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Profile: Marc Moffett (University of Texas at El Paso)
Profile: Marc Moffett
  1. John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright (2009). The Folk on Knowing How. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.
    It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. (...)
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  2. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2011). Two Conceptions of Mind and Action: Knowledge How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence. In John Bengson & Marc Moffett (eds.), Philosophical Inquiry. Oxford University Press 3-55.
    Perhaps it is a pity that the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Conduct have fallen into separate compartments. (It certainly was not so in Socrates’ time, as his interest in the relation between eidos and technê bears witness.) If we studied them together, perhaps we might have a better understanding of both. H.H. Price, Thinking and Representation..
     
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  3. John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2011). Nonpropositional Intellectualism. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How. Oxford University Press 161-195.
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    Marc Moffett (2007). Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry. Episteme 4 (3):352-367.
    According to one widely held view, a belief is fully justified only if it holds up against the strongest available counterarguments, and we can be appropriately confident that it does hold up only if there is free and open critical discussion of those beliefs between us and our epistemic peers. In this paper I argue that this common picture of ideal rational group inquiry interacts with epistemic problems concerning reasonable disagreement in a way that makes those problems particularly difficult to (...)
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  5. Marc Moffett (2007). Know-How and Concept Possession. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
    We begin with a puzzle: why do some know-how attributions entail ability attributions while others do not? After rejecting the tempting response that know-how attributions are ambiguous, we argue that a satisfactory answer to the puzzle must acknowledge the connection between know-how and concept possession (specifically, reasonable conceptual mastery, or understanding). This connection appears at first to be grounded solely in the cognitive nature of certain activities. However, we show that, contra anti-intellectualists, the connection between know-how and concept possession can (...)
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  6. Marc Moffett (2005). Constructing Attitudes. Protosociology 21.
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  7. Marc Moffett (2010). Against A Posteriori Functionalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
    There are two constraints on any functionalist solution to the Mind-Body Problem construed as an answer to the question, “What is the relationship between the mental properties and relations (hereafter, simply the mental properties) and physical properties and relations?” The first constraint is that it must actually address the Mind-Body Problem and not simply redefine the debate in terms of other, more tractable, properties (e.g., the species-specific property of having human-pain). Such moves can be seen to be spurious by the (...)
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    Marc Moffett (2007). Reasonable Disagreement and Rational Group Inquiry. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):352-367.
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  9. Marc A. Moffett, Jennifer Cole Wright & John Bengson, The Folk on Know-How: Why Radical Intellectualism Does Not Over-Intellectualize.
    Philosophical discussion of the nature of know-how has focused on the relation between know-how and ability. Broadly speaking, neo-Ryleans attempt to identify know-how with a certain type of ability,1 while, traditionally, intellectualists attempt to reduce it to some form of propositional knowledge. For our purposes, however, this characterization of the debate is too crude. Instead, we prefer the following more explicit taxonomy. Anti-intellectualists, as we will use the term, maintain that knowing how to ? entails the ability to ?. Dispositionalists (...)
     
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  10.  21
    Marc Moffett & Greg Ray (2011). The 37th Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy. Synthese 181 (2):181 - 184.
  11. Marc Moffett, A Paradox of Ideal Rational Inquiry.
     
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  12.  40
    Marc A. Moffett (2010). Introduction: Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy. [REVIEW] Synthese 176 (2):151-152.
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  13. Marc Moffett, Epistemic Conservatism, Stability, and Self-Trust†.
    “Well, in our country,” said Alice, still panting a little, “you’d generally get to somewhere else—if you run very fast for a long time, as we’ve been doing.”.
     
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  14. Marc Moffett (2005). Language, Communication, and the Paradox of Analysis: Some Philosophical Remarks on Plato's Cratylus. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 8.
    On the face of it, Plato’s dialogue the Cratylus has a clear and narrowly linguistic subject matter, specifically, the debate between conventionalism and naturalism in the theory of meaning. But why should this topic be of sufficient interest to Plato to warrant an entire dialogue? What philosophically was at stake for him in these seemingly recherché questions about language? I argue that at least one major motivation is a defense of Platonistic epistemology and, in particular, Plato’s Theory of Recollection. Specifically, (...)
     
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