Hintikka's second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions can be reformulated in terms of quantifier independence, but the reformulation does not extend to non-factive attitudes like belief. There, formulae with independent quantifiers serve to express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, called ‘de objecto’: in each possible world compatible with the agent's belief, there is an individual with the specified property (...) – in each world the same individual, which or who need not exist actually. The philosophical benefits of our analysis of propositional attitudes include a refined account of the behaviour of proper names as well as of indefinite and definite descriptions in attitude reports. Some remarks about perception and about the hallucination argument are also presented. (shrink)

This Festschrift is published on the occasion of Gerhard Heinzmann's 60th birthday. Its title "Construction" refers to Heinzmann's philosophical options, as well as to his exceptional involvement in the building of many scientific enterprises and new scientific institutions. Sixty authors contributed to the volume, and the gathered essays witness the various centers of interest and intellectual achievements of Heinzmann. They are organised in five sections: Henri Poincare; History and Philosophy of Mathematics; History and Philosophy of Logic; Pragmatism; and Miscellaneous.

Les pronoms personnels peuvent faire référence à la représentation physique (comme une statue ou une photographie) d’une personne plutôt qu’à cette personne elle-même. L’article présente une explication de ce liage sans identité apparente. Une objection est adressée à la théorie des proxies de Reuland et Winter, fondée sur la distinction entre attitudes de re et attitudes de se. La stratégie proposée ici consiste à introduire une nouvelle modalité pour chaque nouveau support d’une représentation physique, ce qui permet d’éviter les proxies (...) et de restaurer l’identité à la base de la résolution des anaphores. Les modalités correspondent à des fenêtres modales au travers desquelles le sujet peut appréhender des objets, existants ou non, y compris lui-même. La sémantique proposée suppose de réinterpréter certains prédicats. Elle emprunte à Wehmeier l’idée de relation inter-mondaine, qui soulève en tant que telle des questions métaphysiques. L’article aborde ces questions, pour proposer finalement d’étendre la théorie des fenêtres modales à l’ensemble des relations intentionnelles. (shrink)

A dialogical version of (modal) epistemic logic is outlined, with an intuitionistic variant. Another version of dialogical epistemic logic is then provided by means of the S4 mapping of intuitionistic logic. Both systems cast new light on the relationship between intuitionism, modal logic and dialogical games.

In this paper we propose a new semantics, based on the notion of a "contextual model", that makes it possible to express and compare — within a unique formal framework — different views on the roles of various notions of context in knowledge ascriptions. We use it to provide a logical analysis of such positions as skeptical and moderate invariantism, contextualism, and subject-sensitive invariantism. A dynamic formalism is also proposed that offers new insights into a classical skeptical puzzle.

In this paper we argue that standard, indexical contextualism about "knows" is unable to account for the factivity of this epistemic expression.

The present paper defines two versions of contextualism about "know": "normal-indexical" contextualism, and "monster-indexical" contextualism. We argue that the former yields counterintuitive results, while the latter entails the rejection of the factivity of knowledge. We conclude that neither of them can properly account for the notion of knowledge.

RÉSUMÉ : Les attitudes de se sont généralement considérées comme constituant une classe particulière d’attitudes de re. Cet article propose une analyse différente, qui s’appuie sur la notion d’attitude de objecto et qui évite un engagement ontologique envers le sujet. La proposition élabore l’idée de Hintikka d’une logique épistémique dite de seconde génération, qui introduit un marqueur syntaxique permettant d’exprimer des relations d’indépendance entre certaines constantes logiques. De cette sémantique résulte une conception du Moi, dénotation de «je», comme un objet (...) simplement intentionnel. ABSTRACT: De se attitudes are generally regarded as being a proper part of de re attitudes. In this paper an alternative analysis that avoids ontological commitment to the self is proposed, based on the notion of de objecto attitudes. This proposal develops an idea from Hintikka’s second generation epistemic logic, which introduces a syntactic marker expressing independence relations between certain logical constants. According to this semantic account, the Self, as the denotation of ‘I’, is conceived of as a mere intentional object. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Les attitudes de se sont généralement considérées comme constituant une classe particulière d’attitudes de re . Cet article propose une analyse différente, qui s’appuie sur la notion d’attitude de objecto et qui évite un engagement ontologique envers le sujet. La proposition élabore l’idée de Hintikka d’une logique épistémique dite de seconde génération, qui introduit un marqueur syntaxique permettant d’exprimer des relations d’indépendance entre certaines constantes logiques. De cette sémantique résulte une conception du Moi, dénotation de «je», comme un (...) objet simplement intentionnel. ABSTRACT: De se attitudes are generally regarded as being a proper part of de re attitudes. In this paper an alternative analysis that avoids ontological commitment to the self is proposed, based on the notion of de objecto attitudes. This proposal develops an idea from Hintikka’s second generation epistemic logic, which introduces a syntactic marker expressing independence relations between certain logical constants. According to this semantic account, the Self, as the denotation of ‘I’, is conceived of as a mere intentional object. (shrink)

This present book explores recent advances in modeling discourse processes, in particular, new approaches aimed at understanding pathological language behavior specific to schizophrenia. The contributors examine the modeling paradigm of formal semantics, which falls within the scope of both linguistics and logic while providing overlapping links with other fields such as philosophy of language and cognitive psychology. This book is based on results presented during the series of workshops on Coherence and Discourse organized by SLAM, a project developed to systemize (...) the study of pathological language processing by taking an overarching interdisciplinary approach combining psychology, linguistics, computer science and philosophy. The principle focus is on conversations produced by people with psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and autism. The contributions come from young and experienced researchers, and invited speakers. The book appeals to likeminded students and researchers. (shrink)

Les Principes des mathématiques revisités de Jaakko Hintikka sont l’une des contributions les plus importantes des vingt dernières années à la philosophie des mathématiques. Son titre, inspiré des célèbres Principes des mathématiques publiés par Russell en 1903, marque l’ambition d’un renouvellement des fondements de la logique et des mathématiques un siècle après l’âge d’or du logicisme. L’auteur dispose pour cela de moyens nouveaux, la sémantique des jeux et la logique faite pour l’indépendance, qu’il a développés depuis les années 1980. La (...) parution des Principes de Hintikka en 1996 a été accompagnée de la publication de nombreux articles techniques dans les revues spécialisées, mais le livre lui-même n’est pas un ouvrage technique : c’est un essai philosophique abordable par un public non spécialiste de philosophie des mathématiques ou de logique. (shrink)

Acknowledgements Five out of the 13 contributions to this volume originate from papers which were presented at the international workshop on “Epistemology, Context, Formalism” held at the MSH-Lorraine in Nancy, France, on November the ...

Ouvrage consacré aux différents auteurs et aspects de la philosophie polonaise du début du XXe siècle, mettant en évidence les innovations de ce courant de pensée issu du cercle de Vienne.

This book presents comparisons of recent accounts in the formalization of natural language with informal conceptions of interaction that have been developed in both psychology and epistemology. There are four parts which explore: historical and systematic studies; the formalization of context in epistemology; the formalization of reasoning in interactive contexts in psychology; the formalization of pathological conversations. Part one discusses the Erlangen School, which proposed a logical analysis of science as well as an operational reconstruction of psychological concepts. These first (...) chapters provide epistemological and psychological insights into a conceptual reassessment of rational reconstruction from a pragmatic point of view. The second focus is on formal epistemology, where there has recently been a vigorous contribution from experts in epistemic and doxatic logics and an attempt to account for a more realistic, cognitively plausible conception of knowledge. The third part of this book examines the meeting point between logic and the human and social sciences and the fourth part focuses on research at the intersection between linguistics and psychology. Internationally renowned scholars have contributed to this volume, building on the findings and themes relevant to an interdisciplinary scientific project called DiaRaFor which was hosted by the MSH Lorraine from 2007 to 2011. (shrink)

This short note provides a tentative formalization of Czeżowski's ideas about axiological concepts: Good and Evil are conceived of as modalities rather than as predicates. A natural account of the resulting “ethical logic” appears to be very close to standard deontic logic. If one does not resolve to become an antirealist regarding moral values, a possible way out is to become a revisionist about deontology: convert to intuitionism or other kind of revisionism for deontic logic, and remain classical for ethical (...) logic. (shrink)

Can epistemic logic state anything interesting about the epistemology of mathematics? That's one of Jaakko Hintikka’s claims. Hintikka was not only the founder of modal epistemic logic (1962), since he also worked on the foundations of mathematics (1996). Using what he calls "second generation" epistemic logic (2003), i.e. independence-friendly (IF) epistemic logic, Hintikka revisits the epistemology of mathematics, and in particular the debate between classical and intuitionistic mathematics (2001). The aim of the talk is to show that Hintikka is right (...) regarding IF epistemic logic, for such a logic enables us to account for interesting features of mathematical knowledge. However, the path is not as easy as that Hintikka suggests. I will show that the well-known issue of logical omniscience directly threatens the understanding of intuitionism offered by IF epistemic logic. (shrink)

The purpose of this talk is to reassert the philosophical significance that the DEL notion of an announcement may have, by (1) drawing an epistemologically motivated double distinction a. between "assertions" and "announcements" on the one hand, b. "public" and "private announcements" on the other hand, by (2) bringing it to bear on two "Moorean Puzzles" - Moore's Paradox and Moore's Proof - that we propose to revisit, thereby (3) contributing to grounding the logic of announcements in the philosophy of (...) knowledge. (shrink)

Quand nous utilisons le langage, nous nous appuyons sur le fait que les expressions linguistiques ont une signification. Comment cela fonctionne-t-il? La signification se reduit-elle a l'information? Y a-t-il un intermediaire entre le langage et le monde? Les significations sont-elles dans la tete? Ces questions sont abordees en partant des conceptions heritees de Frege et de Russell jusqu'a la semantique bidimensionnelle de Chalmers, en passant par les debats sur la reference des noms propres et des termes d'espece naturelle. Le livre (...) presente egalement la demarche de la semantique formelle, depuis les travaux precurseurs de Montague jusqu'a la semantique des situations de Barwise et Perry, tout en interrogeant sa pertinence pour une analyse philosophique de la signification. (shrink)

Kripke’s substitutional interpretation of quantifiers is usually said to be unsatisfactory for independence-friendly (IF) languages. The purpose of this paper is to question this claim. Two accounts of substitutional semantics for IF sentences will be written down, and the objection of the so-called ‘dummy variables’ will be ruled out. Moreover, it will be argued, against the traditional view, that Game-Theoretical Semantics (GTS) should be conceived of as substitutional. The paper ends with some remarks concerning the reasons why substitution is especially (...) suitable for dynamic semantics. (shrink)

The present volume explores recent advances in modeling discourse processes, particularly new approaches aimed at understanding pathological language behavior specific to schizophrenia.

L'historiographie des paradoxes ensemblistes attribue classiquement la "découverte" du paradoxe du plus grand ordinal au mathématicien italien Burali-Forti. Un examen attentif de ses démonstration et revirement révèle qu'il n'en est rien. Nous tenterons de dégager l'impact de la publication des Principles de Russell sur la constitution de cette version historiographique officielle, avant d'aborder la question de la définition des paradoxes et ce qui peut en motiver une conception restrictive.

This short paper provides a tentative formalization of Czeżowski's ideas about axiological concepts: Good and Evil are conceived of as modalities rather than as predicates. A natural account of the resulting “ethical logic” appears to be very close to standard deontic logic. If one does not resolve to become an antirealist regarding moral values, a possible way out is to become a revisionist about deontology: convert to intuitionism or some other kind of revisionism in deontic logic, and remain classical in (...) ethical logic. (shrink)