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  1.  49
    Function and Use of Technical Artefacts: Social Conditions of Function Ascription.Marcel Scheele - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1):23-36.
    It is argued that we cannot understand the notion of proper functions of artefacts independently of social notions. Functions of artefacts are related to social facts via the use of artefacts. The arguments in this article can be used to improve existing function theories that look to the causal history of artefacts to determine the function. A view that takes the intentions of designers into account to determine the proper function is both natural and often correct, but it is shown (...)
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  2.  41
    Social Norms in Artefact Use.Marcel Scheele - 2006 - Techne 10 (1):53-65.
    The use of artefacts by human agents is subject to human standards or norms of conduct. Many of those norms are provided by the social context in which artefacts are used. Others are provided by the proper functions of the artefacts. This article argues for a general framework in which norms that are provided by proper functions are related to norms provided by the (more general) social context of use. Departing from the concept, developed by Joseph Raz, of “exclusionary reasons” (...)
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  3. Handelingstheoretische ontwikkelingen in de techniekfilosofie.Marcel Scheele & Pieter Vermaas - 2004 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 96 (3).
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  4. Never Mind the Gap: The Explanatory Gap as an Artifact of Naive Philosophical Argument.Marcel Scheele - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):333-342.
    It is argued that the explanatory gap argument, according to which it is fundamentally impossible to explain qualitative mental states in a physicalist theory of mind, is unsound. The main argument in favour of the explanatory gap is presented, which argues that an identity statement of mind and brain has no explanatory force, in contrast to "normal" scientific identity statements. Then it is shown that "normal" scientific identity statements also do not conform to the demands set by the proponent of (...)
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