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Marie Guillot [8]Marie-Noëlle Guillot [1]
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Marie Guillot
University of Essex
  1. I Me Mine: On a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I start by disentangling the three (...)
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  2.  48
    Thinking of Oneself as the Thinker: The Concept of Self and the Phenomenology of Intellection.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):138-160.
    The indexical word “I” has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts or more generally phenomenally grounded concepts. I start with what I take to be the defining feature of the (...)
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  3. Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.
    We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let (...)
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  4.  37
    Identification-Free at Last. Semantic Relativism, Evans’s Legacy and a Unified Approach to Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Marie Guillot - 2014 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):07-30.
    One broadly recognised characteristic feature of (a core subset of) the self-attributions constitutive of self-knowledge is that they are ‘immune to error through misidentification’ (hereafter IEM). In the last thirty years, Evans’s notion of “identification-freedom” (Evans 1982) has been central to most classical approaches to IEM. In the Evansian picture, it is not clear, however, whether there is room for a description of what may be the strongest and most interesting variant of IEM; namely what Pryor (1999) has first brought (...)
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  5. The Limits of Selflessness: Semantic Relativism and the Epistemology of de Se Thoughts.Marie Guillot - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1793-1816.
    It has recently been proposed that the framework of semantic relativism be put to use to describe mental content, as deployed in some of the fundamental operations of the mind. This programme has inspired in particular a novel strategy of accounting for the essential egocentricity of first-personal or de se thoughts in relativist terms, with the advantage of dispensing with a notion of self-representation. This paper is a critical discussion of this strategy. While it is based on a plausible appeal (...)
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  6.  69
    Anscombe aurait-elle été relativiste?Marie Guillot - 2012 - Repha (6):55-72.
  7. Stylisation and Representation in Subtitles: Can Less Be More?Marie-Noëlle Guillot - 2012 - Perspectives 20 (4):479-494.
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  8. Connaissance de soi et connaissance du mien. Pour une approche phénoménale de l’immunité aux erreurs d’identification.Marie Guillot - 2014 - In Jean-Marie Chevalier Benoit Gaultier (ed.), Connaître. Questions d’épistémologie contemporaine. Ithaque. pp. 281-302.
  9.  14
    Wittgenstein, Freud, Austin : Voix Thérapeutique Et Parole Performative.Marie Guillot - 2004 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2 (42):259-277.
    La théorie austinienne des énoncés performatifs fournit un modèle à un usage particulier de la parole, l'usage thérapeutique, illustré de deux façons différentes par la talking cure freudienne et par la méthode wittgensteinienne de dissolution des problèmes philosophiques à l'aide d'analyses grammaticales. La notion d' « énoncé de passion », proposée par S. Cavell pour enrichir la théorie d'Austin, permet de mettre en évidence cette parenté.
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