Results for 'M. Kadane'

999 found
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  1.  69
    Stopping to Reflect.M. J. Schervish, T. Seidenfeld & J. B. Kadane - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):315-322.
  2.  63
    When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief.T. Seidenfeld, M. J. Schervish & J. B. Kadane - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:517-524.
    The "Dutch Book" argument, tracing back to Ramsey and to deFinetti, offers prudential grounds for action in conformity with personal probability. Under several structural assumptions about combinations of stakes, your betting policy is coherent only if your fair odds are probabilities. The central question posed here is the following one: Besides providing an operational test of coherent betting, does the "Book" argument also provide for adequate measurement of the agents degrees of beliefs? That is, are an agent's fair odds also (...)
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  3. A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720. By Barbara J. Shapiro.M. Kadane - 2004 - The European Legacy 9:398-398.
     
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  4. Review of Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish and Teddy Seidenfeld's Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics. [REVIEW]M. Hild - 2003 - Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):149-155.
  5.  46
    Remarks on the Theory of Conditional Probability: Some Issues of Finite Versus Countable Additivity.Teddy Seidenfeld - unknown
    This paper (based on joint work with M.J.Schervish and J.B.Kadane) discusses some differences between the received theory of regular conditional distributions, which is the countably additive theory of conditional probability, and a rival theory of conditional probability using the theory of finitely additive probability. The focus of the paper is maximally "improper" conditional probability distributions, where the received theory requires, in effect, that P{a: P(a|a) = 0} = 1. This work builds upon the results of Blackwell and Dubins (1975).
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  6.  41
    De Finetti on Risk Aversion: Joseph B. Kadane and Gaia Bellone.Joseph B. Kadane - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):153-159.
    According to Mark Rubinstein ‘In 1952, anticipating Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt by over a decade, he [de Finetti] formulated the notion of absolute risk aversion, used it in connection with risk premia for small bets, and discussed the special case of constant absolute risk aversion.’ The purpose of this note is to ascertain the extent to which this is true, and at the same time, to correct certain minor errors that appear in de Finetti's work.
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  7.  72
    Is Ignorance Bliss?Joseph B. Kadane, Mark Schervish & Teddy Seidenfeld - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (1):5-36.
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  8. Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics.Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish & Teddy Seidenfeld - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This important collection of essays is a synthesis of foundational studies in Bayesian decision theory and statistics. An overarching topic of the collection is understanding how the norms for Bayesian decision making should apply in settings with more than one rational decision maker and then tracing out some of the consequences of this turn for Bayesian statistics. There are four principal themes to the collection: cooperative, non-sequential decisions; the representation and measurement of 'partially ordered' preferences; non-cooperative, sequential decisions; and pooling (...)
     
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  9.  31
    A Rubinesque Theory of Decision.Joseph B. Kadane, Teddy Seidenfeld & Mark J. Schervish - unknown
  10.  42
    Healthy Scepticism as an Expected-Utility Explanation of the Phenomena of Allais and Ellsberg.Joseph B. Kadane - 1992 - Theory and Decision 32 (1):57-64.
  11.  63
    When Several Bayesians Agree That There Will Be No Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion.Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish & Teddy Seidenfeld - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):289.
    When can a Bayesian investigator select an hypothesis H and design an experiment (or a sequence of experiments) to make certain that, given the experimental outcome(s), the posterior probability of H will be lower than its prior probability? We report an elementary result which establishes sufficient conditions under which this reasoning to a foregone conclusion cannot occur. Through an example, we discuss how this result extends to the perspective of an onlooker who agrees with the investigator about the statistical model (...)
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  12.  7
    When Several Bayesians Agree That There Will Be No Reasoning to a Foregone Conclusion.Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish & Teddy Seidenfeld - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (5):S281-S289.
    When can a Bayesian investigator select an hypothesis H and design an experiment to make certain that, given the experimental outcome, the posterior probability of H will be lower than its prior probability? We report an elementary result which establishes sufficient conditions under which this reasoning to a foregone conclusion cannot occur. Through an example, we discuss how this result extends to the perspective of an onlooker who agrees with the investigator about the statistical model for the data but who (...)
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  13.  23
    Standards for Modest Bayesian Credences.Jessi Cisewski, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Rafael Stern - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (1):53-78.
    Gordon Belot argues that Bayesian theory is epistemologically immodest. In response, we show that the topological conditions that underpin his criticisms of asymptotic Bayesian conditioning are self-defeating. They require extreme a priori credences regarding, for example, the limiting behavior of observed relative frequencies. We offer a different explication of Bayesian modesty using a goal of consensus: rival scientific opinions should be responsive to new facts as a way to resolve their disputes. Also we address Adam Elga’s rebuttal to Belot’s analysis, (...)
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  14.  39
    On the Shared Preferences of Two Bayesian Decision Makers.Teddy Seidenfeld, Joseph B. Kadane & Mark J. Schervish - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (5):225-244.
  15.  12
    On the Shared Preferences of Two Bayesian Decision Makers.Teddy Seidenfeld, Joseph B. Kadane & Mark J. Schervish - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (5):225.
  16.  29
    Progress Toward a More Ethical Method for Clinical Trials.Joseph B. Kadane - 1986 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 11 (4):385-404.
    Methodology for conducting clinical trials of new drugs and treatments on people need not be regarded as fixed. After reviewing the currently most popular method (randomization) and its ethical problems, this paper explores the possibilities of a new method for conducting such trials. It relies on new Bayesian technology for eliciting the opinions of medical experts. These opinions are conditioned on specific predictor variables, and are held in a computer. At any stage in a trial, these opinions can be updated (...)
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  17.  23
    Sleeping Beauty’s Credences.Jessi Cisewski, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Rafael Stern - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):324-347.
    The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “thirders” and “halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty's credence that a coin lands heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used for self-locating beliefs or centered propositions. (...)
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  18.  1
    Comments and Criticism.Mj Schervish, T. Seidenfeld & Jb Kadane - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):315-322.
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  19.  38
    Sleeping Beauty’s Credences.Jessica Cisewski, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Rafael Stern - unknown
    The Sleeping Beauty problem has spawned a debate between “Thirders” and “Halfers” who draw conflicting conclusions about Sleeping Beauty’s credence that a coin lands Heads. Our analysis is based on a probability model for what Sleeping Beauty knows at each time during the Experiment. We show that conflicting conclusions result from different modeling assumptions that each group makes. Our analysis uses a standard “Bayesian” account of rational belief with conditioning. No special handling is used for self-locating beliefs or centered propositions. (...)
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  20. Sham Surgery and Genuine Standards of Care: Can the Two Be Reconciled?Alex John London & Joseph B. Kadane - 2003 - American Journal of Bioethics 3 (4):61-64.
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  21.  99
    Coherent Choice Functions Under Uncertainty.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):157-176.
    We discuss several features of coherent choice functions —where the admissible options in a decision problem are exactly those that maximize expected utility for some probability/utility pair in fixed set S of probability/utility pairs. In this paper we consider, primarily, normal form decision problems under uncertainty—where only the probability component of S is indeterminate and utility for two privileged outcomes is determinate. Coherent choice distinguishes between each pair of sets of probabilities regardless the “shape” or “connectedness” of the sets of (...)
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  22.  28
    Forecasting with Imprecise Probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - unknown
    We review de Finetti’s two coherence criteria for determinate probabilities: coherence1defined in terms of previsions for a set of events that are undominated by the status quo – previsions immune to a sure-loss – and coherence2 defined in terms of forecasts for events undominated in Brier score by a rival forecast. We propose a criterion of IP-coherence2 based on a generalization of Brier score for IP-forecasts that uses 1-sided, lower and upper, probability forecasts. However, whereas Brier score is a strictly (...)
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  23. Matthew Kadane, The Watchful Clothier. The Life of an Eighteenth-Century Protestant Capitalist. [REVIEW]R. C. Richardson - 2015 - Clio: A Journal of Literature, History, and the Philosophy of History 44 (3):383-387.
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  24.  42
    Non-Conglomerability for Countably Additive Measures That Are Not Κ-Additive.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (2):284-300.
    Let κ be an uncountable cardinal. Using the theory of conditional probability associated with de Finetti and Dubins, subject to several structural assumptions for creating sufficiently many measurable sets, and assuming that κ is not a weakly inaccessible cardinal, we show that each probability that is not κ-­additive has conditional probabilities that fail to be conglomerable in a partition of cardinality no greater than κ. This generalizes our result, where we established that each finite but not countably additive probability has (...)
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  25.  63
    The Donation Paradox for Peremptory Challenges.Joseph B. Kadane, Christopher A. Stone & Garrick Wallstrom - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (2):139-155.
    A donation paradox occurs when a player gives an apparently valuable prerogative to another player, but ‘does better’, according to some criterion. Peremptory challenges, used in choosing a American jury, permit each side to veto a certain number of potential jurors. With even a very simple model of jury selection, it is shown that for one side to give a peremptory challenge to the other side may lead to a more favorable jury, an instance of the donation paradox. Both a (...)
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  26. What Experiment Did We Just Do?Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish & Teddy Seidenfeld - unknown
    Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method by which it may be addressed, with an example from the (...)
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  27.  42
    Experiment-Dependent Priors in Psychology and Physics.Robert F. Bordley & Joseph B. Kadane - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (3):213-227.
    Sometimes conducting an experiment to ascertain the state of a system changes the state of the system being measured. Kahneman & Tversky modelled this effect with ‘support theory’. Quantum physics models this effect with probability amplitude mechanics. As this paper shows, probability amplitude mechanics is similar to support theory. Additionally, Viscusi's proposed generalized expected utility model has an analogy in quantum mechanics.
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  28.  77
    William M. Ramsey * Representation Reconsidered.M. Sprevak - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):669-675.
  29.  39
    State-Dependent Utilities.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - unknown
    Several axiom systems for preference among acts lead to a unique probability and a state-independent utility such that acts are ranked according to their expected utilities. These axioms have been used as a foundation for Bayesian decision theory and subjective probability calculus. In this article we note that the uniqueness of the probability is relative to the choice of whatcounts as a constant outcome. Although it is sometimes clear what should be considered constant, in many cases there are several possible (...)
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  30.  41
    Subjective Rightness: Holly M. Smith.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):64-110.
    Twentieth century philosophers introduced the distinction between “objective rightness” and “subjective rightness” to achieve two primary goals. The first goal is to reduce the paradoxical tension between our judgments of what is best for an agent to do in light of the actual circumstances in which she acts and what is wisest for her to do in light of her mistaken or uncertain beliefs about her circumstances. The second goal is to provide moral guidance to an agent who may be (...)
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  31.  25
    What Kind of Uncertainty is That? Using Personal Probability for Expressing One's Thinking About Logical and Mathematical Propositions.Teddy Seidenfel, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (8-9):516-533.
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  32.  20
    Review. Norton M Wise (Ed). The Values of Precision.M. Suarez - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):483-486.
  33.  77
    Preference for Equivalent Random Variables: A Price for Unbounded Utilities.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - 2009 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 45:329-340.
    When real-valued utilities for outcomes are bounded, or when all variables are simple, it is consistent with expected utility to have preferences defined over probability distributions or lotteries. That is, under such circumstances two variables with a common probability distribution over outcomes – equivalent variables – occupy the same place in a preference ordering. However, if strict preference respects uniform, strict dominance in outcomes between variables, and if indifference between two variables entails indifference between their difference and the status quo, (...)
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  34.  86
    A Rate of Incoherence Applied to Fixed-Level Testing.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S248-S264.
    It has long been known that the practice of testing all hypotheses at the same level , regardless of the distribution of the data, is not consistent with Bayesian expected utility maximization. According to de Finetti’s “Dutch Book” argument, procedures that are not consistent with expected utility maximization are incoherent and they lead to gambles that are sure to lose no matter what happens. In this paper, we use a method to measure the rate at which incoherent procedures are sure (...)
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  35.  13
    Two Measures of Incoherence: How Not to Gamble If You Must.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - unknown
    The degree of incoherence, when previsions are not made in accordance with a probability measure, is measured by either of two rates at which an incoherent bookie can be made a sure loser. Each bet is considered as an investment from the points of view of both the bookie and a gambler who takes the bet. From each viewpoint, we define an amount invested (or escrowed) for each bet, and the sure loss of incoherent previsions is divided by the escrow (...)
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  36. I—R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye: An Originalist Theory of Concepts.R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.
    We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...)
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  37.  12
    Dominating Countably Many Forecasts.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - unknown
    We investigate differences between a simple Dominance Principle applied to sums of fair prices for variables and dominance applied to sums of forecasts for variables scored by proper scoring rules. In particular, we consider differences when fair prices and forecasts correspond to finitely additive expectations and dominance is applied with infinitely many prices and/or forecasts.
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  38.  38
    The Effect of Exchange Rates on Statistical Decisions.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (4):504-532.
    Statistical decision theory, whether based on Bayesian principles or other concepts such as minimax or admissibility, relies on minimizing expected loss or maximizing expected utility. Loss and utility functions are generally treated as unit-less numerical measures of value for consequences. Here, we address the issue of the units in which loss and utility are settled and the implications that those units have on the rankings of potential decisions. When multiple currencies are available for paying the loss, one must take explicit (...)
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  39.  14
    Decisions Without Ordering.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark J. Schervish & Joseph B. Kadane - unknown
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  40.  17
    Characterization of Proper and Strictly Proper Scoring Rules for Quantiles.Mark J. Schervish, Joseph B. Kadane & Teddy Seidenfeld - unknown
    We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a scoring rule to be proper for a quantile if utility is linear, and the distribution is unrestricted. We also give results when the set of distributions is limited, for example, to distributions that have first moments.
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  41. Forecasting with Imprecise/Indeterminate Probabilities [IP] – Some Preliminary Findings.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark Schervish & Jay Kadane - unknown
    Part 1 Background on de Finetti’s twin criteria of coherence: Coherence1: 2-sided previsions free from dominance through a Book. Coherence2: Forecasts free from dominance under Brier (squared error) score. Part 2 IP theory based on a scoring rule.
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  42.  39
    When Coherent Preferences May Not Preserve Indifference Between Equivalent Random Variables: A Price for Unbounded Utilities.Teddy Seidenfeld, Mark Schervish & Joseph Kadane - unknown
    We extend de Finetti’s (1974) theory of coherence to apply also to unbounded random variables. We show that for random variables with mandated infinite prevision, such as for the St. Petersburg gamble, coherence precludes indifference between equivalent random quantities. That is, we demonstrate when the prevision of the difference between two such equivalent random variables must be positive. This result conflicts with the usual approach to theories of Subjective Expected Utility, where preference is defined over lotteries. In addition, we explore (...)
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  43.  25
    I–T. M. Scanlon.T. M. Scanlon - 2000 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):301-317.
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  44. Measuring the Consequences of Rules: Holly M. Smith.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):413-433.
    Recently two distinct forms of rule-utilitarianism have been introduced that differ on how to measure the consequences of rules. Brad Hooker advocates fixed-rate rule-utilitarianism, while Michael Ridge advocates variable-rate rule-utilitarianism. I argue that both of these are inferior to a new proposal, optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism. According to optimum-rate rule-utilitarianism, an ideal code is the code whose optimum acceptance level is no lower than that of any alternative code. I then argue that all three forms of rule-utilitarianism fall prey to two fatal (...)
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  45.  58
    W. M. Ramsay—The Historical Geography of Asia Minor.W. W. & W. M. Ramsay - 1890 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 11:352-353.
  46.  35
    A Rate of Incoherence Applied to Fixed‐Level Testing.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S248-S264.
    It has long been known that the practice of testing all hypotheses at the same level , regardless of the distribution of the data, is not consistent with Bayesian expected utility maximization. According to de Finetti’s “Dutch Book” argument, procedures that are not consistent with expected utility maximization are incoherent and they lead to gambles that are sure to lose no matter what happens. In this paper, we use a method to measure the rate at which incoherent procedures are sure (...)
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  47. The Rest of Sleeping Beauty.Jessi Cisewski, Joseph B. Kadane, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Rafael Stern - unknown
     
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  48.  41
    Petr Nigri z Kadaně a jeho pojetí „pomyslného jsoucna“.Efrem Jindracek - 2011 - Filosoficky Casopis 59 (5):717-732.
    Petrus Nigri (Schwarz) se narodil západočeské Kadani (něm. Kaaden) kolem roku 1435 a spolu se svými třemi bratry vstoupil v Německu do dominikánského řádu. Během svého studia prošel velkou část Evropy (Německo, Itálii, Španělsko, Čechy a Maďarsko) a nakonec se stal rektorem generálního studia v Budíně (1481). Obecně je znám spíše jako význačný středověký hebraista. Do dějin filosofie se zapsal zvláště jako autor Clipeus thomsitarum (před r. 1474), což je filosofický komentář na Porfýriův Úvod (Isagoge) a na aristotelovské Kategorie, formou (...)
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  49.  31
    A. M. Mayer's Experiments with Floating Magnets and Their Use in the Atomic Theories of Matter.H. A. M. Snelders - 1976 - Annals of Science 33 (1):67-80.
    In the years 1878 and 1879 the American physicist Alfred Marshall Mayer published his experiments with floating magnets as a didactic illustration of molecular actions and forms. A number of physicists made use of this analogy of molecular structure. For William Thomson they were a mechanical illustration of the kinetic equilibrium of groups of columnar vortices revolving in circles round their common centre of gravity . A number of modifications of Mayer's experiments were described, which gave configurations which were more (...)
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  50.  19
    How to Combine Hermeneutics and Wide Reflective Equilibrium?: A Comment on M. Ebbesen and B. Pedersen, How to Formulate Normative Ethical Principles by Use of Empirical Investigations Within Biomedicine.Guy A. M. Widdershoven - 2006 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (1):49-52.
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