Vulnerability is an important criterion to assess the ethical justification of the inclusion of participants in research trials. Currently, vulnerability is often understood as an attribute inherent to a participant by nature of a diagnosed condition. Accordingly, a common ethical concern relates to the participant’s decisionmaking capacity and ability to provide free and informed consent. We propose an expanded view of vulnerability that moves beyond a focus on consent and the intrinsic attributes of participants. We offer specific suggestions for how (...) relational aspects and the dynamic features of vulnerability could be more fully captured in current discussions and research practices. (shrink)
The purpose of this study was to look beyond the patient as the source of difficulty and to examine the context of care encounters for factors that contributed to the construction of difficulty in the nurse-patient encounter. The study explains the origins of difficulty in the nurse-patient encounter. This explanation broadens the thinking limits previously imposed by locating difficulty within the individual. Key elements of this explanation are: knowing the patient minimizes the likelihood of difficulty in the encounter; and families, (...) availability of supplies and equipment, who is working, and care space changes are contextual factors that contribute to the construction of difficulty in the nurse-patient encounter. Awareness of these findings has implications for the strategies nurses employ in difficult encounters. (shrink)
We agree with Caplan & Waters that there are problems with the single-resource theory of sentence comprehension. However, we challenge their dual-resource alternative on theoretical and empirical grounds and point to a more coherent solution that abandons the notion of working memory resources.
The goal of our work has been to better understand how Engaged Philosophical Inquiry can be used with young children on topics related to our local forest environment as part our foundation curriculum on sustainability. Theoretically we draw on the work of Matthew Lipman ; Philosophy for Children ; Phillip Cam, ; John Dewey, ; Gunilla Dahlberg and Peter Moss to discuss democratic community building, and ethical pedagogical approaches related to EPI and young children. Working with children of this age (...) holistically on the topic of sustainability has not been systematically researched to date. Our findings therefore contribute to better understandings of EPI and: 1) democratic community building processes; 2) the use of context to focus our discussions; 3) group membership and group size; and 4) turn taking and the role of the moderator. (shrink)
Qualitative inquiry is increasingly used to foster change in health policy and practice. Research ethics committees often misunderstand qualitative inquiry, assuming its design can be judged by criteria of quantitative science. Traditional health research uses scientific realist standards as a means-to-an-end, answering the question “So what?” to support the advancement of practice and policy. In contrast, qualitative inquiry often draws on constructivist paradigms, generating knowledge either as an end-in-itself or as a means to foster change. When reviewers inappropriately judge qualitative (...) inquiry, it restricts the ways health phenomena can be understood. Qualitative inquiry is necessary because it enables an understanding not possible within scientific explanation. When such research illuminates, it can also shed light onto the “So what?” In order to ensure an appraisal of qualitative inquiry congruent with its paradigmatic premises, we suggest the “Illumination Test,” met when findings foster rich understanding of phenomena, resulting in a reflective “aha!”. (shrink)
Philosophical theories of perception are generally admitted to be responses to certain problems or puzzles allied to the ancient dichotomy between Appearance and Reality. For they have been mainly provoked by the incompatibility of the common–sense assumption that an external, physical world exists and is revealed to the senses with the well–known facts of perceptual variation and error. If only what is real were perceived just as if only what is right were done it is possible that many of those (...) questions would never have been asked which lead to moral philosophy and a metaphysics of the external world. But sense perceptions of the same object vary so that it appears to have contradictory qualities and are sometimes completely deceptive. Nor do illusory differ internally from veridical perceptions. Moreover, perceptual variation and error can be unmasked only by such procedures as looking more carefully, listening harder, trying to touch, asking others, in short by more sense experience. So the senses are, as it were, both accused and judge in these disputes and why should a venal judge be trusted more than the criminal he tries? Such “correction” of one experience by another of the same kind seems no more reliable than the original “error.” Philosophers have found all this very puzzling. (shrink)