In Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Bernard Williams supplies an interpretation of Descartes's Meditations in which the meditator's clean sweep of initial beliefs is justified by a stance that abrogates all practical pressures: the stance of pure enquiry. Otherwise, Williams explains, it would not be reasonable to set many of the initial beliefs aside. Nowhere, however, does Descartes assert that his approach is in this sense ?pure?. It would of course be preferable if the meditator's rejection of all the (...) initial beliefs did not require an abrogation of the conditions that govern everyday belief-formation and assessment. I supply a reading that accomplishes this. The key to this reading is recognition that Descartes is a thinker of his time, a time when the pre-modern worldview was being systematically rejected. I show, in this regard, that when Descartes characterizes a belief as ?uncertain?, this has the implication that the belief is false. And, certainly, the rational policy, without need for any special stance, is to reject falsehoods. (shrink)

The typically dismissive treatment of Bradleian idealism, to the extent that it is based on philosophical criticism rather than historical bias, suffers from a failure to distinguish Bradley's negative views from his positive doctrines. But the intermingling of the two plays havoc in Bradley's own presentation, so that proper interpretation requires a particularly aggressive approach to the texts. Specifically, in denying a real multiplicity of facts, Bradley, though he may seem to be, is not attacking the commonsense belief that there (...) are many and disparate facts. His claim, as is confirmed by an examination of the analysis of judgement in The principles of logic, is that the facts ordinarily recognized are not those of the bona fide fact-pluralist, e.g. Mill. By getting Bradley's position straight, it becomes possible to tell an illuminating story about the early formation of ?analytic? philosophy, with its often bewildering faith in the ontological significance of logic. (shrink)

System of References To keep footnotes to a minimum, references to classical sources are incorporated into the body of the narrative, normally in the ...

To what extent is conceptual analysis under strict semantic control? In an effort to show that conceptual structure transcends the linguistic dimension proper, the tensions within, and between, several current treatments of the concept red are revealed and explored. It is argued that certain extra-semantic factors — factors, broadly speaking, which concern the manner in which a concept applier interacts with the world as an extralinguistic agent - provide a backdrop against which conceptual analysis guided by language in a strict (...) sense must be deepened and tested. (shrink)

'Everything,' Kant remarks, 'gravitates ultimately towards the practical.' Judging by 'everything,' Kant is fixing on some feature of reality that he regards as invariant across times, places, and people. Judging by 'ultimately,' Kant believes that the feature yields itself up only to penetrative philosophical scrutiny. The remark is, I believe, a key to 'the basic problem confronting any reader of [Kant],' his idealism.

1. The distinction between the functions of sense and intellect in cognition is first given its modern form by Kant. According to one influential commentator, Jonathan Bennett, “Kant’s breakthrough” in fact consists precisely in liberating himself from his predecessors’ misconceptions in this regard. It is true that the categorial duality of receptivity and spontaneity—of intuition and concept—is not to be found in the major classical writings prior to Kant. In its place, one encounters a relativized distinction. The empiricist Hume, for (...) example, describes a conceptual element or “idea” as differing only in “vivacity” from an item of sensory intake or “impression,” and the rationalist Leibniz says of a state of “pure” intellection that it differs from a perceptual state in being clear of the residuum of cognitive “confusion” which taints the latter. (shrink)

Though, in view of Descartes' challenge to the epistemological credentials of "reason" early in the Meditations, one expects him to resist the claim that the professedly invulnerable cogito argument works through the suppressed premise "Everything that thinks, exists," interpreters have been hard-pressed to convert comprendre here into pardonner. Loath to convict Descartes of confusing a psychological point about inferential process with a logical one about the conditions for validity, many are driven to implausible construals, for example, the ingenious performative construal, (...) on which "cogito" does not express a premise. In this fast-paced study Jerrold Katz, calling on his Chomsky-inspired theorising about natural languages, offers a via media. At the core is the thesis that validity is not always a matter of logical form--hence a rejection of the view whose contemporary prestige derives from Frege. According to Katz, the validity of analytic entailments is a function not of logical form but of the senses of the contributing linguistic elements. The cogito argument, Katz maintains, falls into this class. Thus, comprendre avec pardonner: Descartes is not being evasive when he holds that there is an argumentational move from "cogito" to "sum" while denying that the argument, as presented, is enthymematic. (shrink)

En soulignant la position ressemblante du Dieu dans le système de Descartes et de Berkeley comme sujet de connaissance optimale, c'est à dire ' certain', et le rôle de la notion cartésienne de ‛certitude’ en définissant la nature de la vérité scientifique, on peut nettement transformer la théorie réalistique cartésienne en théorie idéalistique berkelienne. L'élimination une équivoque dans la conception de certitude de Descartes est crucial à cette transformation. Sans cette équivoque, la distinction cartésienne non-berkelienne entre la sensation et la (...) perception ne peut être défendu. Cette interprétation est évidemment en conflict avec le point de vue standard sur l'attitude de Descartes, comme rationaliste, concernant les sens, mais malgré cela, le texte y apportent un sérieux soutien. (shrink)

Whence the Cartesian’s advantage over competing world investigators? Descartes’s answer is that those of his persuasion do not proceed by “resting [their] reasons on any other principle than the infinite perfections of God”. The claim’s considerable opacity does not prevent it from letting this much light filter through: only Cartesian scientists operate on the right metaphysical basis.

SummaryBecause it is not generally appreciated that Hume's analysis of the causal tie as radically contingent or ‘irrational’ is bound up with his specialised theory of cognition, its historical position is widely misconceived. Even a rationalist like Spinoza would agree that if, as Hume maintains, the causal tie holds between items each of which is‘ adequately’ grasped independently of the other, i.e. between what Spinoza calls ‘substances’, then the tie is indeed irrational. Also, Kant does not attempt to show that (...) the causal tie, as Hume sees it, is not irrational. His anti‐Humean result is based on the prior denial Humean causal fundaments are available in experiential cognition as we know it.RésuméLa position historique de Hume est généralement mal comprise parce qu'on ne voit pas que son analyse de la relation causale comme étant radicalement contingente ou »irrationnelle« est liée à sa théorie particulière de la connaissance. Même un rationaliste tel que Spinoza accorderait que la causalité est en effet irrationnelle si elle relie, ainsi que le prétend Hume, deux choses saisies indépendamment, c'est‐à‐dire deux substances selon Spinoza. Même Kant ne cherche pas à démontrer que le lien causal tel que Hume le voit n'est pas irrationnel. Son résultat anti‐humien est basé sur la négation préalable que le fondement de la causalité puisse être tiré de la connaissance expérimentale.ZusammenfassungWeil man im allgemeinen nicht berilcksichtigt, dass Humes Analyse der kausalen Verknüpfung als einer radikal kontingenten oder »irrationalen« Relation mit seiner besonderen erkennt‐nistheoretischen Position verbunden ist, wird deren historische Bedeutung oft missverstanden. Sogar ein Rationalist wie Spinoza würde zugestehen, dass die Verknüpfung irrational sein muss, wenn sie zwischen Substanten irn Sinne Spinozas, d.h. zwischen Dingen bestehen soll, die unabhängig voneinander adäquat erfasst werden, wie Hume das behauptet. Auch Kant versucht nicht zu zeigen, dass eine Kausalverknüpfung, so wie Hume sie auffasst, nicht irrational sei. Denn er bestreitet ja gerade, dass kausale Grundlagen auf Grund gewöhnlicher Erfahrung überhaupt gefunden werden können. (shrink)

Whence the Cartesian’s advantage over competing world investigators? Descartes’s answer is that those of his persuasion do not proceed by “resting [their] reasons on any other principle than the infinite perfections of God”. The claim’s considerable opacity does not prevent it from letting this much light filter through: only Cartesian scientists operate on the right metaphysical basis.

Did Descartes make a revolutionary contribution to philosophy? Given the widespread application to him of the title ‘father of modem philosophy,’ the standard affirmative proves surprisingly difficult to justify. ln this paper I locate Descartes’s epoch-making philosophical shift. Descartes contributed a very strong idea of realism, an idea modelled in his cogito-argument. To grasp the contribution aright, it is however necessary to de-emphasise what is usually identified as his key contribution---an epistemological one. AIso, the theoretical connection between Descartes’s core philosophical (...) activity and the scientific revolution of his time has to be appreciated. ln the course of the discussion I explain, in a more philosophical vein, how the influence of Kant clouds the abiIity of post-Kantians to see what Descartes did. A route to an understanding of Descartes’s realism is an inconsistency in Kant’s modal views. The antirealism of Kant’s view---his transcendental idealism---yields up some of its mystery once the dialectical interplay with Cartesian realism is elicited. (shrink)

Did Descartes make a revolutionary contribution to philosophy? Given the widespread application to him of the title ‘father of modem philosophy,’ the standard affirmative proves surprisingly difficult to justify. ln this paper I locate Descartes’s epoch-making philosophical shift. Descartes contributed a very strong idea of realism, an idea modelled in his cogito-argument. To grasp the contribution aright, it is however necessary to de-emphasise what is usually identified as his key contribution---an epistemological one. AIso, the theoretical connection between Descartes’s core philosophical (...) activity and the scientific revolution of his time has to be appreciated. ln the course of the discussion I explain, in a more philosophical vein, how the influence of Kant clouds the abiIity of post-Kantians to see what Descartes did. A route to an understanding of Descartes’s realism is an inconsistency in Kant’s modal views. The antirealism of Kant’s view---his transcendental idealism---yields up some of its mystery once the dialectical interplay with Cartesian realism is elicited. (shrink)

Il se peut du point de vue des etudiants qui s'approchent de la position contextuelle de Descartes, qu'il accepte la distinction reelle entre l'esprit et le corps parce qu'il n'a pas percu comment une forme d'explicarion mecanique-materialiste pourrait etre appropriee aux phenomenes psychologiques. Mais on pourrait demander la signification de cette proposition en ce qui concerne le raisonnement de Descartes pour Pactualite du dualisme. Je demontre que son raisonnement dans les Meditations est defectueux relatif a un probleme theorique emanant de (...) 1' argumentation du cogito. Sum est deduit de cogito. Si c'est le cas, pourquoi Descartes pretend-t-il que celui-la est la premiere certitude? Comme j'explique, cogito c'est clair, mais ce n'est pas distinct; mais sum, c'est Pun et l'autre-et, a cause de cela, possede les qualites necessaires. Mais le caractere particulier du sum possede une variete speciale, et le raisonnement subsequent de Descartes que le sujet reflechissant n'est pas materiel echoue de cette ambiguite. Le cartesianisme sans dualisme n'est pas done un cercle sans un centre. (shrink)

For placing the contrast of certainty and uncertainty at the philosophical center, Descartes is charged with Michael Dummett with mistakenly subordinating the study of language and meaning to epistemology. But Dummett's knowledge-theoretic reading of the certainty/uncertainty duality is as erroneous as the tradition it inherits is long. The Cartesian demand for certainty and critique of uncertainty in mature writings like the Meditations has a definite semantic character. Cartesian uncertainty, construed aright, anticipates Dummett's putatively original idea of a non-reductive yet non-realist (...) semantics for standard factual claims asserted on the basis of sense-evidence. There is an internal relation, in Descartes' philosophy, between a repudiation of uncertainty and a repudiation of a non-realist conception of the world. (shrink)

For placing the contrast of certainty and uncertainty at the philosophical center, Descartes is charged with Michael Dummett with mistakenly subordinating the study of language and meaning to epistemology. But Dummett's knowledge-theoretic reading of the certainty/uncertainty duality is as erroneous as the tradition it inherits is long. The Cartesian demand for certainty and critique of uncertainty in mature writings like the Meditations has a definite semantic character. Cartesian uncertainty, construed aright, anticipates Dummett's putatively original idea of a non-reductive yet non-realist (...) semantics for standard factual claims asserted on the basis of sense-evidence. There is an internal relation, in Descartes' philosophy, between a repudiation of uncertainty and a repudiation of a non-realist conception of the world. (shrink)