Results for 'Mad pain'

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  10
    Ethical Dilemmas in Treating Chronic Pain in the Context of Addiction.Treating Chronic Nonmalignant Pain - 2008 - In Cynthia M. A. Geppert & Laura Weiss Roberts (eds.), The Book of Ethics: Expert Guidance for Professionals Who Treat Addiction. Hazelden.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Mad, Martian, but Not Mad Martian Pain.Peter Alward - 2004 - Sorites 15 (December):73-75.
    Functionalism cannot accommodate the possibility of mad painpain whose causes and effects diverge from those of the pain causal role. This is because what it is to be in pain according to functionalism is simply to be in a state that occupies the pain role. And the identity theory cannot accommodate the possibility of Martian painpain whose physical realization is foot-cavity inflation rather than C-fibre activation (or whatever physiological state occupies the pain-role (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Mad Pain and Martian Pain.David Lewis - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press. pp. 216-222.
  4. Postscript to "Mad Pain and Martian Pain".David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Papers 12:122-133.
  5.  45
    Wittgenstein and Mad Pain.Michael Lee Kelly - 1991 - Synthese 87 (2):285 - 294.
  6. Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  68
    Mad Belief?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.
    “Mad belief” (in analogy with Lewisian “mad pain”) would be a belief state with none of the causal role characteristic of belief—a state not caused or apt to have been caused by any of the sorts of events that usually cause belief and involving no disposition toward the usual behavioral or other manifestations of belief. On token-functionalist views of belief, mad belief in this sense is conceptually impossible. Cases of delusion—or at least some cases of delusion—might be cases of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  8.  7
    No Pain, No Gain: Strategic Repulsion and The Human Centipede.Steve Jones - 2013 - Cine-Excess E-Journal 1.
    Tom Six’s The Human Centipede (First Sequence) (2009) and The Human Centipede II (Full Sequence) (2011) are based on a disturbing premise: people are abducted and stitched together mouth-to-anus. The consequent combinations of faeces and bloodshed, torture and degradation have been roundly vilified by the critical press. Additionally, the sequel was officially banned or heavily censored in numerous countries. This article argues that these reactive forms of suppression fail to engage with the films themselves, or the concepts (such as disgust (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Some Varieties of Functionalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
    Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   43 citations  
  10. Relieving Pain Using Dose-Extending Placebos.Luana Colloca, Paul Enck & David DeGrazia - 2016 - PAIN 157:1590-1598.
    Placebos are often used by clinicians, usually deceptively and with little rationale or evidence of benefit, making their use ethically problematic. In contrast with their typical current use, a provocative line of research suggests that placebos can be intentionally exploited to extend analgesic therapeutic effects. Is it possible to extend the effects of drug treatments by interspersing placebos? We reviewed a database of placebo studies, searching for studies that indicate that placebos given after repeated administration of active treatments acquire medication-like (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Beckettian Pain, in the Flesh: Singularity, Community and 'the Work'.Garin Dowd - 2012 - In Samuel Beckett and Pain. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 67-92.
    This essay argues that the representation of pain in Beckett’s writing exposes the paradox in his work concerning the relationship of the individual suffering subject and the community. Making reference to studies of pain and literature generally and to salient studies of Beckett, the essay shows how the narration of pain in Beckett’s prose works in particular is closely linked to its more general interrogation of subject-object relations. As the preeminent agent, source as well as repository of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Deciphering Animal Pain.Colin Allen - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    In this paper we1 assess the potential for research on nonhuman animals to address questions about the phenomenology of painful experiences. Nociception, the basic capacity for sensing noxious stimuli, is widespread in the animal kingdom. Even rel- atively primitive animals such as leeches and sea slugs possess nociceptors, neurons that are functionally specialized for sensing noxious stimuli (Walters 1996). Vertebrate spinal cords play a sophisticated role in processing and modulating nociceptive signals, providing direct control of some motor responses to noxious (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  13.  24
    Pain and Behavior.Howard Rachlin - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):43-83.
    There seem to be two kinds of pain: fundamental pain, the intensity of which is a direct function of the intensity of various pain stimuli, and pain, the intensity of which is highly modifiable by such factors as hypnotism, placebos, and the sociocultural setting in which the stimulus occurs.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   196 citations  
  14.  66
    Bad by Nature, An Axiological Theory of Pain.Olivier Massin - forthcoming - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  69
    Pain: Perception or Introspection?Murat Aydede - forthcoming - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    [Penultimate draft] I present the perceptualist/representationalist theories of pain in broad outline and critically examine them in light of a competing view according to which awareness of pain is essentially introspective. I end the essay with a positive sketch of a naturalistic proposal according to which pain experiences are intentional but not fully representational. This proposal makes sense of locating pains in body parts as well as taking pains as subjective experiences.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  74
    The Experimental Use of Introspection in the Scientific Study of Pain and its Integration with Third-Person Methodologies: The Experiential-Phenomenological Approach.Murat Aydede & D. Price - 2005 - In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press. pp. 243--273.
    Understanding the nature of pain depends, at least partly, on recognizing its subjectivity (thus, its first-person epistemology). This in turn requires using a first-person experiential method in addition to third-person experimental approaches to study it. This paper is an attempt to spell out what the former approach is and how it can be integrated with the latter. We start our discussion by examining some foundational issues raised by the use of introspection. We argue that such a first-person method in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  17.  31
    Pain and Incorrigibility.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In J. Corns (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  9
    Critical Comments on Williams and Craig’s Recent Proposal for Revising the Definition of Pain.Andrew Wright & Murat Aydede - 2017 - PAIN 158 (2):362-363.
    [DOI: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000765] Amanda Williams and Kenneth Craig, in a recent article in the IASP official journal _Pain_ (DOI: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000613), have argued that it is time to revise the IASP's well-entrenched definition of 'pain'. They propose an alternative definition. We critically discuss their proposed revision and argue that it admits clear counterexamples as both sufficient and necessary conditions. We further discuss the wisdom of replacing 'unpleasant' in the IASP definition with 'distress' as Williams and Craig propose. [Craig and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. The Main Difficulty with Pain.Murat Aydede - 2005 - In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. pp. 123-136.
    Consider the following two sentences: " I see a dark discoloration in the back of my hand. I feel a jabbing pain in the back of my hand. " They seem to have the same surface grammar, and thus prima facie invite the same kind of semantic treatment. Even though a reading of ‘see’ in where the verb is not treated as a success verb is not out of the question, it is not the ordinary and natural reading. Note (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20. Michael Tye on Pain and Representational Content.Barry Maund - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
    Michael Tye argues for two crucial theses: (1) that experiences of pain have representational content (essentially); (2) that the representational content can be specified in terms of something like damage in parts of the body. (Different types of pain are connected with different types of damage.) I reject both of these theses. In my view experiences of pain carry nonconceptual content, but do not represent essentially. Rather they are apt to represent when the subject attends to them. (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. In a State of Pain.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
    Michael Tye and I are both Representationalists. Nevertheless, we have managed to disagree about the semantic character of ‘in’ in ‘There is a pain in my fingertip’ (see Noordhof (2001); Tye (2002); Noordhof (2002)). The first section of my commentary will focus on this disagreement. I will then turn to the location of pain. Here, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be much more agreement between Tye and me. I restrict myself to three points. First, I argue that (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. In Pain.P. Noordhof - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):95-97.
    When I feel a pain in my leg, how should we understand the.
    No categories
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  20
    The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World.Elaine Scarry - 1985 - Oxford University Press.
    Part philosophical meditation, part cultural critique, The Body in Pain is a profoundly original study that has already stirred excitement in a wide range of intellectual circles. The book is an analysis of physical suffering and its relation to the numerous vacabularies and cultural forces--literary, political, philosophical, medical, religious--that confront it. Elaine Scarry bases her study on a wide range of sources: literature and art, medical case histories, documents on torture compiled by Amnesty International, legal transcripts of personal injury (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   82 citations  
  24. Pain and the Ethics of Pain Management.Rem B. Edwards - 1984 - Social Science and Medicine 18 (6):515-523.
    In this article I clarify the concepts of ‘pain’, ‘suffering’. ‘pains of body’, ‘pains of soul’. I explore the relevance of an ethic to the clinical setting which gives patients a strong prima facie right to freedom from unnecessary and unwanted pain and which places upon medical professionals two concomitant moral obligations to patients. First, there is the duty not to inflict pain and suffering beyond what is necessary for effective diagnosis. treatment and research. Next, there is (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Animal Pain.Colin Allen - 2004 - Noûs 38 (4):617–643.
    Which nonhuman animals experience conscious pain?1 This question is central to the debate about animal welfare, as well as being of basic interest to scientists and philosophers of mind. Nociception—the capacity to sense noxious stimuli—is one of the most primitive sensory capacities. Neurons functionally specialized for nociception have been described in invertebrates such as the leech Hirudo medicinalis and the marine snail Aplysia californica (Walters 1996). Is all nociception accompanied by conscious pain, even in relatively primitive animals such (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  26. Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study.Murat Aydede (ed.) - 2005 - MIT Press.
    What does feeling a sharp pain in one's hand have in common with seeing a red apple on the table? Some say not much, apart from the fact that they are both conscious experiences. To see an object is to perceive an extramental reality -- in this case, a red apple. To feel a pain, by contrast, is to undergo a conscious experience that doesn't necessarily relate the subject to an objective reality. Perceptualists, however, dispute this. They say (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  27. Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional Intrinsic Values.Irwin Goldstein - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (December):255-276.
    That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  28. Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain.Bennett W. Helm - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.
    This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   21 citations  
  29. A Phenomenological Analysis of Bodily Self-Awareness in the Experience of Pain and Pleasure: On Dys-Appearance and Eu-Appearance. [REVIEW]Kristin Zeiler - 2010 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (4):333-342.
    The aim of this article is to explore nuances within the field of bodily self-awareness. My starting-point is phenomenological. I focus on how the subject experiences her or his body, i.e. how the body stands forth to the subject. I build on the phenomenologist Drew Leder’s distinction between bodily dis-appearance and dys-appearance. In bodily dis-appearance, I am only prereflectively aware of my body. My body is not a thematic object of my experience. Bodily dys-appearance takes place when the body appears (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  30. Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory.Richard Gray - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):87-101.
    Pain is commonly explained in terms of the perceptual activity of a distinct sensory modality, the function of which is to enable us to perceive actual or potential damage to the body. However, the characterization of pain experience in terms of a distinct sensory modality with such content is problematic. I argue that pain is better explained as occupying a different role in relation to perception: to indicate when the stimuli that are sensed in perceiving anything by (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain.Manolo Martínez - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):67-90.
    Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e.g. in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper, I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  32. The Imperative View of Pain.David Bain - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.
    Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  33. Pain Signals Are Predominantly Imperative.Manolo Martínez & Colin Klein - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):283-298.
    Recent work on signaling has mostly focused on communication between organisms. The Lewis–Skyrms framework should be equally applicable to intra-organismic signaling. We present a Lewis–Skyrms signaling-game model of painful signaling, and use it to argue that the content of pain is predominantly imperative. We address several objections to the account, concluding that our model gives a productive framework within which to consider internal signaling.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain.Brendan O'Sullivan & Robert Schroer - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):737-758.
    It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the ‘affective’ aspect of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. With regard to functionalism, we argue that it gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives rise to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way around. With regard (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  35. Robot Pain.Simon van Rysewyk - 2014 - International Journal of Synthetic Emotions 4 (2):22-33.
    Functionalism of robot pain claims that what is definitive of robot pain is functional role, defined as the causal relations pain has to noxious stimuli, behavior and other subjective states. Here, I propose that the only way to theorize role-functionalism of robot pain is in terms of type-identity theory. I argue that what makes a state pain for a neuro-robot at a time is the functional role it has in the robot at the time, and (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. The Asymmetrical Contributions of Pleasure and Pain to Animal Welfare.Adam Shriver - 2014 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 23 (2):152-162.
    Recent results from the neurosciences demonstrate that pleasure and pain are not two symmetrical poles of a single scale of experience but in fact two different types of experiences altogether, with dramatically different contributions to well-being. These differences between pleasure and pain and the general finding that “the bad is stronger than the good” have important implications for our treatment of nonhuman animals. In particular, whereas animal experimentation that causes suffering might be justified if it leads to the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  50
    The Argument From Pain: A New Argument for Indirect Realism.Dirk Franken - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 93 (1):106 - 129.
    The author puts forward and defends a new argument for indirect realism called the argument from pain. The argument is akin to a well-known traditional argument to the same end, the argument from hallucination. Like the latter, it contains one premise stating an analogy between veridical perceptions and certain other states and one premise stating that those states are states of acquaintance with sense-data. The crucial difference is that the states that are said to be analogous to veridical perceptions (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  23
    Experience and Objectification. The Language of Pain in Wittgenstein.Sanguineti Juan Jose - 2017 - Tópicos 52:239-276.
    The article examines Wittgenstein’s thought on the language of pain in first and third person. Relevant grammatical differences, according to the typical analytical method of this philosopher, are highlighted not only in relation to the two perspectives, but also regarding the use of cognitive verbs such as ‘feeling’ and ‘knowing’. The exam of many texts suggests some issues concerning the relationship between personal experiences, empathic grasping of other’s feelings and their conceptual translation. A brief comparison with some Thomas Aquinas’ (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Pain, Dislike and Experience.Guy Kahane - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):327-336.
    It is widely held that it is only contingent that the sensation of pain is disliked, and that when pain is not disliked, it is not intrinsically bad. This conjunction of claims has often been taken to support a subjectivist view of pain’s badness on which pain is bad simply because it is the object of a negative attitude and not because of what it feels like. In this paper, I argue that accepting this conjunction of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  40. Intentionalism and Pain.David Bain - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.
    The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand two objections: concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of the pain case. I rebut these objections, in (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  41.  8
    Embodiment and Chronic Pain: Implications for Rehabilitation Practice. [REVIEW]Jennifer Bullington - 2009 - Health Care Analysis 17 (2):100-109.
    Throughout the Western world people turn towards the health care system seeking help for a variety of psychosomatic/psychosocial health problems. They become “patients” and find themselves within a system of practises that conceptualizes their bodies as “objective” bodies, treats their ill health in terms of the malfunctioning machine, and compartmentalizes their lived experiences into medically interpreted symptoms and signs of underlying biological dysfunction. The aim of this article is to present an alternative way of describing ill health and rehabilitation using (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  42. Towards an Ontology of Pain.Barry Smith, Werner Ceusters, Louis J. Goldberg & Richard Ohrbach - 2011 - In Proceedings of the Conference on Ontology and Analytical Metaphysics. Keio University Press.
    We present an ontology of pain and of other pain-related phenomena, building on the definition of pain provided by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP). Our strategy is to identify an evolutionarily basic canonical pain phenomenon, involving unpleasant sensory and emotional experience based causally in localized tissue damage that is concordant with that experience. We then show how different variant cases of this canonical pain phenomenon can be distinguished, including pain (...)
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  54
    The Inadequacy of Unitary Characterizations of Pain.Jennifer Corns - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):355-378.
    Though pain scientists now understand pain to be a complex experience typically composed of sensation, emotion, cognition, and motivational responses, many philosophers maintain that pain is adequately characterized by one privileged aspect of this complexity. Philosophically dominant unitary accounts of pain as a sensation or perception are here evaluated by their ability to explain actual cases—and found wanting. Further, it is argued that no forthcoming unitary characterization of pain is likely to succeed. Instead, I contend (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  44. An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.
    I take up the issue of whether pleasure is a kind of sensation or not. This issue was much discussed by philosophers of the 1950’s and 1960’s, and apparently no resolution was reached. There were mainly two camps in the discussion: those who argued for a dispositional account, and those who favored an episodic feeling view of pleasure. Here, relying on some recent scientific research I offer an account of pleasure which neither dispositionalizes nor sensationalizes pleasure. As is usual in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  45. Why People Prefer Pleasure to Pain.Irwin Goldstein - 1980 - Philosophy 55 (July):349-362.
    Against Hume and Epicurus I argue that our selection of pleasure, pain and other objects as our ultimate ends is guided by reason. There are two parts to the explanation of our attraction to pleasure, our aversion to pain, and our consequent preference of pleasure to pain: 1. Pleasure presents us with reason to seek it, pain presents us reason to avoid it, and 2. Being intelligent, human beings (and to a degree, many animals) are disposed (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  46. Comment On: Unconscious Affective Processing and Empathy: An Investigation of Subliminal Priming on the Detection of Painful Facial Expressions [Pain 2009; 1–2: 71–75].Simon van Rysewyk - 2009 - PAIN 145:364-366.
  47.  65
    Defending the IASP Definition of Pain.Murat Aydede - forthcoming - The Monist.
    [Penultimate draft -- please consult the final version for reference] The official definition of ‘pain’ by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) hasn’t seen much revision since its publication in 1979. There have been various criticisms of the definition in the literature from different quarters: that the definition implies a dubious metaphysical dualism, that it requires a strong form of consciousness as well as linguistic abilities, that it excludes many vulnerable groups that are otherwise perfectly (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain.Murat Aydede - 2001 - Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.
    This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  49. Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - manuscript
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the Transparency Datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  73
    The Ethical Pain.Michele Farisco - 2013 - Neuroethics 6 (2):265-276.
    The intriguing issue of pain and suffering in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs), particularly in Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome/Vegetative State (UWS/VS) and Minimally Conscious State (MCS), is assessed from a theoretical point of view, through an overview of recent neuroscientific literature, in order to sketch an ethical analysis. In conclusion, from a legal and ethical point of view, formal guidelines and a situationist ethics are proposed in order to best manage the critical scientific uncertainty about pain and suffering (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000