I present an epistemological puzzle about perceptual knowledge and its relation to the evaluation of probabilities. It involves cases, concerning a given subject S and a proposition P in a determinate context, where apparently: S has perceptual knowledge of P; the epistemic justification S has for believing Not-P is much greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. If those two theses were true, the following very plausible epistemological principle would fail: If S knows P, then the epistemic justification S (...) has for believing Not-P is not greater than her epistemic justification for believing P. I offer a solution to the puzzle, which is compatible with basic intuitions and theses of orthodox Bayesianism. (shrink)
Diverse epistemologists have proposed this Discriminability Postulate : If S knows that p, then S can discriminate between the case that p and other relevant alternatives. I propose that DP derives from other, more basic postulate, that sees knowledge as providing some Warrant Against the Risk of Error : If S knows that p, then this knowledge confers on S’s belief that p a warrant against the risk of error. The kind of error mentioned in WARE is the error consisting (...) in mistaking the case that p for some of its relevant alternatives. But the possibility of mistaking in that sense entails that the subject has appropriate representational access to the two items that have to be distinguished. The fact that DP derives from WARE provides grounds to think that if DP is true, then the discriminative capacities than it involves are not jeopardized when the subject cannot have representational access to one of the corresponding items. A corollary of this idea is a weakening of DP and a subsequent reduction of its potential to raise sceptical doubts against claims of knowledge. (shrink)
Williamson defiende la regla del conocimiento, RK, sobre las aseveraciones: debemos aseverar que p sólo si sabemos que p. En este trabajo exploro algunas consecuencias interesantes de RK: en ocasiones, al hacer una aseveración correcta transmitimos un significado no literal verdadero, que \sin embargo\ no podría ser correctamente aseverado; ese tipo de implicatura se da, entre otros casos, en una cierta subclase de las implicaturas: las implicaturas argumentativas; RK y la noción de implicatura argumentativa permiten explicar la tendencia a tratar (...) de forma equivalente diferentes tipos de argumentos antiescépticos inspirados en Moore.Williamson defends the knowledge rule, KR, about assertions: one must: assert p only if one knows p. In this work I explore some interesting consequences of KR: sometimes, when making a correct assertion we transmit a true non-literal meaning which \nevertheless\ could not be rightly asserted; this kind of implicatures are present, for instance, in a certain subclass of implicatures: argumentative implicatures; KR and the notion of argumentative implicature allow for an explanation of the tendency to treat different kinds of Moore-like antiskeptical arguments as if they were equivalent. (shrink)
I present some puzzling cases regarding knowledge and its relation to rational credence. They seem to entail a failure of an apparently correct principle: if S knows P, then the epistemic justi...
This book examines the social relevance of philosophy as this problem is posed in the contemporary Modernism-Postmodernism debate. Manuel P. Arriaga critically investigates the two sides of the debate in their various presuppositions and their equally diverse ramifications in fields ranging from political theory, philosophy of religion, and theory of knowledge, among others.
Necessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunction of first-order contingentism and higher-order necessitism; a combination that would bring about additional drawbacks. I work out a defence of the hybrid combination, including some replies to Williamson’s additional objections. Considerations of ontological parsimony and pre-theoretical intuitions favour the hybrid view over necessitism at all (...) orders. (shrink)
Desarrollo varias hipótesis sobre los propósitos de la argumentación racional, parcialmente inspiradas en el análisis de Jackson sobre el concepto de petitio principii. Destaco como especialmente relevante entre tales propósitos la referencia a los potenciales destinatarios de una argumentación. Ilustro la discusión con un caso concreto: el argumento elaborado por Putnam para demostrar que no somos cerebros en una cubeta. Presento una versión de ese argumento y lo defiendo frente a una posible crítica que lo acusa de prejuzgar la cuestión.I (...) work out some hypothesis on the purposes of rational arguing, partly inspired by Jackson’s analysis of the concept of petitio principii. It is especially relevant among such purposes the reference to the potential intended addressee of an argument. The discussion is illustrated with a concrete example: Putnam’s proofthat we are not brains in a vat. I present a version of Putnam’s proof and defend it from a possible criticism which accuses it of begging the question. (shrink)
Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume's argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll's Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I (...) defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke's theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)
Empiricist philosophers like Carnap invoked analyticity in order to explain a priori knowledge and necessary truth. Analyticity was “truth purely in virtue of meaning”. The view had a deflationary motivation: in Carnap’s proposal, linguistic conventions alone determine the truth of analytic sentences, and thus there is no mystery in our knowing their truth a priori, or in their necessary truth; for they are, as it were, truths of our own making. Let us call this “Carnapian conventionalism”, conventionalismC and cognates for (...) short. This conventionalistC explication of the a priori has been the target of sound criticisms. Arguments like Quine’s in “Truth by Convention” are in our view decisive: the truth of conventionalismC requires that the class of logical truths and logical validities be reductively accounted for as conventionally established; however, no such reduction is forthcoming, because logic is needed to generate the entire class from any given set of conventions properly so-called. Granted that conventionalismC is untenable, we want to take issue with a different, usually made criticism. Although the argument uncovers some difficulties for the way conventionalist claims are defended by some of its advocates, we will try to show that it fails. The criticism thus stands in the way of a proper appreciation of why the Carnapian account of the a priori is not correct. We will try to illustrate this by showing that the criticism we will dispute would dispose of conventionalist claims not only regarding philosophically problematic cases – logical and mathematical truths –, but also regarding cases for which they have some prima facie plausibility. One such case is that of truths that follow from mere abbreviations, “nominal” definitions; ‘someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried adult male’ can serve at this point for illustration. We will try to articulate a clear sense in which the contents of assertion such as this can be truths by convention. We do not need to prove that a conventionalist claim is true in those cases; it is enough for us to show that it is intelligible, for the arguments we will confront question even this. (shrink)
The main goal of this paper is to contribute to the clarification of the dialectics between compatibilists and incompatibilists on free action. I describe a new incompatibilist position that has been neglected in the literature. I also provide a proper rationale for such a position. First, I present a justification for incompatibilism that is composed of an old idea and a new one. The old idea is the FRAP principle: freedom requires alternative possibilities. Compatibilists and incompatibilists alike usually share a (...) Key Assumption about how the open alternative possibilities allowed by indeterminism are supposed to support the libertarian case: the existence of alternative possibilities should make a metaphysically relevant difference concerning the control and/or the authorship of the agent over the action. The other component in the justification for incompatibilism is the rejection of the Key Assumption. Why to preserve FRAP when the Key Assumption is dropped? The answer has three parts: we have a strong pre-theoretical intuition in favour of FRAP; a crucial anti-libertarian argument, known as the Luck Argument, can be interpreted as showing that FRAP and the Key Assumption cannot both be true; the Luck Argument doesn't work when directed against FRAP itself. (shrink)
I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to our inferential rationality . According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. In that sense, (...) insofar as Boghossian’s scenario is relevant to the debate externalism/internalism, it can be seen as providing additional evidence for content externalism. (shrink)
A common view about Moore’s Proof of an External World is that the argument fails because anyone who had doubts about its conclusion could not use the argument to rationally overcome those doubts. I agree that Moore’s Proof is—in that sense—dialectically ineffective at convincing an opponent or a doubter, but I defend that the argument (even when individuated taking into consideration the purpose of Moore’s arguing and, consequently, the preferred addressee of the Proof) does not fail. The key to my (...) defence is to conceive the Proof as addressed to subjects with a different epistemic condition. To sustain this view I formulate some hypothesis about the common general purpose of arguing and I defend that it can be fulfilled even when the addressee of an argument is not someone who disbelieves or doubts its conclusion. (shrink)
In his outstanding book Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson claims that we have inductive evidence for some negative theses concerning the prospects of defining knowledge, like this: knowing cannot be defined in accordance with a determinate traditional conjunctive scheme; defends a theory of mental states, mental concepts and the relations between the two, from which we would obtain additional, not merely inductive, evidence for this negative thesis; and presents an alternative definition of knowledge. Here I consider these issues and extract (...) two relevant conclusions: Williamson's theory of states and concepts only supports the negative thesis because this theory would explain too much, since it imposes implausible necessary limitations on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. So, there is no appropriate non-inductive evidence for the negative thesis. Williamson's own definition of knowledge is at risk. (shrink)
Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have (...) reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)
Según Williamson, saber y creer son estados mentales, pero creer algo verdadero y creer justificadamente algo verdadero no lo son. Ese tratamiento discriminatorio es relevante para la epistemología de Williamson. Su principal tesis epistemológica negativa y su principal tesis epistemológica positiva están en peligro si su teoría metafísica sobre lo mental es incorrecta. Presento aquí un problema para dicha teoría: impone limitaciones implausibles a los posibles usos de conceptos y expresiones lingüísticas. Describiré algunas opciones que tendría Williamson para evitar el (...) problema; pero sostendré que acarrean cierta dosis de arbitrariedad. (shrink)
I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to our inferential rationality (to use his term). According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge for any theory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. (...) In that sense, insofar as Boghossian’s scenario is relevant to the debate externalism/internalism, it can be seen (against Boghossian’s original intention) as providing additional evidence for content externalism. (shrink)
E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that–according to them–reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses. Furthermore, their vignettes are inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depends on an unjustified assumption: there is not (...) expertise regarding intuitions. (shrink)
Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that any philosophically satisfying conception of modality that encompasses possible worlds semantics (PWS) commits us to the Barcan Formula. His argument depends on the assumption that the domain of what there is (the domain of the actual world) has to be identified with the domain D(@), where @ is the index or possible world that in PWS represents , or stands for , the actual world. I work out an interpretation of the relation between (...) PWS and possible worlds terminology that makes it plausible to reject that assumption. (shrink)
E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that —according to them— reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses, for reasons that —as far as I know— have not been pointed out so far. Furthermore, their vignettes are apparently inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to (...) the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depend on an unjustified assumption: there is not expertise regarding intuitions. (shrink)
Tanto la Fórmula Barcan como la postulación de possibilia contradicen los juicios intuitivos preteóricos de la mayoría de los sujetos, favorables al actualismo sobre la naturaleza de los mundos posibles. En este artículo discuto y rechazo dos argumentos que pretenderían contrarrestar tales juicios, y que conciben erróneamente la relación entre la semántica de mundos posibles y nuestros lenguajes naturales modales. El argumento más importante asume que el dominio de todas las entidades es idéntico al dominio de @. Desarrollo una interpretación (...) de la SMP conforme a la cual esa tesis no está suficientemente justificada. /// Barcan Formula and the postulation of possibilia contradict the pretheoretical intuitive judgments of most people, which favour actualism about possible worlds. In this paper I discuss and reject two arguments against such judgments, both of which conceive wrongly the relation between possible worlds semantics and modal natural languages. The more important argument assumes that the domain of the actual world is identical to the domain of @. I develop an interpretation of PWS which elucidates why that thesis is unwarranted. (shrink)
Kripke formula cuatro objeciones en contra de una solución disposicionalista simple al enigma wittgensteiniano sobre seguir una regla. En este trabajo presento dos propuestas parcialmente disposicionalistas diferentes a la teoría disposicionalista simple que Kripke discute y defiendo que aquellas cuatro objeciones no les afectan. Una de esas dos propuestas puede atribuirse, con cierta precaución, al propio Wittgenstein. La otra, que me parece preferible, invoca una noción teleológica de disposición. Ambas propuestas apelan al concepto de simplicidad, o —alternativamente— al concepto de (...) similitud natural. Rechazo también ciertas críticas que Kripke hace del uso de tales conceptos para solucionar el enigma sobre seguir una regla. (shrink)
EI debate entre la concepción descriptivista de los nombres propios y la teoría de la referencia directa concierne -principalmente- a esta cuestión: interpretándolas como elementos cruciales en su defensa del particularismo semántieo modal.Tbe debate between the description theory of proper names and direct reference is -mainly- a debale on whether or not the referential function of proper names is reducible in term of descriptive and logical functions. A central distinctive thesis in Kripke’s work is what I call modal semantic particularism: (...) the referential function is irreducible even when proper names appear in modal contexts. I present all exegesis of Kripke’s comments against a certain metaphorical understanding of possible worlds according to which these comments are crucial claims in hisdefense of modal semantic particularism. (shrink)
En este artículo abordo uno de los problemas que pone de manifiesto la presunta incompatibilidad entre el externismo y el conocimiento que posee un sujeto sobre el contenido de sus pensamientos. El problema se basa en algunas supuestas consecuencias del externismo concernientes a la existencia de sustancias u objetos externos al sujeto pensante: si el externismo es a priori, entonces un sujeto puede saber a priori que existe el agua, meramente conociendo a priori su pensamiento sobre el agua. Las dos (...) respuestas compatibilistas principales que desarrollo explotan el papel desempeñado por la experiencia en el conocimiento a priori. Una vez se tiene en cuenta la experiencia requerida para poder tener los pensamientos relevantes resulta menos sorprendente que un sujeto pueda adquirir conocimiento a priori sobre la existencia del agua, o sobre una condición similar pero más débil que efectivamente se seguiría del externismo. I approach in this article one of the problems which purportedly would show the incompatibility of externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. The problem is based on some alleged consequences of externalism regarding the existence of substances or objects external to the thinker: if externalism is a priori, then a subject can know a priori that water exists by knowing a priori his thought about water. The two main compatibilist responses I work out exploit the role played by experience in a priori knowledge. Taking into account the experience required to entertain the relevant thoughts makes less puzzling that a subject could acquire a priori knowledge about water's existence, or about a weaker related condition which is the real commitment of externalism. (shrink)
For Williamson, knowing and believing are mental states, but believing truly and justifiedly-and-truly believing are non-mental states. This discriminatory approach is relevant to his epistemology: his main negative epistemological thesis and his main positive epistemological thesis depend on his metaphysical theory about the demarcation of the mental. I present here a problem for Williamson’s theory of the mental: it imposes implausible restrictions on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. I will describe some options that Williamson would have at his (...) disposal to evade the problem; but I maintain that these options carry some degree of arbitrariness. (shrink)
In this work we provide a new topological representation for implication algebras in such a way that its one-point compactification is the topological space given in [1]. Some applications are given thereof.
Karczmarczyck evalúa y critica algunas tesis centrales defendidas en mi libro Vericuetos de la filosofía de Wittgenstein en torno al lenguaje y el seguimiento de reglas, centrado en las ideas del segundo Wittgenstein. Debato aquí sobre diversos puntos examinados por Karczmarczyck. En particular: rechazo su concepción antirrealista de la intencionalidad, según la cual factores posteriores a una acción pueden determinar que dicha acción sea o no una acción deliberada; exploro otros aspectos de la contraposición realismo/antirrealismo, vinculándolos con la lectura antirrealista (...) que Kripke, Karczmarczyck y otros autores hacen de Wittgenstein; explico por qué no es circular mi solución disposicional-teleológica al enigma sobre seguir una regla. (shrink)
En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese punto explorando (...) una analogía entre la lógica modal y la logica clásica de primer orden. Con ello se pretende proporcionar una visión clarificadora sobre el estatus de la lógica modal y su relación con la lógica en general.In this paper I discuss the alleged commitment of quantified modal logic to philosophical essentialism. Besides some other more or less related arguments against quantified modal logic, Quine (its more prominent critic) objects to it by claiming its commitment to a philosophical doctrine usually regarded as suspicious, essentialism: the view that some of the attributes of a thing are essential to it, and others are accidental. I study to what extent Quine can be right about this specific issue. I defend some of his views by exploring an analogy between modal logic and standard first order logic. That serves to get a better understanding of the status of modal logic and its relation with logic in general. (shrink)
This paper is devoted to the study of some subvarieties of the variety Q of Q-Heyting algebras, that is, Heyting algebras with a quantifier. In particular, a deeper investigation is carried out in the variety Q subscript 3 of three-valued Q-Heyting algebras to show that the structure of the lattice of subvarieties of Q is far more complicated that the lattice of subvarieties of Heyting algebras. We determine the simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras in Q subscript 3 and we construct (...) the lattice of subvarieties lambda (Q subscript 3) of the variety Q subscript 3. (shrink)
En este artículo discuto el supuesto compromiso de la lógica modal cuantificada con el esencialismo. Entre otros argumentos, Quine, el más emblemático de los críticos de la modalidad, ha objetado a la lógica modal cuantificada que ésta se compromete con una doctrina filosófica usualmente considerada sospechosa, el esencialismo: la concepción que distingue, de entre los atributos de una cosa, aquellos que le son esenciales de otros poseidos sólo contingentemente. Examino en qué medida Quine puede tener razón sobre ese punto explorando (...) una analogía entre la lógica modal y la logica clásica de primer orden. Con ello se pretende proporcionar una visión clarificadora sobre el estatus de la lógica modal y su relación con la lógica en general.In this paper I discuss the alleged commitment of quantified modal logic to philosophical essentialism. Besides some other more or less related arguments against quantified modal logic, Quine objects to it by claiming its commitment to a philosophical doctrine usually regarded as suspicious, essentialism: the view that some of the attributes of a thing are essential to it, and others are accidental. I study to what extent Quine can be right about this specific issue. I defend some of his views by exploring an analogy between modal logic and standard first order logic. That serves to get a better understanding of the status of modal logic and its relation with logic in general. (shrink)
Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and offered different accounts of why certain necessary truths seem to be contingent. One of these accounts was used by Kripke in an argument against the psychophysical identity thesis. I defend the claim that the explanatory force of Kripke's standard account of the appearance of contingency relies on the explanatory force of one of the more general accounts he also offers. But the more general account cannot be used to undermine (...) the psychophysical identity thesis. Specifically, a crucial feature in Kripke's standard account, which is needed to argue for dualism, is explanatorily superfluous. Alternative accounts that are similar to Kripke's original one but lack that trait would also explain the phenomenon. Consequently, the Kripkean dualist argument is blocked. /// Kripke ha argumentado que existen verdades necesarias a posteriori, y ha ofrecido diferentes explicaciones de por qué ciertas verdades necesarias parecen contingentes. Una de esas explicaciones se usaba en un argumento con el que Kripke criticaba la tesis de la identidad psicofísica. En este trabajo sostengo que la fuerza explicativa de la explicacion kripkeana estándar de la apariencia de contingencia depende de la fuerza explicativa de una de las otras explicaciones que Kripke también propone. Pero esa otra explicación, más general, no sirve para rechazar la identidad psicofísica. Con-cretamente, un rasgo crucial de la explicación kripkeana estandar resulta explicativamente superfluo. Explicaciones alternativas, similares a la de Kripke pero que carezcan de ese rasgo, explicarían también el fenómeno. Como consecuencia, el argumento dualista kripkeano queda bloqueado. (shrink)
Igor Douven has offered an original reconstruction and defence of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. Douven's construal has notable exegetical virtues, since it makes sense of some assumptions in Putnam's argument which his opponents have considered question-begging or puzzling. In this article I provide an indirect defence of metaphysical realism, by showing why this new version of the anti-realist argument should also be rejected. The main problems in the Douven-Putnam argument come from ascribing to the realist a distorted view (...) of correspondence truth. The view entails that when no feature selects just one of all the possible interpretations of language the existence of an interpretation suffices to make true a theory. The sensible realist is not committed to this extreme conception of correspondence truth. /// Igor Douven ha presentado y defendido una reconstructión del argumento teórico-modelista de Putnam contra el realismo metafísico. Esta versión tiene ciertas virtudes exegéticas, pues hace inteligible algunos presu- puestos putnamianos que sus críticos han considerado injustificados o sorprendentes. En este artículo proporciono una defensa indirecta del realismo metafisico, mostrando por qué debe también rechazarse el argumento antirrealista bajo esta nueva forma. Los problemas principales del argumento Douven-Putnam proceden de atribuir al realista una concepción distorsionada de la idea de verdad como correspondencia. Conforme a esa concepción, la ausencia de factores que seleccionen una única interpretación del lenguaje de entre las muchas posibles conlleva que la existencia de alguna interpretación ya es suficiente para hacer verdadera a una teoría que sea consistente. El realista sensato no está obligado a aceptar esa tesis. (shrink)
Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths, and tried to explain why some of them seem to be contingent. His main explanation motivated two philosophical proposals: the attempt - linked to some interpretations of two-dimensionalism - to analyse the epistemic concept of a priori truth using metaphysical modal concepts; the argument for psychophysical dualism worked out by Kripke relying on his explanation of the appearances of contingency. I point out several difficulties for , and argue that can (...) oe blocked because of the existence of alternative accounts of the phenomenon. (shrink)