Thirty-eight “practiced” dreamers and 50 “novice” dreamers completed questionnaires assessing the cognitive, metacognitive, and emotional qualities of recent waking and dreaming experiences. The present findings suggest that dreaming cognition is more similar to waking cognition than previously assumed and that the differences between dreaming and waking cognition are more quantitative than qualitative. Results from the two studies were generally consistent, indicating that high-order cognition during dreaming is not restricted to individuals practiced in dream recall or self-observation. None of the measured (...) features was absent or infrequent in reports of either dreaming or waking experiences. Recollections of dreaming and waking experiences were similar for some cognitive features and different for other features. (shrink)
Color conveys critical information about the flavor of food and drink by providing clues as to edibility, flavor identity, and flavor intensity. Despite the fact that more than 100 published papers have investigated the influence of color on flavor perception in humans, surprisingly little research has considered how cognitive and contextual constraints may mediate color–flavor interactions. In this review, we argue that the discrepancies demonstrated in previously-published color–flavor studies may, at least in part, reflect differences in the sensory expectations that (...) different people generate as a result of their prior associative experiences. We propose that color–flavor interactions in flavor perception cannot be understood solely in terms of the principles of multisensory integration but that the role of higher-level cognitive factors, such as expectations, must also be considered. (shrink)
We demonstrate by use of a simple one-dimensional model of a square barrier imbedded in an infinite potential well that decoherence is enhanced by chaotic-like behavior. We, moreover, show that the transition h→0 is singular. Finally it is argued that the time scale on which decoherence occurs depends, on the degree of complexity of the underlying quantum mechanical system, i.e., more complex systems decohere relatively faster than less complex ones.
I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I press objections against her constitution view in the following ways: First, I critique an analogy she draws between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view [‘Constitution Problems’ ], (...) each more problematic than the next: CP1: Her definition of constitution lacks explanatory power; CP2: If there is a plausible definition of constitution, constitution implies either too many persons or no human persons at all; CP3: Constitution yields no essential distinction between human and divine persons. If my argument go through, her constitution view has neither an explanation for diachronic personal identity nor personal identity through resurrection. (shrink)
The philosophy of mind has long been dominated by the view that mental states are identical with, constituted by, or grounded in brain states. Lynne Rudder Baker has been a persistent critic of this view, developing instead a theory grounded in a larger metaphysical outlook called Practical Realism. This volume is the first critical book-length evaluation of her views and criticism; leading philosophers answer her challenges and explore the consequences of Practical Realism, and Baker herself provides thoughtful replies to (...) elaborate her own position. (shrink)
Lynne Baker’s Constitution Theory seems to be the farthest-reaching and yet the most subtly elaborated antireductive metaphysics available today. Its original theoretical contribution is a nonmereological theory of material constitution, which yet has a place for classical and Lewisian mereology. Constitution Theory hence apparently complies with modern natural science, and yet rescues the concrete everyday world, and ourselvesin it, from ontological vanity or nothingness, and does it by avoiding dualism. Why, then, does it meet so many opponents—or rather, why (...) are its many opponents so stubbornly resisting the very idea of constitution, in Baker’s form? One of the most resisted claims is. Is unity without identity—the feature distinguishing the relation between constituting and constituted things—the only nondualist way to oppose reductionism? What would be the price to pay for unity with identity—without reduction? What I call the Unitarian Tradition, going back to Plato, keeps working out the original Platonic way of constructing acomplex object as a Unity comprising a Collection, as opposed to the Aristotelian suggestion of opposing Collections and Substances. For once you have split things apart ontologically, unifying them again may prove a very hard task. (shrink)
In "Persons and Bodies," Lynne Baker defends what she calls the "Constitution View" of human persons, according to which (a) human persons are constituted by their bodies, and (b) constitution is an asymmetric, nontransitive relation that is somehow "intermediate between identity and separate existence". (Baker 2000: 29) Thesis (a), or something like it, is precisely what we would expect from someone who believes that persons and bodies both are material objects. But thesis (b) is distinctive. Materialists who treat constitution (...) as identity arrive at the view that human persons are identical with their bodies, their brains, or some other material object in the vicinity of their heads. At the other extreme, materialists who treat constitution as nothing more than complete overlap without identity arrive at a simple coincidence theory of the relation between persons and bodies (or brains, or whatever). Baker's view is supposed to stake out a novel account of the nature of constitution. (shrink)
I have been writing and publishing in economics for 50 years and much of my work has been debated and criticised. But I think that this is the first time that someone has honoured me by a full-scale article criticising an unpublished working paper. I am very grateful to Lynne Chester for bringing the questions I raise to a wider audience. The working paper that she criticizes went through several versions, of which the 12 July 2017 draft that (...) class='Hi'>Lynne downloaded from the World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research website is not the final version. In addition, the working paper has now expanded into a book entitled Is There a Future for Heterodox Economics?. Lynne's criticisms help me to attempt to make the text clearer and deal with some misunderstandings that have arisen... (shrink)
Lynne Rudder Baker wants to reconcile the doctrine of resurrection in Christianity with materialism. He claims that we can present proper philosophical and theological explanation of the manner of the life after death on the basis of theory of constitution as a physical approach. Lynne Rudder Baker, Instead of philosophically explaining how mental life is related to the other-worldly body, asserts theologically that the resurrection is the miraculous act of God. One of the consequences of the theory of (...) constitution is that numerical identity of physical and other-worldly body is not important. But it seems that it will not be possible to explain possibility of life after death, unless we take the identity of physical and other-worldly body to be granted. Because human being is composed of soul and body and they are related to each other necessarily rather than contingently. In terms of comparison, we can say that Mūllā Sadrā explains the identity of mundane person and the other-worldly one by the theory of the unity of soul, that is, the human soul determines the matter in every phase and, in terms of the principle of substantial motion, the corporeal and other-worldly body are two aspects of a hierarchical reality. (shrink)
Joanna Crosby and Dianna Taylor: The theme of this special section of Foucault Studies, “Foucauldian Spaces,” emerged out of the 2016 meeting of the Foucault Circle, where the four of you were participants. Each of the three individual papers contained in the special section critically deploys and/or reconceptualizes an aspect of Foucault’s work that engages and offers particular insight into the construction, experience, and utilization of space. We’d like to ask the four of you to reflect on what makes a (...) space Foucauldian, and whether or not you’d consider the space created by the convergence of and intellectual exchanges among an international group of Foucault scholars at the University of New South Wales in the summer of 2016 to be Foucauldian. (shrink)
In Persons and Bodies, Lynne Baker defends what she calls the “Constitution View” of human persons, according to which human persons are constituted by their bodies, and constitution is an asymmetric, nontransitive relation that is somehow “intermediate between identity and separate existence”. Thesis, or something like it, is precisely what we would expect from someone who believes that persons and bodies both are material objects. But thesis is distinctive. Materialists who treat constitution as identity arrive at the view that (...) human persons are identical with their bodies, their brains, or some other material object in the vicinity of their heads. At the other extreme, materialists who treat constitution as nothing more than complete overlap without identity arrive at a simple coincidence theory of the relation between persons and bodies. Baker’s view is supposed to stake out a position between these two extremes, and it does so by offering a novel account of the nature of constitution. (shrink)
The aim of this essay is to extend and refine the concept of ‘haptic visuality’ which has taken decisive shape in film studies so that it can be used to describe narrative form. In recent theory, the haptic has on the whole been set in opposition to narrative. Should narrative cinema then be understood in and through its neglect or disavowal of haptic visuality? Or might certain feature films in fact incorporate haptic imagery, without thereby ceasing to narrate? These are (...) questions urgently provoked by Lynne Ramsay's brilliant first feature film, Ratcatcher. The answer proposed here takes its bearings from the history of literary and filmic Naturalism, and from the understanding of narrative process Siegfried Kracauer develops in his Theory of Film. (shrink)
ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to critically discuss Lynne Rudder's Baker BA-theory of time, and second to contrast it with the R-theory. In the course of my discussion I will contrast three different methodological approaches regarding the relation between common sense and ontology; clarify Russell's authentic view in contrast to the B-theory which is McTaggart's misrepresentation of Russell, and consider how the R-theory can respond to objections Baker makes to eternalism.
O presente trabalho analisa criticamente o realismo prático de Lynne Baker. As principais teses e características da perspectiva de Baker são reconstruídas contra o pano de fundo do que ela denomina a visão standard das atitudes proposicionais e sua eficácia causal. O teste dos contrafactuais, proposto por Baker, para a atribuição de poder causal a estados mentais é, então, criticado. A tese aqui defendida diz que a proposta de Baker fracassa por não ser capaz de fornecer uma resposta adequada (...) ao problema da suficiência. (shrink)
Lynne Baker was a trenchant critic of reductionist and physicalist conceptions of the universe, as well as the foremost defender of the constitution view of human persons. Baker was a staunch defender of a kind of practical realism, or what she sometimes called a metaphysics of everyday life. And it was this general “common sense” philosophical outlook that underwrote her non-reductionist, constitution view of reality. Whereas most of her contemporaries were given to metaphysical reductionism and eliminativism, born of a (...) penchant for so-called Quinean desert landscapes, Baker was unapologetic and philosophically deft in her defense of ontological pluralism. This volume honors Baker’s work by bringing together 16 critical essays by some of her students, colleagues, interlocutors, and friends. The essays fall into four areas, each an area to which Baker made unique and influential contributions: Practical Realism about the Mind, The Constitution View of Human Persons, The First Person Perspective, and God, Christianity and Naturalism. (shrink)
In "Was I Ever a Fetus?" I argued that, since each of us was once an unthinking fetus, psychological continuity cannot be necessary for us to persist through time. Baker claims that the argument is invalid, and that both the premise and the conclusion are false. I attempt to defend argument, premise, and conclusion against her objections.
Locke’s view that continuants are numerically distinct from their constituting hunks of matter is popular enough to be called the “standard account”.1 It was given its definitive contemporary statement by David Wiggins in Sameness and Substance2, and has been defended by many since. Baker’s interesting book contributes new arguments for this view, a new definition of ‘constitution’, and a sustained application to persons and human animals. Much of what she says develops this view in new and important ways. But in (...) some cases she does not advance the position, and in others she takes steps backwards. According to Baker, a person is numerically distinct from her constituting animal. One of Baker’s leading arguments is surprisingly unconvincing. Persons differ in important ways from non-human animals. Only persons are moral agents, modify their goals, have wars, culture, etc. If persons were identical to animals—if we were “nothing but animals”, as she puts it—then the manifest discontinuity between humans and non-human animals would be located “within the domain of biology”. “But from a biological point of view, human animals…are biologically continuous with non-human animals.” (p. 17) The argument fails: why should identifying persons with animals preclude saying that these particular animals have radically distinctive features that are of little interest to biologists? The traditional case for non-identity (which Baker accepts) is more powerful: a person and her constituting animal differ by having different persistence conditions. If my memories were transferred to a new body and my old body destroyed, I the person might survive, but the human animal who constituted me would perish. Therefore, before the transfer, I and the animal that constituted me would be numerically distinct but extremely similar things located in exactly the same place. This consequence—the central thesis of the Wiggins view—is surprising: so surprising that some reject the Wiggins view on that basis.. (shrink)
Baker’s critique of my view of the self as a fiction captures some of its points well but misses the possibility of a theorist’s fiction, like the Equator or a center of gravity, which is not an illusion, but rather an abstraction, like dollars, poems, and software—made of no material but dependent on material vehicles. It is an artifact of our everyday effort to make sense of our own complex activities by postulating a single central source of meaning, intention, and (...) understanding. This is revealed in an example of the heterophenomenological method in action. (shrink)
Each person is perceived by others and by herself as an individual in a very strong sense, namely as a unique individual. Moreover, this supposed uniqueness is commonly thought of as linked with another character that we tend to attribute to persons (as opposed to stones or chairs and even non-human animals): a kind of depth, hidden to sensory perception, yet in some measure accessible to other means of knowledge. I propose a theory of strong or essential individuality. This theory (...) is introduced by way of a critical discussion of Van Inwagen’s and Baker’s ontologies of persons. Composition Theory and Constitution Theory are shown to be complementary, in their opposite strong and weak points. I argue that both theories have unsatisfactory consequences concerning personal identity, a problem which the proposed theory seems to solve more faithfully both to folk intuitions and the phenomenology of personal life. (shrink)
Each person is perceived by others and by herself as an individual in a very strong sense, namely as a unique individual. Moreover, this supposed uniqueness is commonly thought of as linked with another character that we tend to attribute\nto persons (as opposed to stones or chairs and even non-human animals): a kind of depth, hidden to sensory perception, yet in some measure accessible to other means of knowledge. I propose a theory of strong or essential individuality. This theory is (...) introduced by way of a critical discussion of Van Inwagen’s and Baker’s ontologies of persons. Composition\nTheory and Constitution Theory are shown to be complementary, in their opposite strong and weak points. I argue that both\ntheories have unsatisfactory consequences concerning personal identity, a problem which the proposed theory seems to solve\nmore faithfully both to folk intuitions and the phenomenology of personal life. (shrink)