The Stoics incorporeals are "somethings" which, albeit nonexistent strictly, are subsistent. For the Stoics things truly existent are bodies. So, the question is: what role do incorporeals play in Stoic ontology? The author endeavors to demonstrate that the interpretation that incorporeals are secondary realities (bodies being the primary ones) is not consistent with Stoic philosophy as a whole. At this point the argument is that bodies and incorporeals serve to complement each other in the sense that one cannot exist without (...) the other. Thus, between them there seems to be a reciprocal dependence. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the Epicurean genealogy of justice and laws presuppose an analysis of the just as a modality of the useful, an approach that denies the conventional character of justice. This genealogical pattern differentiates the origin of justice from that of the law and refers to friendship as a relevant explanatory factor of the origin of justice. We maintain that the interpretations that underline the incoherence of this reference to friendship, in the framework of a hedonistic (...) theory, presuppose a non-Epicurean sharp distinction between altruism and selfishness. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the fact that there were prominent citizens of different Greek cities who adhered to Epicureanism, felt themselves Epicurean, and were recognized as such, shows that slogans such as “live unnoticed” and “do not participate in politics” (which suggest a complete apoliticism on Epicurus’ and the Epicureans’ part) misrepresent the true meaning of the Epicurean staying away from contingent politics. Our article shows the interaction between Epicurus and the Epicureans and the Greek cities through the (...) analysis of documents (some of them, well known -such as Epicurus’ Testament, which shows the connections of the philosopher with the political life of the city-, others less known of epigraphic character) related to different ancient cities. If what we argue is sound, the usual idea that Epicureanism recommends apoliticism must be discarded. (shrink)

El artículo se centra en los probables trasfondos socráticos de la teoría de la acción aristotélica. El autor argumenta que Aristóteles incorporó a su propia teoría de la acción los siguientes ingredientes, que son de carácter “socrático”: la tesis de que un agente siempre lleva a cabo una acción en vista del bien o, más bien, de lo que considera que es bueno; la opinión de que hay un momento cognitivo que es previo a la búsqueda de lo que uno (...) considera que es bueno, y la idea de que, para neutralizar “el poder de la apariencia” al intentar distinguir apropiadamente el bien aparente del real, el agente debe fortalecer o refinar sus capacidades cognitivas tanto como sus estados de carácter. This paper focuses on the probable Socratic backgrounds to Aristotle's theory of action. The author argues that Aristotle incorporated into his own theory of action the following ingredients, which are “Socratic” in character: the thesis that an agent always performs an action for the sake of the good or rather of what he or she considers to be good; the view that there is a cognitive moment which is previous to the search for what one regards to be good, and the idea that, in order to neutralize “the power of appearance” when attempting to properly distinguish the apparent from the real good, the agent should strengthen or refine his cognitive abilities as well as his states of character. (shrink)

A recent stream of epistemology gives special relevance to ignorance within the framework of an epistemological theory. Indeed, some want to give a significant role to ignorance in epistemological theorizing. In this paper, we argue that a particular sort of ignorance, which involves recognition of the fact that one is ignorant, is central to the acquisition of knowledge given the epistemic structure of society. It is clear, we hold, that Socrates realized the relevance of what we call ‘Socratic ignorance’ in (...) the acquisition of knowledge and was aware of the division of epistemic and cognitive labor that we find in our society. We shall explain the way we understand this Socratic ignorance, as opposed to what we will call ‘stubborn ignorance’ and the role this ignorance of Socratic overtones and related character traits can play in the acquisition of knowledge from others and with others. (shrink)

Este texto presenta la traducción española anotada de Temistio, In libros Aristotelis De Anima paraphrasis 98.12-109.3 (ed. Heinze), las páginas que dedica a su interpretación del “intelecto agente” en el marco de la noética de Aristóteles. En la primera parte del artículo se ofrecen algunos datos biográficos de Temistio, se explica brevemente el método de la paráfrasis por él empleado y se considera su aporte general al complejísimo problema que presenta Aristóteles en De anima III.5 en la distinción entre el (...) intelecto que lo es por llegar a ser todas las cosas y el que lo es por llegar a producirlas a todas. Este estudio también suministra una breve discusión del significado de la distinción “intelecto agente-paciente” en Aristóteles y procura aclarar cuál es la posición adoptada por Temistio al respecto, haciendo hincapié en sus desarrollos constructivos de la noética aristotélica. (shrink)

Este ensayo se propone mostrar que, a pesar de la relevancia de la interpretación alejandrina del intelecto agente aristotélico (que Alejandro identifica con dios), tal interpretación no puede ser correcta por razones de orden sistemático que irían en contra de algunas premisas aristotélicas básicas, tanto ontológicas en general como de su noética y psicología en particular. En el desarrollo de su argumento general Boeri destaca la relevancia de algunos argumentos y explicaciones de Pseudo Filópono, quien (correctamente a su juicio) se (...) esfuerza por anclar el problema del intelecto del lado psicológico, lo cual presupone que el intelecto debe tener un “soporte” corpóreo. Una consecuencia de su examen es, según Boeri, que no sólo la interpretación de Alejandro del intelecto agente no constituye una correcta exégesis de De anima III 5, sino también que, al identificar al intelecto agente con el “intelecto que viene de afuera”, con dios y con la causa primera, Alejandro introduce una importante incoherencia dentro de su propia concepción psicológica que reconoce la tesis de Aristóteles de que los estados anímicos “se dan” a través del cuerpo. (shrink)

El propósito en este artículo es mostrar que, a pesar del juicio lapidario de algunos estudiosos de las últimas décadas respecto del interés filosófico del bizantino Miguel de Éfeso, es posible encontrar aspectos relevantes en sus lecturas e interpretaciones de Aristóteles. Argumentaré que el comentario de Miguel al _De motu animalium_ merece ser tratado seriamente. En la medida en que Miguel a veces emplea un modelo conceptual estoico para explicar Aristóteles, propone una idea nueva sobre cómo entender la teoría aristotélica (...) de la acción. Las interpretaciones del texto aristotélico por parte de Miguel no son meras repeticiones; en algunos pasajes se advierten desarrollos que van más allá de Aristóteles, aun cuando presuponen premisas aristotélicas bastante claras. (shrink)

Este artículo examina críticamente la reciente traducción e interpretación de la Ética a Nicómaco hecha por S. Rus Rufino y J.E. Meabe. El autor argumenta en contra de la interpretación general provista por los traductores y señala lo que considera que son errores fundamentales de interpretación del texto griego y del argumento general de Aristóteles que se sigue de dicha interpretación. This paper examines critically the recent translation and interpretation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics done by S. Rus Rufino and J.E. (...) Meabe. The author argues against the general view provided by the translators, pointing out what he takes to be fundamental mistakes in the interpretation both of the Greek text and of Aristotle's general argument. (shrink)

El tratado Acerca de la indestructibilidad del mundo es uno de los textos filosóficos clave de Filón de Alejandría. El modo en el que el alejandrino “hace filosofía” es idiosincrático en la medida en que una parte esencial de su método se basa en su opinión de que el Antiguo Testamento coincide con lo que argumentan los filósofos griegos. En este artículo argumento que, a pesar de eso, la relevancia de Filón como fuente para el estudio de la filosofía antigua (...) difícilmente puede ser exagerada. El alcance de este ensayo es modesto: en primer lugar, explico la estructura del tratado; luego me centro en las secciones más “filosóficas”, de manera de aclarar cómo Filón incorpora algunos aspectos del platonismo a su proyecto de interpretar el Pentateuco a la luz de la filosofía griega, y cómo, aun cuando toma distancia de y critica a los estoicos, al mismo tiempo incorpora algunos detalles terminológicos y conceptuales de la Estoa, ya que los mismos son funcionales a su propio proyecto. (shrink)

After physical reality began to be considered mathematically, and the Aristotelian conception of the world was abandoned one should accept that the world the Ancient Greeks were in the habit of considering has disappeared. One might also say that the world is not today what it used to be some decades ago. The technological revolution and its progress, the sophistication of methods of communication, the appearance of new illnesses and calamities indicate that our world is no longer the world that (...) was known by the philosophers and scientists of the first decades of the 20th century. Ancient philosophers did not have to face these kinds of problems. My claim in this paper is that Ancient philosophy can be regarded as living thought and hence not as a “piece of archaeology”. I shall examine first some possible ways of considering the study of Ancient philosophy. Secondly, I will provide some examples of philosophical problems posited by Ancient philosophers that have been considered seriously by some distinguished contemporary philosophers. Finally, I will give some concluding remarks. (shrink)

Although philosophy of mind is a hot topic in contemporary philosophy, Ancient theories of the mind are not usually taken into consideration. In this Introduction we briefly focus on some of the reasons why the Ancient conceptions of the mind tend not to be considered seriously any more. We try to account for why it is still reasonable to study some theories that apparently have been overcome by contemporary science of the mind. Although one can grant that Ancient theories of (...) the mind may not be a starting point for a contemporary philosopher of mind, we suggest that the approaches of the Ancient philosophers still provide insights to those who are interested in investigating the mind-body problem. Ancient discussions of the mind, we hold, should not be taken as archeological pieces that can be easily neglected. Even though we recognize that some ingredients of Ancient theories in fact are ‘archeological’, we hold that their philosophical analysis, inasmuch as it can contribute to clarifying problems that have not been resolved yet, can be dealt with seriously. Finally, this Introduction also describes briefly the contents of this book. (shrink)