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Profile: Marek Picha (Masaryk University)
  1.  63
    A Minimalist Framework for Thought Experiment Analysis.Marek Picha - 2016 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 23 (4):503-524.
    Thought experiments are frequently vague and obscure hypothetical scenarios that are difficult to assess. The paper proposes a simple model of thought experiments. In the first part, I introduce two contemporary frameworks for thought experiment analysis: an experimentalist approach that relies on similarities between real and thought experiment, and a reasonist approach focusing on the answers provided by thought experimenting. Further, I articulate a minimalist approach in which thought experiment is considered strictly as doxastic mechanism based on imagination. I introduce (...)
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  2. How to Reconstruct a Thought Experiment.Marek Picha - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (2):154-188.
    The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemological status of thought experiments. I deal with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, I criticize an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, I introduce the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, I present objections to the (...)
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  3.  39
    Apriorism, Psychologism, and Conceptualism About Thought Experiments.Marek Picha - 2014 - Dokos 2014 (1):27-47.
    Epistemological optimists about thought experiments hold that imagination could be under certain conditions source of epistemic justification. Their claim is usually based on one of three dominant conceptions about epistemic value of thought experiments. Apriorism states that imagination may serve as unique a priori source of new synthetic knowledge about the actual world. I argue against this view and show that apriorism is either too weak, or too strong or too vague. Psychologism is viable, yet not fully clear conception about (...)
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  4. Funkcionalismus, Zombie a Absence Mentalistického Slovníku.Marek Picha - 2001 - Filosoficky Casopis 49:857-864.
    [Functionalism, Zombies and the Absence of a Mental Dictionary].
     
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  5. Ó hovado: osobní argumentace v Descartových Meditacích.Marek Picha - 2010 - Studia Philosophica 57 (2):71-81.
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  6. Kdyby chyby: episte­mologie myšlenkových experimen­tů. [REVIEW]Marek Picha - 2012 - Studia Philosophica 59 (1):133-135.
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  7. Představivost, poznávací cíl a Platónova Jeskyně.Marek Picha & Dagmar Pichová - 2014 - Studia Philosophica 61 (2):69-75.
    In the review of 100 myšlenkových experimentů ve filozofii Jakub Mácha raises several questions concerning our approach to thought experiment analysis. We address all of his remarks; particularly, we answer three questions: Which type of imagination do we use in our definition of thought experiments? How is the cognitive aim of thought experiments related to their cognitive value? Is the analysis of Plato’s Cave proposed in our book appropriate?
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  8. Squeezing Searle.Marek Picha - 2004 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:721-734.
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