This stimulating collection is devoted to the life and work of the most flamboyant of twentieth-century philosophers, Paul Feyerabend. Feyerabend's radical epistemological claims, and his stunning argument that there is no such thing as scientific method, were highly influential during his life and have only gained attention since his death in 1994. The essays that make up this volume, written by some of today's most respected philosophers of science, many of whom knew Feyerabend as students and colleagues, cover the diverse (...) themes in his extensive body of work and present a personal account of this fascinating thinker. (shrink)

Published in 1998, the main aim of this book is to use a naturalistic, evolutionary approach to solve some of the most important problems in philosophy. The first two problems come from the philosophy of science: the problem of rationality of science and the problem of truth in science. In presenting the first problem, the author argues that the views of Kuhn and Feyerabend do create a very serious challenge to traditional epistemology, however, if the assumption of individual rationality is (...) abandoned in favour of the author's social concept of rationality, a committed naturalism can account for science as a rational activity. In tackling the second problem of truth, the author shows that a committed evolutionary philosophy does not support realism but leads instead to a thorough evolutionary relativism of scientific knowledge. It is nevertheless possible to use this evolutionary relativism to construct a theory of relative truth. The issue of whether science discovers truth has also been tied to absolutism, that a well formulated theory of relative truth is likely to bring about a profound transformation of the way we think about the field. The author explores the notion of relative truth in the philosophy of science, ethics and aesthetics. (shrink)

Some philosophers think that Paul Feyerabend is a clown, a great many others think that he is one of the most exciting philosophers of science of this century. For me the truth does not lie somewhere in between, for I am decidedly of the second opinion, an opinion that is becoming general around the world as this century comes to an end and history begins to cast its appraising eye upon the intellectual harvest of our era. A good example of (...) this opinion may be found in the admiration for Feyerabend's philosophy of science expressed by Grover Maxwell in his contribution to this volume. Maxwell, recalling his own intellectual transformation, says also that it was Feyerabend who "confirmed my then incipient suspicions that most of the foundations of currently fashionable philosophy and even a great deal of the methodology to which many scientists pay enthusiastic lip service are based on simple mistake- assumptions whose absurdity becomes obvious once attention is directed at them". And lest the reader thinks, as many still do, that however sharp Feyerabend's attacks upon the philosophical establishment may have been, he does not offer a positive philosophy (a complain made by C.A. Hooker and some of the other contributors), Paul Churchland argues otherwise. (shrink)

Writing from a scientifically and philosophically informed perspective, the authors provide a critical overview of the conceptual difficulties encountered in many current neuroscientific and psychological theories.

La notion de « conscience-noyau » due à Antonio Damasio comporte de sérieux défauts. Elle ne peut rendre compte de phénomènes comme le rêve ou le syndrome d’enfermement qu’une théorie adéquate de la conscience devrait expliquer, car elle suppose que la représentation de soi par un organisme est affectée par son traitement d’un objet. Cette condition ne peut être satisfaite dans aucun de ces deux états. De plus, dans de nombreux états dans lesquels l’organisme prend en compte l’effet, par exemple, (...) de la perception d’un objet extérieur, cette prise en compte est inconsciente. Enfin, la connexion étroite que Damasio établit entre la conscience et le moi conduit à une division du moi intenable d’un point de vue théorique: des considérations liées à l’évolution exigent que même un moi primitif manifeste les traits d’un « moi autobiographique ». (shrink)

SPANISH: La filosofía se resiste a extender al hombre estilos de explicación que funcionan bien en la investigación de la naturaleza sin tener en cuenta que también somos parte de ella. Al tenerlo en cuenta, sin embargo, hacemos posible la revitalización de la filosofía y quizá hasta la solución, de sus problemas más importantes. Las ciencias neuronales en un contexto evolutivo transforman, por ejemplo, los problemas del realismo y de la racionalidad científica. Al considerar que nuestras estructuras cerebrales –y por (...) consiguiente nuestros modos de pensar– son el resultado de una larga serie de adaptaciones a una larga sucesión de entornos, vemos que la selección natural habría podido desarrollar diferentes modos de pensar no menos válidos que los nuestros. El resultado de tales consideraciones es lo que he llamado «relativismo evolutivo». Este tipo de relativismo no es susceptible a las objeciones tradicionales y nos proporciona, además, las bases. ENGLISH: Philosophy resists the extensión to man of modes of explanation that function well in the investigation of nature, without taking into account that we too are part of it. When we take that into account, however, we make possible the revitalizing of philosophy and perhaps even the solution of its most significant problems. Neuroscience in an evolutionary context, for example, transforms the problems of realism and scientific rationality. Upon considering that our brain structures – and consequently our modes of thought – are the result of a long series of adaptations to a large succession of environments, we see that natural selection could have brought about different modes of thought no less valid than ours. The result of such considerations is what I have called “evolutionary relativism”. This type of relativism is not susceptible to the traditional objections; and it provides us, in addition, the basis of a theory of relative truth. (shrink)

Philosophy resists the extensión to man of modes of explanation that function well in the investigation of nature, without taking into account that we too are part of it. When we take that into account, however, we make possible the revitalizing of philosophy and perhaps even the solution of its most significant problems. Neuroscience in an evolutionary context, for example, transforms the problems of realism and scientific rationality. Upon considering that our brain structures – and consequently our modes of thought (...) – are the result of a long series of adaptations to a large succession of environments, we see that natural selection could have brought about different modes of thought no less valid than ours. The result of such considerations is what I have called “evolutionary relativism”. This type of relativism is not susceptible to the traditional objections; and it provides us, in addition, the basis of a theory of relative truth. (shrink)

The existence of “grandmother” cells clashes with the model of the brain as a distributive system and is implausible because such neurons would have powers of representation across visuals angles and contexts. Nevertheless, Kreiman, Koch and others have offered experimental evidence that such neurons do exist. I agree that neurons may indeed fire when the subject looks at a variety of pictures, drawings, etc. of one particular person. I argue, however, that such a “grandmother” cell is nothing but the single-neuron (...) output stage of a neural network trained to recognize that person. The so-called “grandmother cell” does not have any extraordinary binding properties: They are properties of the neural network instead. I will thus offer a distributive explanation of grandmother cells. (shrink)

Gettier’s Paradox is considered a most critical problem for the presumably obvious philosophical view that knowledge is justified true belief. Such a view of knowledge, however, exposes the poverty of analytic philosophy. It wrongly assumes, for example, that knowledge must be conscious and explicit, and, to make matters worse, linguistic, as illustrated in Donald Davidson’s writings. To show why this philosophical view is wrong I will point to arguments by Ruth Barcan Marcus and, principally, Paul Churchland, as well as to (...) work by the neuroscientist Paul Reber on intuitive knowledge. We will see, then, that much of our knowledge is neither explicit nor conscious, let alone linguistic. I will suggest that an approach that pays attention to biology is more likely to succeed in developing a proper account of our cognitive abilities. Thus, Gettier’s paradox becomes a mere curiosity. (shrink)

Science is a social expression of intelligence. As such, science can be explained as a product of our natural history. This naturalistic account of science leads to a social conception of scientific rationality, according to which rationality is a structural property of science as a whole, not to be ascribed to the behavior of individual scientists. This new conception of rationality embedded in a straightforward biological epistemology solves the problem of the rationality of science.

La notion de « conscience-noyau » due à Antonio Damasio comporte de sérieux défauts. Elle ne peut rendre compte de phénomènes comme le rêve ou le syndrome d’enfermement qu’une théorie adéquate de la conscience devrait expliquer, car elle suppose que la représentation de soi par un organisme est affectée par son traitement d’un objet. Cette condition ne peut être satisfaite dans aucun de ces deux états. De plus, dans de nombreux états dans lesquels l’organisme prend en compte l’effet, par exemple, (...) de la perception d’un objet extérieur, cette prise en compte est inconsciente. Enfin, la connexion étroite que Damasio établit entre la conscience et le moi conduit à une division du moi intenable d’un point de vue théorique: des considérations liées à l’évolution exigent que même un moi primitif (par exemple un proto-moi) manifeste les traits d’un « moi autobiographique ». (shrink)

In tackling the issue of justification, philosophers have gone overboard in their efforts to discover fallacies in the reasoning of otherwise sensible people. And having fallen into deep water, those philosophers now find that they do not know how to swim. The cause of such philosophical distress can be located in what may have once appeared as a virtue: the separation between man and nature. Science may describe the world, and even us, but it cannot tell us what we ought (...) to do; it may explain how a state of affairs originated and developed, but it cannot tell us whether that state of affairs is a good thing. In this paper I will argue against that separation; and in advocating a philosophy that treats man as part of nature, I will attempt to throw light on the issue of justification. (shrink)

In tackling the issue of justification, philosophers have gone overboard in their efforts to discover fallacies in the reasoning of otherwise sensible people. And having fallen into deep water, those philosophers now find that they do not know how to swim. The cause of such philosophical distress can be located in what may have once appeared as a virtue: the separation between man and nature. Science may describe the world, and even us, but it cannot tell us what we ought (...) to do; it may explain how a state of affairs originated and developed, but it cannot tell us whether that state of affairs is a good thing. In this paper I will argue against that separation; and in advocating a philosophy that treats man as part of nature, I will attempt to throw light on the issue of justification. (shrink)

Los dos principales problemas de la epistemología de la ciencia, racionalidad y verdad, se pueden resolver si adoptamos un enfoque basado en la biología evolutiva y la neuropsicología. Tal enfoque biológico produce una relación de medios a fines de la racionalidad y nos hace darnos cuenta de que la racionalidad es una propiedad social de la ciencia. El problema de la verdad recibe ímpetu de la intuición que solo el realismo puede explicar el éxito de la ciencia. Pero ni la (...) historia ni la práctica actual de la ciencia apoyan la conexión requerida entre verdad y éxito. El enfoque biológico explica cómo la conexión debe ser en el sentido contrario: el éxito explica las atribuciones de la verdad. El relativismo evolutivo que resulta y su asociada teoría de la verdad relativa son propuestas más sensatas que el realismo de los filósofos analíticos. (shrink)

The scientific exploration of Mars might yield results of extraordinary importance for our own planet, particularly the search for extant or fossil Martian life, which would make it possible to understand terrestrial life in a more profound way. This potential scientific treasure places on us an ethical obligation to minimize the disruption of the Martian environment until our scientific exploration has been greatly advanced. We also have ethical obligations to the human scientific explorers of Mars, ethical obligations that require a (...) series of scientific investigations, e.g., about how the low Martian gravitation may affect those explorers’ physiology. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The view that science is typically a cumulative, progressive process, as suggested by some historians of science and some scientific realists, is undermined both by history and by evolutionary considerations about the nature of science. The attempts to use evolutionary biology to portray scientific development as continuous are based on unfortunate analogies to the evolu tion of life. A proper application of evolutionary biology, in combination with neuroscience, defeats the case for the realism in question and leads to the (...) realization that science is not only open to radical transformation, as history indicates, but that it should be so. Non-evolutionary approaches for the historical continuity of science, such as Lakatos', do not fare much better. As I will argue, science is a radical form of knowledge. (shrink)

An anthology of contemporary philosophy of science in Spain. Essays on 19th Century physics, the new cosmology, philosophy of biology, scientific rationality, philosophy of mathematics, phenomenology's account of scientific progress, science and ethics, philosophy of economics, methodology, and the philosophy of technology.

Resumen Este artículo busca demostrar que los argumentos generales acerca de la exploración científica valen también para las ciencias espaciales. El trabajo se basa en el ejemplo de la exploración de Venus y lo que esta nos dice acerca de nuestro propio planeta. Argumenta que el concepto de la probabilidad de Leslie es incorrecto, como también lo son las dudas sobre la evidencia Venusiana. Así mismo, concluye que no se puede rechazar la importancia que tienen los descubrimientos inesperados que han (...) resultado de la exploración de Venus para ayudarnos a comprender nuestro propio planeta. Y que si van a ser rechazados estos descubrimientos debe ser por razones científicas, no por intuiciones acerca de la probabilidad.This article seeks to demonstrate that the general arguments about scientific exploration are also suitable for space sciences. The work is based on the example of the exploration of Venus and what it tells us about our own planet. It argues that Leslie’s concept of probability is incorrect, as are also the doubts on Venusian evidence. Likewise, it concludes that we cannot deny that the unexpected discoveries that have resulted from the exploration of Venus are important to help us understand our own planet. And if these discoveries are going to be rejected, it must be for scientific reasons and not for intuitions about probability. Este artículo busca demostrar que los argumentos generales acerca de la exploración científica valen también para las ciencias espaciales. El trabajo se basa en el ejemplo de la exploración de Venus y lo que esta nos dice acerca de nuestro propio planeta. Argumenta que el concepto de la probabilidad de Leslie es incorrecto, como también lo son las dudas sobre la evidencia Venusiana. Así mismo, concluye que no se puede rechazar la importancia que tienen los descubrimientos inesperados que han resultado de la exploración de Venus para ayudarnos a comprender nuestro propio planeta. Y que si van a ser rechazados estos descubrimientos debe ser por razones científicas, no por intuiciones acerca de la probabilidad. (shrink)

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented withthisthing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to (...) me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)

This book defends antitheodicism, arguing that theodicies, seeking to excuse God for evil and suffering in the world, fail to ethically acknowledge the victims of suffering. The authors argue for this view using literary and philosophical resources, commencing with Immanuel Kant's 1791 "Theodicy Essay" and its reading of the Book of Job. Three important twentieth century antitheodicist positions are explored, including "Jewish" post-Holocaust ethical antitheodicism, Wittgensteinian antitheodicism exemplified by D.Z. Phillips and pragmatist antitheodicism defended by William James. The authors argue (...) that these approaches to evil and suffering are fundamentally Kantian. Literary works such as Franz Kafka'sThe Trial, Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, and George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, are examined in order to crucially advance the philosophical case for antitheodicism. (shrink)

In his last book, David Armstrong sets out his metaphysical system in a set of concise and lively chapters each dealing with one aspect of the world. He begins with the assumption that all that exists is the physical world of space-time. On this foundation he constructs a coherent metaphysical scheme that gives plausible answers to many of the great problems of metaphysics. He gives accounts of properties, relations, and particulars; laws of nature; modality; abstract objects such as numbers; and (...) time and mind. (shrink)

Is consciousness a purely physical phenomenon? Most contemporary philosophers and theorists hold that it is, and take this to be supported by modern science. But a significant minority endorse non-physicalist theories such as dualism, idealism and panpsychism, among other reasons because it may seem impossible to fully explain consciousness, or capture what it's like to be in conscious states (such as seeing red, or being in pain), in physical terms. This Element will introduce the main non-physicalist theories of consciousness and (...) explain the most important arguments for them, and consider how they each respond to the scientific and other arguments in support of physicalism. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

Western democracy is now at a critical juncture. Some worry that power has been wrested from the people and placed in the hands of a small political elite. Others argue that the democratic system gives too much power to a populace that is largely ill-informed and easily swayed by demagogues. This classic study of democratic principles is thus now more relevant than ever. A renowned historian of antiquity and political philosophy, Sir M.I. Finley offers a comparative analysis of Greek and (...) modern conceptions of democracy. As he puts the ancient Greeks in dialogue with their contemporary counterparts, Finley tackles some of the most pressing issues of our day, including public apathy, partisanship, consensus politics, distrust of professional politicians, and the limits of free speech. Including three lectures that Finley delivered at Rutgers University, plus two additional essays that further illuminate his thinking, _Democracy Ancient and Modern _explores the dramatic differences between the close-knit civil society of the ancient Greeks and our own atomized mass societies. By mapping out democracy’s past and its present manifestations, this book helps us plot a course for democracy’s future. (shrink)

This book presents a collection of essays on institutional theory written by the German sociologist and Weber-expert M. Rainer Lepsius. Based on Weber's work, the author develops concepts of institutional theory, which he subsequently applies to topics such as National Socialism, democratization processes, German unification, and the institutionalization of the European Union. By showing how charismatic leadership can under certain circumstances threaten democratic structures and curtail individual freedoms, and by analyzing the structural and cultural conditions under which people develop trust (...) in political and social structures and ultimately come to support and comply with them, the author provides a sound analytical understanding of the development of democratic institutions and a democratic political culture. This collection of essays was edited, translated and commented on by Claus Wendt. (shrink)