8 found
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  1.  12
    A Battle in the Statistics Wars: A Simulation-Based Comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian Methodologies.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13689-13748.
    The debates between Bayesian, frequentist, and other methodologies of statistics have tended to focus on conceptual justifications, sociological arguments, or mathematical proofs of their long run properties. Both Bayesian statistics and frequentist (“classical”) statistics have strong cases on these grounds. In this article, we instead approach the debates in the “Statistics Wars” from a largely unexplored angle: simulations of different methodologies’ performance in the short to medium run. We conducted a large number of simulations using a straightforward decision problem based (...)
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  2. Team Reasoning and a Measure of Mutual Advantage in Games.Jurgis Karpus & Mantas Radzvilas - 0201 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (1):1-30.
    The game theoretic notion of best-response reasoning is sometimes criticized when its application produces multiple solutions of games, some of which seem less compelling than others. The recent development of the theory of team reasoning addresses this by suggesting that interacting players in games may sometimes reason as members of a team – a group of individuals who act together in the attainment of some common goal. A number of properties have been suggested for team-reasoning decision-makers’ goals to satisfy, but (...)
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  3.  21
    Incentives for Research Effort: An Evolutionary Model of Publication Markets with Double-Blind and Open Review.Mantas Radzvilas, Francesco De Pretis, William Peden, Daniele Tortoli & Barbara Osimani - forthcoming - Computational Economics:1-44.
    Contemporary debates about scientific institutions and practice feature many proposed reforms. Most of these require increased efforts from scientists. But how do scientists’ incentives for effort interact? How can scientific institutions encourage scientists to invest effort in research? We explore these questions using a game-theoretic model of publication markets. We employ a base game between authors and reviewers, before assessing some of its tendencies by means of analysis and simulations. We compare how the effort expenditures of these groups interact in (...)
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  4.  27
    The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences, Brian Epstein. Oxford University Press, 2015, Viii + 298 Pages. [REVIEW]Mantas Radzvilas - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):553-560.
  5. Rawlsian “Justice” and the Evolutionary Theory of Games: Cultural Evolution and the Origins of the Natural Maximin Rule.Mantas Radžvilas - 2011 - Problemos 80:35-53.
    This paper is dedicated to the analysis of the maximin principle, which is one of the key theoretical concepts of John Rawls’s theory of justice, and the problem that this principle creates for any attempt to provide a naturalistic interpretation of Rawls’s concept of fairness . Analysis shows that maximin principle is, in fact, incompatible with the Bayesian decision theory. This paper is intended to show that recent breakthroughs in evolutionary game theory could help to reconcile the maximin principle with (...)
     
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  6.  8
    Strategic Interdependence, Hypothetical Bargaining, and Mutual Advantage in Non-Cooperative Games.Mantas Radzvilas - unknown
    One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable outcomes. This prompted the emergence of goal-directed theories of reasoning – the team reasoning theory and the theory of hypothetical bargaining. Both theories suggest that people resolve non-cooperative games by using a reasoning algorithm which allows them to identify mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games. The primary aim of this thesis is to enrich (...)
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  7.  5
    Relative Benefit Equilibrating Bargaining Solution and the Ordinal Interpretation of Gauthier's Arbitration Scheme.Mantas Radzvilas - unknown
    In 1986 David Gauthier proposed an arbitration scheme for two player cardinal bargaining games based on interpersonal comparisons of players’ relative concessions. In Gauthier’s original arbitration scheme, players’ relative concessions are defined in terms of Raiffa-normalized cardinal utility gains, and so it cannot be directly applied to ordinal bargaining problems. In this paper I propose a relative benefit equilibrating bargaining solution for two and n-player ordinal and quasiconvex ordinal bargaining problems with finite sets of feasible basic agreements based on the (...)
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  8.  2
    Hypothetical Bargaining and Equilibrium Refinement in Non-Cooperative Games.Mantas Radzvilas - unknown
    Virtual bargaining theory suggests that social agents aim to resolve non-cooperative games by identifying the strategy profile which they would agree to play if they could openly bargain. The theory thus offers an explanation of how social agents resolve games with multiple Nash equilibria. One of the main questions pertaining to this theory is how the principles of the bargaining theory could be applied in the analysis of hypothetical bargaining in non-cooperative games. I propose a bargaining model based on the (...)
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