A crítica de Frege ao psicologismo evoluiu ao longo do tempo. O ponto principal desta evolução é a passagem da crítica do psicologismo em “Fundamentos da aritmética” àquela das “Leis básicas da aritmética”. O papel determinante nesta passagem se dá a partir da crítica que Frege recebeu de Kerry.

Neokantianismo y realismo lógico desenvuelven dos formas de anti-psicologismo diferenciables tanto del punto de vista sistemático como histórico-filosófico. En las siguientes líneas me propongo clarificar el papel jugado por el neokantianismo en el así llamado Psychologismusstreit, intentando poner de manifiesto su peculiaridad.

Talvez “redescobrimento” seja uma caracterização adequada para designar o _status_ do movimento neokantiano atualmente. Se, por um lado, o neokantismo tem recebido uma maior atenção em diversos lugares da Europa, América do norte, Ásia, e em alguns países da América Latina, por outro, na ainda jovem cultura filosófica brasileira, o estudo desse importante e decisivo movimento é algo atípico dentro de nossas instituições de ensino, para dizer o mínimo. De fato, a quantidade de trabalhos acadêmicos, artigos e livros sobre as (...) filosofias de autores como Cassirer, Windelband, Cohen, Lask, Natorp, Rickert e tantos outros que fizeram parte desse plural movimento filosófico está muito aquém do que eles realmente merecem. Sem dúvidas, esse “acerto de contas” com tais personagens seria uma tarefa muito mais árdua se não tivéssemos à nossa disposição os _Estudos_ _Neokantianos_, do Professor Mario Ariel González Porta. (shrink)

There is an evolution in the Fregean critique of psycho-logism, and the differences between the 1884 and the 1893 stances, when the revision of a psychologistic theory of subjectivity starts to be founded, are particularly relevant.

It is well known that Frege separates drastically logic from psychology. Now, if we consider carefully which is the task Frege accords to psychology, we see three things, that is, first that in reality it consists not in one but in several tasks; second that in some cases it is just doubtful whether psychology can handle them and, finally, third that Frege, even if it seems the contrary, has said relevant things with respect to the aforementioned questions. From the latter (...) it follows that Frege’s drastic separation between logic and psychology does not contradict the fact that he has a clear conception of subjectivity which is intentional and not naturalistic. (shrink)

A filosofia alemã do século XIX posterior a Hegel está bastante estudada em três direções. A primeira, que surge da luta entre hegelianos de esquerda e direita, acaba por conduzir ao materialismo e ao marxismo; a segunda, que se expressa na vertente irracionalista e anti-sistemática, passa por Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard e Nietzsche; a terceira é constituída pelo neo-kantismo e suas derivações, cuja versão oficial teria suas raízes fincadas pelo famoso discurso inaugural de Zeller e pelo livro de Otto Liebmann, que deram (...) o impulso ao movimento “Zurück zu Kant”. Em tal visão de conjunto, o grande ausente é um movimento contínuo, ainda quando irregular e multifacetado, que terminará conduzindo à filosofia contemporânea. Este movimento tem em Trendelenburg uma figura chave. É com suas “Investigações Lógicas” que se inicia a reformulação das relações entre filosofia e ciência e, neste sentido, o verdadeiro retorno a Kant. O fato de sua obra principal ter exatamente o mesmo nome que a coleção de ensaios temáticos de Frege, a obra de ruptura de Husserl e as dissertações de doutorado de Cohen, Dilthey e Brentano significa algo mais que curiosas coincidências. “Zurück zu Kant” (Adolf Trendelenburg the overcoming of idealism and the roots of contemporary philosophy)Considering history of philosophy as a whole, the two main traditions of thought from the 20th century (analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutic) can be regarded as being variants of one same fundamental turn. This systematic relation is connected to a common historical root. To highlight it implies to review the ideas that are deeply in the basis of the historiography of the German thought in the 19th century. Beyond names, problems and theses that may appear to have at first sight no relationship whatsoever, we can notice a continuous unitary development that has not yet received all the attention it deserves. In this movement, Adolf Trendelenburg stands out, once the beginners of both the abovementioned traditions and of neokantianism (Frege, Brentano, Dilthey and Cohen) received a decisive impulse from his reflections. (shrink)

En este artículo se ofrece una re-lectura del ensayo de Moore “The refutation of idealism” que, oponiéndose a lo que es la tendencia mayoritaria, llama la atención sobre el hecho de que la crítica al idealismo remite en Moore, en última instancia, a la propuesta de una teoría de la subjetividad cuya base es introspectivo-fenomenológica.: In this paper a new reading of Moore’s essay “The refutation of idealism” is offered, which, in opposition to the main trend, stresses the fact that (...) Moore’s criticism of idealism is related ultimately to the proposal of a theory of subjectivity whose foundations are phenomenological and introspective.Keywords: Moore, idealism, subjectivity, phenomenology. (shrink)

Hacaracterizadopor filosofia contemporânea a presença de um dualismo entre esquizóide tradição fenomenológica e hermenêutica analítico tradicional. A origem histórica do que pode ser fixado no Congresso Davos, que, aliás, marca o início da negligência de outro programa, a filosofia das formas simbólicas de E. Cassirer e hoje pode ser considerado como uma direção alternativa e possível para a superação do dualismo mencionados. Tal, em breve, a posição defendida por M. Friedman em sua monografia recente, escrito no contexto da convicção de (...) uma crise resultante do esgotamento das tradições e subsequente necessidade de reorientação. O texto oferece um estudo crítico diz Friedman, mostrando onde e como ele pode e deve ser concluída ou, se necessário, corrigidos. (shrink)

Twentieth-century philosophy split into two traditions that often, at least as a matter of fact, regard each other as incommensurable. The last twenty years pointed to the reversal of this trend. This article can be seen as a contribution to that tendency, in so far as, in it, a new approach to the contemporary reflexion as a whole is proposed: logical analysis and phenomenology- hermeneutics are different sides of one and the same turn in the history of philosophy. Such reading (...) not only recovers philosophy's lost unity, but also throws light on its continuity with history of philosophy.La filosofía del siglo XX se ha escindido en dos tradiciones que, a menudo y, las mas de las veces puramente de fato, se consideran inconmensurables. Los últimos veinte años parecen anunciar la reversión de esta tendencia. El presente trabajo efectúa un aporte en tal dirección, en la medida en que propone un nuevo modo de considerar la reflexión contemporánea en su conjunto: análisis lógico y fenomenología-hermenéutica son aspectos de un único y mismo giro en la historia de la filosofía. De este modo, no solo se rescata la unidad del pensamiento contemporáneo, sino que se ilumina su continuidad con la historia de la filosofía. (shrink)

Para Frege, o erro de base do psicologismo é a sua concepção de sujeito, que se concentra no princípio de que meus únicos objetos são conteúdos imanentes da consciência. Entretanto, essa tese não é meramente falsa, mas também refutável. A refutação da mesma aparece, não obstante, tardiamente em Der Gedanke. É esse o sentido último da crítica do idealismo oferecida neste texto. Ela é um passo necessário e imprescindível para assegurar a possibilidade de que captemos pensamentos, possibilidade com a qual (...) se ocupa boa parte do artigo de 1918. (shrink)

It is well known that the discussion concerning the relations between content and object is a central theme in Brentano’s school after the decisive essay by Twardowski in 1894. However, less known is the fact that this discussion also takes place outside the aforementioned school and that the distinction between content and object is already present before 1893 amongst other authors.

La remisión del problema relativo al como de la captación de pensamientos a la psicología por parte de Frege ha llevado a que se imponga entre los críticos la idea de que toda consideración subjetiva está ausente en este autor. La crítica fregueana al psicologismo, sin embargo, se concentra en una crítica a la concepción psicologista de subjetividad y, correlativamente, implica una concepción de subjetividad novedosa en el contexto de la filosofía alemana de la segunda mitad del s. XIX que, (...) como la husserliana, es no-naturalística e intencional.The assignment to psychology by Frege of the problem concerning how a thought is grasped has made the idea that all subjective considerations are absent from this author's work a dominant one amongst its critics. The fregean critic of psychologism, however, focusses on a critic of the psychologistic conception of the subjectivity and accordingly implies a conception of the subjective that is new in the context of the German philosophy of the second half of the 19th century and that is, like Husserl´s, non- naturalistic and intentional. (shrink)

En este trabajo nos proponemos comparar las teorías de la subjetividad de Natorp y Brentano. Resultado de esta comparación será evidenciar una absoluta incompatibilidad entre ambas, incompatibilidad que debe ser fijada a partir de sus propios conceptos básicos, a saber, intencionalidad y conciencialidad (Bewusstheit), los cuales, contra lo que podría pensarse, no son ni equivalentes ni paralelos, sino que responden a concepciones irreconciliables, principalmente en el modo en que cada uno de ellos se sitúa con respecto a la noción de (...) conciencia y a la tradición cartesiana moderna. (shrink)

Resumo: Nesta exposiçáo proponho efetuar uma apresentaçáo dos problemas interpretativos fundamentais e das diferentes leituras que se tem realizado em relaçáo à filosofia das formas simbólicas cassireriana. Palabvas chaves: Cassirer. Filosofia das formas simbólicas. Formas simbólicas.

Contemporary philosophy has been characterized by the presence of a schizoid dualism between the analytic tradition and the fenomenologic-hermeneutic tradition. Its historical origin can be set in the Davos Congress, which sets off the beginning of the oblivion of another program, the philosophy of symbolic forms, proposed by E. Cassirer, and which nowadays can be considered as an alternative and possible surpassing direction of the above-mentioned dualism. That is, in short, the position sustained by M. Friedman in his recent monograph, (...) written in the context of the conviction of a crisis derived from the depauperation of the traditions and from the subsequent need for a re-orientation. The text offered provides a critical comment of Friedman’s study, showing the point from which it can and must be completed and eventually corrected, and how its completion and correction are to be done.La filosofía contemporánea se hacaracterizadopor la presencia de un dualismo esquizoide entre la tradición analítica e la tradición fenomenológico hermenéutica. El origen histórico del mismo puede ser fijado en el Congreso de Davos, el cual, por otra parte, señala el comienzo del olvido de un otro programa, la filosofía de las formas simbólicas de E. Cassirer e que hoy puede ser considerado como alternativa e posible dirección de superación del dualismo mencionado. Tal es, en síntesis, la posición defendida por M. Friedman en su reciente monografía, escrita en el contexto de la convicción de una crisis derivada del agotamiento de las tradiciones y de la subsecuente necesidad de una reorientación. El texto que ofrecemos comenta críticamente el estudio de Friedman, mostrando donde y cómo él puede y debe ser completado o, eventualmente, corregido. (shrink)

“The rise of analitic Philosophy” reúne artículos de diferentes autores sobre el tema anunciado em su título. De hecho, la obra se revela como uma crítica a la posición tradicional defendida por Dummet, negándose, por ejemplo, um vínculo essencial entre filosofia analítica y linguistic turn. Sin embargo, los trabajos mencionados, em vez de superar la solución dummettiana, permanecen antes de su problema, perdiéndose em consideraciones particulares y siendo incapaces de fijar la unidad de la filosofia analítica desde el punto de (...) vista de la historia de la filosofia. (shrink)

La filosofía analítica ha experimentado mudanzas radicales en las últimas décadas, una de las cuales es su interés por la metafísica. El entusiasmo por el tema, sin embargo, ha impedido ver esta mudanza en perspectiva histórico-filosófica y, de este modo, reflexionar adecuadamente su significado. Mas tal vez haya llegado el momento de comenzar a entender este fenómeno, llamando para ello la atención sobre la renovación que experimenta la metafísica pós-kantiana en el siglo XIX, renovación en la cual Brentano participa de (...) modo decisivo. Mas, si el interés por la metafísica analítica termina remitiendo a Brentano, este, por su vez, remite a un contexto peculiar, hoy totalmente olvidado, referente a las relaciones entre metafísica y psicología en el siglo XIX, el cual estuvo indisociablemente vinculado al programa del “método psicológico.” En tanto la importancia decisiva del “método psicológico” en el ámbito del desarrollo de la lógica y epistemología ha sido intensamente estudiada, poca o ninguna atención ha merecido el papel jugado por el mismo en el desarrollo de la metafísica. La presente contribución se dirige a subsanar esa carencia. (shrink)

El hecho de que Frege remita a la psicología el problema respecto a cómo se capturan pensamientos, ha llevado a que se imponga entre los críticos la idea de que toda consideración de la subjetividad está ausente en este autor. Como consecuencia de lo anterior, existe un cierto modo de concebir la relación entre Frege y Husserl como un hiato absoluto entre ambos autores respecto al punto mencionado anteriormente. En la presente contribución se defiende una visión en extremo diferente, a (...) saber, que Frege desempeña un papel intermediario entre el platonismo del siglo XIX y la fenomenología husserliana. El punto central de la argumentación es llamar la atención sobre el compromiso entre naturalismo e idealismo que caracterizó al platonismo anterior a Frege y el inicio de su superación por éste. (shrink)

Volume XVIII Special Issue: Gian-Carlo Rota and The End of Objectivity, 2019 Aim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer. Contributors: Gabriele Baratelli, Stefania Centrone, Giovanna C. Cifoletti, Jean-Marie Coquard, Steven Crowell, Deborah De Rosa, Daniele De Santis, Nicolas de Warren, Agnese Di Riccio, Aurélien Djian, (...) Yuval Dolev, Mirja Hartimo, Burt C. Hopkins, Talia Leven, Ah Hyun Moon, Luis Niel, Fabrizio Palombi, Mario Ariel González Porta, Gian-Carlo Rota, Michael Roubach, Franco Trabattoni and Michele Vagnetti. Submissions: Manuscripts, prepared for blind review, should be submitted to the Editors electronically via e-mail attachments. (shrink)

This paper has a twofold aim. On the one hand, we will discuss the much debated question of the source of normativity (which traditionally has nature and practical reason as the two main contenders to this role) and propose a new answer to it. Second, in answering this question, we will present a new account of practical wisdom, which conceives of the ethical virtues as ultimately unified in the chief virtue of phronesis, understood as ethical expertise. To do so, we (...) will first criticize the main current view of phronesis and its bearer (the phronimos), then offer another view of the nature of phronesis and of its relation to the other ethical virtues. Our proposal should not be intended as an interpretation of Aristotle’s own view; rather, it should be seen as a broadly Aristotelian theoretical proposal, which we believe can satisfyingly address most of the problems that afflict the more traditional accounts of practical wisdom. In section 2 of this paper, after criticizing first-nature naturalistic views of moral virtue, we take practical reason to be the cornerstone of second-nature naturalistic views; in section 3, we will outline criticisms to which, in our view, the traditional views of phronesis are ill-suited to respond, and, in section 4, we will outline our view of phronesis as ethical expertise – a view which in our view is immune to the above-mentioned criticisms – by spelling out the three main tenets of phronesis as ethical expertise: a conceptual thesis, an epistemic thesis, and the educational implications of the two. Finally, we will support our proposal with some empirical evidence taken from cognitive science. (shrink)

Existe en Frege no solo una concepción intencional de la conciencia, sino también uma concepción motivacional de su causalidad, esto es, Frege concibe la idea de una causalidade específica, diferente de la científico-natural, y que tiene como presupuesto la existência de estados intencionales. En tal sentido, existe un interesante punto de contacto entre Frege y Husserl.

ABSTRACT A review of the book by Gottfried Gabriel and Sven Schlotter Frege und die kontinentalen Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie.

El tema de la participación de la escuela de Brentano en la polémica en torno al psicologismo no se deja reducir a una simple y única pregunta, ni se puede responder con una simple y única respuesta, pues presenta una marcada diversidad tanto desde el punto de vista sistemático como histórico, componiéndose de diferentes polémicas que tienen un cierto grado de independencia.

En su obra principal “Crítica de la razón pura”, Kant deja clara su intención de no solo investigar las cualidades epistemológicas del ser humano, sino también de fundamentar las ciencias naturales. Principalmente la física y las matemáticas. El libro “Fundamentaciones metafísicas de las ciencias naturales” continua este proyecto. En su prólogo se excluye aún más a ambas ciencias, al catalogarlas como las únicas portadoras de conocimientos sintéticos a priori. Los problemas surgen con la “Crítica del Juicio” y su apartado “Crítica (...) del Juicio teleológico”. Aquí, Kant intenta legitimar la biología como ciencia natural sin invadir el campo ocupado por la física matemática. El resultado es una biología que porta conocimientos necesarios pero que al mismo tiempo no puede brindarnos leyes constitutivas de la naturaleza. Esta nueva ciencia natural se torna irreconciliable con el sistema de las ciencias naturales que Kant mismo había planteado en sus libros anteriores. (shrink)

Briceño-Iragorry’s story-telling is found throughout the Trujillan and Meridanian press during the first decades of the XX Century. Between 1915 and 1920 we find Ariel and the Rehabilitador de Trujillo, and Albores, Veinte años, Tic-Tac, Alquimia and Ecos Andinos de Merida. They were proba..

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and (...) political philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

O problema inicial do livro de Mario Porta é o de discutir a aprendizagem e propor um método de abordagem da filosofia. Na introdução, o autor pede ao leitor que seu livro seja julgado por sua utilidade, isto é, a de efetivar uma certa prática de exposição filosófica preocupada em ser compreensível e acessível ao leitor.

Machine generated contents note: I. METAPHYSICS -- 1. How Do Realism, Materialism, and Dialectics Fare in Contemporary Science? -- 2. New Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous -- 3. Energy: Between Physics and Metaphysics -- 4. The Revival of Causality -- 5. Emergence and the Mind -- 6 SCIENTIFIC REALISM -- 6. The Status of Concepts -- 7. Popper's Unworldly World 3 --II. METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE -- 8. On Method in the Philosophy of Science -- 9. Induction in Science (...) -- 10. The GST Challenge to the Classical Philosophies of Science -- 11. The Power and Limits of Reduction -- 12. Thinking in Metaphors --III. PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS -- 13. Moderate Mathematical Fictionism -- 14. The Gap between Mathematics and Reality -- 15. Two Faces and Three Masks of Probability --IV. PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS -- 16. Physical Relativity and Philosophy -- 17. Hidden Variables, Separability, and Realism -- 18. Schrodinger's Cat Is Dead --V. PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY -- 19. From Mindless Neuroscience and Brainless Psychology to Neuropsychology -- 20. Explaining Creativity -- VI. PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE -- 21. Analytic Philosophy of Society and Social Science: -- The Systemic Approach as an Alternative to Holism and Individualism -- 22. Rational Choice Theory: A Critical Look at Its Foundations -- 23. Realism and Antirealism in Social Science --VII. PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY -- 24. The Nature of Applied Science and Technology -- 25. The Technology-Science-Philosophy Triangle in Its Social Context -- 26. The Technologies in Philosophy --VIII. MORAL PHILOSOPHY -- 27. A New Look at Moral Realism -- 28. Rights Imply Duties --IX. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY -- 29. Morality Is the Basis of Legal and Political Legitimacy -- 30. Technoholodemocracy: An Alternative to -- Capitalism and Socialism -- Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects. (shrink)

Introduction Introducing Accessibility theory 0.1 On the role of context Utterances cannot be processed and interpreted on their own. ...

Our knowledge about the world is often expressed by generic sentences, yet their meanings are far from clear. This book provides answers to central problems concerning generics: what do they mean? Which factors affect their interpretation? How can one reason with generics? Cohen proposes that the meanings of generics are probability judgments, and shows how this view accounts for many of their puzzling properties, including lawlikeness. Generics are evaluated with respect to alternatives. Cohen argues that alternatives are induced by the (...) kind as well as by the predicated property, and thus provides a uniform account of the varied interpretations of generics. He studies the formal properties of alternatives and provides a compositional account of their derivation by focus and presupposition. Cohen uses his semantics of generics to provide a formal characterization of adequate default reasoning, and proves some desirable results of this formalism. (shrink)

Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ariel Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas (...) for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers and Bart Lipman, and a logician, Johan van Benthem offer comments. (shrink)

Chasing Reality deals with the controversies over the reality of the external world. Distinguished philosopher Mario Bunge offers an extended defence of realism, a critique of various forms of contemporary anti-realism, and a sketch of his own version of realism, namely hylorealism. Bunge examines the main varieties of antirealism - Berkeley's, Hume's, and Kant's; positivism, phenomenology, and constructivism - and argues that all of these in fact hinder scientific research. Bunge's realist contention is that genuine explanations in the sciences (...) appeal to causal laws and mechanisms that are not directly observable, rather than simply to empirical generalisations. Genuine science, in his view, is objective even when it deals with subjective phenomena such as feelings of fear. This work defends a realist view of universals, kinds, possibilities, and dispositions, while rejecting contemporary accounts of these that are couched in terms of modal logic and 'possible worlds.'. (shrink)

Cognitive penetration of perception, broadly understood, is the influence that the cognitive system has on a perceptual system. The paper shows a form of cognitive penetration in the visual system which I call ‘architectural’. Architectural cognitive penetration is the process whereby the behaviour or the structure of the perceptual system is influenced by the cognitive system, which consequently may have an impact on the content of the perceptual experience. I scrutinize a study in perceptual learning that provides empirical evidence that (...) cognitive influences in the visual system produce neural reorganization in the primary visual cortex. The type of cognitive penetration can be synchronic and diachronic. (shrink)