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  1.  18
    The Risk of Fraud in Family Firms: Assessments of External Auditors.Gopal Krishnan & Marietta Peytcheva - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 157 (1):261-278.
    There is a dearth of business ethics research on family firms, despite the importance of such firms to the US economy. We answer Vazquez’s call to examine the intersection of family-firm research and business ethics, by investigating whether external auditors assess higher risk of fraud in family firms. We test the contradictory predictions of two dominant theoretical perspectives in family-firm research—entrenchment theory and alignment theory. We conduct an experiment with highly experienced external audit professionals, who assess the risk of fraud (...)
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  2.  7
    When Ethical Tones at the Top Conflict: Adapting Priority Rules to Reconcile Conflicting Tones.Danielle E. Warren, Marietta Peytcheva & Joseph P. Gaspar - 2015 - Business Ethics Quarterly 25 (4):559-582.
    ABSTRACT:While tone at the top is widely regarded as an important predictor of ethical behavior in organizations, we argue that recent research overlooks the various conflicting ethical tones present in many multi-organizational work settings. Further, we propose that the resolution processes promulgated in many firms and professional associations to reconcile this conflict reinforce the tone at the bottom or a tone at the top of the employee’s organization, and that both of these approaches can conflict with the tone at the (...)
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  3.  7
    Investor-Paid Ratings and Conflicts of Interest.Leo Tang, Marietta Peytcheva & Pei Li - 2020 - Journal of Business Ethics 163 (2):365-378.
    The Securities and Exchange Commission sanctioned investor-paid rating agency Egan-Jones for falsely stating that it did not know its clients’ investment positions. The SEC’s action against Egan-Jones raises the broad question whether knowledge of clients’ investment positions creates a conflict of interest for investor-paid ratings. In an experimental setting, we find that investor-paid rating agencies are likely to assign credit ratings that are biased in favor of their clients’ positions, and that this effect is attenuated when the rated company has (...)
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