In this review I briefly explain the most important points of each chapter of Dummett's book, and critically discuss some of them. Special attention is given to the criticisms of Crispin Wright's interpretation of Frege's Platonism, and also to Dummett's interpretation of the role(s) of the context principle in Frege's thought.
In this paper, I seek to clarify an aspect of Frege's thought that has been only insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical objects. I adduce some elements of Frege's philosophy that elucidate why he saw extensions as natural candidates for paradigmatic cases of logical objects. Moreover, I argue (against the suggestion of some contemporary scholars, in particular, Wright and Boolos) that Frege could not have taken Hume's Principle instead of Axiom V as a fundamental law of (...) arithmetic. This would be inconsistent with his views on logical objects. Finally, I shall argue that there is a connection between Frege's view on this topic and the famous thesis first formulated in ‘Über Begriff und Gegenstand’ that ‘the concept horse is not a concept’. As far as I know, no due attention has been given to this connection in the scholarly literature so far. (shrink)
NCG 4.0 is the latest update of the Network of Cancer Genes, a web-based repository of systems-level properties of cancer genes. In its current version, the database collects information on 537 known (i.e. experimentally supported) and 1463 candidate (i.e. inferred using statistical methods) cancer genes. Candidate cancer genes derive from the manual revision of 67 original publications describing the mutational screening of 3460 human exomes and genomes in 23 different cancer types. For all 2000 cancer genes, duplicability, evolutionary origin, expression, (...) functional annotation, interaction network with other human proteins and with microRNAs are reported. In addition to providing a substantial update of cancer-related information, NCG 4.0 also introduces two new features. The first is the annotation of possible false-positive cancer drivers, defined as candidate cancer genes inferred from large-scale screenings whose association with cancer is likely to be spurious. The second is the description of the systems-level properties of 64 human microRNAs that are causally involved in cancer progression (oncomiRs). Owing to the manual revision of all information, NCG 4.0 constitutes a complete and reliable resource on human coding and non-coding genes whose deregulation drives cancer onset and/or progression. NCG 4.0 can also be downloaded as a free application for Android smart phones. (shrink)
In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s theory of indexicals. In particular, I discuss Evans’ distinction between superficially and deeply contingent truths. I shall raise doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness of the distinction.
In this paper I argue indirectly for Frege's semantics, in particular for his conception of propositions, by reviewing some difficulties faced by one of the main contemporary alternative approaches, i.e., the direct reference theory. While Frege's semantics can yield an explanation of cognitive value and belief-preservation, the alternative approach seems to run into trouble here. I shall also briefly consider the question of whether epistemic issues should be of any concern for semantics, i.e., whether the feature mentioned above should really (...) be regarded as an advantage of Frege's theory. (shrink)
In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.
The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis (i.e., the assumption that judgeable contents are prior to concepts) does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.
n this paper I discuss Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra�s notes on the proper language for publishing texts in analytic philosophy. I am basically in agreement with him on the practical side, i.e., publishing in English increases the chances of philosophical exchange with other communities. I disagree, however, if one wants to read a stronger �should� in his advice, for there is nothing in the essence of analytic philosophy that ties it to the English language. Finally, I end with a caveat that his (...) advice should not be misunderstood and degenerate into an exhortation of what I call �linguistic laziness�. (shrink)
Matthias Schirn has argued on a number of occasions against the interpretation of Frege's ``objects of a quite special kind'' (i.e., the objects referred to by names like `the concept F') as extensions of concepts. According to Schirn, not only are these objects not extensions, but also the idea that `the concept F' refers to objects leads to some conclusions that are counter-intuitive and incompatible with Frege's thought. In this paper, I challenge Schirn's conclusion: I want to try and argue (...) that the assumption that `the concept F' refers to the extension of F is entirely consistent with Frege's broader views on logic and language. I shall examine each of Schirn's main arguments and show that they do not support his claim. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to discuss Frege’s view on vagueness, and to draw some relevant consequences of it. By examining what exactly Frege has in mind each time he complains about vagueness and advocates the sharpness requirement, I argue that he shows preoccupation with different kinds of vagueness in different periods of his thought. I also discuss the scope of the sharpness requirement, and argue that it is intended as applying primarily to mathematics and logic. Finally, I try (...) and argue that some of Frege’s remarks on incomplete functions suggest a view that is close in spirit to the contemporary supervaluationist approach to vagueness. (shrink)
There are some salient explanatory models for the semantic phenomenon known as quantifier domain restriction. Each of these models sees the context of utterance as playing a different role. A particularly clear and helpful way of organizing the issue is offered by Stanley and Szabó , who distinguish three kinds of approaches, and argue for one of them in particular . In this paper, I argue that neither Stanley and Szabó’s arguments against the rival approaches nor their arguments for the (...) semantic approach are conclusive.Há alguns modelos explanatórios proeminentes sobre o fenômeno semântico conhecido como restrição de domínios quantificacionais. Cada um destes modelos considera o contexto de proferimento como desempenhando um papel diferente. Uma forma particularmente clara e útil de organizar a discussão é proposta por Stanley e Szabó , que distinguem três tipos de tratamentos, e argumentam em favor de um deles . Neste artigo, eu procuro mostrar que nem os argumentos de Stanley e Szabó contra os tratamentos rivais nem o seu argumento em favor do tratamento semântico são conclusivos. (shrink)
In this paper I discuss Chateaubriand’s notion of senses. His notions retains the spirit of the original Fregean notion, but differ from it in some fundamental ways. I compare both notions, especially concerning the issue of indirect reference, and also concerning their explanatory power in epistemic matters. Finally, I raise some worries concerning the semantic role played by Chateaubriand’s senses, as well as the notion of judgment that his notion of thoughts seems to imply.Neste artigo, discuto a noção de sentido (...) de Chateaubriand. Sua noção retém o espírito da noção Fregeana original, mas difere da mesma em alguns aspectos fundamentais. Eu comparo ambas as noções, especialmente no que diz respeito à questão da referência indireta, e também no que concerne ao seu poder explicativo em questões epistêmicas. Por fim, levanto algumas preocupações sobre o papel semântico desempenhado pelos sentidos de Chateaubriand, bem como a forma dos juízos que a sua noção de pensamento implica. (shrink)
The purpose of this paper is to discuss Chateaubriand’s criticism of the so-called slingshot arguments, particularly of those versions proposed by Church and by Gödel . I concentrate on two critical points made by Chateaubriand, and argue that they are not decisive against these versions of the slingshot. I also discuss Chateaubriand’s hybrid theory of definite descriptions and argue that, despite its intrinsic interest, it cannot avoid the conclusion of the slingshot.
The paper presents a historical account of the primacy of concepts in Frege's conception of logic. Moreover, it argues that Frege's priority-thesis does not imply that sentential logic is more basic than the logic of concepts in his thought.
MarcoRuffino compares the notion of sense developed in my book with Frege’s notion of sense, and argues that whereas there are ontological similarities, my notion faces epistemological and semantic problems. In my response I discuss the various issues he raises, arguing that my notion of sense can confront them at least as well as Frege’s notion.MarcoRuffino compara a noção de sentido desenvolvida em meu livro com a noção de sentido de Frege, argumentando que mesmo (...) havendo semelhanças ontológicas, minha noção está sujeita a problemas epistemológicos e semânticos. Em minha réplica considero os problemas levantados por Marco, argumentando que minha noção de sentido pode confrontá-los pelo menos tão adequadamente quanto a noção de Frege. (shrink)
Em 2011, celebra-se o centenário de morte de Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). Para esta data, no Brasil e no exterior, editoras e universidades vêm se mobilizando, desde o ano passado, para organizar novas edições e eventos acadêmicos sobre o filósofo alemão. Associados à Fundação Fritz Thyssen em Colônia, Alemanha, tradutores de diversos idiomas vêm vertendo a obra para o inglês, o russo e o japonês. Também traduções para o português estão sendo preparadas no Brasil.
O texto é uma resenha de uma obra do filósofo e psicólogo alemão Wilhelm Dilthey. A resenha aborda uma publicação para o português da obra Introdução às ciências humanas (1883), na data em que se celebra o centenário de morte de Dilthey. A iniciativa dessa análise se justifica por ressaltar esta edição que: apresenta ao público brasileiro este autor relativamente pouco conhecido em nosso país; introduz os termos de sua filosofia. Dilthey é pensador crucial para o século XX por ter (...) contestado a influência que doutrina positivista possuiria sobre as ciências humanas (especialmente as sociais, as históricas e as do psiquismo) com seu método hermenêutico. A influência deste pensador se fez sensivelmente presente na obra de autores como Weber, Spengler, Ortega y Gasset e Gadamer. (shrink)
In §§1-2 I argue that Marco misidentifies my main objections to the Church and Gödel slingshot arguments and that his defense of these arguments does not overcome those objections. In §3 I discuss his criticisms of my theory of descriptions in relation to Church’s argument.