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Michelle Maiese [19]M. Maiese [1]
  1.  60
    How Can Emotions Be Both Cognitive and Bodily?Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.
    The long-standing debate between cognitive and feeling theories of emotion stems, in part, from the assumption that cognition and thought are abstract, intellectual, disembodied processes, and that bodily feelings are non-intentional and have no representational content. Working with this assumption has led many emotions theorists to neglect the way in which emotions are simultaneously bodily and cognitive-evaluative. Even hybrid theories, such as those set forth by Prinz and Barlassina and Newen, fail to account fully for how the cognitive and bodily (...)
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  2. Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition.Michelle Maiese - 2011 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Series Editors' Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- The Essential Embodiment Thesis -- Essentially Embodied, Desire-Based Emotions -- Sense of Self,_Embodiment, and Desire-Based Emotions -- The Role of Emotion in Decision and Moral Evaluation -- Essentially Embodied, Emotive, Enactive Social Cognition -- Breakdowns in Embodied Emotive Cognition -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index.
     
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  3.  31
    Moral Cognition, Affect, and Psychopathy.Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):807-828.
    Few theorists would challenge the idea that affect and emotion directly influence decision-making and moral judgment. There is good reason to think that they also significantly assist in decision-making and judgment, and in fact are necessary for fully effective moral cognition. However, they are not sufficient. Deliberation and more reflective thought processes likewise play a crucial role, and in fact are inseparable from affective processes. I will argue that while the dual-process account of moral judgment set forth by Craigie (2011) (...)
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  4.  5
    Higher-Order Thought, Self-Identification, and Delusions of Disownership.Michelle Maiese - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    David Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory says that for a mental state to be conscious, it must be accompanied by a higher-order thought about that state. One objection to Rosenthal’s account is that HOTs do not secure what Sydney Shoemaker has called ‘immunity to error through misidentification’. I will argue that Rosenthal’s discussion of dissociative identity order fails to salvage his account from this objection and that his thin immunity principle is in tension with cases of somatoparaphrenia. Rather than showing that (...)
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  5.  19
    Can the Mind Be Embodied, Enactive, Affective, and Extended?Michelle Maiese - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-19.
    In recent years, a growing number of thinkers have begun to challenge the long-held view that the mind is neurally realized. One strand of critique comes from work on extended cognition, a second comes from research on embodied cognition, and a third comes from enactivism. I argue that theorists who embrace the claim that the mind is fully embodied and enactive cannot consistently also embrace the extended mind thesis. This is because once one takes seriously the central tenets of enactivism, (...)
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  6.  6
    Dissociative Identity Disorder, Ambivalence, and Responsibility.Michelle Maiese - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):764-784.
    If someone with dissociative identity disorder commits a wrongful act, is she responsible? If one adopts the Multiple Persons Thesis, it may seem that one alter cannot be responsible for the actions of another alter. Conversely, if one regards the subject as a single person, it may seem that she is responsible for any actions she performs. I will argue that this subject is a single person, but one who suffers from delusions of disownership and therefore does not fulfill ordinary (...)
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  7.  69
    Thought Insertion as a Disownership Symptom.Michelle Maiese - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):911-927.
    Stephens and Graham maintain that in cases of thought insertion, the sense of ownership is preserved, but there is a defect in the sense of agency. However, these theorists overlook the possibility that subjectivity might be preserved despite a defect in the sense of ownership. The claim that schizophrenia centers upon a loss of a sense of ownership is supported by an examination of some of the other notable disownership symptoms of the disorder, such as bodily alienation and experiences of (...)
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  8.  35
    Rethinking Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.Michelle Maiese - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):893-916.
    This paper examines two influential theoretical frameworks, set forth by Russell Barkley (1997) and Thomas Brown (2005), and argues that important headway in understanding attention deficit hyperactivity disorder can be made if we acknowledge the way in which human cognition and action are essentially embodied and enactive. The way in which we actively make sense of the world is structured by our bodily dynamics and our sensorimotor engagement with our surroundings. These bodily dynamics are linked to an individual's concerns and (...)
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  9.  17
    Dissociative Identity Disorder and Ambivalence.Michelle Maiese - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):223-237.
    While many theorists have argued that dissociative identity disorder is a case of multiple selves or persons in a single body, I maintain that DID instead should be understood as involving a single self who suffers from significant disruptions to self-consciousness. Evidence of overlapping abilities and memories, as well as the very logic of dissociation, supports the claim that DID results from internal conflict endured by a single self. Along these lines, I will maintain that alter-formation should be understood as (...)
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  10.  28
    Transformative Learning, Enactivism, and Affectivity.Michelle Maiese - 2017 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 36 (2):197-216.
    Education theorists have emphasized that transformative learning is not simply a matter of students gaining access to new knowledge and information, but instead centers upon personal transformation: it alters students’ perspectives, interpretations, and responses. How should learning that brings about this sort of self-transformation be understood from the perspectives of philosophy of mind and cognitive science? Jack Mezirow has described transformative learning primarily in terms of critical reflection, meta-cognitive reasoning, and the questioning of assumptions and beliefs. And within mainstream philosophy (...)
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  11.  1
    Getting Stuck: Temporal Desituatedness in Depression.Michelle Maiese - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    The DSM characterizes major depressive disorder partly in temporal terms: the depressive mood must last for at least two weeks, and also must impact the subject "most of the day, nearly every day." However, from the standpoint of phenomenological psychopathology, the long-lasting quality of the condition hardly captures the distinctiveness of depression. While the DSM refers to objective time as measured by clocks and calendars, what is especially striking about depression is the distortions to lived time that it involves. But (...)
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  12.  6
    Dissociative Identity Disorder, Ambivalence, and Responsibility.Michelle Maiese - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    If someone with dissociative identity disorder commits a wrongful act, is she responsible? If one adopts the Multiple Persons Thesis, it may seem that one alter cannot be responsible for the actions of another alter. Conversely, if one regards the subject as a single person, it may seem that she is responsible for any actions she performs. I will argue that this subject is a single person, but one who suffers from delusions of disownership and therefore does not fulfill ordinary (...)
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  13.  32
    Embodied Social Cognition, Participatory Sense-Making, and Online Learning.Michelle Maiese - 2013 - Social Philosophy Today 29:103-119.
    I will argue that the asynchronous discussion format commonly used in online courses has little hope of bringing about transformative learning, and that this is because engaging with another as a person involves adopting a personal stance, comprised of affective and bodily relatedness (Ratcliffe 2007, 23). Interpersonal engagement ordinarily is fully embodied to the extent that communication relies heavily on individuals’ postures, gestures, and facial expressions. Subjects involved in face-to-face interaction can perceive others’ desires and feelings on the basis of (...)
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  14. The Power of Passion on Heartbreak Hill.Michelle Maiese - 2007 - In Michael W. Austin (ed.), Running & Philosophy: A Marathon for the Mind. Blackwell.
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  15.  2
    Dissociative Identity Disorder, Ambivalence, and Responsibility.Michelle Maiese - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):764-784.
    If someone with dissociative identity disorder commits a wrongful act, is she responsible? If one adopts the Multiple Persons Thesis, it may seem that one alter cannot be responsible for the actions of another alter. Conversely, if one regards the subject as a single person, it may seem that she is responsible for any actions she performs. I will argue that this subject is a single person, but one who suffers from delusions of disownership and therefore does not fulfill ordinary (...)
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  16.  11
    Giovanna Colombetti, The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind, MIT Press, 2013, 288pp, Hardcover, $40.00, ISBN: 9780262019958. [REVIEW]Michelle Maiese - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):973-978.
    The Feeling Body applies several ideas from the enactive approach to the field of affective science, with the aim of both developing enactivism as well as reconceptualizing various affective phenomena. The book is organized into six chapters that examine primordial affectivity (chapter 1), the nature of emotional episodes and moods (chapters 2 and 3), enactive appraisal (chapter 4), the bodily feelings associated with emotional experience (chapter 5), affective neuro-physio-phenomenology (chapter 6), and the affective dimension of intersubjectivity (chapter 7). Giovanna Colombetti’s (...)
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  17.  23
    Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension , by Andy Clark.M. Maiese - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):199-206.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  18.  3
    Affective Scaffolds, Expressive Arts, and Cognition.Michelle Maiese - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  19.  2
    Embodied Social Cognition, Participatory Sense-Making, and Online Learning.Michelle Maiese - 2013 - Social Philosophy Today 29:103-119.
    I will argue that the asynchronous discussion format commonly used in online courses has little hope of bringing about transformative learning, and that this is because engaging with another as a person involves adopting a personal stance, comprised of affective and bodily relatedness. Interpersonal engagement ordinarily is fully embodied to the extent that communication relies heavily on individuals’ postures, gestures, and facial expressions. Subjects involved in face-to-face interaction can perceive others’ desires and feelings on the basis of their expressions and (...)
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  20. Embodied Selves and Divided Minds.Michelle Maiese - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Embodied Selves and Divided Minds examines how research in embodied cognition and enactivism can contribute to our understanding of the nature of self-consciousness, the metaphysics of personal identity, and the disruptions to self-awareness that occur in case of psychopathology. The book reveals how a critical dialogue between Philosophy and Psychiatry can lead to a better understanding of important issues surrounding self-consciousness, personal identity, and psychopathology.
     
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