In this paper we pursue the study of the variety of m -generalized Łukasiewicz algebras of order n which was initiated in . This variety contains the variety of Łukasiewicz algebras of order n . Given , we establish an isomorphism from its congruence lattice to the lattice of Stone filters of a certain Łukasiewicz algebra of order n and for each congruence on A we find a description via the corresponding Stone filter. We characterize the principal congruences on A (...) via Stone filters. In doing so, we obtain a polynomial equation which defines the principal congruences on the algebras of . After showing that for m > 1 and n > 2, the variety of Łukasiewicz algebras of order n is a proper subvariety of , we prove that is a finitely generated discriminator variety and point out some consequences of this strong property, one of which is congruence permutability. (shrink)
Upshot: We seek to address several questions and statements made in the commentaries by elaborating on the four main aspects of the M-N-L framework. Before doing so, we discuss the issue of constructivist teaching in the context of schools. We conclude by hypothesizing on what would be lost in the M-N-L framework by taking constructivism out of the picture.
The difficulty of the task that the authors of this book have posed themselves is due in the first instance to the fact that this period has been very little studied in the history of philosophy. In applying the term "early Russian philosophy" to the set of ideas, images, and conceptions of a philosophical order contained in the cultural texts of the tenth through the seventeenth centuries, M.N. Gromov and N.S. Kozlov see it not simply as a specific stage in (...) the development of Russian philosophy but as a "very particular phenomenon that is qualitatively unique and requires special study" . Thus the authors declare their own position in the far from finished debate about the specificity of Russian philosophy and the distinctive features of its historical development. They rely not only on the vast treasury of early Russian texts that have come down to us but also on the scholarship of historians of literature, language, painting, architecture, folklore, and other areas of culture. Of course, the book also gives careful consideration to the few studies that have been devoted to the historical-philosophical analysis of early Russian culture, from the works of the Archimandrite Gavriil to the most recent works by Soviet and foreign authors published in decades just past. (shrink)
The failure of philosophy -- A new political philosophy -- Radical democracy -- Politics of freedom -- The future of democracy -- Decentralization of power -- A Humanist approach to elections -- A new approach to political and economic problems -- Human nature and humanist practice -- Humanist politics -- Integral humanism -- The way out -- New humanism -- The principles of radical democracy.
Mikhail Nikolaevich bridges 19th- and 20th-century Russian culture as well as Leninism and Stalinism, and later became an instrument in Khrushchev's effort at de-Stalinization. Pokrovskii was born in Moscow in 1868. He described the years before 1905 as his time of "democratic illusions and economic materialism." His interest in legal Marxism began in the 1890's but it was only with the Revolution of 1905 that he stepped into the Marxist camp. Pokrovskii was a leader in the creation of the "historical (...) front"—an organization of scholars authorized to work out a Marxist theory of the past. He formalized the bond between scholarship and politics through his belief that historians should assist party authorities in effecting a cultural revolution; thus he supported Stalin's collectivization of agriculture and leg a campaign to silence non-Marxist scholars, some of whom he had defended earlier. Yet his accommodation with Stalin was uneasy, and after Pokrovskii's death in 1932 his allegedly "abstract sociological schemes" were condemned and his career was dubbed _pokrovshcina_—era of the wicked deeds of Pokrovskii. (shrink)
Some people have supposed that utility is good in itself, non-in-strumentally good, as distinct from good because conducive to other good things. And in modern versions of this view, utility often means want-satisfaction, as distinct from pleasure or happiness. For your want that p to be satisfied, is it necessary that you know or believe that p, or sufficient merely that p is true? However that question is answered, there are problems with the view that want-satisfaction is a non-instrumental good. (...) What if you want something only because you have a false belief? What if the time at which you want that p is fifty or five hundred years before the time to which p itself refers? To meet these difficulties, qualifications have to be introduced, and much has been written about how exactly these qualifications are to be framed.1 There is however what may be a rather more serious objection to the view that want-satisfaction is a non-instrumental good, or rather to the combination of that view with the principle that it is sufficient for your want that p to be satisfied simply that p is true. The objection is that this combination forces you to give undue weight to the mere acquisition of desires when you come to make judgements about changes in the value of things. It forces you to say that for any true proposition p, which initially you do not want to be true, your mere acquisition of a desire that p will, other things being equal, make the world better. Non-instrumental value can be increased merely by multiplying desires, even though everything else remains the same. Surely, however, improving the world is not as easy as that. (shrink)
Contrairement à la plupart des écrits néoplatoniciens sur Aristote, le commentaire de Syrianus sur les Livres M et N de la Métaphysique revêt un ton particulièrement polémique. Certes, il s’agit là peut-être d’une réaction prévisible au contenu fortement antiplatonicien de M et N, mais il n’en demeure pas moins que Syrianus choisit délibérément de commenter ces textes-là. À cette fin, il a recours à divers procédés de polémique rhétorique, qu’il manie avec grande habilité. La première stratégie consiste à traiter Aristote (...) avec condescendance, en lui exposant simplement, ainsi qu’à nous, la doctrine platonicienne véritable. Ailleurs, il l’affronte en échangeant sarcasme pour sarcasme. Cependant il lui arrive aussi de chercher à réfuter le Stagirite dans les termes mêmes de ce dernier, en citant Aristote contre Aristote. Je discute quelques exemples de ces trois procédés en les traitant l’un après l’autre puisque chacun présente un intérêt particulier. Je conclus toutefois que cette polémique ne signifie pas forcément que Syrianus rejette le consensus néoplatonicien sur l’accord fondamental entre Platon et Aristote. (shrink)
M and N, the last two books of the Metaphysics, are Aristotle's only sustained venture into the philosophy of mathematics. In them, he criticizes Plato's theories and suggests alternatives of his own. This commentary concentrates on the continuing philosophical interest of these books rather than on scholarly controversies, and will provide a clear introduction for students, including those without Greek, to an unjustly neglected part of Aristotle's work. This paperback edition replaces the outstandingly successful hardback. 'Dr Annas's translation is clear, (...) readable, and accurate...an enjoyable volume, stimulating both as intellectual history and as philosophical argument.' Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)
M and N, the last two books of the Metaphysics, are Aristotle's only sustained venture into the philosophy of mathematics. In them, he criticizes Plato's theories and suggests alternatives of his own. This commentary concentrates on the continuing philosophical interest of these books rather than on scholarly controversies, and will provide a clear introduction for students, including those without Greek, to an unjustly neglected part of Aristotle's work. -/- This paperback edition replaces the outstandingly successful hardback. -/- 'Dr Annas's translation (...) is clear, readable, and accurate...an enjoyable volume, stimulating both as intellectual history and as philosophical argument.' Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)
I argue for two principles by combining which we can construct a sound cosmological argument. The first is that for any true proposition p's if ‘there is an explanation for p's truth’ is consistent then there is an explanation for p's truth. The second is a modified version of the principle that for any class, if there is an explanation for the non-emptiness of that class, then there is at least one non-member of that class which causes it not to (...) be empty. (shrink)
You have a body, but you are a soul or self. Without your body, you could still exist. Your body could be and perhaps is outlasted by the immaterial substance which is your soul or self. Thus the substance dualist. Most substance dualists are Cartesians. The self, they suppose, is essentially conscious: it cannot exist unless it thinks or wills or has experiences. In this paper I sketch out a different form of substance dualism. I suggest that it is not (...) consciousness but another immaterial feature which is essential to the self, a feature in one way analogous to a non-dispositional taste. Each self has moreover a different feature of this general kind. If this is right then simple and straightforward answers are available to some questions which prove troublesome to the Cartesian, consciousness-requiring type of substance dualist. I mean the questions, How can the self exist in dreamless sleep?, What distinguishes two simultaneously existing selves, and What makes a self the same self as a self which exists at some other time? (shrink)