This chapter enters into a debate with the analytic theory of action, especially the version developed by Donald Davidson, who makes it clear that the upsurge of a desire to perform a specific action is a natural event that is causally responsible for the action in question. The narrative interpretation of selfhood was initiated by Hannah Arendt. Selfhood is certainly assured on a passive and affective plane. Edmund Husserl maintains that in the passive sphere, a self is constituted preceding active (...) reflection. As Paul Ricœur clearly determines, the complicity with reality entails a ‘decentred self’ that is strictly opposed to the self-centred, self-controlled, and self-assured ego of modern philosophy. Emmanuel Levinas never accepted Wittgenstein's constraint on philosophy to remain silent with regard to the ‘unsayable’. (shrink)

Kantian transcendental philosophy has shown that we can never decide the question of whether or not the world is infinite in space and time, because, in the field of appearance, the world as a totality of concordant experience "does not exist as [an unconditioned] whole, either of infinite or of finite magnitude."1 However, appearances are encountered in a world, in which one aspect of a thing always invites us to consider others, indicating thereby a road to infinity. According to a (...) discovery of transcendental phenomenology, every single thing contains in itself "a continuum of appearances," which exhibits an "all-sided infinity."2From this an important consequence can be drawn: although the world as a physical .. (shrink)

Phenomenology is a basic philosophical movement belonging to what is called “continental philosophy.” Recently, a new phenomenology has emerged in France. In the period from Levinas and Henry to Marion and Richir, it has become evident that the phenomenon as such cannot be reduced to a mere constitution by intentional consciousness; rather, it must be considered as an event of appearing that establishes itself by itself. This fundamental insight entails important consequences: on the one hand, a new concept of the (...) subject has been elaborated; on the other hand, a new approach to effective reality and objectivity has been developed. Idealism is overcome, transcendentalism is revised and reinterpreted. These changes will certainly have an impact on the destiny of continental philosophy. (shrink)

When we compare Henry and Levinas, we stumble upon a difficulty. Henry tries to reduce transcendence to immanence; Levinas, on the contrary, strives to call immance into question and to lend a new dignity to transcendence. Hence, the two thinkers seem to be diametrically opposed to one another. Yet, if one does not limit oneself to such an overall view, one finds some similarities between them. There is an affinity between the two approaches which results from the fact that both (...) thinkers establish a narrow relationship between originally passive affectivity and the selfhood of the self. Henry and Levinas are, despite all their differences, united in their efforts to ground selfhood on passivity and affectivity. Assuredly, it remains a question whether or not an originally passive affectivity is really capable of founding selfhood. Some doubt arises here from the observation that affectivity tends to anonymity. However, the observation that affectivity is marked by a tendency to anonymity has not only a negative and critical significance; it also characterizes affective states and arousals in a positive way, since one can maintain that the self could not be a ?self? unless it were constantly confronted with a tendency to anonymity. (shrink)

Anticipated by several thinkers of the Western philosophical tradition over a long period of time, the theory of narrative identity was ultimately put forward in the 1980s by philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre, Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor, David Carr and others. In the present paper, an attempt is made to give a survey of the process in which this theory was integrated into contemporary philosophy during the last two and a half decades. It is pointed out that, even in analytic philosophy, (...) the narrative conception of the self came to a certain break-through, but it is equally shown how it increasingly became the target of fundamental objections and how it led to most instructive controverses. The main thesis that underlies the entire survey is that the present state of discussion concerning the narrative view of the self bestows a new actuality upon the Ricoeurian version of the theory. (shrink)

La obra de Hans-Dieter Gondek y László Tengelyi, Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich (2011) ofrece una relectura de los nuevos desarrollos fenomenológicos provenientes de Francia. Su tesis principal es que a pesar de que estos enfoques son muy diversos, ellos tienen en común el siguiente motivo fundamental: una reformulación del estatuto del fenómeno como «acontecimiento de sentido» (Sinnereignis). El presente trabajo ofrece una traducción al español de la «Introducción» de la obra mencionada, donde se expone un panorama general de la filosofía (...) francesa. En segundo lugar, se aborda la lectura de Dominique Janicaud del supuesto «giro teológico» en cierto sector la fenomenología gala, que juzgan parcial e insuficiente para dar cuenta de la nueva fenomenología en el Hexágono. Finalmente, tratan de probar las limitaciones de la lectura de Janicaud, contraponiendo dos perspectivas fenomenológicas, a su juicio, sumamente distintas, a saber: Jean-Luc Marion y Marc Richir. Aunque estas propuestas tengan metas diferentes, ellas llevan adelante una transformación de los límites de la fenomenicidad, un tópico que también está en el centro mismo de los análisis de los autores. (shrink)

A reflection upon Husserl's notion of an "Idea in a Kantian sense" calls for an inquiry into the relationship between experience and infinity. This question is first considered in Kant's doctrine of antinomies. It is shown that, in the Critique of Pure Reason, infinity is held to be a mere idea, which, however, has an indispensable regulative function in experience. It is at this point that Kant is compared with Husserl, who, drawing upon the notion of regulative principle elaborated in (...) the Critique of Pure Reason, conceives of a thing in its particular reality as an Idea in a Kantian sense. A majordifference between the two thinkers is particularly emphasized: Kant uses his analysis of the antinomies for justifying his distinction between the ' thing in itself and 'appearance'; Husserl, on the contrary, tries to overcome this opposition. It is argued forthat this difference between the two philosophers arises from two different notions of infinity: whereas Kant has a potential infinity in view, Husserl, who is familiar with Cantors mathematical and philosophical thoughts, relies upon a scientifically established form of actual, but nevertheless open infinity. (shrink)

Tout en appréciant le «structuralisme dynamique» de Hayden White, Paul Ricoeur s’engage dans un débat avec la démarche «métahistorique». C’est la constitution du champ historique qui est l’objet principal de la controverse. Pour White, c’est le discours sur l’histoire qui constitue ce champ; la tâche métahistorique consiste, donc, dans une analyse de la structure tropologique et des modes explicatifs de ce discours. Ricoeur considère, au contraire, la vie dans l’histoire comme la véritable base de toute constitution du champ historique; c’est (...) pourquoi il cherche à substituer une phénoménologie herméneutique de l’expérience historique au structuralisme dynamique de White. Pourtant, grâce au caractère dynamique du structuralisme whitien, même la démarche métahistorique laisse entrevoir au moins des traces de l’expérience historique. En effet, des traces de cette espèce peuvent être découvertes dans les études consacrées par White aux grands historiens et philosophes de l’histoire du xixe siècle. Mais ce fait ne supprime pas la différence fondamentale entre les deux penseurs. C’est seulement Ricoeur qui assigne à l’expérience historique un rôle fondamental dans la constitution du champ historique. Pourtant, quant à la description précise de ce rôle, il y a aussi une certaine différence entre Temps et récit, d’une part, et La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli, de l’autre. Dans le premier ouvrage, Ricoeur met l’accent sur la redescription ou refiguration de la réalité par le récit. C’est seulement dans le dernier ouvrage qu’il parvient à mettre en évidence que la question d’une reconstruction vraie du passé ne relève pas seulement d’une approche purement épistémologique de l’histoire, mais qu’elle rend nécessaire également une analyse ontologique de la condition historique. C’est dans cette analyse ontologique que la mémoire et l’oubli trouvent leur lieu, qui est, par ailleurs, central. (shrink)

Selfhood, personal identity and singularity are philosophical concepts which undergo a profound change in Levinas, who is led by three main propositions to transform them. The first of these propositions could hardly be simpler: I am myself and no other. The second proposition is more surprising, but it can lay just as well a claim to self-evidence: I remain myself without becoming another even if I do not remain the same as I were. Finally, the third proposition is not only (...) baffling, but almost scandalous: The fact that I am myself and no other cannot be deduced from my identity with myself; it is rather the outcome of my relationshipwith the Other or, more precisely a consequence of what is described by Levinas as my substitution for the Other. These three propositions are inquired into and commented upon in the paper. It is shown, thereby, how a singularity without identity is conceived of by Levinas. (shrink)

The posthumously published text was presented by Laszlo Tengelyi on July 11th 2014 in the context of a conference dedicated to him on his 60th birthday. He died on July 19th 2014. The essay proposes that modern philosophy does not necessarily lead to a metaphysics of subjectivity but can be developed as a thinking of the world. Tengelyi defines philosophy as such as a thinking of the world in the sense of a science of „beings in a whole“. The whole (...) of the world differentiates itself today into nature and history and is, furthermore, marked by openness towards the infinite. Following Kant’s notion of the world, Rickert’s heterological principle, Duns Scotus’ disjunctive transcendentals, Heidegger’s transcendental principle of world-openness and especially Schelling’s philosophy of the Ages of the World, Tengelyi sketches the philosophical task of a scientific thinking of the world, which takes its starting point in freedom as a capacity of ranscendence and determines nature as the past, history as the present, and the infinite as the openness of the world towards the future. (shrink)

Truth is attributed by hermeneutical phenomenology not only to science but also to art and literature. According to Ricoeur, its veritable bearer is the expression of experience that can take artistic and literary forms as well as scientific ones. However, truth in this sense cannot be defined as a correspondence with a ready-made reality, nor can it be reduced to any internal coherence in our knowledge of the world. What is, then, its precise meaning in this context? The two terms (...) mentioned in the title—'redescription' and 'refiguration' of reality—indicate the two answers Ricoeur gives to this question. The similarities and the differences between these two answers are submitted to an inquiry in the following paper, which, relying upon Ricoeur, adumbrates the outlines of a phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to truth. (shrink)

Résumé L’article présente et analyse la critique à laquelle Ricœur soumet la phénoménologie du temps selon ses deux versions principales, élaborées par Husserl et par Heidegger. Il est montré sous quels présupposés cette critique est formulée, quelles découvertes sont attribuées à Husserl et à Heidegger et quels arguments sont dirigés contre leurs idées sur le temps. Finalement, les fondements de la conception ricœurienne du temps sont déduits de son explication avec ses maîtres en phénoménologie.

Selfhood, personal identity and singularity are philosophical concepts which undergo a profound change in Levinas, who is led by three main propositions to transform them. The first of these propositions could hardly be simpler: I am myself and no other. The second proposition is more surprising, but it can lay just as well a claim to self-evidence: I remain myself without becoming another even if I do not remain the same as I were. Finally, the third proposition is not only (...) baffling, but almost scandalous: The fact that I am myself and no other cannot be deduced from my identity with myself; it is rather the outcome of my relationshipwith the Other or, more precisely a consequence of what is described by Levinas as my substitution for the Other. These three propositions are inquired into and commented upon in the paper. It is shown, thereby, how a singularity without identity is conceived of by Levinas. (shrink)

Investigating Subjectivity examines the importance of a phenomenological account of the subject for the nature and the status of phenomenology, for different themes from practical philosophy and in relation to issues from the philosophy of mind.