Transparency is the following (alleged) property of truth: if one possesses the concept of truth, then to assert, believe, inquire whether it is true that S just is to assert, believe, inquire whether S (and conversely). It might appear (as it did to Frege in 'Thoughts') that if truth ascriptions were transparent, then the truth predicate must be redundant; but the fact that some truth ascriptions are not transparent-for instance, those that quantify over, name, or describe the proposition(s) to which (...) truth is ascribed-shows that the truth predicate could not be redundant. It is argued that the apparent paradox is resolved by treating content as more basic than truth (and arguing, accordingly, that content cannot be explained, even in part, in terms of truth conditions). This strategy is illustrated by three candidate analyses, each of which treats the truth predicate as non-redundant but can, nevertheless, account for transparency. (shrink)
The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive of it.
In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...) notions in question, under the labels of “for-me-ness”, “me-ness” and “mineness”. Next, I argue that these notions are not equivalent; in particular, there is no conceptual implication from for-me-ness to me-ishness or mineness. Empirical considerations based on clinical cases additionally suggest that the three notions may also correspond to different properties (although the claim of conceptual non-equivalence does not depend on this further point). The aim is clarificatory, cautionary but also critical: I examine four existing arguments from subjective character that are fuelled by an undifferentiated use of the three notions, and find them to be flawed for this reason. (shrink)
Ovaj rad se bavi metodološkim aspektima obnovljenih pravno-filozofskih nastojanja da se preispita pojam međunarodnog prava. Posle kratkog osvrta na istoriju pravne filozofije i ključne tačke Hartovog i Kelzenovog pozitivističkog stanovišta, u radu se dalje ispituje na koji način se savremene pravne teorije, kako u pozitivističkoj, tako i u ne-pozitivističkoj tradiciji, bave međunarodnim pravom. Poslednji deo rada predstavlja pokušaj da se skiciraju određene smernice za novi početak u filozofskoj obradi međunarodnog prava. Prvo, istorija rasprava u ovoj oblasti svedoči o tome da (...) su metodološki pravni teoretičari u pravu kada tvrde da nam utvrđivanje odgovarajućeg metoda pomaže u odgovoru na pitanje šta je pravo. Drugo, imajući na umu stalno promenjivu prirodu međunarodnog prava, odgovarajući metodološki pristup zahteva „evolucionarnu epistemologiju“ (D’Amato), koja teško da se može nazvati obeležjem analitičke jurisprudencije. Najzad, takva epistemologija je na kompleksan način povezana sa našim istraživanjem šta međunarodna pravda ili, bar, šta međunarodna „unutrašnja moralnost“ zahteva. (shrink)
This essay considers the relationship between literature and film through a reading of Isabel Coixet's film My Life Without Me. The first half of the essay explores how two recent theorisations of the term incorporation allow us to read, on the one hand, the film's relationship to Nanci Kincaid's short story 'Pretending the Bed is a Raft' in particular and to literature in general and, on the other, the narrative consequences of the protagonist Ann's decision to keep her terminal illness (...) a secret. In the first instance, Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin's definition of incorporation in Remediation helps explain how the film does not adapt the short story upon which it is supposedly based, but in fact only repurposes it. Literary aspects of the film's mise-en-scène, plot and imagery, however, signal My Life Without Me' s incorporation of literature. In the second instance, the essay explores how Jacques Derrida's theory of incorporation's role in mourning helps the viewer understand the film's plot development out of Ann's secret. In the second half of the paper, Leo Bersani's idea of impersonal intimacy is developed into a theory of literature. The conclusion posits that impersonal intimacy defines the literary in contrast to cinema's tendency to full disclosure. (shrink)
In recent years, a number of prominent scientists have argued that free will is an illusion, appealing to evidence demonstrating that information about brain activity can be used to predict behavior before people are aware of having made a decision. These scientists claim that the possibility of perfect prediction based on neural information challenges the ordinary understanding of free will. In this paper we provide evidence suggesting that most people do not view the possibility of neuro-prediction as a threat to (...) free will unless it also raises concerns about manipulation of the agent’s behavior. In Experiment 1 two scenarios described future brain imaging technology that allows perfect prediction of decisions and actions based on earlier neural activity, and this possibility did not undermine most people’s attributions of free will or responsibility, except in the scenario that also allowed manipulation. In Experiment 2 the scenarios increased the salience of the physicalist implications of neuro-prediction, while in Experiment 3 the scenarios suggested dualism, with perfect prediction by mindreaders. The patterns of results for these two experiments were similar to the results in Experiment 1, suggesting that participants do not understand free will to require specific metaphysical conditions regarding the mind–body relation. Most people seem to understand free will in a way that is not threatened by perfect prediction based on neural information, suggesting that they believe that just because “my brain made me do it,” that does not mean that I didn’t do it of my own free will. (shrink)
In this paper I argue that names are predicates when they occur in the appellation position of 'called'-predications. This includes not only proper names, but all names -- including quote-names of proper names and quote-names of other words or phrases. Thus in "You can call me Al", the proper name 'Al' is a predicate. And in "You can call me 'Al'," the quote-name of 'Al' -- namely ' 'Al' ' -- is also a predicate.
Christian parables have retained their force well beyond the sphere of religion; indeed, they share with much of modern literature their status as a form of address: "Who hath ears to hear, let him hear." There is no message without there first being--or, more subtly, without there also being in the message itself--an address to a capacity or an aptitude for listening. This is not an exhortation of the kind "Pay attention!" Rather, it is a warning: if you do not (...) understand, the message will go away.The scene in the Gospel of John in which the newly risen Christ enjoins the Magdalene, "Noli me tangere," a key moment in the general parable made up of his life, is a particularly good example of this sudden appearance in which a vanishing plays itself out. Resurrected, he speaks, makes an appeal, and leaves."Do not touch me." Beyond the Christ story, this everyday phrase says something important about touching in general. It points to the place where touching must not touch in order to carry out its touch (its art, its tact, its grace). The title essay of this volume is both a contribution to Nancy's project of a "deconstruction of Christianity" and an exemplum of his remarkable writings on art, in analyses of "Noli me tangere" paintings by such painters as Rembrandt, Dürer, Titian, Pontormo, Bronzino, and Correggio. It is also in tacit dialogue with Jacques Derrida's monumental tribute to Nancy's work in Le toucher--Jean-Luc Nancy.For the English-language edition, Nancy has added an unpublished essay on the Magdalene and the English translation of "In Heaven and on the Earth," a remarkable lecture he gave in a series designed to address children between six and twelve years of age. Closely aligned with his entire project of "the deconstruction of Christianity,'" this lecture may give the most accesible account of his ideas about God. (shrink)
Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.
Kazuo Ishiguro’s book Never Let Me Go is a thoughtful and provocative exploration of what it means to be human. Drawing on insights from the hermeneutic-phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, I argue that the movement of Ishiguro’s story can be understood in terms of actualising the human potential for autonomous action. Liberal theories take autonomy to be concerned with analytically and ethically isolatable social units directing their lives in accordance with self-interested preferences, arrived at by means of rational calculation. However, I (...) argue that such theories are simplistic abstractions from our human-life world, distorting the fundamental embodied, embedded, and relational nature of autonomy. When we attend closely to our concrete, lived existence we see instead that autonomy is about responding appropriately to others with whom we share a world. As we follow the path of Ishiguro’s central character Kathy H., we are shown how an awareness and acceptance of our existential finitude as precarious and fallible creatures is necessary for guiding such appropriate interactions. As Kathy grows and is affirmed into her life-world, which grounds and supports her Being, she moves from heteronomy to autonomy; from being moved by external laws to embodying those laws, thereby becoming autonomous. This is exemplified by her appropriation of the carer role, through which she responds in a fitting way to those with whom she shares her world, bearing the weight of and dwelling responsibly within our human condition. (shrink)
We offer a critical assessment of the “exclusion argument” against free will, which may be summarized by the slogan: “My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn't have been free”. While the exclusion argument has received much attention in debates about mental causation (“could my mental states ever cause my actions?”), it is seldom discussed in relation to free will. However, the argument informally underlies many neuroscientific discussions of free will, especially the claim that advances in neuroscience seriously challenge (...) our belief in free will. We introduce two distinct versions of the argument, discuss several unsuccessful responses to it, and then present our preferred response. This involves showing that a key premise – the “exclusion principle” – is false under what we take to be the most natural account of causation in the context of agency: the difference-making account. We finally revisit the debate about neuroscience and free will. (shrink)
Missouri, the "Show Me State," has become the epicenter of several important national public policy debates, including abortion rights, the right to choose and refuse medical treatment, and, most recently, early stem cell research. In this environment, the Center for Practical Bioethics (formerly, Midwest Bioethics Center) emerged and grew. The Center's role in these "cultural wars" is not to advocate for a particular position but to provide well researched and objective information, perspective, and advocacy for the ethical justification of policy (...) positions; and to serve as a neutral convener and provider of a public forum for discussion. In this article, the Center's work on early stem cell research is a case study through which to argue that not only the Center, but also the field of bioethics has a critical role in the politics of public health policy. (shrink)
Noli me tangere - Ne me touche pas : c'est une scène singulière de l'évangile de Jean, et c'est une parole emblématique pour des situations de violence ou de désir. C'est aussi, et d'abord, le rappel lapidaire d'un tabou majeur de toutes les cultures : celui du toucher. Or Marie-Madeleine, à qui cette parole est adressée par Jésus, a connu dans l'hagiographie un destin bien particulier : amante tantôt physique et tantôt mystique du Christ, double féminin et sensuel de l'incarnation (...) que son Seigneur est censé représenter, pécheresse dont le repentir poursuit la volupté, son personnage est fait pour troubler aux deux sens du mot la légende religieuse. Comment donc interpréter la scène, et la " résurrection " qu'elle veut annoncer ? Comment les peintres l'ont-ils interprétée ? Que nous font-ils voir entre ces deux corps levés l'un vers l'autre, qui se frôlent et qui s'écartent ? (shrink)
This paper explores the meaning and the development of consciousness in the human child. The idea of a self is made up of at least two major aspects. These can be referred to as the machinery of the self and the mental state of the idea of “me”. The machinery of the self involves all unconscious, unreferenced action of the body, including its physiology and its processing of information that in turn includes cognitions and emotional states, which are unavailable to (...) consciousness. The mental state or the idea of “me” is that part of the self that makes reference to itself. This mental state develops over the first 2 years of life and is a function of both brain maturation processes as well as socialization. (shrink)
In Christ Meets Me Everywhere, Michael Cameron argues that Augustine wanted to train readers of Scripture to transpose themselves into the texts in the same way he did, by the same process of figuration that he found at its core. Tracking Augustine's developing practice of self-transposition into the figures of the biblical texts over the course of his entire career, Cameron shows that this practice is the key to Augustine's hermeneutics.
Since something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else.In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to pose a counter-example to any form of non-reductive physicalism relying on the (...) mind-body supervenience thesis, which would include William Hasker's emergent dualism. Since the particular thought-experiment does not pose any problems for classical substance dualism (CSD) and since the problem, as I call it, of explaining subjectivity is the central problem of mind, I conclude that CSD is better supported than any form of non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)
Kalderon describes his book as "an essay in the philosophy of perception written in the medium of historiography". It is an example of what has sometimes been called 'philosophical scholarship' or 'philosophical exegesis'—that is, scholarship on a historical thinker that is intended to bring to light a view of enduring philosophical significance and to commend it to the attention of contemporary philosophers working on the relevant issues. This is an especially challenging genre, and I do not think that (...) class='Hi'>Kalderon navigates it successfully, but he has nonetheless produced a book of great value to students of Aristotle's theory of perception—especially students who are also interested in contemporary work on... (shrink)
A standard strategy for defending a claim of non-identity is one which invokes Leibniz’s Law. (1) Fa (2) ~Fb (3) (∀x)(∀y)(x=y ⊃ (∀P)(Px ⊃ Py)) (4) a=b ⊃ (Fa ⊃ Fb) (5) a≠b In Kalderon’s view, this basic strategy underlies both Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA) as well as (a variant formulation of) Frege’s puzzle (FP). In the former case, the argument runs from the fact that some natural property—call it “F-ness”—has, but goodness lacks, the (2nd order) property of (...) its being an open question whether everything that instantiates it is good to the conclusion that goodness and F-ness are distinct. And in the latter case, the argument runs from the fact that that Hesperus has, but Phosphorus lacks, the property of being believed by the ancient astronomers to be visible in the evening sky to the conclusion that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct. Kalderon argues that both the OQA and FP fail because in neither case is there good reason to believe that both (1) and (2) are true. The reason we are tempted to believe that they are true is because we mistake de dicto claims for de re claims. In order for FP to go through, the truth of the following de re claims needs to be established: FP1) Hesperus was believed by the ancient astronomers to be visible in the evening sky. (shrink)
Does God knows what it is like to be me? Scripture and religious tradition seem quite clear that God knows everything about us, even the deepest secrets of our hearts. There is nothing hidden from him. And this is an answer backed up by a more philosophical theology; for among the traditional list of divine attributes is omniscience: knowing everything that there is to know. The idea, moreover, seems essential to the ordinary religious consciousness, for how can God really help (...) us, or fairly judge us, unless he knows exactly what things are like for us? (shrink)
Whereas writing a dissertation can be a fear-inducing experience for a doctoral student, there exists the possibility of not only learning but also self-transformation that can take place through the process. In this article, I reflect on how my choice of a research approach provided me with a transformative research experience. I will describe portraiture as a critical feminist research method that was culturally relevant in undertaking my study of African women leaders. Through this process of conducting research utilizing portraiture (...) as method, I became a supplicant learner. (shrink)
The study subjected to scrutiny the context of Rizal’s novel Noli Me Tangere and Hugo’s novel, Notre Dame de Paris in the search for confluence through the two novels’ use of rhetorical devices and imagery. It utilized Kolb’s Experiential Method, Phenomenology, and Interdisciplinary Approach. Primarily, a connection between Hugo and Rizal is established since no studies relating the two writers existed. Gathered evidences proved the historical and biographical connections: the phenomenology of both writers’ existence in the same Romantic milieu, and (...) of Rizal’s diary and bibliographic entries on Hugo. Thereafter, a focus on the two novels’ literary elements by character, setting, point of view, and conflict, as well as theme, confirmed textual confluence. Moreover, Hugolian symbols and rhetorical devices in Noli Me Tangere are conclusive in the establishment of confluence. Furthermore, evaluation of the Notre Dame de Paris as a historical novel, a poetic novel, a novel of ideas, and a dramatic novel are evident in Rizal’s Noli Me Tangere. Finally, a sharp phenomenology of confluence between Victor Hugo’s Notre Dame de Paris and Jose Rizal’s Noli Me Tangere is concluded. Further studies on the novel Noli Me Tangere are recommended to take into account the influence of Victor Hugo. Keywords - Hugo, Rizal, France, Philippines, novel, phenomenology, imagery, criticism. (shrink)
I have suggested that the prefrontal cortex constitutes an ?executive committee? with five streams coming from posterior cortex and subcortical areas to five pre-frontal executive regions, each of which chairs at least one on-going ?sub-committee? and vies with the other executives for taking over central control of conscious attention and willed action. It is through the dynamic interaction of this executive committee that unified conscious experiences and a sense of continuous self-identity are created. There is growing evidence that the amygdala-orbitofrontal (...) brain circuit, in particular, is crucial to impulse control, ?knowledge of good and evil,? personality, personhood, and even ?how X-me made Y-me do something.? There are striking examples of the ways that orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate ?committee members? can stage an insurrection against the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex executive chair. (shrink)
The parable of the butterfly dream is one of the most interesting and influential passages among Zhuangzi's beautiful writings. This article interprets the butterfly dream from an interdisciplinary approach. The review of mythological and religious sources reveals that the image of the butterfly is widely understood to symbolize the human self or soul. The scientific study of dream experience touches upon the issue of self-consciousness and the sense of two-tiered self. The philosophical and psychological perspectives further highlight the tension between (...) the wu 吾-self and the wo 我-self, self and ego, bodily and spiritual soul, and allow me to test my hypothesis of self-alienation. (shrink)
John Grifﬁ n’s classic on racism, Black Like Me (1960), provides an interesting text with which to investigate the development of a dialogical self. Grifﬁ n becomes a black man for only a short period of time, but during that time he develops a black social identity and sense of personal identity, that contrasts radically with his former white identity. When he looks into a mirror on several occasions he engages in a dialogue with himself, as both a black and (...) a white person. At ﬁ rst these two identities are so different that there is no “sympathy” between them. But through his experience, he eventually overcomes the dichotomy of two opposing selves, and acquires a personal identity, neither white nor black, but just human. In this article, I trace the development of these dialogical selves and the emergence of this new human identity. Key words: identity, racism, self, black, white.. (shrink)
Judith Butler and Catherine Malabou’s recent exchange, ‘You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape and Plasticity in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’, is remarkable because in their rereading of Hegel’s famous lord and bondsman parable, rather than focusing on recognition, work, or even desire, Butler and Malabou each wonder about how Hegel contributes to a new way of thinking about ‘having’ a body and how coming to ‘be’ a body necessarily involves a kind of dispossession. Butler and Malabou’s reading of (...) Hegel is congruent with a current shift on the left away from a liberal politics of recognition to a Marxist analytic of dispossession: a move, in other words, away from liberal ‘solutions’ of redistribution – of either goods or recognition – towards thinking through issues of settler colonialism, forced migration and empire. Butler and Malabou’s piece points towards the insight that Hegel’s parable must be thought in terms of the political history of possessive individualism, and so in terms of the history of juridically defined property relations; the history of regarding both the body and the land as property. The ‘two valences’ of dispossession, in other words, refers in fact to a logic of property relations, one between those who ‘have’ property and those who are juridically defined as propertyless. (shrink)
This essay is a personal philosophical reflection on particular dilemma privilege-cognizant white feminists face in thinking through how to use privilege in liberatory ways. Privilege takes on a new dimension for whites who resist common defensive or guilt-ridden responses to privilege and struggle to understand the connections between ill-gotten advantages and the genuine injustices that deny humanity to peoples of color. The temptation to despise whiteness and its accompanying privilege is a common response to white privilege awareness and it is (...) this initial frustration with the perceived inescapability of white privilege that I explore here. -/- What I call the "dilemma of white privilege awareness," leaves privilege-cognizant whites trapped in the awkward position of knowing that privilege is at once impossible to dispose of, and impossible to use without perpetuating those systems of domination I wish to demolish. The dilemma works like this. On the one hand, if my racial appearance and mannerisms act as a magnet for special treatment, then I cannot simply arrange my life so as not to have benefits and immunities extended to me. There appears to be no way to divest myself completely of race privilege. On the other hand, if the focus on privilege divestment is misguided, then perhaps whites ought to find responsible ways of using race privilege that do not perpetuate structural inequalities (e.g. assisting persons of color in surmounting everyday obstacles). Yet, if the power accorded to privilege is made possible by structural inequalities, then the very act of using privilege will automatically reinforce those structural inequalities. If the claims made on both sides of the dilemma are true, then I am trapped: I can neither divest myself of unearned privileges nor can I use them without reinforcing the systems I wish to demolish. -/- I carefully unpack each side of the dilemma marking detours, diversions, and natural sticking points (e.g. cultural impersonation, retreats to white ethnicity, and the temptation to shift discussions away from race to other oppressions) that prevent me engaging critically in discussions of racism. I suggest two possible solutions to the dilemma: conceptual and pragmatic. -/- If there is one lesson we carry away from the dilemma, it is that privilege is impossible to shake, and that using privilege reinscribes it. Rather than frustrating us, this phenomenon should alert us to the strengths of privilege as a resource. To use privilege as a resource for anti-racist activities is to give up its abusive power. (shrink)
Vibrations produced through singing of psalms elicit multifaceted computational events within the structures of the cell; enhances the flow of consciousness and makes me aware of what I am and why I am here, for all the things that goes on around me - my life & my world. Singing has always comforted my soul. It conducts my soul within the matter that makes my body and amalgamates with the Holy Spirit, connecting my soul with the Creator and the Cosmos. (...) Resonating notes connects all living beings to the Universe, for frequency of the vibrations interfere; construct and destruct and transmit energy within and across every living organism. While I sing, I eulogize God for all that thou hast given; foster a relationship with the Holy Spirit, my Soul, the Earth, the Universe and the entirety of the Cosmos; my vibrations proliferate far beyond my imagination, deeper and deeper into the metaphysical. (shrink)
At first sight one might be tempted to regard Descartes' »cogito ergo sum« as logically true by existential generalisation. This however would neither exhaust the specific epistemic content of »cogito« nor reveal the philosophical peculiarities of »sum« which the author takes to have two ontologically different meanings. The full sense of »cogito ergo sum« finally turns out to be Credo* me* cogitare ergo scio* me* esse1/2. Furthermore this proposition can formally be proved to be true by means of epistemic logic.
C I Lewis showed up Down Under in 2005, in e-mails initiated by Allen Hazen of Melbourne. Their topic was the system Hazen called FL (a Funny Logic), axiomatized in passing in Lewis 1921. I show that FL is the system MEN of material equivalence with negation. But negation plays no special role in MEN. Symbolizing equivalence with → and defining ∼A inferentially as A→f, the theorems of MEN are just those of the underlying theory ME of pure material equivalence. (...) This accords with the treatment of negation in the Abelian l-group logic A of Meyer and Slaney (Abelian logic. Abstract, Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981), which also defines ∼A inferentially with no special conditions on f. The paper then concentrates on the pure implicational part AI of A, the simple logic of Abelian groups. The integers Z were known to be characteristic for AI, with every non-theorem B refutable mod some Zn for finite n. Noted here is that AI is pre-tabular, having the Scroggs property that every proper extension SI of AI, closed under substitution and detachment, has some finite Zn as its characteristic matrix. In particular FL is the extension for which n = 2 (Lewis, The structure of logic and its relation to other systems. The Journal of Philosophy 18, 505–516, 1921; Meyer and Slaney, Abelian logic. Abstract. Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981; This is an abstract of the much longer paper finally published in 1989 in G. G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman, eds., Paraconsistent logic: essays on the inconsistent, Philosophica Verlag, Munich, pp. 245–288, 1989). (shrink)
I will talk here about three problems that have bothered me for a number of years, during which time I have experimented with a variety of solutions and encouraged others to work on them. I have raised each of them separately both in full and in passing in various contexts, but thought it would be worthwhile on this occasion to bring them to your attention side by side. In this talk I will explain the problems, together with some things that (...) have been tried in the past and some new ideas for their solution. (shrink)
I was born in Boston, Lincolnshire (actually in Wyberton West Hospital, which no longer exists), educated (if that's the word) first at St Mary's Primary School (run by nuns at the time, which probably explains a lot about my later career if you're a Freudian, which I'm not. Its new incarnation is here), then at Boston Grammar School . At the latter I successfully navigated 'O'-levels, but nearly half-way through my 'A'-levels I developed a number of extra-curricular interests which distracted (...) me from my studies. More importantly, I began to think rather more broadly than some of my teachers (and especially my appalling headmaster) cared for. This led to an almost total cessation of interest in my 'A'-levels. It did, however, involve a number of stage rôles at Blackfriars Theatre and elsewhere, and a good deal of time spent in the theatre bar. (shrink)
James Lasdun’s memoir of being stalked, Give Me Everything You Have, has provoked considerable controversy. Whilst the quality of the writing is widely praised, some critics object to the way Lasdun documents in unsparing detail his experiences without taking any account of the stalker’s apparent mental health problems. There are ethical and conceptual problems with Lasdun’s approach, but side-stepping medical knowledge and relying on what we might call common sense help Lasdun to find ways to interpret his stalker’s actions as (...) meaningful and human. I suggest three interlinked implications concerning: medicalization, stigma, and the relationship between ethics and scientific knowledge. (shrink)
Die Wissenschaftstheorie hat sich in der Vergangenheit hauptsächlich mit dem Aufbau und der Analyse wissenschaftlicher Theorien und den logischen Problemen in ihrem eigenen Gebiet beschäftigt, während Probleme der Wissenschaftspraxis, hier vor allem die theoretischen Grundlagen des Messens, nur am Rande oder gar nicht behandelt wurden. Dies ist insofern bemerkenswert, weil die Messung das wichtigste erfahrungswissenschaftliche Hilfsmittel zur Gewinnung von Erkenntnis darstellt. Beim Messen erfolgt der wichtige Übergang vom Empirischen zum Formalen, indem die empirisch vorliegende Intensität einer Meßgröße durch eine mathematische (...) Größe beschrieben und damit überhaupt erst die Voraussetzung für eine erfahrungswissenschaftliche Theorie geschaffen wird. Die vorliegende Meßtheorie ist in Meßprozeßtheorie, Metrisierungstheorie und Fehlertheorie gegliedert. Die Meßprozeßtheorie behandelt die Vorgänge zwischen Meßobjekt und Meßgerät, die Metrisierungstheorie die Darstellung der empirischen Größe als formale und die Fehlertheorie die Schätzung des gesuchten wahren Wertes aus mehreren fehlerbehafteten gleichwertigen Meßwerten. Der Schätzwert ist das Endergebnis einer Messung. Ziel der Arbeit ist es, die Meßtheorie aus dem engen Kreis der Metrisierungs- bzw. Skalentheorie herauszulösen und auf die häufig übersehenen notwendigen Bedingungen einer Messung aufmerksam zu machen. (shrink)
Since something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else. In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to pose a counter-example to any form of non-reductive physicalism relying on (...) the mind–body supervenience thesis, which would include William Hasker's emergent dualism. Since the particular thought-experiment does not pose any problems for classical substance dualism and since the problem, as I call it, of explaining subjectivity is the central problem of mind, I conclude that CSD is better supported than any form of non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)
There are doubtless many with personal experience of suffering, or of comforting others in distress, who would agree with Milton thus far that philosophic argument is powerless to satisfy those who in their anguish ask the question ‘Why did it happen to me?’ Yet to think so is to underestimate both the necessity and the power of reason: clarity of mind and the disposition to argue are commonly enhanced rather than diminished by suffering; and if reason is an essential part (...) of man's nature, it should serve him, if anywhere, in the trials of life. We have every justification, therefore, despite common opinion, for seeking a rational answer to the question proposed. It must, however, be admitted at the outset that there is no direct answer to the question which can both withstand critical scrutiny and bring genuine comfort to the afflicted, an answer, that is, which accepts the question as it stands with its attendant presuppositions; but there is an indirect answer, which, precisely by rejecting one or more of these presuppositions and restating the question, can indeed satisfy these two requirements. Before such an answer can be outlined, however, the question in its traditional form must be examined and the traditional answers to it critically reviewed. (shrink)
Mobilités spatiales et fluidité sociale Appel à contributions pour un colloque « “Métro, boulot, dodo” Quoi de neuf dans nos routines ? » Lille – 26 et 27 mars 2014 Le prochain colloque du MSFS aura lieu à Lille, les 26 et 27 mars 2014. Nous lançons d'ores et déjà l'appel à contributions, en attirant votre attention sur le fait qu'il se clôt le 26 juillet 2013. Ce colloque porte sur les enjeux spatio-temporels des routines de la mobilité quotidienne. Derrière (...) le terme péjoratif de “routine”, (...) - Actualités. (shrink)
IN an article on Rousseau’s annotations of a popular botany text, Henry Cheyron describes the Genevan philosopher as ‘ce botaniste me´juge´’. 3 The misapprehension of Rousseau’s botanical practice identiﬁed by Cheyron has its roots, I believe, in Rousseau’s own depiction of his botanising in the Reˆveries; in the ‘Septie`me promenade’ Rousseau selfconsciously portrays this study as socially isolated, lazy and lacking in direction: ‘La botanique est l’e´tude d’un oisif et paresseux solitaire... Il se prome`ne, il erre librement d’un objet a` (...) l’autre, il fait la revue de chaque ﬂeur avec inte´reˆt et curiosite´.’4 Neither does Rousseau disguise botany’s role for him as a ‘the´rapeutique improvise´e’; the therapeutic purpose has tended to obscure the rigour, application, time and knowledge that Rousseau put into his botanical studies so that no less a scholar than Jean Starobinski asserts: ‘Jean-Jacques herborise en collectionneur, et non pas en naturaliste. C’est pour lui une occupation, un amusement, plutoˆt qu’une ve´ritable action.’5 Finally, Rousseau fuels this misunderstanding.. (shrink)
Kritičko čitanje Alchourrónove i Bulyginove skupovnoteorijske defnicije normativnoga sustava pokazuje da njegova deduktivna zatvorenost nije neizbježno svojstvo. Slijedeći von Wrightovu pretpostavku da aksiomi standardne deontične logike opisuju svojstva savršenoga normativnog sustava, uvodi se algoritam za prevođenje iz modalnoga u skupovnoteorijski jezik. Prijevod nam otkriva da plauzibilnost pojedinih metanormativnih načela leži na različitim osnovama. Koristeći se metodološkim pristupom koji prepoznaje različite aktere u normama upravljanome međudjelovanju, pokazuje se da su metanormativna načela obveze drugoga reda upućene različitim ulogama. Poseban slučaj jest zahtjev (...) koji se odnosi na deduktivnu zatvorenost jer se pokazuje da je upućen ulozi koja primjenjuje, a ne onoj koja izdaje norme. Pristup je primijenjen i na slučaj čiste derogacije, što dovodi do novoga rezultata; svojstvo neovisnosti biva svojstvom savršenoga normativnog sustava u odnosu na moguću derogaciju. Ovaj članak na polemički način dodiruje nekoliko točaka iznesenih u Kristanovome nedavnom članku. (shrink)
In their Noli me tangere images from the Northern Renaissance, Albrecht Dürer and Hans Holbein the Younger depict the encounter between Mary Magdalene and the risen Christ. They provide us images of the holy in humanity, and the human in the holy, in all their dimensions.
Wenn die relativistische Längenkontraktion und Zeitdilatation Folgen der Signalmessung sind, führt dies im Falle der nach einer Reise zurückgekehrten Uhr zum Widerspruch mit dem Prinzip, daß ein Meßverfahren nur dann auf die Resultate Auswirkungen hat, wenn es de facto angewendet wird. Hängen dagegen die relativistischen Phänomene nicht von der Verwendung von Signalen ab, dann ist die übliche Deutung der Größe c als maximale Signalgeschwindigkeit nicht möglich. Die Meinung, die Formeln der Lorentz-Transformation seien durch operationistische Überlegungen über Meßmethoden, insbes. über die (...) Ermittlung der Gleichzeitigkeit, erkenntnistheoretisch verständlich gemacht worden, wird damit in Frage gestellt. (shrink)
Abstract The Me as a socially constructed self presenting itself, is the subject of new conceptual interest. Discourse analysis is the preferred tool for analysis of the linguistic repertoires that we use to order the experience of our selves. But we also present ourselves visually, with some care. An attempt is made to apply a kind of discourse analysis to self?portraits by eminent photographers. Within the process of portraiture and the rules of the pose, professionals should be able to present (...) their true visions of themselves. Specific dilemmas are likely. While women have been the site of many contradictions in themselves as a sight, men in their images must be prepared to bear the castrating power of ?the look?. It might even be that in some romantic sense, there is the revelation of an authentic, spontaneous self. A set of ten examplars is interpreted, ranging from 1901 to 1986. The photographic evidence for men clearly shows situational self?characteristics in terms of the role of the photographer in the period. Although the women included are comparable in status, using the non?verbal interpretative models of Goffman and Wex, they rather demonstrate signs of the conventional submissive feminine identity. Such an analysis of visual discourse cannot decide on the degree of awareness in the presentations. Further the interpretations are as open to rational contradiction as other forms of discourse analysis. (shrink)
I write, as Robert Graves put it in his Oxford poetry lectures, both matador and judge, both as a novelist and as philosopher and literary theorist. Considering the present aggressive stance of literary theorists, detonating, denuding, and deconstructing the humble scrivener's offerings as if works of fiction were the shoulders of midgets on which the giants of critical theory may grind their jackboots, you will think me rash to confess to the jejune offense of novel writing, but I mean not (...) only to confess but also to explain and justify--even, indeed, to revel--in the inversion of fiction and life that is our lot, revel, that is, in an inversion both more enduring and more significant than that between fiction and literary theory. (shrink)
As a medical student doing a rotation, I was feeling positive as we knocked on the door of an elderly lady who I'd seen just 2 days earlier. Even though seriously ill for many months, this patient had always lived life in her own way, refusing to go to a nursing home. It was clear that her condition had deteriorated rapidly, and the nurse informed me privately that she was dying, sooner rather than later.