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  1.  14
    Explanation and Individual Essence.Márta Ujvári - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (2):23-42.
    In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz Principle (PII) and its converse for the qualitative view can be avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity- conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT or, (...)
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  2.  13
    Intrinsic, Hence Real; Extrinsic, Hence Unreal? The Modal and Sortal Properties of Continuants.Márta Ujvári - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):53-66.
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  3. Cambridge Change And Sortal Essentialism.Marta Ujvari - 2004 - Metaphysica 5 (2):25-34.
     
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  4.  30
    Prior's Fable and the Limits of de Re Possibility.Márta Ujvári - 2012 - Synthese 188 (3):459-467.
    Prior's hitherto unpublished "Fable of the Four Preachers" illuminates the connection of the metaphysical issues of trans-world identity with moral trans-world continuity. The paper shows Prior's position with regard to genuine de re temporal possibility of individuals on the basis of chapter VIII of his Papers on Time and Tense. His position is that radical coming-into-being is not a genuine de re temporal possibility of individuals since there is no identifiable individual, before birth, who could be the subject of such (...)
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  5.  27
    Individual Essence: Gibt Es Solche? [REVIEW]Márta Ujvári - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):17-30.
    Two arguments are offered here for postulating individual essences of concrete individuals on top of their sortal essences. One is the explanatory gap argument, the other draws on the analogy with the individual essences of events presupposed in single causal explanations. These arguments support qualitative individual essences with explanatory goals as opposed to hybrid impure relational essences accounting for origin and numerical identity. It is highlighted why origin properties as parts of impure relational essences do not yield genuine de re (...)
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  6. Why Kantian Transcendental Philosophy Cannot Be a Metaphysical Foundation to Analysis of Language.Marta Ujvari - 1989 - Kant-Studien 80 (2):186-197.
  7.  21
    Analytic Philosophy Challenged. Scepticism and Arguing Transcendentally.Márta Ujvári - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (3):285-304.
    Analytic philosophy has recently been challenged from a perspective advocated by Richard Rorty: this favours edifying philosophy against systematic philosophy comprising also analytic philosophy. In Rorty's presentation analytic philosophy is one more variant of the Cartesian—Kantian epistemology which, being committed to a permanent framework of inquiry rooted in our human subjectivity, implies the uniqueness of one conceptual scheme.Against this tenet I argue in two ways. First, I show that analytic philosophy of mind and language with the Fregean background and possible (...)
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  8.  6
    Intrinzično, Dakle Stvarno; Ekstrinzično, Dakle Nestvarno? Modalna I Sortalna Svojstva Kontinuanata.Márta Ujvári - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):53-66.
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  9.  3
    Mereological Principles in Metaphysics.Márta Ujvári - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (2).
  10.  2
    Realism, Reduction and Relation in the Philosophy of Brentano.Marta Ujvari - 1999 - Magyar Filozofiai Szemle:101-119.
    Realism is vulnerable to the sceptical challenge. Metaphysical realism, in general, is the basis of different specific realist positions, such as semantic, internal, causal, intentional, explanatory, scientific, modal, etc., realisms. One aim of the paper is to show how these specific forms satisfy some of the realist criteria and also what counts as antirealism with respect to these forms. The other aim is to cope with realist antireductionism.
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  11. A Szubsztanciák Trópus Elmélete.Márta Újvári - 2003 - Magyar Filozofiai Szemle 3.
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  12. Intrinsic, Hence Real; Extrinsic, Hence Unreal? The Modal and Sortal Properties of Continuants: Intrinzično, Dakle Stvarno; Ekstrinzično, Dakle Nestvarno? Modalna I Sortalna Svojstva Kontinuanata.Márta Ujvári - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):53-66.
    Eliminativist metaphysicians have recently explored various arguments, including those about over-determination, colocation, the problem of the Many and ontological parsimony, for dispensing with kinds and their token continuants. Further, David Lewis’s missing “real temporary intrinsics” has paved the way to treating the sortal and the modal properties yielding the persistence conditions of continuants as unreal because they are extrinsic. In this paper I show, first, that none of the arguments mentioned above are decisive against the disputed entities. Second, I argue (...)
     
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  13. Metafizikai Dilemmák: Szubsztanciák, Trópusok, Változás.Márta Ujvári - 2009 - L'Harmattan.
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  14. Multi-Criteria Predicates and Supervaluation.Marta Ujvari - 1999 - Acta Analytica 14 (1).
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