En este ensayo, traducido por primera vez al español, Jean-Luc Marion, sin duda el filósofo más importante de la última generación de pensadores franceses, desarrolla una interpretación no ontológica de la demostración de la existencia de Dios de san Anselmo. Con ello, Marion no sólo busca poner en tela de juicio el tratamiento que, desde Kant, se le ha dado a la demostración; antes bien, busca establecer las claves hacia un pensamiento fenomenológico —al margen de la tradición que (...) Heidegger llamó onto-teología—, que anticipan su controversial fenomenología de la “donación”. (shrink)
Along with Husserl's Ideas and Heidegger's Being and Time, Being Given is one of the classic works of phenomenology in the twentieth century. Through readings of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, and twentieth-century French phenomenology (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Henry), it ventures a bold and decisive reappraisal of phenomenology and its possibilities. Its author's most original work to date, the book pushes phenomenology to its limits in an attempt to redefine and recover the phenomenological ideal, which the author argues has never (...) been realized in any of the historical phenomenologies. Against Husserl's reduction to consciousness and Heidegger's reduction to Dasein, the author proposes a third reduction to givenness, wherein phenomena appear unconditionally and show themselves from themselves at their own initiative. Being Given is the clearest, most systematic response to questions that have occupied its author for the better part of two decades. The book articulates a powerful set of concepts that should provoke new research in philosophy, religion, and art, as well as at the intersection of these disciplines. Some of the significant issues it treats include the phenomenological definition of the phenomenon, the redefinition of the gift in terms not of economy but of givenness, the nature of saturated phenomena, and the question “Who comes after the subject?” Throughout his consideration of these issues, the author carefully notes their significance for the increasingly popular fields of religious studies and philosophy of religion. Being Given is therefore indispensable reading for anyone interested in the question of the relation between the phenomenological and the theological in Marion and emergent French phenomenology. (shrink)
In the third book in the trilogy that includes Reduction and Givenness and Being Given. Marion renews his argument for a phenomenology of givenness, with penetrating analyses of the phenomena of event, idol, flesh, and icon. Turning explicitly to hermeneutical dimensions of the debate, Marion masterfully draws together issues emerging from his close reading of Descartes and Pascal, Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas and Henry. Concluding with a revised version of his response to Derrida, In the Name: How to (...) Avoid Speaking of It, Marion powerfully re-articulates the theological possibilities of phenomenology. (shrink)
While humanists have pondered the subject of love to the point of obsessiveness, philosophers have steadfastly ignored it. One might wonder whether the discipline of philosophy even recognizes love. The word philosophy means “love of wisdom,” but the absence of love from philosophical discourse is curiously glaring. So where did the love go? In The Erotic Phenomenon, Jean-Luc Marion asks this fundamental question of philosophy, while reviving inquiry into the concept of love itself. Marion begins his profound and (...) personal book with a critique of Descartes’ equation of the ego’s ability to doubt with the certainty that one exists—“I think, therefore I am”—arguing that this is worse than vain. We encounter being, he says, when we first experience love: I am loved, therefore I am; and this love is the reason I care whether I exist or not. This philosophical base allows Marion to probe several manifestations of love and its variations, including carnal excitement, self-hate, lying and perversion, fidelity, the generation of children, and the love of God. Throughout, Marion stresses that all erotic phenomena, including sentimentality, pornography, and even boasts about one’s sexual conquests, stem not from the ego as popularly understood but instead from love. A thoroughly enlightening and captivating philosophical investigation of a strangely neglected subject, The Erotic Phenomenon is certain to initiate feverish new dialogue about the philosophical meanings of that most desirable and mysterious of all concepts—love. (shrink)
It is reported that in reply to John Wisdom’s request in 1944 to provide a dictionary entry describing his philosophy, Wittgenstein wrote only one sentence: “He has concerned himself principally with questions about the foundations of mathematics”. However, an understanding of his philosophy of mathematics has long been a desideratum. This was the case, in particular, for the period stretching from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the so-called transitional phase. Marion’s book represents a giant leap forward in this direction. In (...) the preface, Marion provides a diagnosis for why it has taken such a long time to obtain an accurate picture of Wittgenstein’s ideas in the foundations of mathematics. When the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics came out in 1956 the reception by specialists, such as Kreisel, was negative. This led many Wittgenstein scholars to set aside the issues in the foundations of mathematics and go on with the business of the day, focusing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and psychology. However, these early negative appraisals were severely limited by two facts. First of all, the nature of the Remarks was a hindrance to an understanding of what Wittgenstein was up to. The book was edited by Wittgenstein’s literary executors by collating together passages from several manuscripts dating from 1937 to 1944, cutting, however, many passages in between remarks. Second, many of the original manuscripts and typescripts of the transitional phase were not available and thus it was virtually impossible to obtain a balanced picture of Wittgenstein’s development. Finally, a stark contraposition between the early and late Wittgenstein did not encourage people to work seriously on the development of Wittgenstein’s position from the Tractatus through the transitional period to the later writings. (shrink)
Marked sharply by its time and place (Paris in the 1970s), this early theological text by Jean-Luc Marion nevertheless maintains a strikingly deep resonance with his most recent, groundbreaking, and ever more widely discussed phenomenology. And while Marion will want to insist on a clear distinction between the theological and phenomenological projects, to read each in light of the other can prove illuminating for both the theological and the philosophical reader - and perhaps above all for the reader (...) who wants to read in both directions at once, the reader concerned with those points of interplay and undecidability where theology and philosophy inform, provoke, and challenge one another in endlessly complex ways." "In both his theological and his phenomenological projects Marion's central effort to free the absolute or unconditional (be it theology's God or phenomenology's phenomenon) from the various limits and preconditions of human thought and language will imply a thoroughgoing critique of all metaphysics, and above all of the modern metaphysics centered on the active, spontaneous subject who occupies modern philosophy from Descartes through Hegel and Nietzsche. (shrink)
Through careful analysis of phenomenological texts by Husserl and Heidegger, Marion argues for the necessity of a third phenomenological reduction that concerns what is fully implied but left largely unthought by the phenomenologies of both ...
This pioneering book demonstrates the crucial importance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics to his philosophy as a whole. Marion traces the development of Wittgenstein's thinking in the context of the mathematical and philosophical work of the times, to make coherent sense of ideas that have too often been misunderstood because they have been presented in a disjointed and incomplete way. In particular, he illuminates the work of the neglected 'transitional period' between the Tractatus and the Investigations.
Jean-Luc Marion advances a controversial argument for a God free of all categories of Being. Taking a characteristically postmodern stance, Marion challenges a fundamental premise of both metaphysics and neo-Thomist theology: that God, before all else, must be. Rather, he locates a "God without Being" in the realm of agape, of Christian charity or love. This volume, the first translation into English of the work of this leading Catholic philosopher, offers a contemporary perspective on the nature of God. (...) "An immensely thoughtful book. . . . It promises a rich harvest. Marion's highly original treatment of the idol and the icon, the Eucharist, boredom and vanity, conversion and prayer takes theological and philosophical discussions to a new level."--Norman Wirzba, Christian Century. (shrink)
In this paper we provide an interpretation of Aristotle's rule for the universal quantifier in Topics Θ 157a34–37 and 160b1–6 in terms of Paul Lorenzen's dialogical logic. This is meant as a contribution to the rehabilitation of the role of dialectic within the Organon. After a review of earlier views of Aristotle on quantification, we argue that this rule is related to the dictum de omni in Prior Analytics A 24b28–29. This would be an indication of the dictum’s origin in (...) the context of dialectical games. One consequence of our approach is a novel explanation of the doctrine of the existential import of the quantifiers in dialectical terms. After a brief survey of Lorenzen's dialogical logic, we offer a set of rules for dialectical games based on previous work by Castelnérac and Marion, to which we add here the rule for the universal quantifier, as interpreted in terms of its counterpart in dialogical logic. We then give textual evidence of the use of that rule in Plato's dialogues, thus showing that Aris... (shrink)
In seven essays that draw from metaphysics, phenomenology, literature, Christological theology, and Biblical exegesis,Marion sketches several prolegomena to a future fuller thinking and saying of love’s paradoxical reasons, exploring evil, freedom, bedazzlement, and the loving gaze; crisis, absence, and knowing.
Givenness and Revelation represents both the unity and the deep continuity of Jean-Luc Marions thinking over many decades. This investigation into the origins and evolution of the concept of revelation arises from an initial reappraisal of the tension between natural theology and the revealed knowledge of God or sacra doctrina. Marion draws on the re-definition of the notions of possibility and impossibility, the critique of the reification of the subject, and the unpredictability of the event in its relationship to (...) the gift in order to assess the respective capacities of dogmatic theology, modern metaphysics, contemporary phenomenology, and the biblical texts, especially the New Testament, to conceive the paradoxical phenomenality of a revelation. This work thus brings us to the very heart and soul of Marions theology, concluding with a phenomenological approach to the Trinity that uncovers the logic of gift performed in the scriptural manifestation of Jesus Christ as Son of the Father. Givenness and Revelation enhances not only our understanding of religious experience, but enlarges the horizon of possibility of phenomenology itself. With a Foreword by Ramona Fotiade, Senior Lecturer in French, and David Jasper, Professor of Literature and Theology, both at the University of Glasgow. (shrink)
First translated into English in 1991, God Without Being continues to be a key book for discussions of the nature of God. This second edition contains a new preface by Marion as well as his 2003 essay on Thomas Aquinas.
Does Descartes belong to metaphysics? What do we mean when we say "metaphysics"? These questions form the point of departure for Jean-Luc Marion's groundbreaking study of Cartesian thought. Analyses of Descartes' notion of the ego and his idea of God show that if Descartes represents the fullest example of metaphysics, he no less transgresses its limits. Writing as philosopher and historian of philosophy, Marion uses Heidegger's concept of metaphysics to interpret the Cartesian corpus--an interpretation strangely omitted from Heidegger's (...) own history of philosophy. This interpretation complicates and deepens the Heideggerian concept of metaphysics, a concept that has dominated twentieth-century philosophy. Examinations of Descartes' predecessors (Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and Suarez) and his successors (Leibniz, Spinoza, and Hegel) clarify the meaning of the Cartesian revolution in philosophy. Expertly translated by Jeffrey Kosky, this work will appeal to historians of philosophy, students of religion, and anyone interested in the genealogy of contemporary thought and its contradictions. (shrink)
Painting, according to Jean-Luc Marion, is a central topic of concern for philosophy, particularly phenomenology. For the question of painting is, at its heart, a question of visibility—of appearance. As such, the painting is a privileged case of the phenomenon; the painting becomes an index for investigating the conditions of appearance—or what Marion describes as “phenomenality” in general. In The Crossing of the Visible, Marion takes up just such a project. The natural outgrowth of his earlier reflections (...) on icons, these four studies carefully consider the history of painting—from classical to contemporary—as a fund for phenomenological reflection on the conditions of (in)visibility. Ranging across artists from Raphael to Rothko, Caravaggio to Pollock, The Crossing of the Visible offers both a critique of contemporary accounts of the visual and a constructive alternative. According to Marion, the proper response to the “nihilism” of postmodernity is not iconoclasm, but rather a radically iconic account of the visual and the arts that opens them to the invisible. (shrink)
The author tries to outline the new possibilities the phenomenology offers for considerations of a specific type of phenomenality which in some respects goes be yond the rules of phenomenalization as defined by Husserl in connection with „the principle of principles“ as well as exploring the horizon, i.e. the constitutive condition of any giving. While the phenomenon – equally with Kant and Husserl – gives itself to the extent corresponding its intuition inadequacy or „lacking“ of intuition, Marion tries to (...) outline such a conception of a phenomenon, which would be marked by a „surplus“ of intuition. Drawing on Husserl and especially on Kant, the definition of the „saturated phenomenon“ proceeds step by step on the ground of a critical interpretation of some Kantian concepts. Such an unconditioned and irreducible phenomenon transcends in its nature everything the intentional meaning is able to comprehend. From this it is obvious, that the concept of a saturated phenomenon urges us to revise also the phenomenological concept of subject as a constitutive instance . Further, the phenomenological analysis borders here a certain type of religious experience. (shrink)
Marion here provides a philosophical/exegetical reflection on the Emmaus episode with a view to debunking a widely entertained understanding of faith as “a deficit of intuition”—something which has to be “added” to human powers “to compensate faulty intuition”. Rather, Marion argues that faith is not so much required in order to recapture a lack in intuition but more a proper response in the face of an excess of intuition in relation to “a deficiency of statements and a dearth (...) of concepts”. (shrink)
The possible and revelation -- The saturated phenomenon -- Metaphysics and phenomenology: a relief for theology -- "Christian philosophy": hermeneutic or heuristic? -- Sketch of a phenomenological concept of the gift -- What cannot be said: Apophasis and the discourse of love -- The banality of saturation -- Faith and reason.
The phenomenological origins of the concept of givenness -- Remarks on the origins of Gegebenheit in Heidegger's thought -- Substitution and solicitude: how Levinas re-reads Heidegger -- Sketch of a phenomenological concept of sacrifice.
In this paper, elementary but hitherto overlooked connections are established between Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematics, written during his transitional period, and free-variable finitism. After giving a brief description of theTractatus Logico-Philosophicus on quantifiers and generality, I present in the first section Wittgenstein's rejection of quantification theory and his account of general arithmetical propositions, to use modern jargon, as claims (as opposed to statements). As in Skolem's primitive recursive arithmetic and Goodstein's equational calculus, Wittgenstein represented generality by the use of free (...) variables. This has the effect that negation of unbounded universal and existential propositions cannot be expressed. This is claimed in the second section to be the basis for Wittgenstein's criticism of the universal validity of the law of excluded middle. In the last section, there is a brief discussion of Wittgenstein's remarks on real numbers. These show a preference, in line with finitism, for a recursive version of the continuum. (shrink)
John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in perception, (...) criticizing both empiricism and idealism, and argued for a moderate nominalist view of universals as being in rebus and only ‘apprehended’ by their particulars. His influence helped swaying Oxford away from idealism and, through figures such as H. A. Prichard, Gilbert Ryle, or J. L. Austin, his ideas were also to some extent at the origin of ‘moral intuitionism’ and ‘ordinary language philosophy’ which defined much of Oxford philosophy until the second half of the twentieth-century. Nevertheless, his name and legacy were all but forgotten for generations after World War II. Still, his views on knowledge are with us today, being in part at work in the writings of philosophers as diverse as John McDowell, Charles Travis, and Timothy Williamson. (shrink)
Descartes ne joue pas, dans la pensée de Heidegger, un rôle limité à l'interprétation de l'histoire de la philosophie. Lorsque Sein und Zeit entreprend de déterminer le mode d'être propre et irréductible du Dasein, Heidegger doit entrer en confrontation avec certes Husserl, mais surtout, par-delà la « conscience » husserlienne, avec Descartes lui-même. Car l'ennemi mortel du Dasein, cest l'ego du cogito. Dans quelle mesure cette rivalité n'induit-elle pas aussi une similitude? Die Rolle, die Descartes in dem Denken von Heidegger (...) spielt, darf nicht in dem Feld seiner Deutung der Geschichte der Philosophie eng begrenztwerden. Denn, als Sein und Zeit eine Bestimmung der eigentümlicheigentlichen Seinsweise des Daseins hervorzubringen unternimmt, setzt die « Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie » eine Auseinanderstzung nicht nur mit Husserl, sondern auch, über Husserl hinaus, gerade mit Descartes vor. Der Todfeind des Daseins ist das ego, das aus dem cogito stammt. Inwiefern aber diese ständige Gegenüberstellung eine tiefe Nachahmung hinweise ? (shrink)
In this paper, I present a summary of the philosophical relationship betweenWittgenstein and Brouwer, taking as my point of departure Brouwer's lecture onMarch 10, 1928 in Vienna. I argue that Wittgenstein having at that stage not doneserious philosophical work for years, if one is to understand the impact of thatlecture on him, it is better to compare its content with the remarks on logics andmathematics in the Tractactus. I thus show that Wittgenstein's position, in theTractactus, was already quite close to (...) Brouwer's and that the points of divergence are the basis to Wittgenstein's later criticisms of intuitionism. Among the topics of comparison are the role of intuition in mathematics, rule following, choice sequences, the Law of Excluded Middle, and the primacy of arithmetic over logic. (shrink)
La thèse selon laquelle la signification d’un énoncé mathématique est donnée par sa preuve a été soutenue à la fois par Wittgenstein et par les intuitionnistes, à la suite de Heyting et de Dummett. Dans ce texte, nous nous attachons à clarifier le sens de cette thèse chez Wittgenstein, afin de montrer en quoi sa position se distingue de celle des intuitionnistes. Nous montrons par ailleurs que cette thèse prend sa source chez Wittgenstein dans sa réflexion, durant la période intermédiaire, (...) sur la notion de preuve par induction. Nous esquissons aussi les grandes lignes de la réponse que Wittgenstein fait à un certain nombre d’objections, dont celle selon laquelle cette thèse, dans le sens qu’il lui donne, remet en question la possibilité même de formuler une conjecture en mathématique. Nous terminons en montrant comment les propos de Wittgenstein trouvent un écho favorable dans le paradigme contemporain de la “proposition comme type” et les extensions de l’isomorphisme de Curry-Howard dont il est issu.The thesis according to which the meaning of a mathematical sentence is given by its proof was held by both Wittgenstein and the intuitionists, following Heyting and Dummett. In this paper, we clarify the meaning of this thesis for Wittgenstein, showing how his position differs from that of the intuitionists. We show how the thesis originates in his thoughts, from the middle period, about proofs by induction, and we sketch his answers to a number of objections, including the idea that, given the particular meaning he gives to this thesis, he cannot account for mathematical conjectures. We conclude by showing how his views find a favourable echo today in the paradigm of “proposition-as-type” and extensions of the Curry-Howard isomorphism from which this paradigm originates. (shrink)
After sketching an argument for radical anti-realism that does not appeal to human limitations but polynomial-time computability in its definition of feasibility, I revisit an argument by Wittgenstein on the surveyability of proofs, and then examine the consequences of its application to the notion of canonical proof in contemporary proof-theoretical-semantics.
Examines the relationship between the question of God and the destiny of metaphysics. Concept of the end of metaphysics; Ambiguous relation between phenomenology and metaphysics; Return of special metaphysics in phenomenology; Phenomenological figure of God. Examines the relationship between the question of God and the destiny of metaphysics. Concept of the end of metaphysics; Ambiguous relation between phenomenology and metaphysics; Return of special metaphysics in phenomenology; Phenomenological figure of God.
Dans ce texte, je pars de l’analyse intuitionniste de la vérité mathématique, « A est vrai si et seulement s’il existe une preuve de A » comme cas particulier de l’analyse de la vérité en termes de « vérifacteur », et je montre pourquoi Wittgenstein partageait celle-ci avec les intuitionnistes. Cependant, la notion de preuve à l’oeuvre dans cette analyse est, selon l’intuitionnisme, celle de la « preuve-comme-objet », et je montre par la suite, en interprétant son argument sur le (...) caractère « synoptique » des preuves, que Wittgenstein avait plutôt en tête une conception de la « preuve-comme-trace ».In this paper, I start with the intutionist analysis of mathematical truth, « A is true if and only if there exists a proof of A », as a particular case of the analysis of truth in terms of « truth-makers », and I show why Wittgenstein shared it with the intuitionists. However, the notion of proof at work in this analysis is, according to intuitionism, that of « proof-as-object », and I then show, with an interpretation of his argument on the « surveyability » of proofs, that, instead, Wittgenstein had in mind a notion of « proof-as-trace ». (shrink)
La question du sujet se trouve, historiquement, toujours rapportée à Descartes : de Kant à Heidegger, par Nietzsche et Husserl, les critiques s’accordent sur cette paternité. Cette tradition ne peut se contester, mais elle ne doit pourtant pas, dans le détail, être admise sans réserves. En effet, Descartes n’a littéralement pas soutenu la thèse d’un ego sujet, ni substance, ni réfléchissant, etc. Ce qui ne signifie pas que ces thèses postérieures ne proviennent pas, en un sens à préciser, de son (...) initiative conceptuelle, mais au moins qu’elles ne lui sont pas identiques et que l’ego cartésien recèle plus de potentialités que ce que l’histoire y a compris.Descartes hors sujetLa questione dello soggetto se trovà relata per la storia della filosfia a Cartesio : Kant e Heidegger, ne meno che Nietzsche e Husserl, sono d’accordo sù questà paternità. Non si contesterà qui questa traditione interpretativa, purtoppo non dobbiamo accerter la senza qualcune riservazione. E un fatto che Descartes, nella litteralità de sui testi, non ha mai sotenuto che il ego sià un soggetto, una sostanzia, neanche ché si pensà per une reflessione, etc. Questo fatto non significà che queste tese non vengonno dell’impostazione cartesiana, mà che al meno non se identifacono con elle et che il ego di Cartesio tiene anché possibilite molte piu ampie che quelle che l’historia a già vista. (shrink)
As they appear to us, we separate phenomena into objects and events according to an apparently phenomenological distinction that is both radical and undisputed. The object appears according to four basic characteristics: it is predictable; it is reproducible; it results from a cause acting as an effect; and it always inscribes itself within the conditions of possibility for experience. The event appears as a reversal of these characteristics: it appears without warning; it appears once and for all, that is, without (...) the possibility of repetition or reproduction; it appears without any assignable or anterior cause; and finally it appears in defiance of the conditions of the possibility for experience—as the impossible made possible. (shrink)
In 1956, a series of BBC radio talks was published in London under the title The Revolution in Philosophy . This short book included papers by prominent British philosophers of the day, such as Sir Alfred Ayer and Sir Peter Strawson, with an introduction by Gilbert Ryle. Although there is precious little in it concerning the precise nature of the ‘revolution’ alluded to in the title, it is quite clear that these lectures were meant to celebrate in an insular manner (...) the birth of ‘analytic philosophy’ at the hands of Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein. The use of the word ‘revolution’ to describe the birth of ‘analytical philosophy’ and its rise to near complete dominance in the British universities thus carries with it connotations of a forcible substitution of one philosophical order by a new one that itself owed nothing to the past. To me, however, this talk of ‘revolution’ carries with it a false view of the history of British philosophy: it isn’t ‘historical’ at all, just ideological; it was introduced for a strategic purpose, namely that of encouraging new generations of students to avoid reading the work of earlier philosophers or becoming interested in the problems that concerned them. I shall sketch the broad outlines of a landscape that involves, when limited to the specific topic of the theory of knowledge, no radical break, where no entirely new order replaces an older one: the options, so to speak, and even some of the arguments are the same before and after the soi-disant ‘revolution’. (shrink)