Results for 'M. Zachary Rosenthal'

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  1.  13
    Henry M. Rosenthal 1906-1977.Joan Stambaugh, James L. Muyskens & Abigail Rosenthal - 1978 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 51 (5):583 - 584.
  2. AHLBRANDT, G. And ZIEGLER, M., Quasi Finitely Axiomatiz-Able Totally Categorical Theories ASH, CJ and ROSENTHAL, JW, Intersections of Algebraically Closed Fields BAUDISCH, A., On Elementary Properties of Free Lie Algebras. [REVIEW]Jw Rosenthal & A. S. H. Cj - 1986 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 30:321.
  3.  12
    Perceptions of the Limitations of Confidentiality Among Chinese Mental Health Practitioners, Adolescents and Their Parents.Marcus A. Rodriguez, Caitlin M. Fang, Jun Gao, Clive Robins & M. Zachary Rosenthal - 2016 - Ethics and Behavior 26 (4):344-356.
    The present study aims to survey Chinese mental health professionals’ attitudes toward therapeutic confidentiality with adolescent patients in specific clinical situations, and compare Chinese adolescents’ and parents’ beliefs about when most mental health professionals would breach confidentiality. A sample of 36 mental health practitioners, 152 parents, and 164 adolescents completed a survey to assess their opinions about when confidentiality should be breached in 18 specific clinical situations. Nearly half of the parents and adolescents and 78% of the therapists in our (...)
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  4.  82
    The Rosenthal-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality.David M. Rosenthal & Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1972 - In Ausonio Marras (ed.), Intentionality, Mind and Language. University of Illinois Press.
    In response to your kind offer to read through portions of the typescript of my thesis pertaining to your views on intentionality, I am sending you a copy of an introductory section to such a chapter.{1} The enclosed typescript represents a first draft, for which I apologize, but I thought it might be useful to get any comments you might have in at the ground floor, so to speak.
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  5.  62
    Intentionality: A Study of the Views of Chisholm and Sellars.David M. Rosenthal - 1968 - Philosophy:1-361.
    Edited in hypertext by Andrew Chrucky. Reprinted with the permission of Professor David Rosenthal. Editor's Note: Due to the limitation of current hypertext, the following conventions have been used. In general, if an expression has some mark over it, that mark is placed as a prefix to the expression. All Greek characters are rendered by their names. Subscripts are placed in parentheses as concatenated suffixes: thus, e.g., HO is the chemical formula for water. Sellars' dot quotes are expressed by (...)
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  6.  16
    The Reign of Richard II: Essays in Honour of May McKisack. F. R. H. Du Boulay, Caroline M. BarronThe Loyal Conspiracy: The Lords Appellant Under Richard II. Anthony Goodman. [REVIEW]Joel Rosenthal - 1973 - Speculum 48 (4):741-743.
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  7.  13
    The History of the Jewish Khazars. D. M. Dunlop.Frank Rosenthal - 1955 - Speculum 30 (2):274-275.
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  8.  6
    Jack Cade's Rebellion of 1450.I. M. W. Harvey.Joel Rosenthal - 1994 - Speculum 69 (1):161-163.
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  9.  15
    Ethics of Spying: A Reader for the Intelligence Professional, Vol. I.Joel H. Rosenthal, J. E. Drexel Godfrey, R. V. Jones, Arthur S. Hulnick, David W. Mattausch, Kent Pekel, Tony Pfaff, John P. Langan, John B. Chomeau, Anne C. Rudolph, Fritz Allhoff, Michael Skerker, Robert M. Gates, Andrew Wilkie, James Ernest Roscoe & Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr (eds.) - 2006 - Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
    This is the first book to offer the best essays, articles, and speeches on ethics and intelligence that demonstrate the complex moral dilemmas in intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Some are recently declassified and never before published, and all are written by authors whose backgrounds are as varied as their insights, including Robert M. Gates, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; John P. Langan, the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor of Catholic Social Thought at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown (...)
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  10. Sensory Qualities, Consciousness, and Perception.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press. pp. 175-226.
  11. Two Concepts of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
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  12.  3
    Four Essays on Art and Literature in Islam.M. J. Zwettler & F. Rosenthal - 1975 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 95 (3):488.
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  13.  14
    The Disappearance of Introspection. [REVIEW]David M. Rosenthal & William Lyons - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):425.
  14. A Theory of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.
  15.  92
    Explaining Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-131.
  16. Thinking That One Thinks.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
     
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  17. Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - unknown
    One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
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  18. The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality.David M. Rosenthal - 1991 - Philosophical Issues 1:15-36.
  19.  60
    Consciousness Science: Real Progress and Lingering Misconceptions.Ned Block, David Carmel, Stephen M. Fleming, Robert W. Kentridge, Christof Koch, Victor A. F. Lamme, Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (11):556-557.
  20. How Many Kinds of Consciousness?David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that (...)
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  21.  27
    The Nature of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 2004 - Mind 113 (451):581-588.
  22. The Nature of Mind.David M. Rosenthal (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
    This anthology brings together readings mainly from contemporary philosophers, but also from writers of the past two centuries, on the philosophy of mind. Some of the main questions addressed are: is a human being really a mind in relation to a body; if so, what exactly is this mind and how it is related to the body; and are there any grounds for supposing that the mind survives the disintegration of the body?
     
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  23.  13
    IRB Practices and Policies Regarding the Secondary Research Use of Biospecimens.Aaron J. Goldenberg, Karen J. Maschke, Steven Joffe, Jeffrey R. Botkin, Erin Rothwell, Thomas H. Murray, Rebecca Anderson, Nicole Deming, Beth F. Rosenthal & Suzanne M. Rivera - 2015 - BMC Medical Ethics 16 (1):32.
    As sharing and secondary research use of biospecimens increases, IRBs and researchers face the challenge of protecting and respecting donors without comprehensive regulations addressing the human subject protection issues posed by biobanking. Variation in IRB biobanking policies about these issues has not been well documented.
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  24. Being Conscious of Ourselves.David M. Rosenthal - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):161-184.
    What is it that we are conscious of when we are conscious of ourselves? Hume famously despaired of finding self, as against simply finding various impressions and ideas, when, as he put it, “I enter most intimately into what I call myself.” “When I turn my reflexion on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions.”.
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  25. Consciousness, the Self and Bodily Location.David M. Rosenthal - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):270-276.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  26. Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments.David M. Rosenthal - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):203-214.
    Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state.
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  27. Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts.David M. Rosenthal - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.
    Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
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  28.  34
    The Colors and Shapes of Visual Experiences.David M. Rosenthal - 1999 - In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 95--118.
    red and round. According to common sense, the red, round thing we see is the tomato itself. When we have a hallucinatory vision of a tomato, however, there may be present to us no red and round phys- ical object. Still, we use the words 'red' and 'round' to describe that situation as well, this time applying them to the visual experience itself. We say that we have a red, round visual image, or a visual experience of a red disk, (...)
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  29. Self-Knowledge and Moore's Paradox.David M. Rosenthal - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):195 - 209.
    As G. E. Moore famously observed, sentences such as 'It's raining but I don't think it is', though they aren't contradictory, cannot be used to make coherent assertions.' The trouble with such sentences is not a matter of their truth conditions; such sentences can readily be true. Indeed, it happens often enough with each of us that we think, for example, that it isn't raining even though it is. This shows that such sentences are not literally contradictory. But even though (...)
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  30. The Timing of Conscious States.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
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  31. The Mind and Its Expression.G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees & David M. Rosenthal - unknown
    pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it.
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  32. Expressing One’s Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (1):21 - 34.
    Remarks such as ‘I am in pain’ and ‘I think that it’s raining’ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, one’s mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, (...)
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  33. Unity of Consciousness and the Self.David M. Rosenthal - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.
    The so-called unity of consciousness consists in the compelling sense we have that all our conscious mental states belong to a single conscious subject. Elsewhere I have argued that a mental state's being conscious is a matter of our being conscious of that state by having a higher-order thought (HOT) about it. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, this HOT model affords a natural explanation of our sense that our conscious states all belong to a single conscious subject. HOTs often (...)
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  34.  29
    Sensory Quality and the Relocation Story.David M. Rosenthal - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):321-350.
  35. Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input.
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  36. Phenomenal Consciousness and What It's Like.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):156--57.
    be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness is represented within this absent together.
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  37. Consciousness and Metacognition.David M. Rosenthal - 1998 - In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. Oxford University Press.
  38.  52
    Moore's Paradox and Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:313-33.
  39. Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field.David M. Rosenthal - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.
    Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processes.
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  40.  92
    Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem.David M. Rosenthal (ed.) - 1971 - Prentice-Hall.
    An expanded and updated edition of this classic collection.
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  41. State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):355-363.
  42.  21
    On Being Accessible to Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):621-621.
  43. State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1994 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (3):355-63.
  44. Apperception, Sensation, and Dissociability.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):206-223.
  45.  25
    Explaining Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 406--421.
  46.  7
    XV-Unity of Consciousness and the Self.David M. Rosenthal - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):325-352.
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  47. Will and the Theory of Judgment.David M. Rosenthal - unknown
    Contemporary discussions typically give somewhat sort shrift to the theory of judgment Descartes advances in the Fourth Meditation.' One reason for this relative neglect is presumably the prima facie implausibility of the theory. It sounds odd to say that, in believing something, one's mental affirmation is an act of free will, on a par with freely deciding what to do. In addition, Descartes advances the theory as a way to explain the possibility of human error, which doubtless strikes many as (...)
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  48. The Kinds of Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - unknown
    I begin by considering Ned Block's widely accepted distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. I argue that on Block's official characterization a mental state's being access conscious is not a way the state's being conscious in any intuitive sense; that if phenomenal consciousness itself corresponds to an intuitive way of a state's being conscious, it literally implies access consciousness; and that Block misconstrues the theoretical significance of the commonsense distinction. These considerations point to the view that mental states' being conscious (...)
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  49. Dualism.David M. Rosenthal - 1998 - In E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
    Dualism is the view that mental phenomena are, in some respect, nonphysical. The best-known version is due to Descartes, and holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance. Descartes argued that, because minds have no spatial properties and physical reality is essentially extended in space, minds are wholly nonphysical. Every human being is accordingly a composite of two objects: a physical body, and a nonphysical object that is that human being's mind. On a weaker version of dualism, which contemporary thinkers (...)
     
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  50. The Identity Theory.David M. Rosenthal - 1994 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    In Descartes's time the issue between materialists and their opponents was framed in terms of substances. Materialists such as Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi maintained that people are physical systems with abilities that no other physical systems have; people, therefore, are special kinds of physical substance. Descartes's DUALISM, by contrast, claimed that people consist of two distinct substances that interact causally: a physical body and a nonphysical, unextended substance. The traditional.
     
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