According to the received view (Boche?ski, Kneale), from the end of the fourteenth to the second half of nineteenth century, logic enters a period of decadence. If one looks at this period, the richness of the topics and the complexity of the discussions that characterized medieval logic seem to belong to a completely different world: a simplified theory of the syllogism is the only surviving relic of a glorious past. Even though this negative appraisal is grounded on good reasons, it (...) overlooks, however, a remarkable innovation that imposes itself at the beginning of the sixteenth century: the attempt to connect the two previously separated disciplines of logic and mathematics. This happens along two opposite directions: the one aiming to base mathematical proofs on traditional (Aristotelian) logic; the other attempting to reduce logic to a mathematical (algebraical) calculus. This second trend was reinforced by the claim, mainly propagated by Hobbes, that the activity of thinking was the same as that of performing an arithmetical calculus. Thus, in the period of what Boche?ski characterizes as ?classical logic?, one may find the seeds of a process which was completed by Boole and Frege and opened the door to the contemporary, mathematical form of logic. (shrink)
In a text written during his stay in Paris, Leibniz, to deny ontological reality to relations, employs an argument well known to the medieval thinkers and which later would be revived by Francis H. Bradley. If one assumes that relations are real and that a relation links any property to a subject – so runs the argument – then one falls prey to an infinite regress. Leibniz seems to be well aware of the consequences that this argument has for his (...) own metaphysical views, where the relation of inherence plays such a central role. Thus, he attempts first to interpret the relation of inherence as something ‘metaphoric’, originating from our ‘spatial way’ of looking at the surrounding world; and then he tries to reduce it to the part-whole relation which clearly he considers weaker, from the ontological point of view, than that of ‘being in’. (shrink)
This book is a collection of essays published by the author in the long run of about 20 years and is centered on the reconstruction of Leibniz’s logical calculi. All the essays have been revised for the present edition and some of them constituted the background for Lenzen’s first monograph on Leibniz’s logic. A feature common to all these essays is the vindication of the relevance and originality of Leibniz’s logical achievements. Lenzen manifests strong dissatisfaction with the evaluations of Leibniz’s (...) logic previously offered by interpreters like Louis Couturat, Clarence I. Lewis, Karl Dürr, William and Martha Kneale, and states that till now Leibniz’s results in the field of logic have been widely underestimated. The book contains a careful and detailed examination of almost all Leibniz’s papers on the logical calculus and it is based on the knowledge of a wide range of texts unknown to previous interpreters. Lenzen’s acquaintance with the entire corpus of Leibniz’s logical texts is impressive. Some chapters of the book in particular contain very solid and useful logical analyses. Chapter 7, for instance, includes the most profound account of Leibniz’s theory of negation I ever read. Chapter 8 presents in a very clear way Leibniz’s attempt to reduce traditional syllogistic to a calculus based on logical inclusion between terms. Chapter 14 is devoted to Leibniz’s a priori proof of the existence of God and presents the first edition of an important manuscript on the proof. On chapters 3 and 5 a series of convincing reasons are given to argue that Leibniz’s concept of ens does not have to be considered a constant in the logical calculus. In brief: this work discusses a wide range of topics in such a clear and learned way that it will surely become a reference book for scholars interested in the study of Leibniz’s logical papers in the forthcoming years. (shrink)
This book is a collection of essays published by the author in the long run of about 20 years and is centered on the reconstruction of Leibniz’s logical calculi. All the essays have been revised for the present edition and some of them constituted the background for Lenzen’s first monograph on Leibniz’s logic. A feature common to all these essays is the vindication of the relevance and originality of Leibniz’s logical achievements. Lenzen manifests strong dissatisfaction with the evaluations of Leibniz’s (...) logic previously offered by interpreters like Louis Couturat, Clarence I. Lewis, Karl Dürr, William and Martha Kneale, and states that till now Leibniz’s results in the field of logic have been widely underestimated. The book contains a careful and detailed examination of almost all Leibniz’s papers on the logical calculus and it is based on the knowledge of a wide range of texts unknown to previous interpreters. Lenzen’s acquaintance with the entire corpus of Leibniz’s logical texts is impressive. Some chapters of the book in particular contain very solid and useful logical analyses. Chapter 7, for instance, includes the most profound account of Leibniz’s theory of negation I ever read. Chapter 8 presents in a very clear way Leibniz’s attempt to reduce traditional syllogistic to a calculus based on logical inclusion between terms. Chapter 14 is devoted to Leibniz’s a priori proof of the existence of God and presents the first edition of an important manuscript on the proof. On chapters 3 and 5 a series of convincing reasons are given to argue that Leibniz’s concept of ens does not have to be considered a constant in the logical calculus. In brief: this work discusses a wide range of topics in such a clear and learned way that it will surely become a reference book for scholars interested in the study of Leibniz’s logical papers in the forthcoming years. (shrink)
Many of the problems traditionally related to the interpretation of Leibniz' theory of relations may be seen in a better light considering essentially two factors: 1) the different plans (ontological, metaphysical, psychological and logical-linguistic) implied by Leibniz reflections on the subject; 2) the reference to scholastic and late-scholastic texts read or consulted by Leibniz. Relations for Leibniz are, from a metaphysical point of view, denominations only seemingly external, they are in reality denominationes intrinsecae, and are founded on the general connection (...) of all things. From a psychological point of view they are abstract entities that our mind builds by resemblance. From an ontological point of view they are individual accidents inherent to the substances. From a logical-linguistic point of view they are abstract structures that connect the one to the other at least two subjects. The propositions in which they appear, as for example the proposition “Paris loves Helen” are transformed by Leibniz in equivalent propositions joined by operators, which in medieval logic were known as termini reduplicantes (terms which define mostly intensional contexts). This may be seen with sufficient clarity examining the last part, until now inedited, of the famous passage about Paris and Helen published by Couturat in his Opuscules. (shrink)
The paper examines three essays that Leibniz wrote in 1688, immediately after the composition of the Discourse on Metaphysics, one of his most organic philosophical works. The main topics which emerge from these essays are: the relationship between substance and accidents; the nature of accidents; and, more generally, the nature of abstract entities. Given that accidents' nature is that of changing, Leibniz sees how hard it is to give an account of the relationship between substance and accidents that does not (...) imply any change in the substance, when its accidents undergo a change. To find a way out of this problem, Leibniz assumes that abstract terms (whiteness, wisdom, etc.) do not name real properties or real parts of substances, and that any sentence containing real abstract terms can be rephrased as a sentence containing logical abstract terms, which do no imply any commitment to the existence of real properties. Coherently with this nominalistic attitude, Leibniz ends up, in the Theodicy and in his correspondence with Des Bosses, considering accidents as modes or internal modifications of the substance. (shrink)
This is an appreciation of Richard Arthur, assessing his contributions to Leibniz studies and recounting the nature of our friendship over the past 30 years.
This book is a collection of essays published by the author in the long run of about 20 years and is centered on the reconstruction of Leibniz’s logical calculi. All the essays have been revised for the present edition and some of them constituted the background for Lenzen’s first monograph on Leibniz’s logic. A feature common to all these essays is the vindication of the relevance and originality of Leibniz’s logical achievements. Lenzen manifests strong dissatisfaction with the evaluations of Leibniz’s (...) logic previously offered by interpreters like Louis Couturat, Clarence I. Lewis, Karl Dürr, William and Martha Kneale, and states that till now Leibniz’s results in the field of logic have been widely underestimated. The book contains a careful and detailed examination of almost all Leibniz’s papers on the logical calculus and it is based on the knowledge of a wide range of texts unknown to previous interpreters. Lenzen’s acquaintance with the entire corpus of Leibniz’s logical texts is impressive. Some chapters of the book in particular contain very solid and useful logical analyses. Chapter 7, for instance, includes the most profound account of Leibniz’s theory of negation I ever read. Chapter 8 presents in a very clear way Leibniz’s attempt to reduce traditional syllogistic to a calculus based on logical inclusion between terms. Chapter 14 is devoted to Leibniz’s a priori proof of the existence of God and presents the first edition of an important manuscript on the proof. On chapters 3 and 5 a series of convincing reasons are given to argue that Leibniz’s concept of ens does not have to be considered a constant in the logical calculus. In brief: this work discusses a wide range of topics in such a clear and learned way that it will surely become a reference book for scholars interested in the study of Leibniz’s logical papers in the forthcoming years. (shrink)
In a text written during his stay in Paris, Leibniz, to deny ontological reality to relations, employs an argument well known to the medieval thinkers and which later would be revived by Francis H. Bradley. If one assumes that relations are real and that a relation links any property to a subject – so runs the argument – then one falls prey to an infinite regress. Leibniz seems to be well aware of the consequences that this argument has for his (...) own metaphysical views, where the relation of inherence plays such a central role. Thus, he attempts first to interpret the relation of inherence as something ‘metaphoric’, originating from our ‘spatial way’ of looking at the surrounding world; and then he tries to reduce it to the part-whole relation which clearly he considers weaker, from the ontological point of view, than that of ‘being in’. (shrink)
In a text written during his stay in Paris, Leibniz, to deny ontological reality to relations, employs an argument well known to the medieval thinkers and which later would be revived by Francis H. Bradley. If one assumes that relations are real and that a relation links any property to a subject – so runs the argument – then one falls prey to an infinite regress. Leibniz seems to be well aware of the consequences that this argument has for his (...) own metaphysical views, where the relation of inherence plays such a central role. Thus, he attempts first to interpret the relation of inherence as something ‘metaphoric’, originating from our ‘spatial way’ of looking at the surrounding world; and then he tries to reduce it to the part-whole relation which clearly he considers weaker, from the ontological point of view, than that of ‘being in’. (shrink)
This book offers a careful investigation of Leibniz’s theory of truth and, at the same time, an accurate analysis of many aspects of Leibniz’s ontology and philosophy of logic. Given its complexity and richness, I limit myself to illustrat ing certain aspects of Rauzy’s inquiry and to expressing some, albeit moderate, disagreement. Despite this disagreement, the author’s achievement is extraordinary. Anyone interested in Leibniz’s logic and metaphysics will read it with great profit.
This book offers a careful investigation of Leibniz’s theory of truth and, at the same time, an accurate analysis of many aspects of Leibniz’s ontology and philosophy of logic. Given its complexity and richness, I limit myself to illustrat ing certain aspects of Rauzy’s inquiry and to expressing some, albeit moderate, disagreement. Despite this disagreement, the author’s achievement is extraordinary. Anyone interested in Leibniz’s logic and metaphysics will read it with great profit.
This book offers a careful investigation of Leibniz’s theory of truth and, at the same time, an accurate analysis of many aspects of Leibniz’s ontology and philosophy of logic. Given its complexity and richness, I limit myself to illustrat ing certain aspects of Rauzy’s inquiry and to expressing some, albeit moderate, disagreement. Despite this disagreement, the author’s achievement is extraordinary. Anyone interested in Leibniz’s logic and metaphysics will read it with great profit.
The paper examines three essays that Leibniz wrote in 1688, immediately after the composition of the Discourse on Metaphysics, one of his most organic philosophical works. The main topics which emerge from these essays are: the relationship between substance and accidents; the nature of accidents; and, more generally, the nature of abstract entities. Given that accidents’ nature is that of changing, Leibniz sees how hard it is to give an account of the relationship between substance and accidents that does not (...) imply any change in the substance, when its accidents undergo a change. To find a way out of this problem, Leibniz assumes that abstract terms do not name real properties or real parts of substances, and that any sentence containing real abstract terms can be rephrased as a sentence containing logical abstract terms, which do no imply any commitment to the existence of real properties. Coherently with this nominalistic attitude, Leibniz ends up, in the Theodicy and in his correspondence with Des Bosses, considering accidents as modes or internal modifications of the substance. (shrink)
