The paper presents a formalization of Henryk Elzenberg’s system of axiology, which features the notions of value, ought, and obligation. The formalization I propose is constructed in the language of sentential modal logic. However, as Elzenberg was well aware, his system of axiology had several difficulties. To avoid them, I propose a modification of the system’s foundations and show that it preserves the formal properties of ought and obligation postulated by Elzenberg. To show this, I express in the proposed formal (...) language a certain theory of the logic of preference that I describe from the syntactical as well as the semantical point of view. (shrink)

Moral Dilemmas and Deontic Logic In the paper I discuss an argument of deontic logic concerning the problem of the existence of moral dilemmas. First, I draw attention to the philosophical context of this argument and present three proofs which reveal an inconsistency in the nature of moral dilemmas. These proofs, however, are philosophically and logically controversial. Accordingly, I provide an alternative proof, based on the LP-system of deontic logic. The system is described from syntactic and semantic point of view. (...) Assuming only the noncontroversial axiom K and a certain formulation of Elzenberg’s principle, I argue that, from the point of view of the LP-system, there is an inconsistency in the definition of moral dilemmas. (shrink)

In my work I present a version of the semantics of relative preference for the logic of ought-to-be and for the logic of ought-to-do. I draw the philosophical inspirations for this semantics from Elzenberg’s axiological papers. In the semantics of relative preference I check which deontic principles are valid—especially those which Wolniewicz extracted from Elzenberg’s papers. I also check if it is possible in this semantics to fulfil the condition of the moral dilemma.

A Deontic Logic for Normative Dilemmas: Standard deontic logic does not tolerate normative conflicts. If we assume that one ought to do A and ought to do B, but cannot do them both, we get a contradiction within deontic logic. Philosophers who deny that there could be genuine moral dilemmas treat this fact as the proof that dilemmas are logically impossible. At the same time, the advocates of the possibility of moral dilemmas propose to reject or restrict standard deontic principles. (...) What consequences does it have for the resulting logic? Some of them are too strong because they contain the theorem of normative triviality or “deontic explosion,” which says that if there is any case of normative conflict, then everything is obligatory. On the other hand, some of them are too weak, since they are not able to validate more important deontic inferences especially the Smith Argument. Lou Goble introduces three criteria of adequacy that any deontic logic should meet if it is to accommodate normative conflicts successfully. First, I present these conditions and then I introduce a new logic of ought that fully meets all of them. (shrink)