Kant's distinction between intuitive and discursive knowledge precludes his giving intuitions linguistic representation. Singular terms represent concepts given what kant calls a 'singular use' and are analyzable as definite descriptions. That the object described exists and that there is only one such object can be given linguistic representation only through an explicit assertion of existence and uniqueness. As an intuitionist in mathematics kant holds that mathematics proclaims the constructibility and not the existence of its objects.
As even a cursory glance at Peirce’s Collected Papers makes apparent, he is an extremely unsystematic and difficult writer. In this paper, I want to sort out some of the main arguments that connect his verificationism with his realism and his metaphysics. I pay particular attention to his contrast between individuals and universals and its bearing on his doctrine of perceptual judgment and abductive inference. In the final section, I turn to two criticisms of Peircean realism urged by Quine and, (...) in conclusion, offer some suggestions as to what is needed for a full critical evaluation of it. (shrink)
If necessity is a generic notion, then, like any generic notion, it becomes specified not by a criterion as such but by a differentia. The differentia of logical necessity is that the denial of a logically necessary proposition is self-contradictory; one of our best criteria of logical necessity is that after careful consideration we see that the denial of the proposition is self-contradictory.
Both ways of looking at the history of logic as well as some of the issues that plague contemporary disputes over the nature of logic are illustrated in three recent books. Henry Veatch's Intentional Logic turns to a medieval Aristotelian philosophy as providing the framework for an adequate account of logical subject matter. Ernest Moody's Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic borrows from the technical apparatus of present-day logicians in an endeavor to reassess what was once dismissed as fourteenth century (...) logic-chopping. Benson Mates' Stoic Logic is a similar study in the logic of an earlier period. (shrink)