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Maiya Jordan
McGill University
  1.  46
    Representation and Regress.Maiya Jordan - 2017 - Husserl Studies 33 (1):19-43.
    I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the (...)
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  2.  24
    Literal Self-Deception.Maiya Jordan - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):248-256.
    It is widely assumed that a literal understanding of someone’s self-deception that p yields the following contradiction. Qua self-deceiver, she does not believe that p, yet – qua self-deceived – she does believe that p. I argue that this assumption is ill-founded. Literalism about self-deception – the view that self-deceivers literally self-deceive – is not committed to this contradiction. On the contrary, properly understood, literalism excludes it.
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    Secondary Self‐Deception.Maiya Jordan - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):122-130.
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    Instantaneous Self-Deception.Maiya Jordan - forthcoming - Tandf: Inquiry:1-26.
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  5.  39
    Sartrean Self-Consciousness and the Principle of Identity.Maiya Jordan - 2017 - Sartre Studies International 23 (2).