ABSTRACT The paper challenges the general perception that the positive–negative freedom discourse privileges negative liberty. It demonstrates that Constant and Berlin’s dual freedom conceptual scheme contains the blueprint of a modern concept of positive freedom and it reveals the nature of negative freedom in an entirely new light. Constant’s ancient and modern liberties have many similarities with Berlin’s two concepts of freedom – positive and negative. The paper shows that these similarities warrant a parallel study and allow us to examine (...) the relation between the two sides of the freedom dichotomy by using the compound terms modern/negative and ancient/positive freedom. It is argued that understanding the relation between the two freedoms depends on accepting ancient/positive liberty as practiced by the participants of modern revolutions. Then we can see why this freedom can both violate and complement modern/negative freedom. The paper argues that the combined tension and mutual dependency of the two freedoms can be explained by tapping into a metaphysical study of human agency, where metaphysics is understood as conceptualisation of moral experience. This helps demonstrate why Constant’s modern liberty and Berlin’s negative liberty rely on satisfaction as a key category reflecting individuals’ capacity for subjective judgement. (shrink)
This book offers a new phenomenological interpretation of T.H. Green's (1836-1882) philosophy and political theory. By analyzing his theory of human practice, the moral idea, the common good, freedom and human rights, the book demonstrates that Green joins the same tradition as Kantian and Husserlian transcendentalism. The book offers a reconstruction of Green's idealism and demonstrates its potential to address contemporary debates on the nature of moral agency, positive and negative freedom and on justifying human rights.
Recent years have seen a growth of interest in the great English idealist thinker T. H. Green (1836-82) as philosophers have begun to overturn received opinions of his thought and to rediscover his original and important contributions to ethics, metaphysics, and political philosophy. This collection of essays by leading experts, all but one published here for the first time, introduces and critically examines his ideas both in their context and in their relevance to contemporary debates.
This article offers a new scheme of the relation between positive and negative freedom that is based on a retrieval of T. H. Green's theory of freedom and on further reconstructions of his theory. Some of the distinctions in the literature have proven difficult to sustain, and this has resulted in a weakening of the dichotomy in principle, and of the concepts of positive and negative freedom independently of each other. The main distinction between negative and positive freedom offered here (...) is based on the relation of freedom to the will. We have two kinds of freedom, in both our private and social spheres, because there are two types of goods that we, as human beings, pursue: ordinary and moral. This distinction proves to be sustainable, manages to explain the antagonistic nature of the two concepts, and provides grounds for the support of the two kinds of freedom in their own right. (shrink)
Multiculturalism is higher on the daily political agenda than it has ever been. Leading politicians and public commentators speak with an unparalleled bluntness about the perceived limitations of multiculturalism while representatives of cultural, minorities express concern about marginalisation. This debate is taking place against a background of fear about terrorism, the integrity of national identities and a loosely construed ‘clash of civilizations’. Secularism is pitted against religious fundamentalism, respect for difference against the right of freedom of speech, integration against self-determination, (...) and duties of citizenship against minority rights. This book confronts the reality of moral conflict in the debate on multiculturalism while resisting the simplification which too frequently accompanies daily commentary on both sides of an increasingly polarised debate. The volume as a whole marks an important step in the attempt to examine the underlying concepts, of the nature and legitimate extent of disagreement, of secularism, the nature of power, the state and citizenship, which inevitably constitute key assumptions in the debate. Bringing together leading scholars on multiculturalism: Gerald Gaus, Peter Jones, John Horton, Tariq Modood, Chandran Kukathas, Bhikhu Parekh, Matthew Festenstein and Cecile Laborde, this book discusses the latest developments in the field. It will be of strong interest students and scholars of multiculturalism, political science, political theory, international relations, sociology, philosophy and anthropology. (shrink)
Multiculturalism is higher on the daily political agenda than it has ever been. Leading politicians and public commentators speak with an unparalleled bluntness about the perceived limitations of multiculturalism while representatives of cultural, minorities express concern about marginalisation. This debate is taking place against a background of fear about terrorism, the integrity of national identities and a loosely construed ‘clash of civilizations’. Secularism is pitted against religious fundamentalism, respect for difference against the right of freedom of speech, integration against self-determination, (...) and duties of citizenship against minority rights. This book confronts the reality of moral conflict in the debate on multiculturalism while resisting the simplification which too frequently accompanies daily commentary on both sides of an increasingly polarised debate. The volume as a whole marks an important step in the attempt to examine the underlying concepts, of the nature and legitimate extent of disagreement, of secularism, the nature of power, the state and citizenship, which inevitably constitute key assumptions in the debate. Bringing together leading scholars on multiculturalism: Gerald Gaus, Peter Jones, John Horton, Tariq Modood, Chandran Kukathas, Bhikhu Parekh, Matthew Festenstein and Cecile Laborde, this book discusses the latest developments in the field. It will be of strong interest students and scholars of multiculturalism, political science, political theory, international relations, sociology, philosophy and anthropology. (shrink)
Recent years have seen a growth of interest in the great English idealist thinker T. H. Green as philosophers have begun to overturn received opinions of his thought and to rediscover his original and important contributions to ethics, metaphysics, and political philosophy. This collection of essays by leading experts, all but one published here for the first time, introduces and critically examines his ideas both in their context and in their relevance to contemporary debates.
L.T.Hobhouse's concept of liberty--the concept at the heart of new liberalism--is based on T.H. Green's positive freedom. However, this paper demonstrates that the former has its own distinct nature and can be usefully defined as 'liberty as welfare'. In a context of renewed interest in the link between liberty and ability/personal development, scholars have looked back to Green's positive liberty. But the complex nature of latter has led to scholarly disagreement about its definitive features. The paper argues that Hobhouse's liberty (...) has achieved what neither of Green's two liberties, juristic and true (or positive), have: accommodate concerns with personal development and social justice in a 'primary' concept of freedom. It is demonstrated that only Green's positive freedom, as opposed to his juristic freedom, internalises commitment to development and social justice, but for a number of reasons reviewed in the paper, it is not a primary concept. The first section of the paper examines and criticises Green's dismissal of juristic freedom and outlines the ways in which this concept could have been more viable. The second section demonstrates how Hobhouse's liberty achieves what Green's juristic freedom could have but did not--accommodate personal development and social justice in a concept of liberty that remains an opportunity concept. (shrink)
Recent years have seen a growth of interest in the great English idealist thinker T. H. Green (1836-82) as philosophers have begun to overturn received opinions of his thought and to rediscover his original and important contributions to ethics, metaphysics, and political philosophy. This collection of essays by leading experts, all but one published here for the first time, introduces and critically examines his ideas both in their context and in their relevance to contemporary debates.
Why Iris Murdoch Matters celebrates the highly regarded novelist as one of the most significant thinkers of our time. It responds to the renewed interest in her philosophical work, in particular, b...
This paper aims to show the advantages of the personal ethics perspective employed by the British idealists in the analysis of justice. In the context of Green’s and Bosanquet’s political theory, justice is a secondary moral ideal. Yet, it is argued here, their moral philosophy leads us, through a longer path, to the philosophical grounds we already occupy today: those of thinking about human rights as fundamental, not derivative, i.e. thinking about justice as a primary, not secondary moral ideal. There (...) are three related yet distinct philosophical claims here. First, the British idealists saw clearly the stand-off between justice and virtue. Second, the personal ethics of Green and Bosanquet, with some reconstruction offered here, outlines the way in which this stand-off can be resolved without undermining its significance. Third, the personal ethics perspective is beneficial for resolving some of the difficulties surrounding the institutional approach of implementing of social justice. (shrink)
T. H. Green’s eternal consciousness can be explained in a meaningful way. In his paper “The Much —Maligned and Misunderstood Eternal Consciousness” Coin Tyler argues that “the eternal consciousness is a potential of every individual mind”. Later in this paper I will myself argue that the eternal consciousness has a role to play. It comes to emphasise the importance of what exists beyond the routine daily experience, more specifically, the importance of true knowledge and moral perfection. However, does the fact (...) that we can make sense from the eternal consciousness give us enough grounds to defend it? Tyler vigorously criticises the critics of the eternal consciousness but his two lines of defending it end up with two rather modest claims. (shrink)
Recent years have seen a growth of interest in the great English idealist thinker T. H. Green as philosophers have begun to overturn received opinions of his thought and to rediscover his original and important contributions to ethics, metaphysics, and political philosophy. This collection of essays by leading experts, all but one published here for the first time, introduces and critically examines his ideas both in their context and in their relevance to contemporary debates.
This article offers a new scheme of the relation between positive and negative freedom that is based on a retrieval of T. H. Green's theory of freedom and on further reconstructions of his theory. Some of the distinctions in the literature have proven difficult to sustain, and this has resulted in a weakening of the dichotomy in principle, and of the concepts of positive and negative freedom independently of each other. The main distinction between negative and positive freedom offered here (...) is based on the relation of freedom to the will. We have two kinds of freedom, in both our private and social spheres, because there are two types of goods that we, as human beings, pursue: ordinary and moral. This distinction proves to be sustainable, manages to explain the antagonistic nature of the two concepts, and provides grounds for the support of the two kinds of freedom in their own right. (shrink)
T. H. Green’s eternal consciousness can be explained in a meaningful way. In his paper “The Much —Maligned and Misunderstood Eternal Consciousness” Coin Tyler argues that “the eternal consciousness is a potential of every individual mind”. Later in this paper I will myself argue that the eternal consciousness has a role to play. It comes to emphasise the importance of what exists beyond the routine daily experience, more specifically, the importance of true knowledge and moral perfection. However, does the fact (...) that we can make sense from the eternal consciousness give us enough grounds to defend it? Tyler vigorously criticises the critics of the eternal consciousness but his two lines of defending it end up with two rather modest claims. (shrink)