Este artigo tem por objetivo ilustrar a relação de Marx com a filosofia hegeliana a partir do conceito de alienação. A autora procura demonstrar que o lugar metodológico deste conceito na argumentação filosófica de Hegel e Marx representa a diferença entre as concepções idealista e materialista respectivas. Porém, sublinha igualmente a semelhança entre ambos pensadores que têm no conceito de alienação os limites da tematização filosófica do mundo concreto.

In 2003, the Food and Drug Administration approved the use of growth hormone treatment for idiopathic short stature children, i.e. children shorter than average due to an unknown medical cause. Given the absence of any pathological conditions, this decision has been contested as a case of medicalisation. The aim of this paper is to broaden the debate over the reasons for and against the treatment, to include considerations of the sociocultural phenomenon of the medicalisation of short stature, by means of (...) a critical understanding of the concept of medicalisation. After defining my understanding of medicalisation and describing both the treatment and the condition of idiopathic short stature, I will problematise two fundamental issues: the medical/non-medical distinction and the debate about the goals of medicine. I will analyse them, combining perspectives of bioethics, medical sociology, philosophy of medicine and medical literature, and I will suggest that there are different levels of normativity of medicalisation. Ultimately, this study shows that: the definition of idiopathic short stature, focusing only on actual height measurement, does not provide enough information to assess the need for treatment or not; the analysis of the goals of medicine should be broadened to include justifications for the treatment; the use of growth hormone for idiopathic short stature involves strong interests from different stakeholders. While the treatment might be beneficial for some children, it is necessary to be vigilant about possible misconduct at different levels of medicalisation. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to initiate a philosophical discussion about the ethical component of professional competence in nursing from the perspective of Brazilian nurses. Specifically, this article discusses professional competence in nursing practice in the Brazilian health context, based on two different conceptual frameworks. The first framework is derived from the idealistic and traditional approach while the second views professional competence through the lens of historical and dialectical materialism theory. The philosophical analyses show that the idealistic view of (...) professional competence differs greatly from practice. Combining nursing professional competence with philosophical perspectives becomes a challenge when ideals are opposed by the reality and implications of everyday nursing practice. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to initiate a philosophical discussion about the ethical component of professional competence in nursing from the perspective of Brazilian nurses. Specifically, this article discusses professional competence in nursing practice in the Brazilian health context, based on two different conceptual frameworks. The first framework is derived from the idealistic and traditional approach while the second views professional competence through the lens of historical and dialectical materialism theory. The philosophical analyses show that the idealistic view of (...) professional competence differs greatly from practice. Combining nursing professional competence with philosophical perspectives becomes a challenge when ideals are opposed by the reality and implications of everyday nursing practice. (shrink)

The general definition of mental disorder stated in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders seems to identify a mental disorder with a harmful dysfunction. However, the presence of distress or disability, which may be bracketed as the presence of harm, is taken to be merely usual, and thus not a necessary requirement: a mental disorder can be diagnosed as such even if there is no harm at all. In this paper, we focus on the (...) harm requirement. First, we clarify what it means to say that the harm requirement is not necessary for defining the general concept of mental disorder. In this respect, we briefly examine the two components of harm, distress and disability, and then trace a distinction between mental disorder tokens and mental disorder types. Second, we argue that the decision not to regard the harm requirement as a necessary criterion for mental disorder is tenable for a number of practical and theoretical reasons, some pertaining to conceptual issues surrounding the two components of harm and others pertaining to the problem of false negatives and the status of psychiatry vis-à-vis somatic medicine. However, we believe that the harm requirement can be maintained among the specific diagnostic criteria of certain individual mental disorders. More precisely, we argue that insofar as the harm requirement is needed among the specific diagnostic criteria of certain individual mental disorders, it should be unpacked and clarified. (shrink)

Riassunto: In questo contributo analizzeremo il criterio del danno, presente nella definizione generale di disturbo mentale del DSM. La questione ha rilevanza sia da un punto di vista filosofico, perché il danno è una componente normativa e valoriale, non oggettiva, sia da un punto di vista clinico, perché chi ha difeso il criterio del danno ha spesso sostenuto che in sua assenza avremmo troppi falsi positivi. Infine, ha importanza dal punto di vista socio-sanitario in relazione al rapporto tra la psichiatria (...) e la medicina non psichiatrica, nello specifico tra il DSM e l’ICD. Sosterremo che ci sono buone ragioni per non mantenere il danno come criterio necessario nella definizione generale del disturbo mentale. Dopo una breve introduzione, forniremo una panoramica storica sul ruolo del criterio del danno nelle varie edizioni del DSM. Successivamente si illustrerà la principale obiezione contro l’inclusione del criterio del danno nella definizione generale di disturbo mentale, ossia il problema dei falsi negativi, per poi presentare e discutere ulteriori ragioni – medico-pratiche e concettuali – che depongono a sfavore dell’attribuzione di un forte peso al criterio del danno. In sede conclusiva ribadiamo come la decisione presa dalla task force del DSM-5 di escludere il criterio del danno dalla definizione generale di disturbo mentale debba essere sostenuta. Parole chiave: Danno; Disabilità; Disagio; Disturbo mentale; DSM “Harm” as Criterion for the Definition of Mental Disease in DSM. Some Epistemological Reflections: In this paper, we analyse the harm requirement in the general definition of mental disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders. This issue has both philosophical and clinical relevance: on the one hand the harm requirement is a normative, value-laden, non-objective component in the definition of mental disorder; on the other hand, the harm requirement has often been defended on the grounds that it prevents an increase in false positives. The issue is also important in assessing the relationship between psychiatry and somatic medicine, more precisely, between the DSM and the International Classification of Diseases. We argue that there are good reasons not to maintain the harm requirement in the general definition of mental disorder. After a brief introduction, we overview the history of the harm requirement across the various editions of the DSM. Then, we examine the main objection to the inclusion of the harm requirement in the general definition of mental disorder, that is, the problem of false negatives, and also present several other points – both practical and conceptual – that help demonstrate why the harm requirement is inadequate as a definiens of mental disorder. To conclude, we stress that the decision of the DSM-5 task force not to regard the harm requirement as a necessary component of mental disorder should be endorsed. Keywords: Harm; Disability, Distress; Mental Disorder; DSM. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the nature of researchmethods in the history of economic thought. In reviewing the“techniques” which are involved in the discipline, four broadercategories are identified: a) textual exegesis; b) “rationalreconstructions”; c) “contextual analysis”; and d) “historical narrative”.After examining these different styles of doing history of economicthought, the paper addresses the question of its appraisal, namely whatis good history of economic thought. Moreover, it is argued that there isa distinction to be made between doing economics (...) and doing history ofeconomic thought. The latter requires the greatest possible respect forcontexts and texts, both published and unpublished; the former entailsconstructing a theoretical framework that is in some respects freer, notbound by derivation, from the authors. Finally, the paper draws uponEconlit records to assess what has been done in the subject in the lasttwo decades in order to frame some considerations on how the pastmay impinge on the future. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é entender a medida ou a importância da ética na concepção teórica de Jeremy Bentham. Para que fosse identificado o espaço desse tema nos escritos do autor, foi necessário estabelecer os limites entre a ética e a legislação, uma vez que, para alguns casos, quando a tendência geral do ato é má, torna-se desvantajosa a aplicação de penas formais restando espaço para as regras da ética, por meio da sanção moral. Em outras palavras, será possível compreender (...) que estudar o espaço da ética no sistema teórico de Bentham requer que sejam estabelecidos os limites entre a ética e a legislação. É tese deste trabalho que o próprio princípio de utilidade coloca a fronteira entre ambos os campos, pois, em última instância, é sempre efetuado um balanço entre prazer e dor ou custo e benefício para decidir sobre a necessidade de se formular regras para punir os agentes. Ou seja, a aplicação de punição a determinadas transgressões tende a gerar custos sociais mais elevados do que o benefício auferido, fazendo com que para alguns tipos de ofensas a legislação não deva ser aplicada, mas apenas as regras da ética. (shrink)

En este trabajo analizo la concepción de Eugenio Bulygin respecto de aquellos enunciados jurídicos que afirman que una cierta acción es jurídicamente obligatoria, prohibida o permitida. Conforme a Bulygin, estos enunciados son ambiguos. Ellos pueden ser enunciados empíricos externos que afirman la existencia o validez de una norma, o pueden ser enunciados normativos internos que expresan una norma, o una actitud moral absoluta. En el trabajo sostengo que, para una concepción positivista, si el derecho es concebido como un conjunto de (...) normas, los enunciados bajo análisis no enuncian un hecho empírico, pero tampoco expresan una actitud moral absoluta. Ellos ciertamente enuncian un hecho normativo: la validez o existencia jurídica de una entidad normativa, que es relativa a un determinado tiempo y lugar. En mi opinión, la dificultad de Bulygin para admitir este tipo de enunciados se debe fundamentalmente a la presuposición de una falsa dicotomía entre dos modos en los que una entidad puede existir: uno empírico y otro normativo. Con el fin de criticar esta aparente dicotomía presento brevemente una concepción constructivista de la existencia de normas. Si mi razonamiento es correcto, esta concepción es adecuada para explicar, desde una perspectiva teórica positivista, aquellos enunciados que expresan el hecho normativo de la existencia o validez jurídica de una norma. In this paper I analyze Bulygin's conception of those legal statements asserting that a certain action is legally obligatory, prohibited or permitted. According to Bulygin, these statements are ambiguous. They can be external, empirical statements expressing the existence or validity of a legal norm, but they can also be internal, normative statements expressing a norm or an absolute, moral attitude. In the paper I attempt to defend that for a positivist theory, if law is conceived as a set of norms, this kind of statements do not report an empirical fact, but do not express an absolute moral attitude either. They surely assert a normative fact: the legal existence or validity of a normative entity, which is relative to a certain time and place. In my view, Bulygin's failure to see this point is fundamentally due to the assumption of a false dichotomy between two ways in which an entity can exist: one empirical, the other normative. In order to criticize this apparent dichotomy, I briefly sketch a constructivist conception in which we can say that legal norms exist. If my reasoning is correct, this conception is apt to explain those statements expressing the normative fact that a norm exists or is legally valid. (shrink)

The present article traces the changes that took place within the Genevan church between the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. These changes resulted from a number of different factors, but especially from the evolution in theological and other, broader intellectual parameters. The analysis focuses on the spirited debates that surrounded the Consensus Helveticus, a formula which was adopted in Geneva in 1679 and to which all pastors were required to subscribe. When the Genevan church decided in 1706 no longer (...) to require subscription, it did so – among others – for the freedom of conscience on articles not necessary to salvation, and thus embarked on a long road of theological reflection which led it eventually to abandon, within the space of only several decades, the orthodox theology that had dominated the seventeenth century. As result of this evolution, the eighteenth century saw a slow but definite change in the image the church of Geneva held for the rest of European Calvinism. (shrink)

Genetic counselling is an important aspect of prenatal care in many developed countries. This tendency has also begun to emerge in Br.

In the ongoing pandemic, death statistics influence people’s feelings and government policy. But when does COVID-19 qualify as the cause of death? As philosophers of medicine interested in conceptual clarification, we address the question by analyzing the World Health Organization’s rules for the certification of death. We show that for COVID-19, WHO rules take into account both facts and values.

Philosophers of medicine have formulated different accounts of the concept of disease. Which concept of disease one assumes has implications for what conditions count as diseases and, by extension, who may be regarded as having a disease and for who may be accorded the social privileges and personal responsibilities associated with being sick. In this article, we consider an ideal diagnostic test for coronavirus disease 2019 infection with respect to four groups of people—positive and asymptomatic; positive and symptomatic; negative; and (...) untested—and show how different concepts of disease impact on the disease and sickness judgements for these groups. The suggestion is that sickness judgements and social measures akin to those experienced during the current COVID-19 outbreak presuppose a concept of disease containing social harm as a component. We indicate the problems that arise when adopting this kind of disease concept beyond a state of emergency. (shrink)

Exemplos, relatos e anedotas históricas são recorrentes nos Ensaios e revelam a maneira original de Montaigne se apropriar da história: como estudo do passado e das ocorrências particulares; como alimento moral; como referência fictícia ou real; através da relação da história com a retórica e a prova argumentativa; como história contemporânea e a crítica da mentalidade cultural; como história de vida. Em todas essas articulações da narrativa histórica, que podemos sintetizar ao modo de uma conversação com os homens do passado (...) e do presente, encontramos o alvo de Montaigne: ir das ações às intenções, do outro para o conhecimento de si, do diverso para o discernimento. A história, sobretudo aquela à maneira plutarquiana, constitui matéria prima indispensável para o exercício do julgamento de Montaigne. Examples, reports and historical anecdotes are not hard to find in Les Essais and reveal Montaigne's original way of approaching history: as a study of the past and particular events; as moral nourishment; as fictitious or real reference; by relating history to rhetoric and argumentative proof; as contemporary history and criticism of cultural mentality; as life story. In all these articulations of historical narrative, which we can synthesize as a conversation with men of the past and present time, we find Montaigne's target: to go from actions to intentions, from the other to the knowledge of oneself, from diversity to discernment. History, mainly the one that follows Plutarch's style, composes the raw material indispensable to Montaigne's exercise of judgment. (shrink)

Este texto es un estudio profundo sobre lo poético en la obra de Jorge Luis Borges, rastreado no solo en sus poemas sino en su narrativa: ensayo y cuento. Lo que permite sostener que la cualidad principal de su escritura se encarna en la figura del poeta. El eje central del estudio se refiere a la particularidad de su adjetivación en la cual puede reconocerse el vínculo entre literatura y filosofía puesto que en la escritura de Borges el adjetivo no (...) es un mero adorno sino una manera de vincular pensamiento y poesía y hacer posible que en la lectura de sus textos el lector experimente el efecto que las ideas tienen sobre la vida. (shrink)

[No hay resumen disponible, se incluyen los primerso párrafos del texto] Hace ya mucho tiempo algunos amigos de alrededor de treinta años comenzamos a estudiar filosofía bajo la dirección de Gregorio Klimovsky. Muy pronto uno de nosotros se destacó por su capacidad creadora y su curiosidad filosófica: era Juan Larreta. Es así que, a pesar de haber iniciado tarde su formación, descolló como filósofo de mérito tanto en la Argentina como en el exterior. Presidente de la Sociedad Argentina de Análisis (...) Filosófico (SADAF) durante dos períodos, obtuvo el Diploma al M érito en Filosofía de la Fundación Konex en el 2006 y fue nombrado miembro honorario de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica (SEFA) en 2010. Organizó seminarios y dictó conferencias en centros de estudios filosóficos y en universidades argentinas y extranjeras, en cuyas publicaciones escribió numerosos artículos de singular valía, todos ellos caracterizados por su originalidad, su irreverente desafío al sentido común y sus ingeniosos experimentos mentales (thought experiments). Esta despedida dolorosa se empeña en acercar a la memoria recuerdos queridos de circunstancias compartidas con este amigo excepcional. fue nuestro centro: en su casa organizó, durante muchos años, seminarios de filosofía, de economía y, junto con María Elisa, esas reuniones cinéfilas de divertidas, sorprendentes y variadas interpretaciones... (shrink)

(2009). Transitions to democracy: the role of moral and citizenship education in Latin America. Journal of Moral Education: Vol. 38, Moral and Citizenship Education in Latin America: Towards Reconciliation, Community Development and Democracy, pp. 391-406.

In Davidson’s opinion, the model of triangulation, which is a situation where two or more sufficiently similar interacting creatures respond to one another within a shared external environment, can give explanation to how concepts and mental contents are acquired and also clarify their very nature. In this paper, I will explore the model of triangulation, its various levels, and its specific role in concept acquisition. I will then assess the plausibility of Davidson’s account and suggest a few possible amendments to (...) the model of triangulation, in order to make it effective in explaining the process of concept acquisition. Finally, I will argue that the model of triangulation cannot be disconnected from holism and will briefly sketch some consequences of this claim. (shrink)

According to the minimal version of the traditional analysis of knowledge, there are (at least) three necessary components to knowledge, that is, truth, belief and justification. In this paper we will argue that even in a global sceptical scenario, all three conditions minimally necessary for knowledge can be satisfied. In particular, we will focus on the justification requirement and analyse two “traditional” theories of justification, i.e., coherentism and foundationalism, as well as a more “innovative” one, i.e., reliabilism. Then, we will (...) conclude that if we want to continue to claim that, in a global sceptical scenario, a cognitive subject does not know (almost) anything, we should recognise that she may still have justified true beliefs, and we should, therefore, look elsewhere for the reasons why she lacks knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the connection between some of Stanley’s claims about propaganda and flawed ideologies, and the idea of the social situatedness or perspective-relativity of knowledge. More precisely, I will try to show how Stanley’s reflections on the nature of propaganda and its relationship with flawed ideologies push us towards the empiricists’ characterisation of the social situatedness of knowledge. Not only do these reflections reveal some important weaknesses of standpoint theories, but they also support the request for (...) the pluralism, rational critique, cooperation, fair discussion and epistemic integration fostered by social empiricism. This means that the broad idea of the social situatedness of knowledge should be defended and further developed along the lines sketched by social empiricism. (shrink)

As it emerged from philosophical analyses and cognitive research, most concepts exhibit typicality effects, and resist to the efforts of defining them in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. This holds also in the case of many medical concepts. This is a problem for the design of computer science ontologies, since knowledge representation formalisms commonly adopted in this field do not allow for the representation of concepts in terms of typical traits. However, the need of representing concepts in terms of (...) typical traits concerns almost every domain of real world knowledge, including medical domains. In particular, in this article we take into account the domain of mental disorders, starting from the DSM-5 descriptions of some specific mental disorders. On this respect, we favor a hybrid approach to the representation of psychiatric concepts, in which ontology oriented formalisms are combined to a geometric representation of knowledge based on conceptual spaces. (shrink)

I testi biblici si guardano, rinviano l'uno all'altro, si citano si rispecchiano l'uno nell'altro, e il frutto di tale rispecchiamento precipita a formare nuovi strati testuali.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo formular comparação entre as concepções de ética e direito dos autores Bentham e Kant. A posição assumida neste artigo ressalta que tanto para Kant quanto para Bentham o direito se baseia nos mesmos princípios que fundamentam a ética. No caso de Kant, é o imperativo categórico que fundamenta a ética e o direito e, no caso de Bentham, é o princípio de utilidade. Embora ambos os autores possuam apenas um princípio para fundamentar a ética e (...) o direito, há inúmeras diferenças entre ambos os campos do pensamento, bem como entre as teorias, que se pretende apresentar neste artigo. Entre elas estão a origem epistemológica dos princípios e o que cada um deles prescreve. The aim of this work is to formulate a comparison between Bentham’s and Kant’s conceptions of ethics and law. The position taken in this paper is that, for Bentham and Kant, law is grounded in the same principles which are the basis of ethics. For Kant it is the categorical imperative which is the basis of ethics, while the principle of utility is the basis of Bentham’s theory of law and ethics. Although both authors have established only one principle on which to ground ethics and law, there are several differences between the two fields and between the theories of the two philosophers. Among these differences, we mention the epistemological origin of principles and their prescriptions. (shrink)