38 found
Order:
  1.  64
    Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW]Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  2. Personal Identity, Memory, and Circularity: An Alternative for Q-Memory.Marc Slors - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):186-214.
  3.  3
    Mechanistic Explanation for Enactive Sociality.Ekaterina Abramova & Marc Slors - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    In this article we analyze the methodological commitments of a radical embodied cognition approach to social interaction and social cognition, specifically with respect to the explanatory framework it adopts. According to many representatives of REC, such as enactivists and the proponents of dynamical and ecological psychology, sociality is to be explained by focusing on the social unit rather than the individuals that comprise it and establishing the regularities that hold on this level rather than modeling the sub-personal mechanisms that could (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4.  24
    Conscious Intending as Self-Programming.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):94-113.
    Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5.  33
    What is a Cognitive Ontology, Anyway?Annelli Janssen, Colin Klein & Marc Slors - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):123-128.
    This special issue brings together philosophical perspectives on the debate over cognitive ontology. We contextualize the papers in this issue by considering several different senses of the term “cognitive ontology” and linking those debates to traditional debates in philosophy of mind.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  54
    Neural Resonance: Between Implicit Simulation and Social Perception. [REVIEW]Marc Slors - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):437-458.
    Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have recently argued against a simulationist interpretation of neural resonance. Recognizing intentions and emotions in the facial expressions and gestures of others may be subserved by e.g. mirror neuron activity, but this does not mean that we first experience an intention or emotion and then project it onto the other. Mirror neurons subserve social cognition, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, by being integral parts of processes of enactive social perception. I argue that the notion of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7.  12
    From Commonsense to Science, and Back: The Use of Cognitive Concepts in Neuroscience.Jolien C. Francken & Marc Slors - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 29:248-258.
  8.  63
    Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW]Leon Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9.  58
    Intentional Systems Theory, Mental Causation and Empathic Resonance.Marc Slors - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):321-336.
    In the first section of this paper I argue that the main reason why Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory (IST) has been perceived as behaviourist or antirealist is its inability to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. The rest of the paper is devoted to the claim that by emending the theory with a phenomenon called ‘empathic resonance’ (ER), it can account for the various explananda in the mental causation debate. Thus, IST + ER is a much more (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  10.  25
    Social Cognition in Simple Action Coordination: A Case for Direct Perception.Ekaterina Abramova & Marc Slors - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:519-531.
  11.  24
    The Model-Model of the Theory-Theory.Marc Slors - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (5):521-542.
    Abstract ?Theory of Mind? (ToM) is widely held to be ubiquitous in our navigation of the social world. Recently this standard view has been contested by phenomenologists and enactivists. Proponents of the ubiquity of ToM, however, accept and effectively neutralize the intuitions behind their arguments by arguing that ToM is mostly sub-personal. This paper proposes a similar move on behalf of the phenomenologists and enactivists: it offers a novel explanation of the intuition that ToM is ubiquitous that is compatible with (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12.  56
    Two Conceptions of Psychological Continuity.Marc Slors - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):61 – 80.
    In this article, I develop and defend a conception of psychological continuity that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of overlapping chains of strongly connected mental states. By recognizing the importance of the (narrative) interrelatedness of qualitatively dissimilar mental contents, as well as the role of the body in psychological continuity, I argue, serious problems confronting the orthodox view can be solved.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  13.  3
    Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition.Michiel van Elk, Marc Slors & Harold Bekkering - 2010 - Frontiers in Psychology 1.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14.  40
    Care for One's Own Future Experiences.Marc Slors - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):183-195.
    We care for our own future experiences. Most of us, trivially, would rather have them pleasurable than painful. When we care for our own future experiences we do so in a way that is different from the way we care for those of others (which is not to say that we necessarily care more about our own experience). Prereflectively, one would think this is because these experiences will be ours and no one else's. But then, of course, we need to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  63
    Rethinking Folk-Psychology: Alternatives to Theories of Mind.Marc Slors & Cynthia Macdonald - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):153 – 161.
  16.  94
    Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance.Marc Slors - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):93-98.
  17.  53
    From Brain Imaging Religious Experience to Explaining Religion: A Critique.Marc Slors & Nina Azari - 2007 - Archive for the Psychology of Religion 29 (1):67-85.
    Recent functional neuroimaging data, acquired in studies of religious experience, have been used to explain and justify religion and its origins. In this paper, we critique the move from describing brain activity associated with self-reported religious states, to explaining why there is religion at all. Toward that end, first we review recent neuroimaging findings on religious experience, and show how those results do not necessarily support a popular notion that religion has a primitive evolutionary origin. Importantly, we call into question (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  2
    The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument.Marc Slors & Frederick C. Doepke - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):465.
  19.  48
    Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading.Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):173-184.
    In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this problem because they (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  2
    Tussen Wetenschap En Dagelijks Leven.Marc Slors - 2017 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 109 (2):205-209.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  16
    Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.
    In this paper I assess the extent to which Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Stance Theory fits into the overall proposal for a programme on naturalizing mental content outlined by Daniel Hutto and Glenda Satne in this issue. I argue that in order to fit the proposal, two changes need to be made: the reality of intentional states should not be grounded in the reality of behavioral patterns but in the ascription-independent status of Ur-intentionality that is the at the root of all (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  32
    The Closest Continuer View Revisited.Marc Slors - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):387-402.
    Many theories of personal identity allow for the metaphysical possibility of fission. In 1981 Nozick proposed a theory of personal identity called ‘the closest continuer view’ that denies fission in the case of persons but allows fisson in the case of human beings. CCV may thus appear to reduce ‘person’ to a nonmetaphysical, practical notion. Against this I argue that CCV is an externalist metaphysical theory that purports to solve a problem that is insurmountable within the confines of an internalist (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  30
    A Reply to Igor Douven.Marc Slors - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):150-152.
  24.  13
    The Narrative Practice Hypothesis and Externalist Theory Theory: For Compatibility, Against Collapse.Marc Slors - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (6-8):6-8.
    What defence does the Narrative Practice Hypothesis have against the charge that it is a covert form of externalist theory theory ? I discuss and reject Dan Hutto's own strategies and argue that the NPH remains vulnerable to a threat of collapse into externalist TT as long as narrative folk-psychological explanation is differentiated from simple belief-desire explanation merely by a degree of complexity, subtlety and/or context-sensitivity. It is entirely plausible, however, that there is a more principled distinction between these two (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  19
    The Kinds of Things.Marc Slors - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):465-468.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  11
    Personal Identity and Responsibility for Past Actions.Marc Slors - 2000 - In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 63--76.
  27. Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction.Marc Slors - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):15-36.
    In the first part of this paper I argue that epiphenomenalism does not pose a threat to nonreductive physicalism, if type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy of mental (or in general higher-level) typing of events and/or states. Furthermore, if justifiable induction over folk-psychological regularities is possible independently of the ways in which these regularities are realized, type-epiphenomenalism does not imply the redundancy ofmental typing. Inthe second part of this paper I explain how justifiable 'cross-realization induction' can be possible. This explanation (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Introduction.Marc Slors & Sven Walter - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):1-13.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  19
    Two Claims That Can Save a Nonreductive Account of Mental Causation.Marc Slors - 1998 - In J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 225--248.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  6
    The Importance and Limits of Phenomenological Mind.Marc Slors - 2008 - Abstracta 4 (3):34-44.
  31.  3
    Nijmegen University.Marc Slors - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie 65:15.
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. The Problematic Reality of Values.Jan Bransen & Marc Slors (eds.) - 1996 - Van Gorcum.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  34
    Reasons of One's Own.Maureen Sie, Marc Slors & Bert van den Brink (eds.) - 2004 - Ashgate.
    This book presents a range of investigative essays on the concept of reasons of one's own by leading authors from all relevant philosophical areas of expertise.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Belichaamde sociale cognitie: consequenties voor de status van'theory of mind'.Marc Slors - 2012 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 104 (3).
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Human Action, Deliberation and Causation.Marc Slors - 1998 - Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Het onbewuste zelf.Marc Slors - unknown - Wijsgerig Perspectief 50 (1).
    In de vroege jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw publiceerde Benjamin Libet de resultaten van experimenten waarmee hij volgens velen de illusie van een vrije wil aantoonde . Wat Libet liet zien, was dat hersenactiviteit te meten is die indicatief is voor een aankomende handeling kort voordat iemand de bewuste intentie vormt die handeling uit te voeren. Op het moment dat we bewust de ‘beslissing’ nemen een handeling uit te voeren, zijn onze hersenen al bezig geweest die handeling voor te (...)
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Het probleem van eigen redenen.Marc Slors, Maureen Sie & Bert van den Brink - 2005 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 4.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Mental Causation, Multiple Realization, and Emergence.Marc Slors & Sven Walter (eds.) - 2002 - Rodopi.
    Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Introduction. Marc SLORS: Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction. Michael PAUEN: Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization? Sven WALTER: Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist? Achim STEPHAN: Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Carl GILLETT: The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance. Wim DE MUIJNCK: Causation by Relational Properties. Albert NEWEN & Rimas ČUPLINSKAS: Mental Causation: A Real Phenomenon in a Physicalistic World without Epiphenomenalism or Overdetermination. Bernd LUDWIG: Warum kommen „mentale Ursachen“ physikalischen Erklärungen eigentlich nicht in (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark