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Max Coltheart [73]M. Coltheart [11]
  1.  55
    DRC: A dual route cascaded model of visual word recognition and reading aloud.Max Coltheart, Kathleen Rastle, Conrad Perry, Robyn Langdon & Johannes Ziegler - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (1):204-256.
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  2. Abductive inference and delusional belief.Max Coltheart, Peter Menzies & John Sutton - 2010 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 15 (1):261-287.
    Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. Firstly, the abnormalities of cognition which initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Secondly, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider eight) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive (...)
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  3. Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
    We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...)
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  4.  53
    Models of reading aloud: Dual-route and parallel-distributed-processing approaches.Max Coltheart, Brent Curtis, Paul Atkins & Micheal Haller - 1993 - Psychological Review 100 (4):589-608.
  5.  38
    Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):133-158.
    Article copyright 2002. We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher's view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second (...)
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  6. Iconic memory and visible persistence.Max Coltheart - 1980 - Perception and Psychophysics 27:183-228.
  7.  72
    Various Ways to Understand Other Minds: Towards a Pluralistic Approach to the Explanation of Social Understanding.Anika Fiebich & Max Coltheart - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (3):235-258.
    In this article, we propose a pluralistic approach to the explanation of social understanding that integrates literature from social psychology with the theory of mind debate. Social understanding in everyday life is achieved in various ways. As a rule of thumb we propose that individuals make use of whatever procedure is cognitively least demanding to them in a given context. Aside from theory and simulation, associations of behaviors with familiar agents play a crucial role in social understanding. This role has (...)
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  8. The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions.Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):183-216.
    After reviewing factors implicated in the generation of delusional beliefs, we conclude that whilst a perceptual aberration coupled with a particular type of attri‐butional bias may be necessary to explain the specific thematic content of a bizarre delusion, neither of these factors, whether in isolation or in combination, is sufficient to explain the presence of delusional beliefs. In contrast to bias models (theories which explain delusion formation in terms of extremes of normal reasoning biases), we advocate a deficit model of (...)
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  9. Pathologies of belief.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):1-46.
    In this book, psychologists and philosophers describe and discuss a range of case studies of delusional beliefs, drawing out general lessons both for the cognitive architecture of the mind and for the notion of rationality, and exploring connections between the delusional beliefs that occur in schizophrenia and the flawed understanding of beliefs that is characteristic of autism.
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  10. Towards a universal model of reading.Ram Frost, Christina Behme, Madeleine El Beveridge, Thomas H. Bak, Jeffrey S. Bowers, Max Coltheart, Stephen Crain, Colin J. Davis, S. Hélène Deacon & Laurie Beth Feldman - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (5):263.
    In the last decade, reading research has seen a paradigmatic shift. A new wave of computational models of orthographic processing that offer various forms of noisy position or context-sensitive coding have revolutionized the field of visual word recognition. The influx of such models stems mainly from consistent findings, coming mostly from European languages, regarding an apparent insensitivity of skilled readers to letter order. Underlying the current revolution is the theoretical assumption that the insensitivity of readers to letter order reflects the (...)
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  11.  99
    Pathologies of Belief.Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (eds.) - 1991 - Blackwell.
    In this book, psychologists and philosophers describe and discuss a range of case studies of delusional beliefs, drawing out general lessons both for the cognitive architecture of the mind and for the notion of rationality, and exploring connections between the delusional beliefs that occur in schizophrenia and the flawed understanding of beliefs that is characteristic of autism.
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  12.  44
    Cumulative semantic inhibition in picture naming: experimental and computational studies.David Howard, Lyndsey Nickels, Max Coltheart & Jennifer Cole-Virtue - 2006 - Cognition 100 (3):464-482.
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  13. Towards an understanding of delusions of misidentification: Four case studies.Nora Breen, Diana Caine, Max Coltheart, Julie Hendy & Corrine Roberts - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):74–110.
    Four detailed cases of delusions of misidentification (DM) are presented: two cases of misidentification of the reflected self, one of reverse intermetamorphosis, and one of reduplicative paramnesia. The cases are discussed in the context of three levels of interpretation: neurological, cognitive and phenomenological. The findings are compared to previous work with DM patients, particularly the work of Ellis and Young (1990; Young, 1998) who found that loss of the normal affective response to familiar faces was a contributing factor in the (...)
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  14.  39
    Varieties of developmental dyslexia.Anne Castles & Max Coltheart - 1993 - Cognition 47 (2):149-180.
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  15.  24
    Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief.Max Coltheart & Martin Davies - 2021 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 26 (4): 213-230.
    INTRODUCTION: In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce. METHODS: In this (...)
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  16.  18
    What is Capgras delusion?Max Coltheart & Martin Davies - 2022 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 27:69-82.
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  17. Conscious experience and delusional belief.Max Coltheart - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.
  18. Is there a causal link from phonological awareness to success in learning to read?Anne Castles & Max Coltheart - 2004 - Cognition 91 (1):77-111.
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  19.  65
    On the Distinction between Monothematic and Polythematic Delusions.Max Coltheart - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):103-112.
    Some delusional patients exhibit only a single delusional belief (or several delusional beliefs concerning a single theme): this is monothematic delusion. It contrasts with polythematic delusion, where the patient exhibits a variety of delusions concerning a variety of different themes. The neuropsychological bases of various monothematic delusions are rather well understood, and there is a well-worked-out general neuropsychological theory of monothematic delusion, the two-factor theory. Whether polythematic delusion might be explained in a similar way is an open question: I sketch (...)
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  20. Anosognosia and the Two‐factor Theory of Delusions.Martin Davies, Anne Aimola Davies & Max Coltheart - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):209-236.
    Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the body following damage to (...)
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  21.  31
    Ecological necessity of iconic memory.Max Coltheart - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):17-18.
  22. Understanding Minds and Understanding Communicated Meanings in Schizophrenia.Robyn Langdon, Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (1‐2):68-104.
    The work reported in this paper investigated the putative functional dependence of pragmatic language skills on general mind‐reading capacity by testing theory‐of‐mind abilities and understanding of non‐literal speech in patients with schizophrenia and in healthy controls. Patients showed difficulties with inferring mental states on a false‐belief picture‐sequencing task and with understanding metaphors and irony on a story‐comprehension task. These difficulties were independent of low verbal IQ and a more generalised problem inhibiting prepotent information. Understanding of metaphors and understanding of irony (...)
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  23.  60
    Models of misbelief: Integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions.Ryan McKay, Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):932-941.
    The impact of our desires and preferences upon our ordinary, everyday beliefs is well-documented [Gilovich, T. . How we know what isn’t so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life. New York: The Free Press.]. The influence of such motivational factors on delusions, which are instances of pathological misbelief, has tended however to be neglected by certain prevailing models of delusion formation and maintenance. This paper explores a distinction between two general classes of theoretical explanation for delusions; the motivational (...)
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  24.  35
    Mentalising, schizotypy, and schizophrenia.Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 1999 - Cognition 71 (1):43-71.
  25.  30
    Visual perspective-taking and schizotypy: evidence for a simulation-based account of mentalizing in normal adults.Robyn Langdon & Max Coltheart - 2001 - Cognition 82 (1):1-26.
  26.  25
    Confabulation and delusion.Max Coltheart & Martha Turner - 2009 - In William Hirstein (ed.), Confabulation: Views From Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 173.
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  27.  58
    The Fregoli Delusion: A Disorder of Person Identification and Tracking.Robyn Langdon, Emily Connaughton & Max Coltheart - 2014 - Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):615-631.
    Fregoli delusion is the mistaken belief that some person currently present in the deluded person's environment is a familiar person in disguise. The stranger is believed to be psychologically identical to this known person even though the deluded person perceives the physical appearance of the stranger as being different from the known person's typical appearance. To gain a deeper understanding of this contradictory error in the normal system for tracking and identifying known persons, we conducted a detailed survey of all (...)
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  28.  38
    The Neuronal Recycling Hypothesis for Reading and the Question of Reading Universals.Max Coltheart - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (3):255-269.
    Are there universals of reading? There are three ways of construing this question. Is the region of the brain where reading is implemented identical regardless of what writing system the reader uses? Is the mental information-processing system used for reading the same regardless of what writing system the reader uses. Do the word's writing systems share certain universal features? Dehaene offers affirmative answers to all three questions in his book. Here I suggest instead that the answers should be negative. And (...)
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  29.  20
    Cognitive neuropsychology.Max Coltheart - 2002 - In J. Wixted & H. Pashler (eds.), Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology. Wiley.
  30.  23
    Right-hemisphere reading.Max Coltheart - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1):67-68.
  31.  11
    A Peircean Pathway from Surprising Facts to New Beliefs.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - 2020 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 56 (3):400-426.
  32.  35
    Does reading develop in a sequence of stages?Morag Stuart & Max Coltheart - 1988 - Cognition 30 (2):139-181.
  33.  70
    Autism, modularity and levels of explanation in cognitive science.Max Coltheart & Robyn Langdon - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (1):138-152.
    Over the past century or more, cognitive neuropsychologists have discussed many of the issues raised in this volume. On the basis of this literature, we argue that autism is not a single homogeneous condition, and so can have no single cause. Instead, each of its symptoms has a cause, and the proper study of autism is the separate study of each of these symptoms and its cause. We also offer evidence to support the radical view advanced by Stoljar and Gold (...)
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  34.  2
    The neuropsychology of delusions.Max Coltheart - 2010 - Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1191 (1):16–26.
  35.  54
    A laboratory analogue of mirrored-self misidentification delusion: The role of hypnosis, suggestion, and demand characteristics.Michael H. Connors, Amanda J. Barnier, Robyn Langdon, Rochelle E. Cox, Vince Polito & Max Coltheart - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1510-1522.
    Mirrored-self misidentification is the delusional belief that one's own reflection in the mirror is a stranger. In two experiments, we tested the ability of hypnotic suggestion to model this condition. In Experiment 1, we compared two suggestions based on either the delusion's surface features (seeing a stranger in the mirror) or underlying processes (impaired face processing). Fifty-two high hypnotisable participants received one of these suggestions either with hypnosis or without in a wake control. In Experiment 2, we examined the extent (...)
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  36.  28
    How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway.Max Coltheart & Martin Davies - 2021 - Consciousness and Cognition 87:103037.
    People acquire new beliefs in various ways. One of the most important of these is that new beliefs are acquired as a response to experiencing events that one did not expect. This involves a form of inference distinct from both deductive and inductive inference: abductive inference. The concept of abduction is due to the American pragmatist philosopher C. S. Peirce. Davies and Coltheart elucidated what Peirce meant by abduction, and identified two problems in his otherwise promising account requiring solution if (...)
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  37. From the internal lexicon to delusional belief.Max Coltheart - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3/2014):19-29.
  38.  33
    The relationship between language-processing and visual-processing deficits in developmental dyslexia.Laurie Cestnick & Max Coltheart - 1999 - Cognition 71 (3):231-255.
  39.  83
    Lessons From Cognitive Neuropsychology for Cognitive Science: A Reply to Patterson and Plaut (2009).Max Coltheart - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (1):3-11.
    A recent article in this journal (Patterson & Plaut, 2009) argued that cognitive neuropsychology has told us very little over the past 30 or 40 years about “how the brain accomplishes its cognitive business.” This may well be true, but it is not important, because the principal aim of cognitive neuropsychology is not to learn about the brain. Its principal aim is instead to learn about the mind, that is, to elucidate the functional architecture of cognition. I show that this (...)
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  40.  52
    Are there universals of reading? We don't believe so.Max Coltheart & Stephen Crain - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (5):282-283.
    There are universals of language; but is it also true, as the target article claims, that there are universals of reading? We believe there are no such universals, and invite others to refute our claim by providing a list of some universals of reading. If there are no universals of reading, there cannot be a universal model of reading.
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  41.  30
    Computational modeling of reading in semantic dementia: Comment on Woollams, Lambon Ralph, Plaut, and Patterson (2007).Max Coltheart, Jeremy J. Tree & Steven J. Saunders - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (1):256-271.
  42.  18
    Case alternation impairs word identification.Max Coltheart & Roger Freeman - 1974 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 3 (2):102-104.
  43. Inference and explanation in cognitive neuropsychology.Max Coltheart & Martin Davies - 2003 - Cortex 39 (1):188-191.
    The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. (...)
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  44.  15
    Implicit memory and the functional architecture of cognition.Max Coltheart - 1989 - In S. Lewandowsky, J. M. Dunn & K. Kirsner (eds.), Implicit Memory: Theoretical Issues. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 285--297.
  45.  30
    Dismissing subliminal perception because of its famous problems is classic “baby with the bathwater”.Matthew Finkbeiner & Max Coltheart - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1):27-27.
  46.  15
    Varieties of developmental dyslexia: A comment on Bryant and Impey.Max Coltheart - 1987 - Cognition 27 (1):97-101.
  47. Index to Volume 13.D. Braddon-Mitchell, M. Brody, H. Cappelen, E. Lepore, P. Carruthers, A. Clark, M. Coltheart, R. Langdon & J. L. H. Cruz - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (4):622-625.
     
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  48.  19
    Auditory processing deficits in children with reading and language impairments: Can they (and should they) be treated?G. M. McArthur, D. Ellis, C. M. Atkinson & M. Coltheart - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):946-977.
  49.  12
    Psychology is – and should be – central to cognitive science.Max Coltheart - 2023 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 14:40-58.
    _Abstract_: Cognitive science is typically defined as the multidisciplinary study of mind, with the disciplines involved usually listed as philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology. Furthermore, these six “core disciplines” are generally regarded as having equal status vis-à-vis cognitive science. In contrast to the latter position, I argue that psychology has a special status here: it is central to cognitive science in a way that none of the other five disciplines is. I support this argument via both theoretical (...)
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  50.  40
    Cotard delusion, emotional experience and depersonalisation.Martin Davies & Max Coltheart - forthcoming - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry.
    Introduction: Cotard delusion—the delusional belief “I am dead”—is named after the French psychiatrist who first described it: Jules Cotard (1880, 1882). Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998) proposed that the idea “I am dead” comes to mind when a neuropathological condition has resulted in complete abolition of emotional responsivity to the world. The idea would arise as a putative explanation: if “I am dead” were true, there would be no emotional responsivity to the world. Methods: We scrutinised the literature on people who (...)
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