In the debate on personal identity, different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. The criteria of identity have usually been taken to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are interpreted as providing truth conditions for relevant identity statements. The Simple View of personal identity is the thesis that there are no noncircular and informative metaphysical criteria of identity for persons. The paper intends to first deliver a precise and general formulation of the Simple View, and, second, (...) to present the various arguments in favour of the doctrine in question. It argues that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which could serve as the truth-conditions of identity statements. The considerations presented in the paper lead to the conclusion that, although the Simple View is faced with many theoretical difficulties, it is still a lively intellectual position in the debate on personal identity. (shrink)
Sophie Gibb has recently invented a very interesting strategy against Kim’s causal exclusion argument. This strategy adopts the powers theory of causation and an interpretation of mental causation in terms of double prevention. Gibb’s strategy results both in invalidating the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain in most of its formulations and in disarming the argument in question. In my paper, I present a general procedure for the opponents of reductive physicalism which enables them to _grapple successfully_ (...) with the mentioned principle. I also argue that although it could be possible to adopt Gibb’s strategy as a part of this procedure, there is a simpler one to obtain a similar outcome. This strategy is mainly based on Uwe Meixner’s causal argument against physicalism and it leads to the conclusion that if one accepts the principle of sufficient cause, then one should reject the principle of causal closure in the light of some empirical data. This alternative proposal is more attractive than Gibb’s solution, since it is independent of any conception of causation, does not make any distinction between causal relevance and causal efficacy, and does not refer to the notion of _double prevention_. (shrink)
The main aim of the paper is to revive Zdzisław Augustynek's attempts to define the relation of genidentity. The text embraces the following issues: (i) a presentation of three axiomatic definitions of genidentity; (ii) a reconstruction of the definitions in question in the language of the predicate calculus; (iii) a supplementing the above reconstruction by appropriate proofs; (iv) an analysis of the selected methodological and ontological assumptions of the discussed systems; (v) a comparison of Augustynek's systems with Eugeniusz Żabski's proposal; (...) (vi) an outline of the definition of a thing as an abstractum (equivalence class, invariant) over the set of all punctual events under a relation of genidentity. (shrink)
In a series of influential articles Jaegwon Kim has developed strong arguments against nonreductive physicalism as a possible solution to the problem of mental causation. One of them is the Supervenience Argument which states that assuming the mental/physical supervenience thesis, the causal closure principle, the exclusion principle with the no-overdetermination requirement and property dualism we obtain the conclusion that mental causation is unintelligible. On the other hand Collin McGinn has argued that a solution to the mind-body problem is forever beyond (...) our reach: we can never understand how the brain produces consciousness and therefore the relation between them must remain mysterious. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that Kim's Supervenience Argument corroborates McGinn's pessimistic conclusion (of course, if we do not assume any form of reductive physicalism or epiphenomenalism). Thereby it tries to show that the Supervenience Argument could be treated as a justification of non-constructive naturalism (aka new misterianism): we do not understand mental causation, because we cannot understand how the brain generates consciousness. It also suggest considering possibility that the thesis of causal closure of the physical domain might entail the cognitive closure thesis (the claim that those properties of the brain which are responsible for conscious processes are in principle cognitively closed to us). (shrink)
Kuźniar's argument against the point-eventistic definition of a thing rests on the fact that its two important conditions - namely the spatial extension condition and the temporal continuity condition - cannot be jointly satisfied. The paper provides a detailed analysis and an assessment of Kuźniar's objection and offers some strate-gies in order to overcome difficulties generated by it.
The paper provides an answer to Paweł Garbacz's article Problem of Artefact's Existence, which is a critique of eliminativistic views presented in my book Identyczność i trwanie. Studium ontologiczne (Identity and Persistence. An Ontological Study). In the text crucial objections formulated by Garbacz are reconstructed and carefully discussed.
There are several faces of Four-Dimensionalism. Sometimes 4D-ism is formulated as the thesis that the material world is composed of spatial as well as temporal parts. Another version of 4D-ism states that persisting objects are extended over time in the same way that they are extended over space. Some Four-Dimensionalists defend the thesis that all objects persist by perduring i.e. by having different temporal parts at different times. Sometimes 4D-ism means the same as eternalism - the thesis that past and (...) future objects (and times) are just as real as currently existing ones. Finally it can mean the thesis that all objects are in fact four-dimensional i.e. they are in every case a filling of some subregions of space-time. The author examines some varieties of 4D-ism and tries to formulate both a precise meaning of those doctrines and an evaluation of them. (shrink)
The metaphysical explanations of genidentity are very important both for scien-tific researches and for everyday human activities. Endurantism, perdurantism and exdurantism (stage view and point-eventism) are the standard metaphysical theo-ries, which provide descriptions and explanations of relations of change and persistence. The descriptions and explanations in question give simultaneously the truth-conditions for statements about an identity of objects, which persist and undergo changes in time. The main aim of the paper is to formulate the above-mentioned metaphysical stances and to give (...) the general account of the relation of genidentity within a conceptual framework of these theories. The second aim is to provide a suitable reconstruction of criteria of genidentity, which are appropriate for the three metaphysical doctrines. (shrink)
The paper is an attempt to formulate some consequences of the metaphysical doctrine of mereological essentialism (ME) and the assumption that persons persisting through time remain identical in the strict and philosophical sense (Chisholm, following Butler and Reid). Those consequences are substantiality , non-constitutivity , constantiality , anti-identism ( non-bodility ), and simplicity of persons. The author tries to show that although the above stance has a great theoretical appeal, it leads to the many further difficulties, which remain without reasonable (...) answers. (shrink)
The text is a rejoinder to Mr. Wciórka's critical analysis of two author's arguments against nominalistic definition of abstract objects. The author shows that although his first argument is not sound, the second still remains correct. The paper also offers a modified definition of abstract objects inspired by E. N. Zalta's metaphysical theory of objects and some critical remarks, which Mr. Wciórka aimed at the earlier papers of the author.
In a number of his essays E. J. Lowe has presented an interesting argument for the ontological simplicity of the self. This argument became the subject of Eric T. Ol-son’s polemic reaction, who tried — unsuccesfully — to discover a formal mistake in the argument. Eventually, the modified and improved version of Lowe’s reasoning came out in his paper Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self. It seemed that the argument for the ontological simplicity of the self has resisted (...) criticism. In my paper, I present a few manoeuvres which can be used by advocates of animalism to dismiss conclusions of Lowe’s argument. An animalist may want to do that for a simple reason: on the basis of animalism it is difficult to argue for the thesis of the simplicity of the self, as persons are — according to animalism — human organisms, that is, composite objects. My analysis shows that the simplicity argument — al-though it remains formally valid — is not sound in the light of the shown difficulties and shortcomings. This enables me to insist on an animalistic interpretation of the subjectaccording to which the self is a composite material object, identical with a liv-ing human organism. (shrink)
The ontological theory of point eventism appears in the Polish philosophical literature as Zdzisław Augustynek's original work, belonging to the glorious philosophical tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The author concentrates exclusively on "weak points" of Augustynek's eventism (skipping simultaneously all its unquestionable advantages); he examines basic notions and statements of the analysed doctrine. The main aim of this critical survey is to prepare a ground for a proper reconstruction of this ontological stance.
The paper presents a rejoinder to Katarzyna Paprzycka's critique of my defence of Davidson's ontology. According to Paprzycka the epiphenomenalists objection to the doctrine of anomalous monism, considered as an internal objection, is unquestionably flawed, but when it comes to some external interpretations of the objection in question — it is justified. The text provides a couple of arguments and comments which are intended to show that in most cases the external objection to anomalous monism is in fact either uncharitable (...) or inaccurate, thus unsound one. (shrink)
The paper offers a sketchy reconstruction of axiomatic foundations of Zalta's theory of abstract objects. The theory is based on Ernst Mally's distinction between two types of predication: an exemplification of properties and an encoding of properties. The author shows how the theory in question could be used to reconstruct in a satisfying way many other metaphysical theories e.g. the theory of Platonic Forms, the theory of situations, the theory of possible worlds. The paper also provides several critical comments to (...) some presumptions and consequences of the analyzed metaphysical doctrine. (shrink)
The paper is an attempt to defend the Chisholm's metaphysical doctrine called mereological essentialism. The main thesis of mereological essentialism states that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). This radical theory gives a categorisation of all objects via entia per se (...) and entia successiva. The paper contains a critical survey of the theory of mereological essentialism: it deals with some important arguments against it and answers as well. The author tries to show that in defence of the theory and the categorisation in question the applicability of the doctrine of mereological essentialism must be somehow limited. He suggests that the best way in doing so is to restrict theses of mereological essentialism either only to objects qua occurrents or only to objects qua continuants or only to persons. (shrink)
In the text Zdarzenia, rzeczy, procesy Zdzisław Augustynek argued against some versions of liberal reism that they are not able to deliver appropriate, non-circular definitions both of events and moments respectively. The main aim of the article is to show that the objection in question is not sound: indeed, we are vested with a proce-dure to find a way out from the indicated difficulty. In the text three forms of liberal reism are presented and their problems with the relevant definitions (...) are analysed. Then the schematic method of defining the aforementioned categories is proposed and discussed. The presented considerations are crowned with the conclusion that in the light of the suggested reconstructions Augustynek's pessimistic evaluation of reistic doctrines should not be seen as a correct one. (shrink)
Mereologcal essentialism is a metaphysical doctrine formulated and defended originally by Roderick M. Chisholm. The main principle of mereological essentialism states, that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). The principle may also be put by saying, that every object has the (...) parts that it has necessarily. In the paper the above mentioned doctrine is reconstructed and analysed. Some consequences of the theory in question as well as many variants of it are examined. The main purpose of the text is to provide a critical analysis of mereological essentialism in order to make this radical doctrine more acceptable. (shrink)
In the paper the most popular arguments in favour of the doctrine of temporal parts are presented and analysed. The author discusses the following arguments: (i) from analogy; (ii) from ontological parsimony; (iii) from intrinsic change; (iv) from mereological change; (v) against presentism; (vi) from time travel; (vii) from vagueness; (viii) from coincidence. The main aim of the paper is to show - in the light of examined arguments - that the 3D-ism/4D-ism equivalence thesis might be treated as a well-founded (...) conjecture. (shrink)
In the text Jaegwon Kim's epiphenomenalist objection to anomalous monism is critically discussed and refuted. The author tries to show that the objection in question originates mainly on the basis of disregarding of Davidsonian ontology - particularly his views on properties and events. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the epiphenomenalist objection does not arise, if we are prepared to take Davidson's ontology seriously.
The main aim of the paper is to reconstruct and analyse two methodological approaches to the problem of universals, presented in Bocheński’s papers “Powszechniki jako treści cech w filozofii św. Tomasza z Akwinu” and “The Problem of Universals.” It is argued that, although these approaches are rather different from historical and methodological points of view, they are still based on the same ontological ground, viz. on immanent realism. The article provides a detailed analysis and comparison of the respective views. Justification (...) is provided for the claim that Bocheński was an immanent realist and some of Bocheński’s detailed solutions are highlighted that may be of particular importance for further debate over the problem of universals. A couple of minor critical comments concerning some of Bocheński’s analyses are presented at the end of the paper. (shrink)
The paper aims at presenting Dowgird’s attitude toward various topics in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant – its main objective is to specify and characterise those of Dowgird’s convictions which are of a direct relevance to the issues posed within transcendental idealism. The paper delivers the most important information concerning Dowgird’s life, a general outline of his philosophical conceptions against the background of Polish Enlightenment philosophy, and – in the main part – an articulation of these elements in Dowgird’s philosophy (...) which stand in a clear opposition to Kant’s views. The main aim of analyses presented in the paper is to justify the thesis that Dowgird’s attitude toward Kant’s philosophy was a complex, highly critical one, though different from that of other Polish philosophers of the nineteenth century. Dowgird’s uniqueness lies in the fact, first, that his analyses of Kant’s theories – in comparison with efforts of his Enlightenment contemporaries – were much more substantial, very scrupulous and exceptionally sophisticated, and second, that many of the problems discussed by Kant were approved by Dowgird as rightful philosophical issues. (shrink)