The absence of a necessary connection in singular causation is a key step in the Humean argument against any form of necessity in causation. I argue that Hume's defence of this step is unsuccessful, and that the step could be skipped, accepting the possibility of necessary a posteriori truths. Still this does not suffice to guarantee a necessary connection in singular causation. Necessary a posteriori truths should be backed by necessary a priori truths. Thus, a main object of this paper (...) is to argue that an a priori philosophical concept of causality involves a necessary connection between its terms. (shrink)

It was an empirical discovery that Phosphorus is Hesperus. According to Kripke, this was also the discovery of a necessary fact. Now, given Kripke’s theory of direct reference one could wonder what kind of discovery this is. For we already knew Phosphorus/Hesperus, and we also knew that any entity is, necessarily, identical to itself. So what is it that was discovered? I want to show that there is more to this widely known case than what usual readings, and critics, reveal; (...) and I want to show this under the Kripkean pattern that what was discovered is the plain fact of identity that Phosphorus is, and necessarily is, Hesperus. Moreover, I will show how both Kripkean theses, the necessity of identity and the direct theory of reference, should not be kept apart to understand the kind of discovery this is. In particular, understanding the kind of discovery we made will help us see how intuition is displayed in metaphysics, and how metaphysical impossibilities, and metaphysical modality in general, can be discerned by reason and separated from other modalities. The study of this discovery will help us see, in a line, how identity belongs to the inner and most profound structure of reality and to the most profound structure of cognition and language. (shrink)

This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so-called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they (...) form. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to offer a conception of singular causality that lies between two main views in the literature, which I take to be paradigmatically represented by David Armstrong (1997) and by Michael Tooley (1987, 1990) respectively. Armstrong maintains that there is singular causation wherever there are singular facts that instantiate causal laws; these facts are otherwise independent regularities. Tooley maintains that singular causation is independent of causal laws together with any other non-causal fact. My own view (...) is that Armstrong’s account is too weak to conform a singularist position, as in his view singular causal relations are finally dependent on universal causation. On the other hand, Tooley’s account is too strong to be causal, as causation dissolves into a purely external and mysterious connection that is not even Humean -not even regularities play a role in its establishment. I want to maintain that there exists a middle way that correctly characterizes the spirit of singular causation, and that can be stated by (CS): (CS) Singular causality is metaphysically independent of universal causality. Neither Tooley nor Armstrong would admit (CS) as an appropriate defining thesis for causal singularism. In what follows, I consider different causal situations existing in the literature, with the purpose of analysing singular causation, arguing against Tooley and Armstrong's views, and defending (CS) instead. If my reasons are accepted, Armstrong’s position, rather than being singular in spirit, results into a form of causal universalism. I will also reject Tooley’s singularism as an extreme counterintuitive form of hyperrealism. Some consequences for causation are immediate. In particular, that singular causal relations are tropes, i.e., individual relations. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article examine l'argumentation de Sullivan en faveur du principe que toute chose a une cause. On soutient que les critiques de Smith et d'Allen ne lui rendent pas justice et que Sullivan est justifié de maintenir que nous n'avons pas de bonnes raisons de nier la vérité de ce principe. Sa défense finale, cependant, qui semble basée sur une approche thomiste, échoue. Être contingent et être causé sont séparables. Il semble au bout du compte que nous n'ayons pas (...) non plus de bonnes raisons de nier la fausseté du principe en question. (shrink)

RésuméCet article examine l'argumentation de Sullivan en faveur du principe que toute chose a une cause. On soutient que les critiques de Smith et d'Allen ne lui rendent pas justice et que Sullivan est justifié de maintenir que nous n'avons pas de bonnes raisons de nier la vérité de ce principe. Sa défense finale, cependant, qui semble basée sur une approche thomiste, échoue. Être contingent et être causé sont séparables. Il semble au bout du compte que nous n'ayons pas non (...) plus de bonnes raisons de nier la fausseté du principe en question. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the possibility of a kind of a priori cognition that serves the purposes of metaphysics, given that metaphysics involves the search for modal knowledge. Necessary or, better, modal knowledge is a priori; so metaphysical knowledge is likewise a priori. Here I argue that intuition is the route to modal knowledge in metaphysics, and I insist that conceivability or knowledge of conceptual truths does not lead towards the modal realm of metaphysics.

I argue that the fundamental dogma that all necessary relations are internal is ungrounded. To motivate my argument, I analyse Moore’s classic ideas on internal relations and take them as an illustration of the common form of reasoning that can mislead us to conclude that all necessary relations are internal. That reasoning illicitly smuggles the idea that necessary properties and relations reflect on identity—in the sense that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of identity—into the separate idea (...) that the loss of a necessary property/relation is a loss of essence. Essence, however, is not identity. So the way seems to be open for the existence of necessary properties/relations which do not belong to the essence of entities; that is, the existence of necessary but external relations. I then offer some examples of such relations. (shrink)

Este artículo defiende que toda acción es un suceso que entraña, responsabilidad agente. Toda acción es el suceso que es el "hacer" de alguien. La responsabilidad del agente que define una acción es el tipo que justifica el premio-castigo. Esto implica que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es la responsabilidad que la define. Más aún, si la identidad personal se ha de comprender dentro del reino de la acción, las teorías de (...) corte narrativo, más que las aproximaciones mentalistas, se encuentran mucho mejor posicionadas para llevar a cabo esta labor de comprensión.Este artículo defiende que toda acción es un suceso que entraña, responsabilidad agente. Toda acción es el suceso que es el "hacer" de alguien. La responsabilidad del agente que define una acción es el tipo que justifica el premio-castigo. Esto implica que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es la responsabilidad que la define. Más aún, si la identidad personal se ha de comprender dentro del reino de la acción, las teorías de corte narrativo, más que las aproximaciones mentalistas, se encuentran mucho mejor posicionadas para llevar a cabo esta labor de comprensión.This paper argues that an action is an event that essentially conveysagent responsibility. Any action is the event that is someone’s doing. Andagent responsibility, which defines action, is the kind of responsibility that justifiesreward and punishment. This means that action is, in all cases, defeasileand socially santioned, such as it is the type of responsibility that defines action.Moreover, if pesonal identity is to be understood within the frame ofaction, narrativist kind of theories, rather than mentalist approaches, are in amuch better position to do the job. (shrink)

In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell held the view that facts in the world are formally structured complexes, the structure of which matches the logical structure of correspondent propositions. Russell also seems to have denied that there are facts of identity and of diversity. This paper argues that Identity and Diversity can be understood as purely formal structures in Russellian facts. It considers Russell’s possible reasons for denying the existence of facts of identity and diversity and shows how problematic (...) these reasons are. In particular, I argue that identity statements are not tautologies, and their denial does not result into a contradiction. An important consequence of this thesis is that Metaphysics and Logic are not as tied up as Russell took them to be, but nevertheless these are good news for the old formal program for Metaphysics that lies at the very heart of what he called philosophical logic. (shrink)

I want to make sense of the view that singular causation involves a metaphysical necessary connection. By this I understand, where A and B are particulars, that ifA causes B then in every possible world in which A (or an A-indiscernible) or B (or a B-indiscernible) occurs, A (or an Aindiscernible) and B (or a B-indiscernible) occur. In the singularist approach that I will favour causal facts do not supervene on laws, causal relata are best understood as tropes, causation is (...) founded on the nature of its terms, and the necessity thus involved does not entail essentialism, determinism, and other usual problems. (shrink)

The aim of this research was to gain insight into the experiences and perspectives of individual members of a Medical Research Ethics Committee regarding their individual roles and possible tensions within and between these roles. We conducted a qualitative interview study among members of a large MREC, supplemented by a focus group meeting. Respondents distinguish five roles: protector, facilitator, educator, advisor and assessor. Central to the role of protector is securing valid informed consent and a proper risk-benefit analysis. The role (...) of facilitator implies that respondents want to think along with and assist researchers in order to help medical science progress. As educators, the respondents want to raise ethical and methodological awareness of researchers. The role of advisor implies that respondents bring in their own expertise. The role of assessor points to contributing to the overall evaluation of the research proposal. Various tensions were identified within and between roles. Within the role of protector, a tension is experienced between paternalism and autonomy. Between the role of protector and facilitator tensions occur when the value of a study is questioned while risks and burdens for the subjects are negligible. Within the role of assessor, a tension is felt between the implicit nature of judgments and the need for more explicit formulations. Awareness of various roles and responsibilities may prevent one-sided views on MREC work, not only by members themselves, but also by researchers. Tensions within and between the roles require reflection by MREC members. (shrink)

The aim of this research was to gain insight into the experiences and perspectives of individual members of a Medical Research Ethics Committee regarding their individual roles and possible tensions within and between these roles. We conducted a qualitative interview study among members of a large MREC, supplemented by a focus group meeting. Respondents distinguish five roles: protector, facilitator, educator, advisor and assessor. Central to the role of protector is securing valid informed consent and a proper risk-benefit analysis. The role (...) of facilitator implies that respondents want to think along with and assist researchers in order to help medical science progress. As educators, the respondents want to raise ethical and methodological awareness of researchers. The role of advisor implies that respondents bring in their own expertise. The role of assessor points to contributing to the overall evaluation of the research proposal. Various tensions were identified within and between roles. Within the role of protector, a tension is experienced between paternalism and autonomy. Between the role of protector and facilitator tensions occur when the value of a study is questioned while risks and burdens for the subjects are negligible. Within the role of assessor, a tension is felt between the implicit nature of judgments and the need for more explicit formulations. Awareness of various roles and responsibilities may prevent one-sided views on MREC work, not only by members themselves, but also by researchers. Tensions within and between the roles require reflection by MREC members. (shrink)

(1996). Knowledge elicitation using a multi‐modal approach. World Futures: Vol. 47, Unity and Diversity in Contemporary Systems Tinking: Systematic Pictures at an Exhibition, pp. 93-101.

The use of coercive measures in the care for the addicted has changed over the past 20 years. Laws that have adopted the “dangerousness” criterion in order to secure patients’ rights to non-intervention are increasingly subjected to critique as many authors plead for wider dangerousness criteria. One of the most salient moral issues at stake is whether addicts who are at risk of causing danger to themselves should be involuntarily admitted and/or treated. In this article, it is argued that the (...) dilemma between coercion on the one hand and abandonment on the other cannot be analysed without differentiated perspectives on the key notions that are used in these debates. The ambiguity these notions carry within care practice indicates that the conflict between the prevention of danger and respect for autonomy is not as sharp as the legal systems seem to imply. Some coercive measures need not be interpreted as an infringement of autonomy—rather, they should be interpreted as a way to provide good care. (shrink)

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win (...) the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Investigating Extended Embodiment Using a Computational Model and Human Experimentation” by Yuki Sato, Hiroyuki Iizuka & Takashi Ikegami. Upshot: First, we comment on a potential weakness highlighted by the use of self-reporting in the human-coupled windmill experiment as described in the target article. Second, we suggest that the authors treat their windmill models as soft-assembled dynamical systems. This would allow them to investigate extended body schemes by looking for 1/f noise in the interface between (...) the agent and the windmills. (shrink)

Tropes, as distinguished from other possible kinds of entities such as universals, states of affairs, events and bare particulars, are best-suited to play the role of causal relata.

As a first comment it should not be taken that we have any argument against the consistency of Mellor’s actualist version of the B-theory. Not only have we no argument; we hold that Mellor’s position is consistent. As far as logic goes we believe that you can translate A into B, and B into A. Mellor takes a quotation from our article as endorsing the policy of doing for time just what you do for modality, and vice versa, and it (...) is true that you can take our sentence that way. It is also true that we are sympathetic to an equal treatment of these two, but it is important to acknowledge that nothing in the logic forces you to do this. In particular, we agree with Mellor that practically no one treats space in an A-theory manner – even though it is logically consistent to do so. Our concern is solely with Mellor’s argument that a certain position in the temporal case is inconsistent where the analogous modal position is not. And our paper is addressed not so much to Mellor’s own position as to an A-theorist who wants to escape the consequences of Mellor’s argument by doing for time what Mellor does for modality. In fact, there is a position against which Mellor’s argument is successful. As far as we can tell the version we shall present is, if not precisely what Mellor has in mind, close to it, or at least sufficiently like it to illustrate his reply in a form in which we are able to comment on it. Mellor’s example is of Jim who …. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.