A small industry has grown up around these works - Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens - complaining not just about their theological illiteracy but also about their ...

In the current academic climate, teaching is often seen as secondary to research. Teaching Philosophy seeks to bring teaching philosophy higher on the academic agenda.An international team of contributors, all of whom share the view that philosophy is a subject that can transform students, offers practical guidance and advice for teachers of philosophy. The book suggests ways in which the teaching of philosophy at undergraduate level might be facilitated. Some of the essays place the emphasis on individual self discovery, others (...) focus on the wider political context, many offer practical ideas for enhancing the teaching of philosophy through exercises that engage students in often unconventional ways. The integration of students' views on teaching provides a necessary reminder that teaching is not a one-way process, but a project that will ultimately succeed through cooperation and a shared sense of achievement amongst participants. (shrink)

The book offers a conception of philosophy as a form of self-enquiry which begins not in reflection, but in silence and meditation, conceived as conditions for the emergence and cessation of contending states of mind which influence perception and action. The philosopher thus becomes a kind of cartographer of a shifting interior landscape. This underlying perspective explains the personal nature of the writing and its mixing of genres. The book draws on both the Greek and Buddhist traditions, recognising that it (...) is time for Western thinkers to acknowledge and respond to an intercultural canon. It aims to integrate ethics and a non-theistic philosophy of religion through the medium of aesthetics, mapping Buddhist 'mindfulness' and the Greek virtues and vices of temperance and licentiousness, continence and incontinence, onto an account of the development of moral sentiments and their relation to practical judgement in the context of oppressive political and social realities. (shrink)

I have meditated regularly, following simple Buddhist procedures, for more than ten years, and that seems just about long enough for me to start to offer some preliminary account of it, despite the limitations of my progress and experience, and the difficulty of describing the more intimate and less explored reaches of the mind. I think I have learned enough to say that through prolonged spiritual practice one arrives at the springs of action and at root attitudes, and is in (...) a position to be possessed of them in a purer, stronger form. It may seem difficult to see how the practice of philosophy can be reconciled with the practice of meditation, but I shall describe how I have tried to do so, and say how I think the one bears on the other. In fact all I can do in the present paper is to attempt a limited discussion of moral psychology, and its relation to the foundations of ethics, a discussion, I must concede now, in which I waver uncertainly in my expression of the key issues. But I think that I cannot delay indefinitely, and if I can sketch out the terrain even roughly, better work on it can come later. My references to mindfulness and to meditation will be elementary and not systematic, though adequate, I hope, to what I want to say about ethics. What I am writing in praise of is mindfulness, or awareness, which I take to be a virtue that is developed through the practice of meditation or some comparable contemplative activity. I am also concerned for the future direction of philosophy. It seems to me that our attaining to this virtue will transform its practice, so that it moves closer to traditional expectations, somewhat disappointed in recent years, though supposedly less so now. If I am not deluded, there is an interior route towards the great questions of metaphysics, and we shall be known for not having taken it. It is a task for a new generation of philosophers, and I for one still scan the horizon for their arrival. (shrink)

‘Godless’ was never a neutral term: in 1528 William Tindale talked of ‘godlesse ypocrites and infidels’ and a ‘godless generation’ is one that has turned its back on God and the paths of righteousness. An atheist, by contrast, a new and self-conscious atheist perhaps, might now wear the term as a badge of pride, to indicate their rejection both of belief and the implication of moral turpitude. Traditionally, though, those who declared themselves ‘atheist’ had a hardly better press than the (...) ‘godlesse’, since ‘atheism’ was and in some cases still is considered a form of intellectual and moral shallowness: thus Sir Francis Bacon offers a bluff refinement of the Psalmist's verdict on the fool who says in his heart that there is no God: The Scripture saith, The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God ; it is not said, The fool hath thought in his heart ; so he rather saith it, by rote to himself, as that he would have, than that he can thoroughly believe it, or be persuaded of it. (shrink)

In this book, Professor Mohanty develops a new interpretation of the ontology and nature of Indian philosophical thinking. Using the original Sanskrit sources, he examines the concepts of consciousness and subjectivity, and the theories of meaning and truth, and explicates the concept of theoretical rationality that underlies the Indian philosophies. The author brings to bear insights from modern Western analytical and phenomenological philosophies, not with a view to instituting direct comparisons but in order to interpret Indian thinking. In doing so, (...) he highlights some very distinctive features of Indian thinking. (shrink)

David E. Cooper proposes that the ”mystery’ of ”reality as it “anyway‘ is, independently of human perspective’ provides measure for the leading of our lives and thus avoids, on the one hand, the hubris of a humanism for which moral life is the product of the human will and has no warrant beyond it, and, on the other, a theism which appears to be at once too remote from and too close to the human world to provide any such warrant. (...) The paper rejects the role this gives to ”mystery’ and locates ”warrant’ in a moral perspective that is not the product of will. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.4 (2002) 343-347 [Access article in PDF] Mysticism and Psychosis:Descriptions and Distinctions Michael McGhee IT IS REFRESHING to read a paper that manages at once to be interdisciplinary and intercultural in its range of reference, and that also confronts a difficult and controversial question about how we are to assess the similarities and differences between psychotic and mystical experiences. Many psychiatrists have been skeptical about (...) whether there are any genuine differences, and not, mostly, because they thought that psychotics were in reality mystics. But mystical is pretty vague, as is spiritual, and that does not bode well for the enterprise of making comparisons, unless we can tie these latter terms down with some precision. How vague psychosis is I must leave others to judge, but one of the conclusions I have drawn from reading this paper is that the crucial questions turn not on agreed definitions, but on agreed judgments about what are to count as the examples or cases that fall under the definitions. I have some doubts about Caroline Brett's approach to these questions, in the first half hesitant doubts, in the second part less so. Her leading claim appears first in the Introduction:... spiritual or mystical experiences are those states in which the form of experience is altered from normal consciousness, resulting in a new understanding of the basic nature of reality, life, and the individual. Psychotic experiences are those states that also flow from alterations of the form of experience, but result in a pathological interaction between the individual and the world. Therefore, according to these definitions, phenomena occurring in a spiritual context may be identical to those traditionally viewed as symptoms of psychosis, but cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves. (Brett 2002, 322) What I was struck by in reading this passage was not so much the claim that "phenomena occurring in a spiritual context may be identical to those traditionally viewed as symptoms of psychosis, but cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves." What struck me was its implication: that psychotic experiences cannot be seen as psychotic in themselves, either. In other words, the claim is that there is a neutral core of common experience shared by psychotic and mystic alike. I do not know how controversial this is in the psychiatric literature that deals with delusion and hallucination, but I should like to explore the claim a little in what follows. Brett expands on it near the end of her paper: The pathology that differentiates the psychotic from the benign mystical state lies not in the content of beliefs, or even in the broad form of experience, but in a few interrelated commonsense factors. It consists of an inability to return to the ontological framework of consensus reality; in psychological isolation, and inability [End Page 343] to accommodate to the subjectivity of others; in a focus of interest in the mental realm and loss of practical concerns that leads to paucity of action and neglect of self-care. (Brett 2002, 336) This pushes the pathology away from the experience that might have been thought to constitute the psychosis. I wonder whether there are problems with this. The fact, if it is one, that both mystic and psychotic alike undergo "an altered state" clearly does not imply that there is a (common) altered state that they both undergo, so what are the grounds for the claim that the core or central experience is the same? What kind of experiences are claimed to be common? How are we to conceive delusion on this scenario?What makes psychotic experiences psychotic on the present pushed back view seems to be that they "result in a pathological interaction between individual and world" (my italics), which thus exonerates the experience itself of pathology, pushing it back to one possible set of consequences for someone who reacts badly to the experiential phenomena (e.g., their inability to return from it). It seems to suggest that someone can be comfortable or well adapted to their voices and visions (and surely there are such people around, for whom the boundaries... (shrink)

In this paper I continue an enterprise begun in earlier work in which I attempt to naturalize into a western philosophical context concepts that derive from the practice of Buddhist meditation. In particular I shall try to make use of the notion of samādhi and vipassanā or insight. I should stress that I make no attempt at a scholarly explication of these terms but try rather to establish a use for them through reflection on experience, and by making a connection (...) with concerns from aesthetics about expression and intentionality: I do so as a moral philosopher seeking to retrieve the Greek virtues of continence and temperance, which I have tried to relate to stages in the emergence of what I call an ‘ethical sensibility’, so that temperance, for instance, is the natural state of one in whom such a sensibility is flourishing. But I see the development of that sensibility as the concentration or gathering of a person's energies into its structure, into the sustaining of the thought or perception upon which action or non-action depends, as well as into the sustaining of action itself. In talking of ‘energy’ here I am trying to develop an idea of Simone Weil's in which she refers to ‘the energy available for action’. (shrink)

In this paper I continue an enterprise begun in earlier work in which I attempt to naturalize into a western philosophical context concepts that derive from the practice of Buddhist meditation. In particular I shall try to make use of the notion of samādhi and vipassanā or insight. I should stress that I make no attempt at a scholarly explication of these terms but try rather to establish a use for them through reflection on experience, and by making a connection (...) with concerns from aesthetics about expression and intentionality: I do so as a moral philosopher seeking to retrieve the Greek virtues of continence and temperance, which I have tried to relate to stages in the emergence of what I call an ‘ethical sensibility’, so that temperance, for instance, is the natural state of one in whom such a sensibility is flourishing. But I see the development of that sensibility as the concentration or gathering of a person's energies into its structure, into the sustaining of the thought or perception upon which action or non-action depends, as well as into the sustaining of action itself. In talking of ‘energy’ here I am trying to develop an idea of Simone Weil's in which she refers to ‘the energy available for action’. (shrink)

There is a short section of Peter Harvey's recent book on Buddhism in which he offers a thumbnail sketch of Buddhist groups in the United Kingdom. Among the groups he describes is the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order, and I declare an interest, as one of its members. I have no particular quarrel with the description of FWBO activities, but there is a sting in the tail, which is, I think, a point of some conceptual interest, which others have (...) also focused on. (shrink)

Christian thinkers have recently expressed concern about the “silencing” or marginalisation of religion in public life, have affirmed the desirability of dialogue between the world of faith and the world of reason but have raised doubts about the feasibility of a moral language that refers to unconditional moral claims or human rights or the intrinsic dignity of human beings if it is not grounded in a transcendent or supernatural source of value. The present paper is an attempt to open a (...) conversation about these themes from the point of view of a non-theistic humanism inspired by a notion of incarnation. (shrink)

The three of us sweated in the heat and swayed with the rhythms of the crowded suburban train as we talked—or rather shouted to make ourselves heard—hanging by straps in the crush as we trundled back toward Andheri West. We were two Indians, Probal Dasgupta and Prabodh Parikh, and one Britisher, myself—all around the same age, in our late thirties. It was 1985, and Probal and I had traveled down from Pune on the Deccan Express to meet Prabodh in Bombay—and (...) it was also a chance for me to meet the incomparable M. P. Rege. The polymath and inexhaustible Probal had been a kind (but challenging) friend, and had gently but firmly introduced me—opened my eyes—to the real-life of India, including the nature, diversity .. (shrink)

There is a dichotomy in the Humean thought that morality is more properly felt than judged of. The idea of a moral sensibility with an epistemic and rational content is grounded in the experience of the state of nature, and a distinction made between a defensive and a constructive morality, constituted by a set of motivations, against the law of the strongest, and protective of the relationships of education and creative work, exclusion from which undermines the conditions for a constructive (...) morality. Aesthetic education is a means of overcoming the sectarianism of defensive morality. (shrink)

This is a powerful and learned meditation on Christianity by a senior Irish theologian, and the main reason it should be noticed in a journal of philosophy is that James Mackey conceives theology as fundamentally philosophical in the way it reflects on and develops our ideas about the sources and nature of being and conduct as they have been articulated in myth, symbol and poetry, as well as more abstractly in metaphysics. On this view the philosophical aspect of theology is (...) displayed no less in the scrutiny and interpretation of that myth, symbol and poetry than in the more narrowly focussed field of natural theology as this has come to be practised by recent analytic philosophers—a field, indeed, which might well be thought, on the evidence of this book, to depend upon and be undermined by an uncritical reception of discredited readings of the imagery of the creation myth . It is appropriate—and something of a relief—that in his nuanced and compelling reflections on that myth Mackey's philosophical temper leads him to stress the importance of the creative imagination, particularly that of the poet, who is ‘the seer, the prophet, the visionary, who sees so deeply into the fabric of reality that the ways of the Creator with creation are revealed in the ensuing poetry, and with a power and a clarity seldom equalled in other forms’ . Indeed he opens his chapter on Creation by highlighting the importance of the metaphors and imagery which are to be his theme and by which myth is constituted and ‘reality’ mediated. He refers to them as ‘configurations through which reality first rewards the attentive, or more precisely the contemplative mind’ and remarks that at its outer limit ‘imagination … ends up by telling a cosmic story, resulting in nothing less than a cosmic myth’ . One important implication of this fertile approach is that it also requires engagement with a question about the nature of the relationship between myth and metaphysics: after all, some philosophers still incline to the view that metaphysics underwrites and validates what the poet ‘sees’. However, it provokes another question, which is at least as important, about the status of theism as itself perhaps ‘a cosmic myth’. What kind of ‘reality’ is revealed by the poet? Are ‘the ways of the Creator with his creation’ the reality whose nature is revealed by the poet? Or is it, rather, that ‘the ways of the Creator with his creation’ are part of a particular configuration of images by which the poets widen our perceptions and articulate their wonder at the world of creative forces in the form of story-telling, both mythopoeic and metaphysical. (shrink)

An alternative agenda for the philosophy of religion emerges from this interdisciplinary collection. Going outside the traditional concerns of natural theology, the distinguished contributors to this volume explore such topics as the nature of selfhood and its images in the ancient, the medieval and the modern world; the role of philosophy as a route to wisdom; non-conceptual awareness; and the nature of love and its relation to attention. Discussion focuses on the figures of Plato and Augustine, William James and the (...) Absolute Idealist F. H. Bradley, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, as well as leading figures of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. (shrink)

Many people describe themselves as secular rather than religious, but they often qualify this statement by claiming an interest in spirituality. But what kind of spirituality is possible in the absence of religion? In this book, Michael McGhee shows how religious traditions and secular humanism function as 'schools of wisdom' whose aim is to expose and overcome the forces that obstruct justice. He examines the ancient conception of philosophy as a form of ethical self-inquiry and spiritual practice conducted by a (...) community, showing how it helps us to reconceive the philosophy of religion in terms of philosophy as a way of life. McGhee discusses the idea of a dialogue between religion and atheism in terms of Buddhist practice and demonstrates how a non-theistic Buddhism can address itself to theistic traditions as well as to secular humanism. His book also explores how to shift the centre of gravity from religious belief towards states of mind and conduct. (shrink)

The original claim made in the introduction to this classic volume was that it broke fresh ground: that it set a new agenda for the philosophy of religion and was a reaction against a narrow conception of the discipline that had little to say philosophically about human experience, or subjectivity, or about the religious imagination, or the idea of 'spirituality'. In a new foreword to the book, Michael McGhee reflects on how the discipline has changed or remained the same in (...) the intervening twenty-five years since first publication. He argues that the connections between 'philosophy' and 'spirituality' are still developing; and that what we think of as 'religious' or 'spiritual' is shifting, along with ideas about self-knowledge. The book contains pertinent chapters by some of the leading thinkers in the field, including Rowan Williams, Janet Soskice, Fergus Kerr, Stephen Clark and Paul Williams, who offers a comparative piece on Tibetan Buddhism. Michael McGhee is Honorary Senior Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. His latest book is Spirituality for the Godless : Buddhism, Humanism, and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2021). (shrink)

We precipitately express opinions about religion without reflecting critically on our conception of it, and may blame it for conduct that the religious traditions themselves judge unbecoming. A distinction can be drawn between the raw, natural self of the untrained person and the well‐tempered demeanour of a spiritually developed person. Such a distinction drives the appropriation of religious beliefs and can survive their demise. ‘Religious belief’ is not to be conflated with Abrahamic notions of ‘belief in God’ and ‘faith’. There (...) are other versions of transcendence and other psycho‐dramas. One possible form of transcendence is available within the moral life of human beings. (shrink)

Belief in life after death is implicated, for the typical 'Wittgensteinian', with Cartesian dualism, and the latter seen to entail a private inner subject that cannot survive the anti-private language argument. But Descartes does not really suffer from this defect and belief in life after death is not merely a product of 'confused' Cartesian metaphysics. Descartes is presented as an intellectual analogue of the formation of the concept of 'soul' in spiritual contexts. Just as metaphysical reflection forces us to conclude, (...) for Descartes, that we are only contingently flesh and blood beings, so it is only under the condition of recalcitrant experience that exemplary practitioners seem forced to forge a distinction between body and soul, thus revising influentially their view of themselves as single beings both conscious and extended. (shrink)

This is a response to Peter Winch’s Maharbaleshwar reflections on Simone Weil’s ideas about the exercise of power and its renunciation, and on her changing views about the nature of action as she draws out the implications of our ‘hesitation’ when confronted by beauty and by the presence of other human beings.

The paper draws on the Heideggerian distinction between Bildung and Besinnung to locate a discussion of theological strategies in the face of Nietzsche's pronouncement that God is dead, and sketches what should be an epistemologically vigilant (and thus properly sceptical) Buddhist response to that pronouncement. The theological options that are mentioned or discussed include naive and critical theological realism, anti-realism and a nontheistic 'spiritual realism'. Buddhism is discussed in terms of its naturalistic sources and their development in the expression of (...) states of mind rather than in terms of belief. (shrink)

How should we understand Wittgenstein's comment in 1929 that his ‘ideal’ was ‘a certain coolness’? Does it have the implication for the practice of philosophy that is suggested by the late Dewi Phillips? Wittgenstein's use of the metaphor of a temple in relation to the passions is curiously reminiscent in its structure of Rilke's first sonnet to Orpheus. In Zettel a similar preoccupation seems to be manifested in the long and unexpected passage that Wittgenstein copies out from Plato, a passage (...) which is juxtaposed to the famous remark that the philosopher is the citizen of no community of ideas. (shrink)