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M R. X. Dentith
University of Waikato
  1. The Problem of Fake News.M. R. X. Dentith - 2016 - Public Reason 8 (1-2):65-79.
    Looking at the recent spate of claims about “fake news” which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem in epistemology. Te phenomena of fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indiference towards truth, which is sometimes expressed insincerely by political actors. Tis indiference and insincerity, I argue, has been allowed to fourish due to the way in which we have set the terms of the “public” epistemology that maintains what (...)
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  2. The Applied Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories: An Overview.M. R. X. Dentith & Brian L. Keeley - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Applied Epistemology. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 284-294.
    An overview of the current epistemic literature concerning conspiracy theories, as well as indications for future research avenues on the topic.
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  3. Expertise and Conspiracy Theories.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (3):196-208.
    Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call `conspiracy theories,' but that the conspiracy theorist has good reason to be suspicious of the role of expert endorsements when it comes (...)
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  4. Clearing Up Some Conceptual Confusions About Conspiracy Theory Theorizing.Martin Orr & M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - In M. R. X. Dentith (ed.), Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. London: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 141-153.
    Orr and Dentith argue that a recurrent problem in much of the wider academic literature on conspiracy theories is either conceptual confusion or a refusal to put theory before practice. Orr and Dentith show that a naive empiricism pervades much of the social science literature when it comes to these things called ‘conspiracy theories’ which not only runs at odds with the philosophical literature but also the general tenor of the social sciences over the latter part of the 20th Century (...)
     
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  5. What is Fake News?M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - University of Bucharest Review (2):24-34.
    Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then show what does and does not fall under the rubric of ‘fake news’. I then go on to argue that fake news is not a new problem. Rather, if there is problem (...)
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  6. The Iniquity of the Conspiracy Inquirers.M. R. X. Dentith - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (8):1-11.
    A reply to “Why ‘Healthy Conspiracy Theories’ Are (Oxy)morons” by Pascal Wagner-Egger, Gérald Bronner, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez and Nicolas Gauvrit.
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  7.  17
    Debunking Conspiracy Theories.M. R. X. Dentith - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
    In this paper I interrogate the notion of `debunking conspiracy theories’, arguing that the term `debunk’ carries with it pejorative implications, given that the verb `to debunk’ is commonly understood as `to show the wrongness of a thing or concept’. As such, the notion of `debunking conspiracy theories’ builds in the notion that such theories are not just wrong but ought to be shown as being wrong. I argue that we should avoid the term `debunk’ and focus on investigating conspiracy (...)
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  8.  88
    Politics, Deception, and Being Self-Deceived. [REVIEW]M. R. X. Dentith - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (4):38-43.
    A review of Anna Elisabeth Galeotti's "Political Self-Deception".
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  9.  73
    Between Forteana and Skepticism. [REVIEW]M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (11):48-52.
    A review of Bernard Will's "Believing Weird Things".
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  10. The Conspiracy Theory Theorists and Their Attitude Towards Conspiracy Theory—Introduction to Section Two.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - In Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. London: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 73-77.
    An introduction to section two, which introduces and summarises two recent critiques of belief in conspiracy theories by social scientists, as well as introducing the various arguments in the section.
     
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  11.  11
    Conspiracy Theories, Q Cassam, 2019. Cambridge, Polity Press, Vii + 127 Pp, USD45 (Hb) USD12.95. [REVIEW]M. R. X. Dentith - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
  12.  17
    Taking Account of Conspiracy Theorising.M. R. X. Dentith - 2019 - Colloquium.
    In this paper I both summarise the recent volume "Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously" (Rowman and Littlefield, 2018) and argue as to why we should investigate conspiracy theories rather than assume they are false or irrational by definition.
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  13. Introduction.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - In Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. London: Rowman and Littlefield.
    An introduction to section one, introducing the various arguments in the section, and the common features of the critique of Dentith’s paper, When inferring to a conspiracy theory might be the best explanation.
     
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  14. Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously and Investigating Them.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - In Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. London: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 217-225.
    In this concluding chapter Dentith presents a synthesis of the views on offer, arguing that the various philosophical, sociological and psychology theses defended in this section point towards a necessary reorientation of the literature, one which requires we purge public discourse of the pejorative aspects of the terms ‘conspiracy theory’ and ‘conspiracy theorist’ and, rather, engage with conspiracy theories as theories (like we do with theories in the Sciences and the Social Sciences) appraising them on their particular merits. Not just (...)
     
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  15. The Psychologists’ Conspiracy Panic: They Seek to Cure Everyone.M. R. X. Dentith & Dr Dr Lee Basham - 2018 - In Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. London: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 79-93.
    Basham and Dentith argue that the danger of condemning both conspiracy theorists and their conspiracy theories in a democracy has grave consequences. They argue that we should encourage research into public concerns about influential institutions, especially in cases where a conspiracy has been alleged. Rather than dismiss conspiracy theorising, we should, encourage the politically crucial, historically proven gift of watchfulness in the citizen, and its sometimes necessary, proper and correct expression, conspiracy theory.
     
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  16. A (Naive) View of Conspiracy as Collective Action.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - Filosofia E Collettività 22:61-71.
    Conspiracies are, by definition, a group activity; to conspire requires two or more people working together towards some end, typically in secret. -/- Conspirators have intentions; this is borne out by the fact they want some end and are willing to engage in action to achieve. Of course, what these intentions are can be hard to fathom: historians have written a lot about the intentions of the assassins of Julius Caesar, for example; did they want to restore the Republic; was (...)
     
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  17. The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory: Bringing the Epistemology of a Freighted Term Into the Social Sciences.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - In Joseph Uscinski (ed.), Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 94-108.
    An analysis of the recent efforts to define what counts as a "conspiracy theory", in which I argue that the philosophical and non-pejorative definition best captures the phenomenon researchers of conspiracy theory wish to interrogate.
     
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  18. What Particularism About Conspiracy Theories Entails.M. R. X. Dentith - 2018 - In Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously. London: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 59-69.
    In What particularism about conspiracy theories entails Dentith responds to their critics and examines the case for a refined and revised thesis of Particularism, the argument that we should appraise individual and particular conspiracy theories rather than appraise them in light of our views of the class of conspiracy theories generally. Recent work in the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories has presented challenges to Particularism simpliciter (or Naive Particularism). Dentith argues that by facing these challenges Particularism presents an even stronger case (...)
     
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