Results for 'Manuel P��rez Otero'

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  1.  9
    Is There Epistemologically Irrational Knowledge?Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (2):229-249.
    I present an epistemological puzzle about perceptual knowledge and its relation to the evaluation of probabilities. It involves cases, concerning a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context, where apparently: S has perceptual knowledge of P; the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. If those two theses were true, the following very plausible epistemological principle would fail: If S knows P, then the epistemic justification S (...)
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  2.  8
    An Epistemic Puzzle About Knowledge and Rational Credence.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2019 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (3-4):195-206.
    I present some puzzling cases regarding knowledge and its relation to rational credence. They seem to entail a failure of an apparently correct principle: if S knows P, then the epistemic justi...
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  3. El papel de la discriminabilidad en el conocimiento.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 75:295-299.
    Diverse epistemologists have proposed this Discriminability Postulate : If S knows that p, then S can discriminate between the case that p and other relevant alternatives. I propose that DP derives from other, more basic postulate, that sees knowledge as providing some Warrant Against the Risk of Error : If S knows that p, then this knowledge confers on S’s belief that p a warrant against the risk of error. The kind of error mentioned in WARE is the error consisting (...)
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  4.  40
    La regla de la aseveración y las implicaturas conversacionales.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 24 (1):63-81.
    Williamson defiende la regla del conocimiento, RK, sobre las aseveraciones: debemos aseverar que p sólo si sabemos que p. En este trabajo exploro algunas consecuencias interesantes de RK: en ocasiones, al hacer una aseveración correcta transmitimos un significado no literal verdadero, que \sin embargo\ no podría ser correctamente aseverado; ese tipo de implicatura se da, entre otros casos, en una cierta subclase de las implicaturas: las implicaturas argumentativas; RK y la noción de implicatura argumentativa permiten explicar la tendencia a tratar (...)
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  5.  4
    S. Martinho de Dume Antologista de Séneca.Manuel P. Ferreira De Sousa - 1995 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 51 (3/4):699 - 706.
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  6.  89
    The Humean Problem of Induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357 - 376.
    Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have (...)
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  7.  12
    The Modernist-Postmodernist Quarrel on Philosophy and Justice: A Possible Levinasian Mediation.Manuel P. Arriaga - 2006 - Lexington Books.
    This book examines the social relevance of philosophy as this problem is posed in the contemporary Modernism-Postmodernism debate. Manuel P. Arriaga critically investigates the two sides of the debate in their various presuppositions and their equally diverse ramifications in fields ranging from political theory, philosophy of religion, and theory of knowledge, among others.
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  8.  14
    Boghossian’s Inference Argument Against Content Externalism Reversed.Manuel PÉrez Otero - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):159-181.
    I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to our inferential rationality . According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. In that sense, (...)
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  9. Textos.Manuel P. Ferreira Sousa - 1990 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 46 (4):513-545.
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  10.  70
    Purposes of Reasoning and Moore’s Proof of an External World.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4181-4200.
    A common view about Moore’s Proof of an External World is that the argument fails because anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the argument to rationally overcome those doubts. I agree that Moore’s Proof is—in that sense—dialectically ineffective at convincing an opponent or a doubter, but I defend that the argument (even when individuated taking into consideration the purpose of Moore’s arguing and, consequently, the preferred addressee of the Proof) does not fail. The key to my (...)
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  11.  10
    The Conventional and the Analytic.Manuel Pérez Otero Manuel García‐Carpintero - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):239-274.
  12.  32
    Los propósitos de razonar, ilustrados con el argumento externista anti-escéptico de Putnam.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2012 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (1):55-74.
    Desarrollo varias hipótesis sobre los propósitos de la argumentación racional, parcialmente inspiradas en el análisis de Jackson sobre el concepto de petitio principii. Destaco como especialmente relevante entre tales propósitos la referencia a los potenciales destinatarios de una argumentación. Ilustro la discusión con un caso concreto: el argumento elaborado por Putnam para demostrar que no somos cerebros en una cubeta. Presento una versión de ese argumento y lo defiendo frente a una posible crítica que lo acusa de prejuzgar la cuestión.I (...)
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  13.  5
    The Humean Problem of Induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357-376.
    Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume's argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll's Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I (...)
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  14.  23
    How Indeterminism Could Help Incompatibilism on Free Action.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (2):169-184.
    The main goal of this paper is to contribute to the clarification of the dialectics between compatibilists and incompatibilists on free action. I describe a new incompatibilist position that has been neglected in the literature. I also provide a proper rationale for such a position. First, I present a justification for incompatibilism that is composed of an old idea and a new one. The old idea is the FRAP principle: freedom requires alternative possibilities. Compatibilists and incompatibilists alike usually share a (...)
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  15.  4
    Pluralismo plural en la concepción de Wittgenstein sobre seguir una regla.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2016 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 67:73.
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  16.  21
    Verdad necesaria versus teorema de lógica modal.Manuel Perez Otero - 1996 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 11 (1):185-201.
    En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese punto explorando (...)
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  17. The Conventional and the Analytic.Manuel García-Carpintero & Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):239-274.
    Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian conventionalism”, conventionalismC and cognates for (...)
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  18.  11
    El dominio de lo mental en la filosofía de Williamson.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 33 (1):23-40.
    Según Williamson, saber y creer son estados mentales, pero creer algo verdadero y creer justificadamente algo verdadero no lo son. Ese tratamiento discriminatorio es relevante para la epistemología de Williamson. Su principal tesis epistemológica negativa y su principal tesis epistemológica positiva están en peligro si su teoría metafísica sobre lo mental es incorrecta. Presento aquí un problema para dicha teoría: impone limitaciones implausibles a los posibles usos de conceptos y expresiones lingüísticas. Describiré algunas opciones que tendría Williamson para evitar el (...)
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  19.  13
    Teorías de la Referencia, Filosofía Experimental y Calibración de Intuiciones.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2017 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 32 (1):41-62.
    E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that–according to them–reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses. Furthermore, their vignettes are inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depends on an unjustified assumption: there is not (...)
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  20.  67
    Possible Worlds: Structure and Stuff.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (2):209-237.
    Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that any philosophically satisfying conception of modality that encompasses possible worlds semantics (PWS) commits us to the Barcan Formula. His argument depends on the assumption that the domain of what there is (the domain of the actual world) has to be identified with the domain D(@), where @ is the index or possible world that in PWS represents , or stands for , the actual world. I work out an interpretation of the relation between (...)
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  21. Respuestas disposicionalistas al problema wittgensteiniano-kripkeano sobre el signigicado y el seguimiento de reglas.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2016 - Critica 48 (143):21-45.
    Kripke formula cuatro objeciones en contra de una solución disposicionalista simple al enigma wittgensteiniano sobre seguir una regla. En este trabajo presento dos propuestas parcialmente disposicionalistas diferentes a la teoría disposicionalista simple que Kripke discute y defiendo que aquellas cuatro objeciones no les afectan. Una de esas dos propuestas puede atribuirse, con cierta precaución, al propio Wittgenstein. La otra, que me parece preferible, invoca una noción teleológica de disposición. Ambas propuestas apelan al concepto de simplicidad, o —alternativamente— al concepto de (...)
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  22.  17
    El estatus ontológico de los mundos posibles.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Critica 41 (122):69-96.
    Tanto la Fórmula Barcan como la postulación de possibilia contradicen los juicios intuitivos preteóricos de la mayoría de los sujetos, favorables al actualismo sobre la naturaleza de los mundos posibles. En este artículo discuto y rechazo dos argumentos que pretenderían contrarrestar tales juicios, y que conciben erróneamente la relación entre la semántica de mundos posibles y nuestros lenguajes naturales modales. El argumento más importante asume que el dominio de todas las entidades es idéntico al dominio de @. Desarrollo una interpretación (...)
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  23.  9
    Aplicaciones Filosoficas Del Bi-Dimensionalismo: Modalidad Y Contenido Epistemico.Manuel Perez Otero - 2002 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 17 (3):457-477.
    Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths, and tried to explain why some of them seem to be contingent. His main explanation motivated two philosophical proposals: the attempt - linked to some interpretations of two-dimensionalism - to analyse the epistemic concept of a priori truth using metaphysical modal concepts; the argument for psychophysical dualism worked out by Kripke relying on his explanation of the appearances of contingency. I point out several difficulties for, and argue that can oe (...)
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  24.  45
    Verdad Necesaria Versus Teorema de Lógica Modal (Necessary Truth Versus Theorem of Modal Logic).Manuel Perez Otero - 1996 - Theoria 11 (1):185-201.
    En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese punto explorando (...)
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  25.  38
    Modest Skepticism and Question Begging Proper.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (1):9-32.
  26.  4
    Prospects for Non-Negationist Regulative Epistemology: Nathan Ballantyne: Knowing Our Limits. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019, Xi + 344 Pp, £25.99 HB. [REVIEW]Manuel Pérez Otero - 2021 - Metascience 30 (2):223-226.
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  27.  30
    An Evaluation of Kripke's Account of the Illusion of Contingency.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2007 - Critica 39 (117):19-44.
    Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and offered different accounts of why certain necessary truths seem to be contingent. One of these accounts was used by Kripke in an argument against the psychophysical identity thesis. I defend the claim that the explanatory force of Kripke's standard account of the appearance of contingency relies on the explanatory force of one of the more general accounts he also offers. But the more general account cannot be used to undermine (...)
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  28.  6
    Cogency, Warrant Transmission-Increase and Non-Ideal Thinkers.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):23-43.
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  29. Invariantism Versus Relativism About Truth.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):145-162.
  30.  57
    Boghossian’s Inference Argument Against Content Externalism Reversed.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):159-181.
    I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to our inferential rationality (to use his term). According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. (...)
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  31.  10
    The Conventional and the Analytic.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):239 - 274.
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  32.  23
    Influence Exerted on Drug Prescribing by Patients' Attitudes and Expectations and by Doctors' Perception of Such Expectations: A Cohort and Nested Case‐Control Study.Eugenia Lado, Manuel Vacariza, Carlos Fernández-González, Juan Jesús Gestal-Otero & Adolfo Figueiras - 2008 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 14 (3):453-459.
  33.  6
    The Distribution of Intensity in Electron Diffraction Patterns Due to Phonon Scattering.P. Rez, C. J. Humphreys & M. J. Whelan - 1977 - Philosophical Magazine 35 (1):81-96.
  34.  3
    An Interesting Fallacy Concerning Dynamical Supertasks.Jon P.É & rez Laraudogoitia - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):321-334.
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  35.  68
    Nietzsche on Mind and Nature.Manuel Dries & P. J. E. Kail (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This volume presents new essays exploring important aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy in connection with two major themes: mind and nature. A team of leading experts address questions including: What is Nietzsche's conception of mind? How does mind relate with the nature? And what is Nietzsche's conception of nature? They all express the thought that Nietzsche's views on these matters are of great philosophical value, either because those views are consonant with contemporary thinking to a greater or lesser extent or because (...)
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  36. The Ontological Commitments of Logical Theories.Manuel García-Carpintero & M. Pérez Otero - 1999 - European Review of Philosophy 4:157-182.
    This paper is partly inspired by a well-known debate between Ruth Barcan Marcus, Terence Parsons and W. V. 0. Quine in the sixties> concerning the extent to which Quantified Modal Logic is committed to Essentialism; the issue nevertheless goes back to the origins of "analytic philosophy'', to the reflections of Frege, Russell, and the earlier Wittgenstein on the nature of logic. By elaborating on a suggestion by Quine, we purport to show that there is a relevant and interesting way to (...)
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  37.  28
    El Argumento Antiintelectualista de Wittgenstein sobre la Comprensión del Lenguaje (Wittgenstein's Antiintellectualist Argument about Linguistic Understanding).Manuel Perez Otero - 2000 - Theoria 15 (1):155-169.
    En el contexto de este artículo denominaremos mentalismo a la conjunción de dos tesis diferentes: (i) para que las expresiones lingüísticas tengan significado es necesario que haya entidades de carácter mental; (ii) tales entidades mentales son suficientes para fijar el significado de las expresiones correspondientes (es decir, lo determinan). Es característico deI segundo Wittgenstein el rechazo a ambas tesis. Pero son sus argumentos contra (ii), especialmente a partir de las consideraciones sobre seguir una regla, los que han concentrado casi toda (...)
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  38.  7
    El Argumento Antiintelectualista de Wittgenstein sobre la Comprensión del Lenguaje.Manuel Perez Otero - 2000 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 15 (1):155-169.
    En el contexto de este artículo denominaremos mentalismo a la conjunción de dos tesis diferentes: para que las expresiones lingüísticas tengan significado es necesario que haya entidades de carácter mental; tales entidades mentales son suficientes para fijar el significado de las expresiones correspondientes. Es característico deI segundo Wittgenstein el rechazo a ambas tesis. Pero son sus argumentos contra, especialmente a partir de las consideraciones sobre seguir una regla, los que han concentrado casi toda la atención. En este trabajo presento el (...)
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  39. Epistemología representacionalista y realismo científico metafísico en Locke.Manuel Perez Otero - 2000 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):5-17.
  40. Las distinciones modales de Kripke y el concepto de proposición.Manuel Perez Otero - 1998 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):61-74.
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  41.  7
    Variedades del escepticismo y del antiescepticismo.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2016 - Análisis Filosófico 36 (1):7-27.
    El objetivo de este artículo es proporcionar elementos para una comprensión apropiada de las diversas dialécticas entre escepticismo y antiescepticismo en epistemología. En particular, demostrar que cierta tesis escéptica es falsa o que es imposible defenderla coherentemente puede resultar insuficiente para solucionar el problema conceptual derivado de un determinado argumento escéptico a favor de dicha tesis. Incluyo una discusión sobre la fuerza y los límites de los argumentos trascendentales, así como un análisis de su estructura, ilustrado por el argumento de (...)
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  42.  12
    Aspectos particularistas en el discurso modal.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2006 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (2):213-232.
    EI debate entre la concepción descriptivista de los nombres propios y la teoría de la referencia directa concierne -principalmente- a esta cuestión: interpretándolas como elementos cruciales en su defensa del particularismo semántieo modal.Tbe debate between the description theory of proper names and direct reference is -mainly- a debale on whether or not the referential function of proper names is reducible in term of descriptive and logical functions. A central distinctive thesis in Kripke’s work is what I call modal semantic particularism: (...)
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  43. Bases epistémicas de la inducción.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2007 - Ludus Vitalis 15 (27):37-49.
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  44.  15
    Developmental Changes in Face Visual Scanning in Autism Spectrum Disorder as Assessed by Data-Based Analysis.Anouck Amestoy, Etienne Guillaud, Manuel P. Bouvard & Jean-René Cazalets - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  45.  15
    Las Consecuencias Existenciales Del Externismo.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2004 - Análisis Filosófico 24 (1):29-58.
    En este artículo abordo uno de los problemas que pone de manifiesto la presunta incompatibilidad entre el externismo y el conocimiento que posee un sujeto sobre el contenido de sus pensamientos. El problema se basa en algunas supuestas consecuencias del externismo concernientes a la existencia de sustancias u objetos externos al sujeto pensante: si el externismo es a priori, entonces un sujeto puede saber a priori que existe el agua, meramente conociendo a priori su pensamiento sobre el agua. Las dos (...)
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  46.  2
    Propiedades teleológicas y supervivencia.Manuel Pérez Otero - 1994 - Endoxa 1 (3):121.
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  47.  1
    Sobre el alcance del antirrealismo de Wittgenstein.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2020 - Análisis Filosófico 40 (2):273-286.
    Karczmarczyck evalúa y critica algunas tesis centrales defendidas en mi libro Vericuetos de la filosofía de Wittgenstein en torno al lenguaje y el seguimiento de reglas, centrado en las ideas del segundo Wittgenstein. Debato aquí sobre diversos puntos examinados por Karczmarczyck. En particular: rechazo su concepción antirrealista de la intencionalidad, según la cual factores posteriores a una acción pueden determinar que dicha acción sea o no una acción deliberada; exploro otros aspectos de la contraposición realismo/antirrealismo, vinculándolos con la lectura antirrealista (...)
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  48.  6
    The Domain of the Mental in Williamson’s Philosophy.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1).
    For Williamson, knowing and believing are mental states, but believing truly and justifiedly-and-truly believing are non-mental states. This discriminatory approach is relevant to his epistemology: his main negative epistemological thesis and his main positive epistemological thesis depend on his metaphysical theory about the demarcation of the mental. I present here a problem for Williamson’s theory of the mental: it imposes implausible restrictions on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. I will describe some options that Williamson would have at his (...)
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  49.  12
    Theories of Reference, Experimental Philosophy, and the Calibration of Intuitions.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2017 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 32 (1).
    E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that —according to them— reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses, for reasons that —as far as I know— have not been pointed out so far. Furthermore, their vignettes are apparently inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to (...)
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  50.  16
    Williamson on Defining Knowledge.Manuel Pérez Otero - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    In his outstanding book Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson claims that we have inductive evidence for some negative theses concerning the prospects of defining knowledge, like this: knowing cannot be defined in accordance with a determinate traditional conjunctive scheme; defends a theory of mental states, mental concepts and the relations between the two, from which we would obtain additional, not merely inductive, evidence for this negative thesis; and presents an alternative definition of knowledge. Here I consider these issues and extract (...)
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