Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, (...) in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of passive experience first came to systematic and detailed expression in the lectures on passive synthesis from the early 1920s, where he discusses pure passivity under the rubric of affection and association. In this paper I suggest that this familiar theory of passive experience is a first approximation leaving important questions unanswered. Focusing primarily on affection, I will show that Husserl did not simply leave his theory untouched. In later manuscripts he significantly reworks the theory of affection in (...) terms of instinctive intentionality and a passive experience of desire aimed at satisfaction and enjoyment. This paper will show that the theory of affection and the theory of instincts in Husserl are really one and the same, differing only in the superior theoretical apparatus with which Husserl treats the phenomenon in his more considered theory of the instincts. I demonstrate the connection between the two theories by showing how what he generically calls “affection” in earlier texts is the same phenomenon he calls “curiosity” in later texts. The connection is further supported by the way curiosity does the same work as affection in its function within Husserl’s theory of association, serving as the basic connective tissue linking diverse experiences. In closing, I deal with the problem of how to integrate the experience of the body into the theory of instincts, displaying in another way how Husserl improves his theory of affection by making it more concrete when he recasts it as a theory of instincts. (shrink)

Levinas is usually discussed as a philosopher wrestling with the nature of our experience of others, ethical obligation, and the divine. Unlike other phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Heidegger, he is not often mentioned in discussions about issues in philosophy of mind. His work in that area, especially on perception, is underappreciated. He gives an account of the nature of perceptual experience that is remarkable both in how it departs from that of others in the phenomenological tradition and for how (...) it fits in among presently available views about the nature of perceptual experience, namely, as a form of naïve realism. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 755-777, June 2022.

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 755-777, June 2022.

A number of philosophers have held that we visually experience objects’ occluded parts, such as the out-of-view exterior of a voluminous, opaque object. That idea is supposed to be what best explains the fact that we see objects as whole or complete despite having only a part of them in view at any given moment. Yet, the claim doesn’t express a phenomenological datum and the reasons for thinking we do experience objects’ occluded parts, I argue, aren’t compelling. Additionally, I anticipate (...) and reply to attempts to salvage the idea by appeal to perceptual expectation and amodal completion. Lastly, I address potential concerns that the only way to capture the phenomenal character of perceiving voluminous objects is to say experience outstrips what’s in view, providing a description of such experience without any implication of that idea. (shrink)

The relation of genetic phenomenology and the project of phenomenological reduction is the primary concern of this paper. Despite Husserl’s occasional loose references to “the” reduction, performing the reduction actually refers to numerous interrelated techniques. I want here to delve into these intricacies with the aim of determining the place of genetic phenomenology within the whole of phenomenological technique. It will be necessary to both state in general terms what the aim of the reduction is and what the different “ways” (...) to the reduction are before highlighting their inadequacy for dealing with genetic matters, which then brings us face to face with the underexplored possibility that there might be a peculiar novel from of reduction or transformation of the reduction that is needed to deal with genesis on properly transcendental ground. Following this line of thought, I attempt to elaborate a way into genetic phenomenology, which, I suggest, begins to appear most clearly in Husserl’s later reflections on “abnormal” forms of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper argues that egalitarian theories should be judged by the degree to which they meet four different challenges. Fundamentalist egalitarianism, which contends that certain inequalities are intrinsically bad or unjust regardless of their consequences, fails to meet these challenges. Building on discussions by T.M. Scanlon and David Miller, we argue that egalitarianism is better understood in terms of commitments to six egalitarian objectives. A consequence of our view, in contrast to Martin O'Neill's “non-intrinsic egalitarianism,“ is that egalitarianism is better (...) understood as a family of views than as a single ethical position. (shrink)

Interpretations abound about Husserl’s understanding of the relationship between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination. Some read him as taking the two to share the same distinctive essential nature, like contemporary conjunctivists. Others find in Husserl grounds for taking the two to fall into basically distinct categories of experience, like disjunctivists. There is ground for skepticism, however, about whether Husserl’s view could possibly fall under either of these headings. Husserl, on the one hand, operates under the auspices of the phenomenological reduction, (...) abstaining from use of any epistemic commitments about mind-transcendent reality, whereas conjunctive and disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, on the other hand, are both premised on some form of metaphysical realism. There seems to be a basic incompatibility between the former approach and the latter. I examine this line of thinking and argue that the incompatibility is only apparent. (shrink)

The relativistic three-particle systems are studied within the framework of Relativistic Schrödinger Theory, with emphasis on the determination of the energy functional for the stationary bound states. The phenomenon of entanglement shows up here in form of the exchange energy which is a significant part of the relativistic field energy. The electromagnetic interactions become unified with the exchange interactions into a relativistic U gauge theory, which has the Hartree–Fock equations as its non-relativistic limit. This yields a general framework for treating (...) entangled states of relativistic many-particle systems, e.g., the N-electron atoms. (shrink)

In recent years a growing trend has emerged which has argued for a greater priority to be placed upon patient autonomy within the doctor-patient relationship. The patient self determination movement, which first began to emerge in the 1960s, helps to mark the start of this ground swell of patient power sentiment. In keeping with this idea, the recent book by Robert M. Veatch, Patient heal thyself: How the new medicine puts the patient in charge addresses this very idea, arguing for (...) and promoting a new paradigm for medicine which places the patient firmly at the centre of all decision making in terms of medical treatment and care. Veatch is one of the leading bioethicists in the USA, having previously held the position of Senior Associate at the Hastings Center before moving to the Kennedy Institute of Ethics where he has served as director and Professor of Medical Ethics. (shrink)

The mathematical framework of Relativistic Schrödinger Theory (RST) is generalized in order to include the self-interactions of the particles as an integral part of the theory (i.e. in a non-perturbative way). The extended theory admits a Lagrangean formulation where the Noether theorems confirm the existence of the conservation laws for charge and energy–momentum which were originally deduced directly from the dynamical equations. The generalized RST dynamics is applied to the case of some heavy helium-like ions, ranging from germanium (Z=32) to (...) bismuth (Z=83), in order to compute the interaction energy of the two electrons in their ground-state. The present inclusion of the electron self-energies into RST yields a better agreement of the theoretical predictions with the experimental data. (shrink)

Guilt and shame are self-conscious emotions with implications for mental health, social and occupational functioning, and the effectiveness of sports practice. To date, the assessment and role of athlete-specific guilt and shame has been under-researched. Reporting data from 174 junior elite cricketers, the present study utilized exploratory factor analysis in validating the Athletic Perceptions of Performance Scale, assessing three distinct and statistically reliable factors: athletic shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and no-concern. Conditional process analysis indicated that APPS shame-proneness mediated the relationship between general (...) and athlete-specific distress. While APPS domains of guilt-proneness and no-concern were not significant mediators, they exhibited correlations in the expected direction with indices of psychological distress and well-being. The APPS may assist coaches and support staff identify players who may benefit from targeted interventions to reduce the likelihood of experiencing shame-prone states. (shrink)

Gers (Biol Philos, 2011) provides a positive and constructive view of the project to generalise Darwinian principles in Geoffrey Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen’s Darwin’s Conjecture. We note considerable overlap with his work and ours, and also with important recent work of Godfrey-Smith ( 2009 ), which Gers cites extensively. But we also note that there are differences in research objectives between Gers and Godfrey-Smith, on the one hand, and ourselves, on the other. Gers and Godfrey-Smith focus on the elucidation of (...) the most general principles possible. Our aim is to derive principles that are sufficiently abstract to span the natural and human social worlds, and then add additional principles to help understand the Darwinian evolution of human society. Furthermore, Gers and Godfrey-Smith critique a replicator concept that is different from ours. Once these points are made apparent, the criticisms are essentially disabled, and we end up in a position with different but complementary and overlapping research projects. (shrink)

In online lectures, unlike in face-to-face lectures, teachers lack access to (nonverbal) cues to check if their students are still “with them” and comprehend the lecture. The increasing availability of low-cost eye-trackers provides a promising solution. These devices measure unobtrusively where students look and can visualize these data to teachers. These visualizations might inform teachers about students’ level of “with-me-ness” (i.e., do students look at the information that the teacher is currently talking about) and comprehension of the lecture, provided that (...) (1) gaze measures of “with-me-ness” are related to comprehension, (2) people not trained in eye-tracking can predict students’ comprehension from gaze visualizations, (3) we understand how different visualization techniques impact this prediction. We addressed these issues in two studies. In Study 1, 36 students watched a video lecture while being eye-tracked. The extent to which students looked at relevant information and the extent to which they looked at the same location as the teacher both correlated with students’ comprehension (score on an open question) of the lecture. In Study 2, 50 participants watched visualizations of students’ gaze (from Study 1), using six visualization techniques (dynamic and static versions of scanpaths, heatmaps, and focus maps) and were asked to predict students’ posttest performance and to rate their ease of prediction. We found that people can use gaze visualizations to predict learners’ comprehension above chance level, with minor differences between visualization techniques. Further research should investigate if teachers can act on the information provided by gaze visualizations and thereby improve students’ learning. (shrink)

This thought-provoking book sets out to restructure philosophical enterprise in the analytic tradition. The aim is to disprove the following statements: Soames 2003a, xiv: “In general, philosophy d...

Control-based accounts of moral responsibility face a familiar problem. There are some actions which look like obvious cases of responsibility but which appear equally obviously to lack the requisite control. Drunk-driving cases are canonical instances. The familiar solution to this problem is to appeal to tracing. Though the drunk driver isn't in control at the time of the crash, this is because he previously drank to excess, an action over which he did plausibly exercise the requisite control. Tracing seeks to (...) show that an agent's responsibility for some outcome can be traced back to a prior exercise of control which caused the later lack of control. These and related cases have led many theorists to treat tracing as an indispensable component of any adequate theory of responsibility. This paper argues that tracing is in fact dispensable. I offer two strategies for explaining responsibility in drunk-driving cases : responsibility can either be exhaustively modeled on recklessness, or exhaustively modeled on negligence. Neither explanation, however, relies on tracing. If I'm right, the case for tracing is seriously weakened. (shrink)

First, let me start by thanking all of my commentators for doing a careful reading of my book, providing me with lots of though-provoking responses, and on top of all of that for the significant time commitment in being a part of this symposium. I’m very grateful for all the support! Let me add a further note of thanks to Noell Birondo for taking on the role of editor in bringing all of these wonderful contributions together in this issue of (...) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. (shrink)

I am aware of the rain outside, but only in virtue of looking at a weather report. I am aware of my friend, but only because I hear her voice through my phone. Thus, there are some things that I’m aware of, but only indirectly. Many philosophers believe that there are also some things of which I am directly aware. The most plausible candidates are experiences such as pains, tickles, visual sensations, etc. In fact, the philosophical consensus seems to be (...) that experiences are the only plausible candidates for acquaintance. But I will argue that we are also acquainted with ourselves. After outlining what it means to be acquainted with oneself, I will introduce, develop, and defend a commonly used test for acquaintance. Then I will apply this test to us and show that we pass. I will consider various objections to my argument. But ultimately I will conclude that we can be, and often are, acquainted with ourselves. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo apply a socioecological approach to identify risk and protective factors across levels of the “sports-ecosystem,” which are associated with mental health outcomes among athletes in para-sports and non-para sports. A further aim is to determine whether para athletes have unique risks and protective factor profiles compared to non-para athletes.MethodsA cross-sectional, anonymous online-survey was provided to all categorized athletes aged 16 years and older, registered with the Australian Institute of Sport. Mental health outcomes included mental health symptoms, general psychological distress, (...) risky alcohol consumption and eating disorder risk. Risk and protective factors across multiple levels of the socioecological model, including individual, microsystem, exosystem and macrosystem level factors were assessed via self-report.ResultsA total of 427 elite athletes participated in the study. No significant differences in the rates of mental health problems were observed between para and non-para athletes. Both differences and similarities in risk and protective factor profiles were found across the multiple levels of the sports-ecosystem. Weak evidence was also found to support the hypothesis that certain risk factors, including experiencing two or more adverse life events in the past year, sports related concussion, high self-stigma, inadequate social support and low psychological safety conferred a greater risk for poorer mental health outcomes for para athletes in particular.ConclusionRisk factors occurring across various levels of the sports ecosystem, including individual, interpersonal and organizational level risk factors were found to be associated with a range of poorer mental health outcomes. The association between mental ill-health and certain risk factors, particularly those at the individual and microsystem level, appear to be greater for para athletes. These findings have important implications for policy and mental health service provision in elite sports settings, highlighting the need for more nuanced approaches to subpopulations, and the delivery of mental health interventions across all levels of the sports ecosystem. (shrink)

My question in this talk is “Does Knowledge Matter?” Before I give you my answer —which is “not in itself,” roughly—I need to explain exactly what the question means. Think of epistemology as studying our beliefs and the process of inquiry by which we arrive at them.1 There will be many ways of sorting our beliefs, in themselves or with reference to the inquiry that led to them. Some of these won’t be particularly interesting. No one much cares whether a (...) particular belief is the product of an inquiry that began on a Tuesday. We do care about whether a belief arose from an inquiry that was wellconducted (whatever that means); it reflects on how good the believer is as a believer. The question is: Should we care whether a belief counts as knowledge? Here I’m thinking of ‘knowledge’ as we intuitively judge it when we’re not thinking about philosophical concerns; including the judgment that (at least many) people make that knowledge is lacking in Gettier cases. So: When we evaluate a belief, should we care whether it’s knowledge, including the avoidance of Gettier cases? Mark Kaplan (1985) has given an argument that we shouldn’t care. Suppose someone has a Gettiered belief; it’s justified and true but fails to amount to knowledge because of a false lemma or some such. Kaplan points out that this can’t lead to any criticism of your methods of inquiry. Ex hypothesi your belief is justified; the conduct of your inquiry was entirely proper. Nor (though Kaplan does not emphasize this point) is your belief erroneous. Kaplan’s conclusion is that the concept of knowledge does not.. (shrink)

Pancreatitis is a complex, progressively destructive inflammatory disorder. Alcohol was long thought to be the primary causative agent, but genetic contributions have been of interest since the discovery that rare PRSS1, CFTR and SPINK1 variants were associated with pancreatitis risk. We now report two associations at genome-wide significance identified and replicated at PRSS1-PRSS2 and X-linked CLDN2 through a two-stage genome-wide study. The PRSS1 variant likely affects disease susceptibility by altering expression of the primary trypsinogen gene. The CLDN2 risk allele is (...) associated with atypical localization of claudin-2 in pancreatic acinar cells. The homozygous CLDN2 genotype confers the greatest risk, and its alleles interact with alcohol consumption to amplify risk. These results could partially explain the high frequency of alcohol-related pancreatitis in men. © 2012 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

The suspension of major sporting competitions due to the global COVID-19 pandemic had a substantial negative impact on the sporting industry. As such, a successful and sustainable return to sport will require extensive modifications to the current operations of sporting organizations. In this article we argue that methods from the realm of sociotechnical systems theory are highly suited for this purpose. The aim of the study was to use such methods to develop a model of an Australian Football League club’s (...) football department. The intention was to identify potential modifications to the club’s operations to support a return to competition following the COVID-19 crisis. Subject Matter Experts from an AFL club participated in three online workshops to develop Work Domain Analysis and Social Organization and Cooperation Analysis models. The results demonstrated the inherent complexity of an AFL football department via numerous interacting values, functions and processes influencing the goals of the system. Conflicts within the system were captured via the modeling and included pursing goals that may not fully reflect the state of the system, a lack of formal assessment of core values, overlapping functions and objects, and an overemphasis on specialized roles. The current analysis has highlighted potential areas for modification in the football department, and sports performance departments in general. (shrink)

Logics L F (M) are considered, in which M ("most") is a new first-order quantifier whose interpretation depends on a given filter F of subsets of ω. It is proved that countable compactness and axiomatizability are each equivalent to the assertion that F is not of the form $\{(\bigcap F) \cup X:|\omega - X| with $|\omega - \bigcap F| = \omega$ . Moreover the set of validities of L F (M) and even of L F ω 1 ω (M) depends (...) only on a few basic properties of F. Similar characterizations are given of the class of filters F for which L F (M) has the interpolation or Robinson properties. An omitting types theorem is also proved. These results sharpen the corresponding known theorems on weak models (U, q), where the collection q is allowed to vary. In addition they provide extensions of first-order logic which possess some nice properties, thus escaping from contradicting Lindstrom's Theorem [1969] only because satisfaction is not isomorphism-invariant (as it is tied to the filter F). However, Lindstrom's argument is applied to characterize the invariant sentences as just those of first-order logic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:preface “Africa Reconfigured,” the cluster in this issue on recent scholarly and creative work on Africa, displays a variety of cultural, artistic, and linguistic approaches to decolonizing gender. Originating in disparate fields, each article in this cluster presents examples of how new meanings of gender are produced that defy dominant definitions. Xavier Livermon examines the cultural and political context of postapartheid South Africa, arguing that redefinitions of “tradition”—not just (...) legal rights—have led Black South Africans to “queer” marriage practices. Busi Makoni pushes the boundaries of feminist linguistics to consider how young women creatively relate to the prevailing lexicon of body parts in southern African languages and, in doing so, how they challenge normative gender identities. Cheryl Toman offers an account of writer, playwright, and performer Werewere Liking’s distinctive lifelong fusing of performance art and social activism in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali and how Liking’s plays, prose, and poetry enact decolonization in unique ways. Nigerian artist Peju Alatise, whose work is featured in our art spread, presents an array of ideas, materials, and genealogies that deeply question European and US aesthetics, as the art essay by Moyo Okediji explains. Concluding “Africa Reconfigured” are critical perspectives on Euro-American gender orders found in Olumide Popoola’s except from a novel and the poems by Gabeba Baderoon. Two articles in the second half of this issue reconsider a specific moment of US women’s history: women’s liberation in the 1960s and early 1970s. Sara M. Evans challenges the stereotyping of the women’s liberation movement as white, middle class, and antisex, arguing that this is a myth fostered by academic theory, the movement’s opponents, and the mistaken notion that women ’s liberation rejected its New Left roots. Complementing Evans’s argument, Agatha Beins addresses the issue of racism in that same historical moment of women’s liberation in the United States by revisiting images 8Preface of revolutionary women of color in US feminist periodicals of the time, arguing that we have to understand the use of these images in the context of mainstream and New Left portrayals that demeaned feminism as being not serious about politics. Also in this issue is Mark Schuller ’s analysis of gender-based violence in Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake of 2010, in which he examines how international humanitarian organizations are not always fully aware of how structural violence operates in the country. In our forum “Teaching about Ferguson,” Feminist Studies offers our readers reflections on the pedagogical challenges and opportunities in taking up the issue of state-sanctioned violence against people of color in the United States. All the articles and essays in this issue emphasize that the specificities of transnational, historical, and political contexts—rather than abstract invocations of globalization —are essential for understanding the changing meanings of gender identities and hierarchies as well as the political goals of women ’s organizations. The first article in our cluster on “Africa Reconfigured” takes on a popular Western assumption about South Africa, which is that the constitutional changes that acknowledged and legalized same-sex partnerships replaced intolerant “traditional” practices among Black South Africans. Xavier Livermon challenges this assumption by demonstrating how Black South Africans engage tradition in creative nonheteronormative ways. He closely follows how Black South Africans redefine autochthonous cultural practices in order to create new meanings and practices for marriage. Just as the very definitions of gender have been continuously in flux, so have the definitions of marriage, and Livermon demonstrates how marriage and long-standing coupling practices have become queered and reconstituted in contemporary Black South Africa. In line with Livermon’s interest in redefinitions of sexuality and gender in a postapartheid context, Busi Makoni explores the relationship between the naming of genitalia and gender positionings. Studying both men’s and women’s uses of the lexicon for body parts in multiple Southern African languages, Makoni concludes that women engage in a process of dis-identification with, and reappropriation of, socially inscribed language for their bodies. Women use the same name labels, but assign them completely different meanings, thereby creating counternarratives of feminine identity. Preface 9 The ability to create new meanings permeates the art... (shrink)

Logics $L^F(M)$ are considered, in which $M$ ("most") is a new first-order quantifier whose interpretation depends on a given filter $F$ of subsets of $\omega$. It is proved that countable compactness and axiomatizability are each equivalent to the assertion that $F$ is not of the form $\{(\bigcap F) \cup X: |\omega - X| < \omega\}$ with $|\omega - \bigcap F| = \omega$. Moreover the set of validities of $L^F(M)$ and even of $L^F_{\omega_1\omega}(M)$ depends only on a few basic properties of (...) F. Similar characterizations are given of the class of filters $F$ for which $L^F(M)$ has the interpolation or Robinson properties. An omitting types theorem is also proved. These results sharpen the corresponding known theorems on weak models $(\mathfrak{U}, q)$, where the collection $q$ is allowed to vary. In addition they provide extensions of first-order logic which possess some nice properties, thus escaping from contradicting Lindstrom's Theorem [1969] only because satisfaction is not isomorphism-invariant (as it is tied to the filter $F$). However, Lindstrom's argument is applied to characterize the invariant sentences as just those of first-order logic. (shrink)

We enrich intuitionistic logic with a lax modal operator and define a corresponding intensional enrichment of Kripke models M = (W, , V) by a function T giving an effort measure T(w, u) {} for each -related pair (w, u). We show that embodies the abstraction involved in passing from true up to bounded effort to true outright. We then introduce a refined notion of intensional validity M |= p : and present a corresponding intensional calculus iLC-h which gives a (...) natural extension by lax modality of the well-known G: odel/Dummett logic LC of (finite) linear Kripke models. Our main results are that for finite linear intensional models L the intensional theory iTh(L) = {p : | L |= p : } characterises L and that iLC-h generates complete information about iTh(L).Our paper thus shows that the quantitative intensional information contained in the effort measure T can be abstracted away by the use of and completely recovered by a suitable semantic interpretation of proofs. (shrink)

We enrich intuitionistic logic with a lax modal operator ○ and define a corresponding intensional enrichment of Kripke models M = (W, ⊑, V) by a function T giving an effort measure T(w, u) ∈ \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $${\mathbb{N}} \cup$$ \end{document} {∞} for each ⊑-related pair (w, u). We show that ○ embodies the abstraction involved in passing from “ϕ true up to bounded effort” to “ϕ true outright”. We then introduce a refined (...) notion of intensional validityM |= p : ϕ and present a corresponding intensional calculus iLC-h which gives a natural extension by lax modality of the well-known G: odel/dummett logic LC of (finite) linear Kripke models. Our main results are that for finite linear intensional models L the intensional theory iTh(L) = {p : ϕ | L |= p : ϕ} characterises L and that iLC-h generates complete information about iTh(L).Our paper thus shows that the quantitative intensional information contained in the effort measure T can be abstracted away by the use of ○ and completely recovered by a suitable semantic interpretation of proofs. (shrink)

Given a model \ of set theory, and a nontrivial automorphism j of \, let \\) be the submodel of \ whose universe consists of elements m of \ such that \=x\) for every x in the transitive closure of m ). Here we study the class \ of structures of the form \\), where the ambient model \ satisfies a frugal yet robust fragment of \ known as \, and \=m\) whenever m is a finite ordinal in the sense (...) of \ Our main achievement is the calculation of the theory of \ as precisely \-\. The following theorems encapsulate our principal results:Theorem A. Every structure in \ satisfies \-\.Theorem B. Each of the following three conditions is sufficient for a countable structure \ to be in \: \ is a transitive model of \-\. \ is a recursively saturated model of \-\. \ is a model of \.Theorem C. Suppose \ is a countable recursively saturated model of \ and I is a proper initial segment of \ that is closed under exponentiation and contains \. There is a group embedding \ from \\) into \\) such that I is the longest initial segment of \ that is pointwise fixed by \ for every nontrivial \.\)In Theorem C, \\) is the group of automorphisms of the structure X, and \ is the ordered set of rationals. (shrink)

I am the full-time father of two very curious boys aged 7 and 8 for whom I do the daily school run commute and drop off, before I do my other job of teaching high school philosophy. It is a constant challenge to keep my car companions occupied every day, so I’m indebted to the ‘ABC Short and Curly’ podcast. My boys are big fans of the show, and our daily car journeys have been enlivened with often heated discussions about (...) who we would save in a fire, or should we rob the rich to help the poor? Such questions have transformed my humble family car into a mobile ‘Philosophy in Schools’ classroom for our morning commute. The podcast provides the stimulus, while I facilitate the discussion as I navigate rush-hour traffic—it is a great way to prepare me for my school day. As a result, I was excited to receive a copy of the accompanying series book 'The Short and Curly guide to life. 'The book is written by the Short and Curly’s resident Philosopher and Ethicist Dr Matt Beard and Kyla Slaven. The book approaches ethical issues in the style of a collection of ‘field research reports’ that are completed by characters from the ‘Brains Trust’ who take on the role of research agents. Twelve ethical issues are investigated at length, with a chapter being allocated to each—examples being lying, happiness, fairness, promises, friendship, bravery and integrity. (shrink)

Open-mindedness is widely regarded as an epistemic virtue and, more recently, a moral one: its exercise is supposed to be conducive not only to the acquisition of epistemic goods such as truth, knowledge, and understanding, but also to the development of moral goods such as the promotion of social cohesion and the fostering of people’s respect and care for one another. This glossy view of open-mindedness, however, has come under challenge. Critics have argued that adopting a default stance of openness (...) can be detrimental to our epistemic and moral selves, especially in today’s world where fake news, attacks on the idea of truth, and blatant lies abound. The articles in this symposium by Howard Curzer and Jessica Gottlieb and by Matt Ferkany represent some of these challenges. Concerned with the question of when it is safe to exercise open-mindedness, both seek to identify the potential hazards that may arise as a result being open-minded and to propose ways to curtail those hazards. In this paper, I will assess each of their arguments in turn. (shrink)

In a recent article Paul Cartledge and Matt Edge argue that the modern republican tradition offers a useful framework for understanding the Athenian concept of freedom, and that within this framework the Athenians protected their freedoms without reference to a concept of rights. This paper agrees with both of these conclusions but identifies and corrects three assumptions behind Cartledge and Edge’s argument: that the only purpose of rights is to protect individual freedoms against the state; that rights have no place (...) at all in the republican tradition; and that the ancient Greeks did not understand rights. In fact the Athenians did have an understanding of rights but they did not use rights to protect freedoms. The reason for this is that the protected freedom is a very modern and particularly sophisticated application of the concept of rights. (shrink)

This paper reviews the book, Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer, Guns and Gandhi in Africa: Pan-African Insights on Nonviolence, Armed Struggle, and Liberation in Africa. Bill Sutherland recounts to Matt Meyer his many years of activism for peace and social justice in Africa. Sutherland worked with Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and others. Sutherland and Meyer together tour places Sutherland lived and interview important lifelong activists still working in Africa, all documented in this book.