This article provides a historico-philosophical profile of late-medieval nominalism. It shows how nominalism placed limitations on the use of logic and natural reason in academic theology. In the first part, the historical meaning and use of the notions ‘moderni’ and ‘nominales’ are explored. In the second part, the methodology of the ‘moderni’ and ‘nominales’ is investigated, showing how nominalist understanding of logic and natural reason led to a separation of philosophy and theology. Three examples are discussed, taken from commentaries on (...) the Sentences. As these examples show, according to a number of ‘moderni’ and ‘nominales’ , logic and natural reason are not able to exclude all ambiguities and heresies from theological discourse. Thus logic loses its privileged function in theology as arbiter of true reasoning, clearing the way for the rules of traditional and ordinary speech, the ‘vulgus modus loquendi’. Only when logic and reason deal with the natural aspects of creation, do they remain authoritative. When applied to the divine, however, they may easily lead to heresy and error. (shrink)
Die metaphysische Spekulation über die Natur der Ideen gilt als eines der wichtigsten philosophischen Themen bis weit ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein. Im Nachdenken über die Ideen hat die Metaphysik versucht, die unveränderlichen Prinzipien zu entdecken, die die Wirklichkeit ordnen und ihren intelligiblen Charakter erklären und begründen. Die Frage nach den Ideen liegt somit an der Basis des metaphysischen Denkens überhaupt, das nach der klassischen Bestimmung des Aristoteles als Wissenschaft von den Prinzipien und Ursachen des Seienden als solchen verstanden werden kann.
Marsilius of Inghen’s Commentary on the Sentences evinces the history of Scholasticism between Ockham and Luther. The part edited here discusses the Trinity revealing new evidence on the debates among Realists and Nominalists at the Universities of Paris and Heidelberg.
This paper gives an account of the debate between F.A. Hayek and J.M. Keynes in the 1930s written for the general public. The purpose of this is twofold. First, to provide the general reader with a narrative of what happened, … More ›.
It is a curious thing about the philosophy of mind, that it includes surprisingly little about minds. In an average anthology on the subject, or a book like Ryle's, one finds discussions of thinking, imagining, believing, willing, remembering, and so on, but not of minds. It seems to be assumed that investigating these topics is investigating minds; but whether that is true is not itself made a topic for investigation.
The following are not among the least puzzling remarks in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations : 572. Expectation is, grammatically, a state; like: being of an opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, being able to do something. But in order to understand the grammar of these states it is necessary to ask: ‘What counts as a criterion for anyone's being in such a state?’ 573.… What, in particular cases, do we regard as criteria for someone's being of such and such an opinion? (...) When do we say: he reached this opinion at that time? When he has altered his opinion? And so on. The picture which the answers to these questions give us shews what gets treated grammatically as a state here. (shrink)