By giving sympathy a central role, Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) can be regarded as one of the ‘enlightened’ moral theories of the Enlightenment, insofar as it widened the scope of moral consideration beyond the traditionally restricted boundary of human beings. This, although the author himself does not seem to have been aware of this fact. In this paper, I want to focus on two aspects which I think lead to this conclusion. First, by making sentience the requisite (...) to be taken into moral consideration, nonhuman animals in Smith’s moral theory can count as moral patients towards whom we should exercise the virtue of beneficence (if not justice). Secondly, Smith’s idea of morality as working in concentric circles –generating more stringent duties towards those closer to us– could explain and perhaps also justify our caring for some nonhuman animals, especially pets. (shrink)

What does the basic right to subsistence allow its holders to do for themselves when it goes unfulfilled? This book guides the reader through the morality of infringing property rights for subsistence, in a global context.

Given the conceptual gap in the global justice debate today (where most of the talk is about the duties of the rich, but little is said about what the poor may do for themselves), in this article I reintroduce the idea of a right of necessity. I first delineate a normative framework for such a right, inspired by these historical accounts. I then offer a contemporary case where the exercise of the right of necessity would be morally legitimate according to (...) that framework – even though illegal and probably condemned by the standard moral norms. The case is that of a small group of Paraguayan campesinos (small farmers) suffering from the effects of a severe drought. In the third part, I introduce the concept of noncivil disobedience: I call an act of noncivil disobedience a conscientious, public, illegal and forcible act whose performance, while not necessarily intended directly as a means to bring about social and/or political change, may help to trigger these changes indirectly. In the fourth part, I suggest that certain instances where the right of necessity is overtly exercised – as in the case of the famine-struck Paraguayan campesinos – may also be interpreted in terms of noncivil disobedience, insofar as they serve a double function: as a means of satisfying immediate need, and as a marker of discontent in a society where the equal rights of individuals are a nominal ideal which remains unfulfilled in practice. I then address two objections that may be raised against resurrecting the idea of a right of necessity and identifying it in certain instances with noncivil disobedience. I conclude by suggesting that, at the point of convergence between the two, a basic right like the right of necessity recovers its value as an active, (rather than passive) entitlement of its holders, while the use of force enters the picture as a legitimate means that – at least under certain circumstances – may be resorted to within the limits of civil society. (shrink)

With growing vigor, political philosophers have started questioning the Westphalian system of states as the main actors in the international arena and, within it, the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. In this article I add to these questionings by showing that, when it comes to migratory natural resources, i.e., migratory species, a plausible theory of territorial rights should advocate a regime of shared sovereignty among states. This means that one single entity should represent their interests and maybe also (...) those of third parties, managing and making decisions over the resource as a whole. Although such a regime might be the tacit goal of existing international conventions regarding wildlife, it remains untheorized in political philosophy and largely under-theorized in international law. By presenting the critical situation of the monarch butterfly in North America, I point to the inadequacy of the compartmentalized current regime, which generates injustice in migration; namely, the phenomenon whereby range states of a given species may neglect or over-exploit it while in their territory, to the detriment of others. I suggest that more flexible and imaginative governance arrangements are needed to deal in a better way with these and similar natural resources. (shrink)

Given the grim global statistics of extreme poverty and socioeconomic inequalities, moral and political philosophers have focused on the duties of justice and assistance that arise therefrom. What the needy are morally permitted to do for themselves in this context has been, however, a mostly overlooked question. Reviving a medieval and early modern account of the right of necessity, I propose that a chronically deprived agent has a right to take, use and/or occupy whatever material resources are required to guarantee (...) her self-preservation, or the means necessary to acquire them. There are three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: the need is basic, the claimant does not violate other equally important moral interests, and it is a last resort. I present two recommendations to be followed by the claimants, and offer some examples where this principle may be applied today. I reply to the objections that understanding the right of necessity in this way kills its intuitive plausibility, and that it is a remedy worse than the disease. I conclude that, while not the best solution for the problem of global poverty, the exercise of this right should be accepted if we believe in the human right to subsistence. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 36, Issue 1, pp 63 - 77 At the basis of modern natural law theories, the concept of the _suum_, i.e. what belongs to the person, has received little scholarly attention despite its importance both in explaining and justifying not only the genealogy of property, but also that of morality and war. In this essay I focus on Grotius’s account of the _suum_ and examine what it is, what things it includes, what rights it gives rise to, (...) and how it is extended in the transition from the state of nature to civil society. I then briefly suggest that reviving this concept could help to illuminate the current discussion on the foundations of basic human rights, and to re-evaluate cases where these seem to clash with property rights. (shrink)

From the end of the twelfth century until the middle of the eighteenth century, the concept of a right of necessity –i.e. the moral prerogative of an agent, given certain conditions, to use or take someone else’s property in order to get out of his plight– was common among moral and political philosophers, who took it to be a valid exception to the standard moral and legal rules. In this essay, I analyze Samuel Pufendorf’s account of such a right, founded (...) on the basic instinct of self-preservation and on the notion that, in civil society, we have certain minimal duties of humanity towards each other. I review Pufendorf’s secularized account of natural law, his conception of the civil state, and the function of private property. I then turn to his criticism of Grotius’s understanding of the right of necessity as a retreat to the pre-civil right of common use, and defend his account against some recent criticisms. Finally, I examine the conditions deemed necessary and jointly sufficient for this right to be claimable, and conclude by pointing to the main strengths of this account. Keywords: Samuel Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius, right of necessity, duty of humanity, private property. (shrink)

At the basis of modern natural law theories, the concept of the suum, or what belongs to the person (in Latin, his, her, its, their own), has received little scholarly attention despite its importance both in explaining and justifying not only the genealogy of property, but also that of morality and war.1 In this paper I examine Hugo Grotius's what it is, what things it includes, what rights it gives rise to and how it is extended in the transition from (...) the state of nature to civil society. I then briefly point out how bringing this concept back to the fore could help to illuminate the current discussion on the foundations of basic human rights, and to evaluate cases where these seem to clash with property rights. (shrink)

The Scottish sentimentalist Francis Hutcheson and the Chinese Confucianist Mencius give benevolence (ren) a key place in their respective moral theories, as the first and foundational virtue. Leaving aside differences in style and method, my purpose in this essay is to underline this similarity by focusing on four common features: first, benevolence springs from compassion, an innate and universal feeling shared by all human beings; second, its objects are not only human beings but also animals; third, it is sensitive to (...) proximity; and finally, it has to be constantly cultivated in order to become a character trait. I will conclude with some brief remarks as to how this understanding of benevolence as rooted in feeling rather than reason, and in personal rather than impersonal relationships, helps to illuminate part of the discussion in moral philosophy today. (shrink)

John Locke’s justification of property rights starts with the idea that mixing one’s labor with previously unowned (natural) physical objects entitles one to ownership of the resulting product. American philosopher Robert Nozick presents this idea in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), but notes that things are not as straightforward as they might seem. On the contrary, Nozick writes, there are instances where by mixing one’s labor with something in nature, one loses one’s labor without making any gain: “If I own (...) a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?” The answer is obviously the latter, he argues; and he suggests that what Locke really had in mind was that what one ought to own is not the full resulting product of one’s labor, but rather the value added to the original product before the laboring took place. In this article, I claim that one of the most common arguments supporting patents over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) rests on the same misunderstanding. I present three possible defenses that might be given to support it, and show how they fail. (shrink)

By virtue of the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959, the territorial claims to Antarctica of seven of the original signatories were held in abeyance or “frozen.” Considered by many as an exemplar of international law, the Antarctic Treaty System has come to be increasingly questioned, however, in a very much changed global scenario that presents new challenges to the governance of the White Continent. In this context, it is necessary to gain a clearer understanding of the moral weight of those (...) initial claims, which stand as a cornerstone of the treaty. The aim of this article is to offer an appraisal of such claims, which may be divided into two main kinds: those grounded on some relevant link to the territory, and those grounded on official documents and geographical doctrines. After pointing to the limitations and challenges that they face, I conclude with some remarks about how this assessment ought to serve as a starting point to rethink the territorial status of Antarctica. (shrink)

It has become a trope in the field of Antarctic humanities that the history of Antarctica was no exception to world politics (as once thought), but just another instance of the colonial project at the global level. However, the wrongs of colonialism are normally tied to the subjugation of native populations, and in Antarctica there were none. So what is wrong with Antarctic colonialism? In this article, I point to three such wrongs: first, the unilateral appropriation by a few states (...) of extravagant expanses of land, in a context where the finitude of land and resources worldwide was already well-known; second, the constitution of a political system (i.e. the Antarctic Treaty) where the majority of those who should have been consulted were not; and third, the maintenance of a system where not all members are treated under equal and reciprocal terms. I then give some suggestions to decolonize Antarctica, address one key objection, and conclude. (shrink)

Anna Stilz’s Territorial Sovereignty (2019) aims to be a revisionist account of territorial rights that puts the value of individual autonomy first, without giving up the value of collective self-determination. In what follows I examine Stilz’s definition of occupancy rights and her emphasis on the moral relevance of what she calls ‘located’ life plans. I suggest that, if it aims at being truly revisionist, her theory should work with a broader definition of occupancy. So long as it doesn’t, these rights (...) will be mainly the preserve of groups of settlers and peoples with predictable patterns of movement. Moreover, insofar as occupancy rights ground collective rights to self-determination, they actually have the potential to trump individual rights to what I call ‘dynamic’ or non-located occupancy. This is worrying, I claim, for at least two reasons. First, rights to dynamic occupancy are arguably as central for respecting individual autonomy as rights to located occupancy. And second, rights to dynamic ocupancy should be seen as key in helping to form the kind of political allegiances required to overcome the most pressing collective action problems that humanity faces. (shrink)

In Justice and Natural Resources: An Egalitarian Theory, Chris Armstrong proposes a version of global egalitarianism that – contra the default renderings of this approach – takes individual attachment to specific resources into account. By doing this, his theory has the potential for greening global egalitarianism both in terms of procedure and scope. In terms of procedure, its broad account of attachment and its focus on individuals rather than groups connects with participatory governance and management and, ultimately, participatory democracy – (...) an essential ingredient in the toolkit of green politics and policy-making. In terms of scope, because it does not commit itself to any particular moral framework, Armstrong’s theory leaves the door open for non-human animals to become subjects of justice, thus extending the realm of the latter beyond its traditionally anthropocentric borders. I conclude that these greenings are promising, but not trouble-free. (shrink)

"Avatar" and "Princess Mononoke" as representative of radically different positions in environmental ethics.

Abstract:Most of the liberal moral and political debate concerning global poverty has focused on the duties of justice or assistance that the well-off have toward the needy. In this essay, I show how rights-based theories in particular have unanimously understood subsistence rights just (and only) as claims, where all it means to have a claim—following Hohfeld—is that others have a duty toward us. This narrow interpretation of subsistence rights has led to a glaring omission; namely, there has been no careful (...) examination of what the rights-holders themselves may do to realize the object of their rights. Furthermore, in the few cases where this question gets posed, rights are again understood just (and only) as claims, but this time of an Austinian kind: rights-holders are limited to the performance of speech-acts like demanding, pleading, and entreating to make noncompliers fulfill their duties. I suggest that this approach betrays the original spirit of subsistence rights as individual moral powers delineating a sovereign sphere of action. More seriously, it is unjust to the rights-holders themselves, to the extent that many of the actions they undertake to realize the objects of their rights fall off the radar of moral analysis. (shrink)

Narrowly understood, veganism is the practice of excluding all animal products from one’s diet, with the exception of human milk. More broadly, veganism is not only a food ethics, but it encompasses all other areas of life. As defined by the Vegan Society when it became an established charity in the UK in 1979, veganism is best understood as “a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude – as far as is possible and practicable – all forms of (...) exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, animals and the environment”. There are two main moral justifications for veganism, both of which rely on a common assumption: that sentience, i.e., the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, is the necessary and sufficient trait to be morally considerable. In what follows, I present these two justifications and a third one which, although less popular, captures some core intuitions among vegans. I then present a challenge faced by veganism and two arguments that reject it as discriminatory, and briefly conclude. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to present the formation of poblaciones callampa in Chile during the second half of the twentieth century (especially between 1950 and 1970), as an expression of the right of necessity of thousands of homeless persons. I suggest that this social phenomenon is the germ of the consequent tomas de sitio (illegal encampments), where the requisites to take part were “to be poor, to have children, three sticks and a flag”. The individual right of necessity (...) is the foundation of the formal claims of politically organized groups looking for a permanent place to live that fulfilled minimal criteria of social justice. Although the argument is focused on the specific case of the Chilean callampas, I suggest that it may be applied to other cases of precarious, illegal settlements in Latin America and worldwide. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that taking basic human rights seriously—and the basic right to subsistence in particular—requires acknowledging that, given certain conditions, people in need have a right of necessity to take, use and/or occupy the property of others in order to get out of their plight. I explore the implications of this for the phenomenon of illegalized migration for subsistence reasons, and suggest that receiving countries ought not to deny entry to these migrants. On the contrary, those seeking (...) to enter should be morally permitted to do it. The reason is that, just as basic rights should serve as internal limits to any minimally reasonable system of property rights, so should they serve as limits to any minimally reasonable system of territorial rights. After developing this idea, I address some objections to the principle and its application, and conclude by pointing to the immediate, mediate and final duties that this principle gives rise to. (shrink)

That there is a human right to subsistence is a basic assumption for most moral and political theorists interested in the problem of global poverty, but it is not one exempt from controversy. In this article, I examine four justifications for this right and suggest that it takes the form of a claim, that is, a right which creates correlative duties on others who are then taken to be the main agents in its fulfillment. I point to some criticisms made (...) against this conceptualization and offer an alternative approach that emphasizes the key importance of the moral and political agency of the needy. Two aspects of this approach are that the needy are seen as actors in their own right when it comes to poverty alleviation measures and their demands are no longer seen as demands for mere subsistence but ultimately for putting an end to their political marginalization and exclusion. Towards the end, I point to the complementarity of both views. (shrink)

Recent scientific studies suggest that the destabilisation of the earth's climate and biodiversity loss are not separate, but interdependent phenomena. In this context, some have proposed the creation of a ‘Global Safety Net’ of ecoregions that should be preserved to stop further biodiversity loss, preventing at the same time the growth of CO2 emissions produced by deforestation and allowing natural carbon removal. In this article, I suggest that a first step to achieve this might be to replace permanent sovereignty over (...) natural resources in these areas with permanent guardianship. I propose to take some inspiration from a model that has already been implemented over an entire continent with a fair degree of success. In 1959, the Antarctic Treaty froze the sovereign claims of seven countries over Antarctica. However, these countries plus 47 others today have been remarkably successful at jointly preserving the continent for peace, science, and the protection of the environment, especially since the signature of the Environmental Protocol in 1991. After outlining some principles that could give form to a Global Environmental Protocol for Ecoregions, I address a series of objections and offer some concluding remarks. (shrink)

In this article, we investigate three arguments for Rights of Antarctica (RoA), understood as recognising the whole continent as a rights-holder with legal standing. For this, we draw inspiration from the Antarctica Declaration, a text developed by an interdisciplinary and international group of scholars and activists. We scrutinise three justifications that could potentially be used in support of RoA. First, we investigate whether arguments for Rights of Nature (RoN) elsewhere can support RoA. RoN has been accepted in several domestic legislations. (...) Unfortunately, we discover important disanalogies between RoA and RoN, defeating the purpose of justifying RoA with reference to RoN. Second, we scrutinise potential arguments that focus on giving rights to specific Antarctic ecoregions or places. However, such arguments would only cover parts of the continent, thus going against the holistic approach of RoA, and they would require using a broader understanding of ‘attachments’ as grounds for justifying rights for parts of Antarctica. In contrast, we construct an argument for accepting RoA based on four components: (1) Antarctica’s intrinsic value, (2) wider forms of human attachments, (3) Antarctica’s substantial role as a global systemic resource, and (4) the fact that Antarctica is under recurrent and substantial threats. While none of these are individually sufficient for recognising RoA, they can jointly make RoA appropriate. We conclude that it remains an open question whether international law or, more specifically, the Antarctic Treaty, would be open to such conceptual and normative innovation, adopting a new paradigm in our treatment of the nonhuman natural world. At the same time, we hope to kickstart a discussion of what RoA would require and how it should relate more generally to RoN discourses. (shrink)

Recent theories of territorial rights could be characterized by their growing attention to environmental concerns and resource rights (understood as the rights of jurisdiction and/or ownership over natural resources). Here I examine two: Avery Kolers’s theory of ethnogeographical plenitude, and Cara Nine’s theory of legitimate political authority over people and resources. While Kolers is a pioneer in demanding ecological sustainability as a minimum requirement for any viable theory of territorial rights – building a bridge between environmental and political philosophy – (...) Nine highlights a crucial distinction when looking at territorial rights from a global justice perspective, namely that between jurisdictional powers and ownership rights over resources. Daring and innovative at first glance, I claim that both theories present, however, deep ambiguities and retreat from their radical implications which, if taken seriously, would lead to a massive redrawing of current territorial borders. (shrink)

According to the brain drain argument, there are good reasons for states to limit the exit of their skilled workers (more specifically, healthcare workers), because of the negative impacts this type of migration has for other members of the community from which they migrate. Some theorists criticise this argument as illiberal, while others support it and ground a duty to stay of the skilled workers on rather vague concepts like patriotic virtue, or the legitimate expectations of their state and co-citizens. (...) In this article, on the contrary, we suggest that the liberal conception of states’ legitimate political authority demands, and not just permits, that developing states from which migration of skilled workers occurs set up contractual mechanisms. These mechanisms will ensure that state-funded training in the health sector is provided against a commitment on the part of future professionals to reciprocate with their services for the benefits obtained. If one of the conditions for the state to maintain legitimate political authority is to provide basic services such as healthcare to its subjects (while respecting at the same time their autonomy and freedom), then this is what developing states affected by the brain drain ought to do. What we call the authority-based approach to the brain drain also helps to clarify the obligations that other states have not to interfere with these contractual mechanisms when they exist, and not to profit from their absence. Inspired by FIFA’s legal instruments of training compensation and solidarity mechanism for the transfer of players, we conclude by suggesting a plausible global policy to complement this authority-based approach. (shrink)

Forty years ago, in his landmark work A Theory of Justice, John Rawls depicted a just society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens, regarded as free and equal persons. Justice, Rawls famously claimed, ought to be “the first virtue of social institutions.” Ever since then, moral and political philosophers have expanded, expounded or criticized Rawls’s main tenets, from perspectives as diverse as egalitarianism, left and right libertarianism, and the ethics of care. The most important and influential views in (...) this ‘post-Rawlsian’ era constitute the focus of this volume, which seeks to give a general picture of the main strands in contemporary justice theorizing, as well as addressing more recent developments, especially regarding methodological issues. How to build a theory of justice and how to delineate its proper scope; the relationship between justice and equality, justice and liberty, and justice and desert; and the critique of the Rawlsian paradigm especially from the feminist perspective and from the growing strand of non-ideal theory are the main topics addressed in this selection of essays. (shrink)

In the deep disagreements characterized by Robert Fogelin (1985/2005) the parties do not share a common framework sufficient for the argumentative exchange to actually occur. Arguments are present as propositional structu-res, but do not develop as activity. Some public debates, particularly those that appeal to a resolution through the knowledge provided by science, can be reconstructed from the perspective of this model. Can scientific evidence be constructed from which to build, at least partially, that necessary common framework? Which notion of (...) objectivity is the most adequate for this purpose? Fogelin’s proposal is a starting point to reflect on the resolution of disagree-ments and scientific knowledge, in particular from the notions of incommen-surability and objectivity. It is argued that objectivity in scientific activity resul-ting from the conditions that allow negotiating meanings can work to resolve some deep disagreements. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se aborda la proyección que tuvo la escuela histológica de Cajal en México. En primer lugar, se analiza la atención que despertó en los científicos mexicanos el renacer de la ciencia española y en particular los trabajos de la escuela cajaliana. Se estudia también el papel que desempeñó en su difusión Tomás Gutiérrez Perrín, histólogo vallisoletano afincado en México, discípulo de Cajal y catedrático de Histología en la Escuela Nacional de Medicina. Finalmente, se valora la contribución (...) de los exiliados republicanos, entre los que figuran varios discípulos de Cajal, como Isaac Costero y Dionisio Nieto, quienes al reanudar sus investigaciones histopatológicas y neuropsiquiátricas en México, dieron continuidad en este país a la prestigiosa escuela de Cajal. (shrink)

La creatividad y la paz están íntimamente relacionadas, incluso en su dimensión histórica. El cambio de concepción de la paz observado por Galtung lleva a una comparación con la evolución de la noción de creatividad. Además de las mencionadas similitudes, ambos conceptos están en concomitancia en tanto en cuanto la creatividad es necesaria como herramienta para la transformación de conflictos de forma pacífica. El nexo que se propone para unir ambos conceptos es la educación, encardinada dentro de un constructo que (...) llamamos triángulo abstractivo. (shrink)

En este artículo se presentan algunos elementos para el debate en torno a la relación entre publicidad y arte. Algunos autores han señalado que la publicidad es el arte en la era de la muerte del arte, sin embargo, discutiremos esta afirmación tomando como punto de anclaje la diferente lógica de estos dos campos de la producción imaginística y estética. Para ello nos centraremos en los fines, en los destinatarios y en la autoría, tanto en lo referido a las artes (...) como a la publicidad. This article presents an advance for discussion about the relationship between advertising and art. Some authors have argued that advertising is an art in times when art has died. However, we will discuss this statement considering the logic of these two different fields, both image and aesthetic production. To that effect, we will focus on the purposes, addressees and authorship, all of them in regard to the arts and advertising. (shrink)

At Universitat Politècnica de València, Meridies, an internship programme that places engineering students in countries of Latin America, is one of the few opportunities the students have to explore the implications of being a professional in society in a different cultural and social context. This programme was analyzed using the capabilities approach as a frame of reference for examining the effects of the programme on eight student participants. The eight pro-public-good capabilities proposed by Melanie Walker were investigated through semi-structured interviews. (...) The internship is an environment in which students can put into practice the knowledge they have acquired in undergraduate studies and to find practical relevance in what they studied. Occasionally, this also entails a critical questioning of what they have learned, a greater awareness of the limits of the contents of their studies and of the way things were taught, and interest in less explored issues that are closely linked to social justice. However, tensions can arise between the pro-public-good oriented perspectives of this programme, and a more instrumental vision. One way to overcome these tensions is to foster consideration of reflexivity, that is, the dynamic relationship between technology and society. To do so, the programme must create space before and during the internship, and upon the return of the students, to discuss and collectively reflect upon their lived experience. Additionally, it ought to engage supervisors in this educational journey, both at the university and in the host institutions, and also involve socially committed organisations in this task. (shrink)

Earlier work has demonstrated that attention is indirectly cognitively malleable by processes of self-association – processes by which agents explicitly associate an item with the self. We extend this work by considering the manipulation of attention to both salient and non-salient objects. We demonstrate that self-association impacts attentional processing not only of non-salient objects, but also regarding salient items known to command attention. This result indicates the flexibility and susceptibility of attentional processing to cognitive manipulation.

A través de un estudio de caso y bajo el paradigma de investigación cualitativa, este artículo contribuye con evidencia que da cuenta de la conformación de los repertorios lingüísticos de estudiantes universitarios en el centro-norte de México, así como los espacios en donde ejercen prácticas lingüísticas flexibles.

ABSTRACTIn this paper we explore the role of Digital Grassroots Innovation in the construction of a more participatory smart city. 18 DGIs from four Spanish cities (Santander, Valencia, Bilba...

El presente artículo es producto de un trabajo etnográfico que se realizó durante más de un año en una escuela primaria pública que contaba con apoyo de un servicio de Educación Especial. Los principales hallazgos versan sobre cotidianeidad de los procesos de evaluación de estudiantes con discapacidad. El trabajo es un llamado a humanizar las prácticas docentes.

En este trabajo ofrecemos la traducción del latín al español del Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in obiecto de Ramón Llull, con introducción y notas. Se trata de una obra en la que el filósofo mallorquín efectúa una síntesis de su pensamiento en torno de las relaciones entre fe y razón, así como de su posición respecto de la defensa de la fe católica y la conversión de los no cristianos. El opúsculo, que se muestra como un trabajo definitivo (...) en cuanto al establecimiento de la relación mencionada, hecha mano de los elementos fundamentales de su sistema, el Ars magna, pero aun así es una rara avis dentro de la opus luliana: está pleno de citas bíblicas y alusiones a las auctoritates eclesiásticas más renombradas, unas y otras ausentes en la mayoría de las obras lulianas. In this paper we offer the translation from Latin to Spanish of Ramón Llull´s Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in obiecto with introduction and notes. This is a work where the mallorcan philosopher makes a synthetic framework of his thinking on the relationship between faith and reason, as well as of his position towards the defense of catholic faith and conversion of non-christian people. The text, which is shown as a definitive work in the setting of this relationship, uses the most characteristic principles of his system, Ars magna, but still is a rara avis inside the opus lulliana: is full of biblical quotations and allusions to the most renowned ecclesiastical auctoritates, all these absents in most lullian woks. (shrink)

El presente trabajo explora, desde una lectura husserliana, la experiencia de la creación artística. Así, parte de una lectura sobre la conciencia interna del tiempo para ahondar en los fenómenos constituyentes que operan tanto de forma activa como pasiva en el acto creativo. Esta vuelta al fondo anónimo de la conciencia, permite pensar la originariedad del presente inscrito en un horizonte temporal y, con ello, una forma de responsabilidad del artista con su propio tiempo. Finalmente, se expondrá la concepción husserliana (...) sobre la fantasía, entendida como un tipo de vivencia peculiar que, a diferencia de la conciencia de imagen, neutraliza la realidad para abrir un horizonte propio capaz de confrontarnos. (shrink)

En este trabajo se extraen y estudian las referencias musicales que aparecen en las Constituciones del sínodo que celebró el arzobispado de Granada en 1572. Así, en primer término se hace una contextualización histórica al documento sinodal, pasando después a analizar los asuntos musicales recogidos en el mismo sobre la celebración de la misa y del oficio divino en los templos de la demarcación granadina, la mayor parte de ellos parroquiales. Tras esto se inserta un epígrafe dedicado a los intérpretes (...) de la música en los cultos religiosos, al que finalmente le sucede otro con algunas cuestiones relevantes sobre la música profana ligada a las iglesias o al clero de las mismas. (shrink)

En el presente escrito se hace una lectura filosófica de la ética protestante a partir de un talante predominante en la época que circunscribe al barroco mostrándoles como una forma fundamental y fundacional de la Modernidad europea ejemplificado a través del drama trágico alemán y en contraste con una configuración alternativa y desemejante de un proyecto civilizatorio propiamente barroco y utópico en las colonias americanas. Palabras clave: Barroco - Talante - Protestantismo - Modernidad - Ethos.

The aim is to show that study objects that address social problems , should be analysed with a consistent method to it complexity, i.e. critical dialectical, because it not only explains the problem, but transforms the current conditions with the intention of enhancing its constituent elements. The first section shows the onto-epistemological and teleological assumptions of the study object, the second the explanation of an epistemic matrix that displays the location of the problem, thus establishing the right process for its (...) approach. Se trata de mostrar que los objetos de estudio que aborden problemas sociales , deben ser analizados con un método consecuente a la complejidad del mismo, siendo éste la dialéctica-crítica, puesto que no se trata solamente de explicar el problema, sino de transformar las condiciones existentes con una intencionalidad potenciadora de los elementos que lo constituyen. Para ello se recurre, en un primer momento, a la explicación de los supuestos onto-epistemológicos y teleológicos del objeto de estudio, y en un segundo momento, a la explicación de una matriz epistémica que permite visualizar la ubicación del problema, estableciendo en consecuencia, el proceso adecuado para su abordaje. (shrink)