-155.
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  18.  21
    Testability, Likelihoods, and Design.Lydia McGrew - 2004 - Philo 7 (1):5-21.
    It is often assumed by friends and foes alike of intelligent design that a likelihood approach to design inferences will require evidenceregarding the specific motives and abilities of any hypothetical designer. Elliott Sober, like Venn before him, indicates that this information is unavailable when the designer is not human and concludes that there is no good argument for design in biology. I argue that a knowledge of motives and abilities is not always necessary for obtaining a likelihood on design. In (...)
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  19. On the Historical Argument: A Rejoinder to Plantinga.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2006 - Philosophia Christi 8 (1):23-38.
  20.  37
    Jeffrey Conditioning, Rigidity, and the Defeasible Red Jelly Bean.Lydia McGrew - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):569-582.
    Jonathan Weisberg has argued that Jeffrey Conditioning is inherently “anti-holistic” By this he means, inter alia, that JC does not allow us to take proper account of after-the-fact defeaters for our beliefs. His central example concerns the discovery that the lighting in a room is red-tinted and the relationship of that discovery to the belief that a jelly bean in the room is red. Weisberg’s argument that the rigidity required for JC blocks the defeating role of the red-tinted light rests (...)
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  21.  30
    Tall Tales and Testimony to the Miraculous.Lydia McGrew - 2012 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):39-55.
    In the debate over testimony to miracles, a common Humean move is to emphasize the prior improbability of miracles as the most important epistemic factor. Robert Fogelin uses the example of Henry, who tells multiple tall tales about meeting celebrities, to argue that low prior probabilities alone can render testimony unbelievable, with obvious implications for testimony to miracles. A detailed Bayesian analysis of Henry’s stories shows instead that the fact that Henry tells multiple stories about events that occurred independently if (...)
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  22.  6
    Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem.Timothy Mcgrew & Lydia Mcgrew - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23:239-256.
    On the “Russellian” solution to the Gettier problem, every Gettier case involves the implicit or explicit use of a false premise on the part of the subject. We distinguish between two senses of “justification” ---“legitimation” and “justification proper.” The former does not require true premises, but the latter does. We then argue that in Gettier cases the subject possesses “legitimation” but not “justification proper,” and we respond to many attempted counterexamples, including several variants of the Nogot scenario, a case involving (...)
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  23.  18
    Level Connections in Epistemology.Lydia M. McGrew & Timothy J. McGrew - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):85 - 94.
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  24.  4
    Foundationalism, Transitivity and Confirmation.Timothy Mcgrew & Lydia Mcgrew - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:47-66.
    John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that “justifies” is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general transitive. They respond to attempted counterexamples to transitivity brought by Watkins and (...)
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  25.  4
    Evidential Diversity and the Negation of H: A Probabilistic Account of the Value of Varied Evidence.Lydia McGrew - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
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  26.  4
    Reason, Rhetoric and the Price of Linguistic Revision.Lydia McGrew - 1997 - Public Affairs Quarterly 11 (3):255-279.
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  27.  1
    Probability Kinematics and Probability Dynamics.Lydia Mcgrew - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:89-105.
    Richard Jeffrey developed the formula for probability kinematics with the intent that it would show that strong foundations are epistemologically unnecessary. But the reasons that support strong foundationalism are considerations of dynamics rather than kinematics. The strong foundationalist is concerned with the origin of epistemic force; showing how epistemic force is propagated therefore cannot undermine his position. The weakness of personalism is evident in the difficulty the personalist has in giving a principled answer to the question of when the conditions (...)
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  28. Book Review. [REVIEW]Lydia Mcgrew - 1999 - Philosophia Christi 1 (2):160-162.
     
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  29. Historical Inquiry.Lydia McGrew - 2013 - In Charles Taliaferro Victoria Harrison & Stewart Goetz (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Theism.
    Two different types of objections to the historical investigation of miracles imply that such investigation is inappropriate or can never lead to rational belief that a historical miracle has occurred. The first objection concerns the alleged chasm between the rational realm of history and the realm of faith. The second objection alleges that God is, or would be if he existed, too much unlike ourselves for us reasonably to use Divine action as an explanatory hypothesis. Both objections involve a tacit (...)
     
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  30. Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason.Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew - 2006 - Routledge.
    This book is a sustained defence of traditional internalist epistemology. The aim is threefold: to address some key criticisms of internalism and show that they do not hit their mark, to articulate a detailed version of a central objection to externalism, and to illustrate how a consistent internalism can meet the charge that it fares no better in the face of this objection than does externalism itself. This original work will be recommended reading for scholars with an interest in epistemology.
     
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  31. Mere Creation: Science, Faith, and Intelligent Design.Lydia McGrew - 1999 - Philosophia Christi 1 (2):160-162.
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  32. Probabilistic Issues Concerning Jesus of Nazareth and Messianic Death Prophecies.Lydia McGrew - 2013 - Philosophia Christi 15 (2):311-328.
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